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 Introduction 
This study offers a new narrative of David Hume’s conception of the 
conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. 
Conjectural history is a familiar topic of study for Hume scholars,  but the 
reason  for  approaching  this  anew  is  that  the  central  point  Hume  was  
making has been missed.1 This study examines one question and one line of 
answers to it. The question is: how to derive moral institutions from human 
nature? In order to provide a plausible answer, particular attention is paid to 
Pierre Nicole’s essays, Bernard Mandeville’s later works and finally to David 
Hume’s science of man. 
 The  argument  is  that  what  made  a  great  difference  in  Mandeville  and  
Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the 
introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The 
purpose  of  this  distinction  is  that  we  should  not  debate  whether  we  are  
selfish or other-regarding by nature. This kind of deliberation easily puts 
too  much  strain  on  the  concept  of  self-preservation.  Instead,  in  our  
theoretical discussions, once we separate self-love and self-liking into two 
different passions (instead of referring to man’s selfish or other-regarding 
nature in general) we are able to streamline the general picture of human 
nature and the corresponding moral institutions. It is not only self-love or 
self-interest we are dealing with, but also self-liking or pride.2 The 
                                                        
1 For a recent general account of the importance of conjectural history ranging from 
the eighteenth century to Darwin, see Stephen G. Alter, ‘Mandeville’s ship: Theistic 
design and philosophical history in Charles Darwin’s vision of natural selection’, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 69, 2008, pp. 460–463. For a discussion of recent scholarship and the 
question of historicity of human nature, see Christopher J. Finlay, Hume’s social philosophy. 
Human nature and commercial sociability in A Treatise of human nature, Continuum, 2007, pp. 5–
7  and  the  works  cited  there.  The  idea  of  this  thesis,  like  Finlay’s,  is  to  understand  the  
social elements of Hume’s science of man. The argument, however, pursued in this 
dissertation is completely different from Finlay’s in Hume’s social philosophy. About 
conjectural history and the role of Mandeville for Hume, see also Michael Gill, ‘Hume’s 
progressive view of human nature’, Hume Studies, 26, 2000, pp. 87–108. See also Simon 
Evnine, ‘Hume, conjectural history, and the uniformity of human nature’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 31, 1993, pp. 589–606. 
2 Regarding self-interest, for a recent account that touches upon many aspects of this 
work, see the admirable introduction, Scott Paul Gordon, ‘“Spring and motive of our 
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symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the 
corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say 
that  moral  institutions  are  drawn from human nature.  In  the  case  of  self-
love or self-interest, the moral institution is justice. Concerning self-liking or 
pride the moral institution is politeness.3 There is an explicit analogy 
between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we 
do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. 
 Often the analysis of amour-propre concentrates on self-love and self-
interest  in  a  sense  that  the  excessive  attraction  to  the  self  (amour-propre) is 
distinguished  from  the  proper  love  of  the  self  (amour de soi)  that  can  be  
argued  to  correlate  with  the  love  of  God.  This  is  a  familiar  idea  of  the  
juxtaposition between charity as a theological concept and the self-love that 
corrupts it. Jean-Jacques Rousseau characteristically makes a distinction 
between proper self-preservation (instinctual) and ‘excessive, and illusion-
ridden attachment to the self’.4 Rousseau’s formulation of amour-propre is 
partly a reaction towards Mandeville’s later works that diverts the ongoing 
debate back towards the seventeenth-century French origins and the 
question  of  moral  basis  of  self-love  and vanity.  What  is  significant  of  the  
French context of amour-propre for our discussion is the Augustinian 
background: the concept of concupiscence and the notion that human will 
is either utterly or in some particular way corrupted.5 We  have  many  
                                                                                                                 
actions”: disinterest and self-interest’ in Gordon, Power of the passive self in English literature, 
1640-1770, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1–20. 
3 Shelley Burtt notices that the ‘true source of politeness’ for Mandeville is ‘self-
liking’. Shelley Burtt, Virtue transformed. Political argument in England 1688-1740, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 139.  
4 Michael Moriarty, Fallen nature, fallen selves. Early modern French thought II, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 238. See also Pierre Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith. A 
genealogy of economic science. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Regarding Cornelius Jansen 
pointing to this division, see Moriarty, Fallen nature, fallen selves, 2006, pp. 171–185. On 
Rousseau’s role in shaping the early modern discussion on amour-propre, see Force, Self-
interest before Adam Smith, 2003, pp. 41–47. Force takes his cue from Rousseau’s definition 
of amour-propre already in Force, ‘Self-Love, identification, and the origin of political 
economy’, Yale French Studies, 92, 1997, pp. 46–64. For considerations about different 
aspects of Rousseau’s conception of amour-propre, see N. J. H. Dent, ‘Amour-propre’ in 
his A Rousseau Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp. 33–36 and Dent, ‘Rousseau on 
amour-propre’, Supplement to the Transactions of the Aristotelian Society, 72, 1998, pp. 57–73. 
See also Timothy O’Hagan, ‘Rousseau on amour-propre: on six facets of amour-propre’, 
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 1999, pp. 91–107 and Frederick Neuhouser, 
‘Rousseau on the relation between reason and self-love (amour-propre)’, Internationales 
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus, 1, 2003, pp. 221–239. 
5 We have several excellent studies of amour-propre, concupiscence and self-love as 
moral and theological concepts in seventeenth-century France. See Anthony Levi, French 
moralists: the theory of passions, 1585 to 1649, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1964 and Levi, 
‘Amour-propre: the rise of an ethical concept’, The Month, 1959, pp. 283–294. F. B. Kaye 
stressed that Mandeville’s ideas had their roots in the seventeenth-century French 
thought. F. B. Kaye, ‘Introduction’, The Fable of the Bees, p. xciv and F. B. Kaye, ‘The 
writings of Bernard Mandeville’, The Journal  of  English  and Germanic  Philology, 20, 1921, p. 
419. Since the 1920s, our understanding of the conception of amour-propre in France has 
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accounts pondering what makes an author an Augustinian and whether 
Mandeville is one of these Augustinians.6 If  we  would  like  to  describe  
Mandeville and Hume’s conception of the division between self-love and 
self-liking as a neo-Augustinian development, we might want to point out 
that  both  of  these  passions  are  at  the  same  time  equally  natural  and  
excessive. Self-love can develop into avarice, self-liking on the other hand 
can develop into excessive pride. But without either one of these passions 
the individual cannot exist. 
 I argue, that in crucial ways Mandeville and Hume’s distinction between 
self-love and self-liking and the idea not to treat this as an ethical question 
sets  them  apart  from  Rousseau  and  several  other  French  moralists.  The  
entire point of view is hence different from the familiar division between 
charity and self-love. This study attempts to deliberately break this mode of 
reading amour-propre as self-love consisting of self-preservation and excessive 
attachment to oneself. Or, more precisely, this was the point that Nicole, 
Mandeville and Hume were making when applying the distinction between 
self-love  and  self-liking.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the  significance  of  the  
distinction between self-love and self-liking has been previously overlooked 
in scholarship, also the theoretical importance of a moral institution of 
politeness, and crucially how it correlates with justice, has not been 
sufficiently appreciated in the history of early modern philosophy. 
The natural law theory and justice 
Roger Emerson wrote twenty years ago: ‘Scottish social and political 
thought in the eighteenth century is usually seen as belonging to one of two 
traditions  –  to  the  natural  law theory  or  to  civic  humanism’.7 In  the  same 
                                                                                                                 
broadened. Levi offered the first comprehensive reading of this ethical concept in the 
early seventeenth-century French context and others have enlarged and supplemented his 
work, see Nannerl O. Keohane, Philosophy and state in France. The renaissance to the 
enlightenment, Princeton University Press, 1980; Rogers, ‘In praise of vanity’, 1994; see also 
Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003. Perhaps above all else, Michael Moriarty’s 
precise, clear and insightful analysis of self-love and concupiscence grasps the context of 
amour-propre for Mandeville and Hume. Moriarty, Fallen nature, fallen selves, 2006, pp. 159–
271. Particularly valuable is Moriarty’s analysis of Malebranche’s synthesis of self-love 
and amour propre, ibid. pp. 249–271. 
6 On the connection between Mandeville and Jansenists, see Dale Van Kley, ‘Pierre 
Nicole, Jansenism, and the morality of enlightened self-interest’, in Anticipations of the 
Enlightenment, Alan C. Kors and Paul Korshin, eds., Philadelphia, 1987, pp. 69–85; 
Laurence Dickey, ‘Pride, hypocrisy, and civility in Mandeville’s social and historical 
theory’, Critical Review, 4, 1990, pp. 387–431; E. D. James, ‘Faith, sincerity and morality: 
Mandeville and Bayle’, in Mandeville studies. New explorations in the art and thought of Dr. 
Bernard Mandeville, Irwin Primer, ed., Hague, 1975, p. 54 and E. J. Hundert, Enlightenment’s 
Fable. Bernard Mandeville and the discovery of society, Cambridge University Press, 1994.  
7 Roger L. Emerson, ‘Science and the origins and concerns of the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, History of Science, 26, 1988, p. 351. For a more critical approach towards 
Pocock and others, see Emerson, ‘Science and moral philosophy in the Scottish 
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year, the late Maurice Goldsmith pointed out that ‘recent studies have 
discovered in the Scottish Enlightenment two “paradigms,” traditions, or 
modes of political discourse: “civic humanism” and “natural 
jurisprudence”’.8 The scholarly output has exponentally increased within the 
last twenty years, but as Istvan Hont has recently reminded us, ‘modern 
histories of political thought are’ still ‘routinely organized around a contrast 
between Renaissance humanism, the politics of virtue, and seventeenth-
century natural jurisprudence, the precursor of the modern meta-legal 
discourse of human rights’. The change from one tradition to another, 
according to Hont, is often indicated to mark the birth of modern liberalism 
and political economy.9 
 Amongst the scholars emphasising the tradition of natural jurisprudence 
Duncan Forbes considered Hume an advocate of the modern theory of 
natural law.10 Forbes viewed Hume’s philosophical politics ‘as an attempt to 
give the established, Hanoverian, regime a proper intellectual foundation’. 
He thought of this as Hume’s ‘programme of political  education’ that was 
no  more  conservative  in  the  end  than  it  was  in  the  beginning.11 Forbes 
emphasised that ‘the legislators are a powerful influence in the fashioning of 
a people’s character and manners’. Forbes’s conception of Hume differed 
considerably from any form of republican thinking in which active 
citizenship must be given a great role. According to Forbes, in Hume’s texts 
‘the historical role of the people, as such, is uncreative and passive’.12 After 
Forbes a number of scholars have viewed and reviewed Hume in the light 
                                                                                                                 
Enlightenment’, in Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, M. A. Stewart, ed., 
Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 33–4. 
8 M. M. Goldsmith, ‘Regulating anew the moral and political sentiments of mankind: 
Bernard Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment’, Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas, 49, 
1988, p. 587. See also Goldsmith’s earlier ‘Public virtue and private virtues’, Eighteenth-
Century Studies 9, 1976, pp. 477–510. The conflict between these two lines of 
interpretation is also apparent in Ronald Hamowy, ‘Cato’s letters, John Locke, and the 
republican paradigm’, History of Political Thought, 11, 1990, pp. 273–294. 
9 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of trade. International competition and the nation-state in historical 
perspective. Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 11. See also the works cited there. 
10 Duncan Forbes, ‘Hume’s science of politics’, in David Hume. Bicentenary papers, G. P. 
Morice, ed., 1977, pp. 39–50. Forbes, ‘Hume and the Scottish enlightenment’, in The 
Philosophers of the Enlightenment, S. C. Brown, ed., Hassocks, Sussex, 1979, pp. 94–109 also 
emphasises the role of the natural law tradition. For Forbes’s view of James Moore’s 
account of Hume and the natural law tradition, see Duncan Forbes, ‘Natural law and the 
Scottish enlightenment’, in The origins and the nature of the Scottish enlightenment, A. S. Skinner 
and R. H. Cambell, eds., Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 195–6. See also Forbes, ‘The European, or 
Cosmopolitan dimension in Hume’s science of politics’, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 1, 1978, pp. 57–60. 
11 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 5. The idea 
that Hume’s thinking turns more conservative over time has been famously stressed by 
John Pocock. 
12 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 319. 
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of natural jurisprudence. Many students of the natural law theory criticise 
Forbes’s austere reading of Hume.13 
 The  problem  with  any  natural  jurisprudence  reading  of  Hume  is  that  
Hume  discusses  rights  to  a  minimal  extent.  This  general  problem  is  
apparent, for example, in J. B. Schneewind’s recent reconstruction of ethical 
thinking from the classical natural law theory through Grotius and 
voluntarism towards Kant.14 What  is  interesting  in  Schneewind’s  project  
(and the reason why it  is discussed here) is that it  is symptomatic of most 
approaches to Hume’s political philosophy from the perspective of the 
natural law theory. Schneewind claims that Hume’s ‘division’ between 
‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ virtues ‘is best understood in the light of the natural 
law distinction between perfect and imperfect duties’.15 The  role  of  the  
natural law tradition for Hume rests upon the idea of perfect and imperfect 
duties.16 Hume had naturally been drilled in the natural law thinking as a law 
student in Scotland, but in this study I will advance a different argument of 
the  distinction  between  natural  and  artificial  virtues.  In  spite  of  certain  
similarities, I am quite confident that this classic distinction is not what 
Hume had in mind when he made the categorical distinction between 
natural and artificial virtues.17 
 Through a series of debates, this study describes how, the discussion on 
the origin of morality evolves from French moral philosophy through the 
hands of Bernard Mandeville to David Hume.18 The distinction between 
natural and artificial  virtues is vital  for our understanding of the nature of 
Hume’s moral and political philosophy. But this has little to do with the 
natural law theory. The division between natural and artificial attributes of 
                                                        
13 Haakonssen has paid close attention to natural and artificial virtues placing the 
individual ‘in a social context’. Knud Haakonssen, Science of the legislator. The natural 
jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 5. See 
also Haakonssen, Natural law and moral philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish enlightenment, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. The aspect of the spectator is particularly prevalent in 
Haakonssen’s interpretation of Hume’s social theory. Haakonssen does not give the 
legislator’s as crucial a role as Forbes does. Instead, Haakonssen’s emphasis is on Hume’s 
conception of sympathy which is in line with that of Adam Smith’s. Haakonssen, Science of 
the legislator, 1982, pp. 8–9. 
14 Schneewind’s project has been excellently summarised in Stephen Darwall, ‘The 
inventions of autonomy’, European Journal of Philosophy, 7, 1999, pp. 339–350. 
15 J. B. Schneewind, The invention of autonomy. A history of modern moral philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 365. 
16 Moreover Haakonssen emphasises ‘the distinction between the natural and the 
artificial virtues’ by stating that ‘the former are useful in each individual case, the latter 
need not be’. Haakonssen, Science of the legislator, 1982, p. 36. 
17 This is one of the main arguments put forward below in Chapter 5, Social theory 
of A Treatise of human nature. 
18 For an interesting account that emphasises the role of ‘Pufendorfian natural law’ 
for the French concepts of sociability and politeness, see Daniel Gordon, Citizens without 
sovereignty. Equality and sociability in French thought, 1670-1789, Princeton University Press, 
1994, pp. 54–85. About Pufendorf and ‘desire of appreciation’ see Kari Saastamoinen, 
The morality of the fallen man. Samuel Pufendorf on natural law, Helsinki, 1995, pp. 149–158. 
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human nature  and natural  and  artificial  virtues  was  simply  widely  used  by  
the  moral  philosophers  of  the  1720s.  Hence,  setting  Hume’s  argument  of  
natural and artificial virtues in its historical context will reveal that natural 
and artificial virtues and perfect and imperfect rights might seem similar, 
but intellectually they had little to do with one another. 
 Artificial virtues also relate to a common philosophical problem of 
Kantian and Aristotelian friction regarding temptation and moral worth. 
Talbot Brewer states that ‘Kant maintained that moral worth is most clearly 
exhibited by those who perform their duty without any inclination to do so, 
and even in the face of strong temptations to violate it’. He then contrasts 
this with Aristotle, who ‘makes the contrary suggestion that those who feel 
displeasure  in  virtuous  action,  or  who  feel  a  strong  temptation  to  act  
viciously, are not fully virtuous’.19 The division between natural and artificial 
virtues does not fit in either one of these postulations. The reason why it is 
so important to keep natural and artificial virtues separate in Hume’s outline 
is that there are cases in which we are obliged to perform an action without 
any natural inclination to do so, even when facing a strong temptation to 
violate the rule. There are also circumstances (love towards our children, 
gratitude) in which we are not fully virtuous if we are not inclined to carry 
out our duty. This friction regarding artificial virtues and our temptation to 
violate  the  rules  never  dissolves.  What  is  crucial  is  that  we  can  develop  a  
habit of following rules and we approve of this trait  in others.  This is the 
very  reason  why  the  approbation  of  others  is  so  important  for  Hume.  
Without it, the entire structure of civil society would collapse.  
 Another  characteristic  problem  of  the  natural  law  reading  of  Hume  is  
the prevalence of justice. Duncan Forbes, among others, emphasises that 
for Hume private property enables promises and contracts and hence plays 
a foundational role in Hume’s political thinking.20 As in many other cases,  
the role of private property and justice is focal in Forbes’s account. The 
anglo-american intellectual atmosphere has been dominated to a large 
extent by a Rawlsian tendency to solely concentrate on justice as the 
defining concept of political philosophy and to expand its scope with such 
ideas  as  distributive  justice  as  well  as  justice  as  fairness.  These  different  
factors have had the unfortunate consequence of ignoring other key moral 
terms.  As  an  overall  result,  we  have  an  inadequate  understanding  of  how  
Hume  thought  a  civil  society  should  be  able  to  function.  Justice  is,  of  
course, a foundational artificial virtue in the Treatise, but so is politeness. For 
each artificial virtue analysed in the Treatise, there is always a corresponding 
                                                        
19 Talbot Brewer, ‘The character of temptation: Towards a more plausible Kantian 
moral psychology’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83, 2002, p. 103. Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics, in Aristotle, The complete works, Jonathan Barnes, ed., 2 vols., Princeton University 
Press, 1984, 1099a15–20, 1151b32–1152a8 and Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford University Press, 2002, Ak. 399. 
20 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 26. About private property and justice, 
see especially James Moore, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’, Political Studies, 24, 
1976, pp. 103–119. 
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passion  in  human  nature  that  needs  to  be  controlled  or  redirected.  
However,  I  am not  only  suggesting  that  we  have  to  include  politeness  on  
Hume’s list of artificial virtues. What I am proposing is that we also have to 
analyse how different passions and institutions interact in the conjectural 
history  of  civil  society,  which  in  other  words  means  that  we  have  to  
understand David Hume’s social theory. 21 
The republican tradition and politeness 
It  has  often  been  discussed  whether  Hume  is  a  Whig  or  Tory  (and  more  
recently,  what  sort  of  a  Whig  he  is).22 When attempting to describe the 
nature of Hume’s whiggishness, scholars have often put an emphasis on 
active citizenship as a main quality of Hume’s political thinking.23 John 
Pocock writes and many agree that ‘The heart of Hume’s political position’ 
rests on civil liberty, the ‘exercise of sovereignty by the citizenship’.24 Other 
                                                        
21 For a general account of the social theory in the Scottish enlightenment, see 
Christopher Berry, The social theory of Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh University Press, 
1997. 
22 Forbes, ‘Hume’s science of politics’, 1977, pp. 39–50; Robert C. Elliott, ‘Hume’s 
“Character of Sir Robert Walpole”: some unnoticed additions’, The Journal  of  English  and 
Germanic Philology, 48, 1949, pp. 367–370 and James Conniff, ‘Hume on political parties: 
the  case  for  Hume  as  a  Whig’,  Eighteenth-Century Studies, 12, 1978-9, pp. 150–173. On 
Hume being a liberal or conservative and the anachronism of asking this kind of 
questions (usually it is thought that Hume’s philosophical scepticism entails 
conservatism), see the discussion in Donald Livingston, ‘On Hume’s conservatism’, Hume 
Studies, 21, 1995, pp. 151–164. One that argues that Hume is a liberal is John B. Stewart, 
see Stewart, ‘The public interest vs. old rights’, Hume Studies, 21, 1995, pp. 165–188 and 
Stewart, The moral  and political  philosophy  of  David  Hume, Columbia University Press, 1963. 
For  a  rare  article  on  Hume  and  Jacobitism,  see  F.  J.  McLynn,  ‘Jacobitism  and  David  
Hume: the ideological backlash foiled’, Hume Studies, 9, 1983, pp. 171–199. For an 
excellent reading of Hume’s conservative tendencies, see Okie Laird, ‘Ideology and 
partiality in David Hume’s History of England’, Hume Studies, 11, 1985, pp. 1–32. 
23 See for example, Fruchtman, Jr., ‘Classical republicanism, Whig political science, 
Tory history’, 1996, pp. 94–103. 
24 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a study of the 
relations between the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential interpretation of 
eighteenth-century social thought’ in Wealth  and Virtue.  The  Shaping  of  Political  Economy in  
the Scottish Enlightenment, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Cambridge University 
Press, 1983, p. 239. Goldsmith, for example, agrees with the view that the ‘problems 
posed in Hume’s political essays are set by a civic humanist framework’. Goldsmith, 
‘Regulating anew’, 1988, p. 589. For Goldsmith’s view of the development of political 
freedom from Hobbes to Hume regarding the Machiavellian republicanism: M. M. 
Goldsmith, ‘Liberty, virtue, and the rule of law, 1689-1770’, in Republicanism, liberty, and 
commercial society, 1649-1776, David Wootton, ed., Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 
197–232. Goldsmith’s interpretation of Hume’s political thought is rather traditional 
concentrating on the historical change of the idea of political freedom, stating that 
Hume’s ‘account of English history combined a “modern Whig” conception of the 
development of the English constitution with a Mandevillean account of the 
development of civilization’ (pp. 218–9).  
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scholars  have  pointed  out  that  Hume  used  the  ‘language  of  classical  
republicanism’.25 
 Many aspects of Hume’s thinking, including his ideas of military 
organisation  have  been  linked  to  the  Pocockian  argument  of  civic  
humanism.26 Politeness in particular has played a role as a key issue in the 
explanation how republican ideas evolve. The well-known argument, put 
forward by John Pocock, is that politeness modified republican thinking by 
broadening the strict definition of virtue and, in a sense, rendered it suitable 
for the modern world.27 Others  have  also  maintained  that  a  new  concept  
was  coined  that  replaced  the  old  idea  of  civic  virtue  and  dominated  the  
following accounts of politeness in the age of Enlightenment.28 Because this 
line of interpretation sees politeness as a form of virtuous sociability, it 
lends credence to the claim that the classical republicanism retained its 
position as the leading intellectual tradition in an increasingly commercial 
age. 
 In the Pocockian interpretation, Hume’s political thinking is seen to 
represent the modern version of the classical republican tradition in which 
certain problems of trade and commerce have been efficiently solved. Part 
of  this  argument  is  that  whatever  criticism Hume might  have  towards  the  
republican principles comes from the same tradition. John Pocock has no 
problem in describing Thomas Jefferson and David Hume as belonging to 
the same intellectual tradition.29 This  line  of  interpretation  sees  the  
eighteenth-century politeness as a political culture.30 The  third  earl  of  
                                                        
25 Ian Simpson Ross, ‘Hume’s language of skepticism’, Hume Studies, 21, 1995, p. 237. 
It needs to be pointed out that classical republicanism in the eighteenth century still 
yields serious work, e.g. Michael Baker Keith, ‘Transformations of classical republicanism 
in eighteenth-century France’, The Journal of Modern History, 73, 2001, pp. 32–53; Jack 
Fruchtman, jr., ‘Classical republicanism, Whig political science, Tory history: the state of 
eighteenth-century political thought’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 20, 1996, pp. 94–103. 
26 John Robertson, The Scottish enlightenment and the militia issue, John Donald 
Publishers, Edinburgh, 1985. 
27 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian moment. Florentine political thought and the Atlantic 
republican tradition, Princeton University Press, 1975.  
28 E.g. Lawrence E. Klein, ‘The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of 
politeness’, Eighteenth-Century studies, 18, 1984, pp. 186–214; Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury 
and the culture of politeness: moral discourse and cultural politics in early eighteenth-century England, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994; Nicholas Phillipson, Hume, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1989 and Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Politeness and politics in the reigns of Anne and the early 
Hannoverians’, in The varieties of British political thought, 1500-1800, J. G. A. Pocock, 
Gordon J. Schochet and Lois G. Schwoerer, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 
211–245. 
29 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Hume and the American revolution: The dying thoughts of a 
North Briton’, in Virtue, commerce and history. Essays on political thought and history, chiefly in the 
eighteenth century, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 126. 
30 This originates in Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 1975. Of Addison, politeness 
and Hume, cf. Phillipson, ‘Towards a definition of the Scottish enlightenment’, in P. Fritz 
and D. Williams, eds., City and society in the eighteenth century, Toronto, 1973, pp. 125–148; 
Phillipson, ‘Culture and society in the eighteenth-century province: the case of Edinburgh 
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Shaftesbury launched a campaign in order to redefine the principles of civil 
conversation.31 His prime instrument was a claim that the false ‘language of 
the  court’  has  finally  been  ‘banished’  from  ‘the  town,  and  all  good  
company’.32 Feigned politeness causes a disadvantage to civil  society while 
‘men have not been contented to show the natural advantages of honesty 
and virtue’.33 Dissimulation and the hypocritical nature of politeness are 
denounced.  It  is  an  innate  quality  that  has  to  shine  through  outward  
gestures. Although education and polishing the rough edges in children 
plays a role in his thinking, for Shaftesbury real politeness is the politeness 
of the heart. 
 Other features of the culture of politeness are parliamentarianism and 
the division between city and court with the idea that the preceding court-
centred tradition had been overcome.34 Lawrence Klein has established the 
role of active citizenship in his interpretation of politeness-as-a-culture by 
emphasising that the political freedom of an individual is gained by 
politeness. The key phrase for this interpretation is: ‘All politeness is owing 
                                                                                                                 
and the Scottish enlightenment’, in The University in Society, Lawrence Stone, ed., 2 vols., 
Princeton University Press, 1974, I, pp. 407–448; Phillipson, ‘The Scottish 
enlightenment’, in The enlightenment in national context, Roy Porter and Michael Teich, eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 19–40 and particularly Phillipson, Hume, 1989. 
Phillipson’s view of the ‘Addisonian politeness’ has come to correlate with the research 
carried out by Lawrence Klein. Phillipson, ‘Politeness and politics in the reigns of Anne’, 
1993, pp. 211–245. I see the following as the seminal article establishing the “Pocockian” 
view of politeness: Klein, ‘The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of politeness’, 
1984, pp. 186–214. The influence of Klein’s interpretation can be seen for example in 
Watts, Richard H. Politeness, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 27–46. 
31 For a Pocockian understanding of Shaftesbury’s role regarding the eighteenth-
century politeness, see Klein, ‘The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of 
politeness’, 1984, pp. 186–214 and Klein, Shaftesbury and the culture of politeness, 1994.  
32 Anthony Shaftesbury, ‘An essay on the freedom of wit and humour’ [1709], in 
Characteristics of men, manners, opinions and times, J. M. Robertson, ed., London, [1900], I, p. 
46.  
33 Shaftesbury, ‘An essay on the freedom of wit and humour’ [1709], Characteristics, I, 
p. 66. 
34 About the vanishing influence of the court for eighteenth-century politeness e.g 
Klein, ‘The third earl of Shaftesbury and the progress of politeness’, 1984, pp. 187–188; 
Lawrence E. Klein, ‘The political significance of “politeness” in early eighteenth-century 
Britain’, in Politics, politeness, and patriotism: papers presented at the Folger institute seminar ’Politics 
and politeness: British political thought in the age of Walpole’ Directed by N. T. Phillipson, Gordon J. 
Schochet, Patricia E. Tatspaugh and Carol Brobeck, eds., The Folger Institute Center for the 
History of British Political Thought Proceedings, 5, Washington, 1993, pp. 85–86; Lawrence E. 
Klein, ‘Gender, conversation and the public sphere in early eighteenth-century England’, 
in Textuality and sexuality: reading theories and practices, Judith Still and Michael Worton, eds., 
Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 109–110 and Klein, Shaftesbury and the culture of 
politeness, 1994, pp. 11–14, 20–23 and especially 175–194. For a contrasting interpretation, 
see Markku Peltonen, The duel in early modern England: civility, politeness and honour, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
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to liberty’.35 According  to  Klein,  this  line  of  thought  links  Shaftesbury  to  
‘the civic tradition in English political discourse’.36 For Klein, Shaftesbury’s 
phrase is a label of what Pocock describes as the ‘Whig ideology’ that ‘took 
a decisive turn toward social, cultural, and commercial values, one we 
associate especially with the name of Addison’ at the beginning of the 
eighteenth-century.37 
 It  is  safe  to  say  that  active  citizenship  is  the  key  to  the  republican  
political thinking. Once this is compromised, an author cannot be described 
as a republican thinker. This is a problem that Duncan Forbes immediately 
spotted after the publication of the Machiavellian moment.  Forbes sided with 
‘the  traditional  view’  that  sees  ‘civic  humanism’  as  ‘recessive’  in  the  
eighteenth-century ‘unless one means’ by it simply ‘classical education’ in 
the widest sense’.38 By  and  large,  once  one  gives  up  the  role  of  active  
citizenship there is no additional conception that will save us from the fact 
that civic humanism was recessive in the eighteenth century.39 
 In  recent  scholarship,  as  mentioned,  David  Hume’s  overall  account  of  
politeness has been interpreted as part of the tradition of the virtuous 
sociability. John Pocock writes that Hume, among others, had ‘isolated 
growth of exchange, production and diversified labour as the motor force 
which created the growth of manners, culture and enlightenment’.40 True 
enough, Hume thought that commerce was a central social factor, but it is 
still  problematic  to  argue  that  ‘it  was  preeminently  the  function  of  
commerce to refine the passions and polish the manners’.41 No matter how 
hard we look, the role of active citizenship does not feature in Hume’s 
political philosophy and his conception of politeness had little to do with 
                                                        
35 Shaftesbury, ‘An essay on the freedom of wit and humour’ [1709], Characteristics, I, 
p. 46.  
36 Lawrence E. Klein, ‘Liberty, manners, and politeness in early eighteenth-century 
England’, Historical Journal, 32, 1989, p. 584. 
37 Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history, 1985, p. 235. Klein, ‘Liberty, manners, and 
politeness in early eighteenth-century England’, 1989, p. 602. 
38 Duncan Forbes, review of Pocock’s Machiavellian moment, Historical Journal, 19, 
1976, p. 555. 
39 Pocockian interpretation of the link between civic tradition and Hume has also 
been challenged. For an early account, see James Moore, ‘Hume’s political science and 
the classical republican tradition’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 10, 1977, pp. 809–839. 
For a later challenge, see, Christopher J. Finlay, ‘Hume’s theory of civil society’, European 
Journal of Political Theory, 3, 2004, pp. 369–391. For a recent account of the concept of civil 
society in the Scottish Enlightenment that takes the Pocockian account as its explicit 
analytical framework, see Fania Oz-Salzberger, ‘Civil society in the Scottish 
enlightenment’, in Civil society. History and possibilities, Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, 
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 58–83. For an emphasis on Montesquieu’s 
influence on Scottish Enlightenment and Ferguson in particular in contrast with the 
Pocockian republicanism, see Richard B. Sher, ‘From Troglodytes to Americans: 
Montesquieu and the Scottish enlightenment on liberty, virtue, and commerce’, in 
Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1994, pp. 368–402. 
40 Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history, 1985, p. 199.  
41 Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history, 1985, p. 49. 
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Shaftesbury, Addison or Steele. Already before the Treatise,  Hume  was  
inclined  to  side  with  a  theoretical  outlook  that  stood  in  contrast  with  the  
popular eighteenth-century understanding of politeness as a natural quality 
of human nature. 
 Nicholas Phillipson has attempted to show that when Hume started to 
write essays, a clear change took place and ‘Hume turned to the business of 
Addisonian moralizing immediately after completing the Treatise in 1740’.42 
Phillipson’s argument is tied to Pocock and Klein’s interpretation.43 This 
dissertation will advance a different interpretation linking Hume’s 
conception of politeness to Mandeville.44 Some of the texts that have been 
seen as key evidence supporting the prevailing paradigm were in fact 
designed to argue against such notions. An idea of a dominant definition of 
politeness is insufficient in order for us to grasp the eighteenth-century 
controversy over this concept. In order to understand this significant 
theme, we have to acknowledge the existence of rivalling interpretations.45 
                                                        
42 Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Hume as Moralist’, in The philosophers of the enlightenment, S. C. 
Brown, ed., 12, Hassocks, Sussex, 1979, p. 147.  
43 Klein’s view has been largely accepted and emulated in secondary literature 
regarding eighteenth-century politeness. Cf. Paul Langford, ‘The uses of eighteenth-
century politeness’, Transactions of the RHS, 12, 2002, pp. 311–331; Robert B. Shoemaker, 
‘The taming of the duel: masculinity, honour and ritual violence in London, 1660-1800’, 
Historical Journal 45, 2002, pp. 525–545 and Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘From virtue to 
politeness’, in Republicanism: a shared European heritage. The values of republicanism in early 
modern Europe, Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., 2002, II, pp. 85–105. 
44 The complex nature of politeness in the Scottish enlightenment and the role 
Mandeville plays in it have been pointed out in John Robertson, ‘The Scottish 
contribution to the enlightenment’ in The Scottish enlightenment: essays in re-interpretation, Paul 
Wood, ed., Rochester, NY, 2000, pp. 46–47. For another consideration of the civic 
tradition in Scotland, see also John Robertson, ‘The Scottish enlightenment at the limits 
of the civic tradition’, in Wealth and Virtue, 1983, pp. 137–178. 
45 It is not my intention to claim that the entire eighteenth-century debate on 
politeness was merely a battle between two rivalry camps or that there would have been 
only two categorical definitions of politeness. For example, many religious authors 
addressed the topic of good-breeding and conversation. Some argued contrary to both, 
Shaftesbury and Mandeville, that the Christian religion in fact ‘is quite consistent with, 
and in some respects productive of politeness and good-breeding’. William Howdell, 
Religion productive of joy, and consistent with politeness. A sermon preached at the Abbey-church at 
Bath, April 16, 1744, York, 1744, p. 23. There are also several other religious writers 
arguing consequently for and against different aspects of Shaftesburyan and Mandevillian 
interpretations of politeness. Cf. Richard Lucas, The influence of conversation, with the regulation 
thereof; being a sermon preach'd at Saint Clement Dane, to a religious society, (2nd ed.), London, 
1707; Robert Burrow, Civil society and government vindicated from the charge of being founded on, 
and preserv'd by, dishonest arts: in a sermon preached before the ... Lord-Mayor; ... at the Guild-hall 
chappel,  on  Sept.  28,  1723, London, 1723; Henry Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes; relating a 
conversation with Hortensius, upon the subject of false religion, London, 1736; W[illiam] Webster, 
Two sermons, I. On the duty, the means, and the happy effects of living peaceably with all men. II. On 
self-love and benevolence, London, 1748. 
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 The  topic  of  politeness  is  far  more  complicated  than  what  had  
previously been suggested.46 Markku Peltonen has shown that Shaftesbury, 
Addison and Steele  were  not  inventing  a  new theory  of  politeness,  but  in  
fact  redefining  the  main  principles  of  the  court  civility  to  fit  their  
philosophical principles.47 This redefinition of politeness did not entail that 
an interpretation stressing the outward features of civility had disappeared.48 
The remaining flaw in Mandeville scholarship regarding politeness is that 
even when scholars like Dickey have well understood how the French 
Augustinian tradition used amour-propre as ‘a psychological trait that could be 
manipulated  so  as  to  turn  pride  into  a  principle  of  social  order’,  yet,  the  
actual implications of this tradition and the use of amour-propre and pride 
have not yet surfaced.49 In  general,  the  scholars  paying  most  attention  to  
amour-propre rarely refer to politeness at all.50 Simultaneously, the scholars 
underlining the centrality of politeness do not show the role that the moral 
institutions of justice and politeness play in this context. 
 When examining Hume’s writings more carefully in this context, we 
realise  that  the  link  between  Hume  and  the  civic  tradition  based  on  
politeness is questionable.51 It  takes  too  much  bending  to  argue  that  the  
demand that citizens need to behave politely transforms into a continuum 
of the idea of politically active citizenry of the civic tradition. The role of 
politeness is already central in the Treatise and there is no actual change in 
Hume’s views when he advances to essays. As this study is meant to 
establish, Hume’s strong argument about politeness was in fact directed 
against Shaftesbury, Addison and others who tried to make a link between 
politeness and certain qualities of the heart. Despite the fact that Hume’s 
                                                        
46 Anna Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility: changing codes of conduct in early modern England, 
Oxford University Press, 1998 and Peltonen, The duel in early modern England, 2003. See 
also Hampsher-Monk, ‘From virtue to politeness’, 2002, pp. 85–105 and Jenny Davidson, 
Hypocrisy and the politics of politeness. Manners and morals from Locke to Austen. Cambrdige 
University Press, 2004. For a more cultural historical, yet, interesting overall account, see 
David Kuchta, The three-piece suit and modern masculinity. England, 1550-1850, University of 
California Press,  2002.  One classic  reading of politeness as  a  historical  concept is  Peter  
France, Politeness and its discontents. Problems in French classical culture. Cambridge University 
Press, 1992. 
47 For a direct challenge to Peltonen’s interpretation of duelling from the point of 
view of social history, see Linda A. Pollock, ‘Honour, gender, and reconciliation in elite 
culture, 1570-1700’, Journal of British Studies, 46, 2007, pp. 3–30.  
48 Peltonen, The duel in early modern England, 2003, pp. 267–268. Another Mandeville 
scholar  has  expressed  a  certain  dislike  for  the  Pocockian  view  that  is  portraied  ‘all  too  
often as being obsessed with “politeness” in society, and “virtue” in politics’ in Charles 
Prior, ‘Introduction’ in Mandeville and Augustan ideas: new essays, Charles Prior, ed., 
University of Victoria, 2000, p. 11. 
49 Dickey, ‘Pride, hypocrisy, and civility in Mandeville’, 1990, pp. 403–4. 
50 Pierre Force, for example, does not even refer to politeness or civility. Also, 
Michael Moriarty seems to be reluctant to discuss the texts in which seventeenth-century 
authors discussed politeness in relation to amour-propre. 
51 Phillipson, ‘Hume as Moralist’, in The philosophers of the enlightenment, S. C. Brown, 
ed., 12, Hassocks, Sussex, 1979, p. 140. 
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literary  style  changed  when  he  advanced  from  a  treatise  to  essays,  his  
arguments remained the same. The style that he adopted might have been 
that of Addison’s, but his views remained completely different.52 To Hume, 
the world simply began to seem more complex than what splendid 
Machiavellian maxims, such as ‘Interest will not lie’ would imply.53  
Philosophy, politeness and Mandeville 
Eighteenth-century politeness has gathered increasing attention particularly 
in cultural history, but the case is rather different in the study of the history 
of philosophy. Scholars generally acknowledge that while interpreting the 
eighteenth-century philosophical works, we cannot make sharp distinctions 
between moral, social, political, economic or even aesthetic dimensions. 
Each of them was considered to be part of moral philosophy. Even when 
modern scholars are aware of the broad definition of the discipline, what 
has often been ignored is that for many eighteenth-century authors civility 
and politeness  were  just  as  important  in  moral  philosophy  as  some of  the  
more conventional institutions, such as justice and promise-keeping. 
 In  1734,  Alexander  Forbes  pointed  out  that  even  when  the  value  of  
‘civility and politeness’ is occasionally undermined because it ‘reaches no 
farther than the outside’, this ‘least of all laws’ is in fact ‘more observed than 
any’.54 Forbes  was  not  just  reminding  his  contemporaries  that,  after  all,  
‘good-breeding or decency’ (which some claimed to have no value) had in 
practise proved to be indispensable for civil society. Forbes was also 
concurring with a particular theory of politeness that stressed the centrality 
of pride. As he put it, ‘the greater the pride’ of men, ‘the greater dominion’ 
there is for politeness and civility.55 In other words, Forbes sought to point 
out that peaceful existence in civil society requires, above all, a circle of 
refinement where politeness and pride are cultivated hand in hand – an idea 
which the moralists who concentrated solely on inward attributes of the 
individual knew nothing of. 
 Alexander Forbes composed his philosophical works on the secluded 
shores  of  Aberdeenshire,  but  he  was  not  stranded  with  his  theory  of  
politeness. Pride in eighteenth-century philosophy was increasingly 
considered a decisive quality, which had to be carefully kept out of sight 
under  the  veil  of  politeness.  This  is  an  outlook  that  might  seem  strange  
                                                        
52 Because of the ideological charge given to the expression by Phillipson I feel 
reluctant to call Hume an ‘Addisonian essayist’ as Adam Potkay, for example, does. 
Adam Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of Hume, Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 9. 
53 For the history of the maxim “Interest will not lie”, see J. A. W. Gunn, ‘“Interest 
will not lie”: a seventeenth-century political maxim’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 29, 1968, 
pp. 551–564. 
54 Alexander Forbes, Essays moral and philosophical, on several subjects, London, 1734, p. 
206, 210, 229. 
55 Forbes, Essays moral and philosophical, 1734, p. 220. 
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from  the  modern  perspective.  We  are  accustomed  to  thinking  that  moral  
philosophy is constituted of inward attributes that are real, sincere and truly 
praiseworthy.  Pride  and  hypocrisy  do  not  seem  to  meet  the  criteria.  Ever  
since Plato there has been a strong strand of antagonism towards hypocrisy, 
vanity and pride among philosophers. This has been further amplified by 
Kant’s  attempt  to  reject  the  idea  that  civility  is  part  of  morality  and,  
consequently, by his overwhelming influence on modern philosophy. 
 The polarisation of manners and morals in philosophy has been 
acknowledged in some of the recent historical studies.56 However, no effort 
has been made to re-examine this truism in the history of philosophy. 
Politeness,  pride  and  hypocrisy  are  rarely  taken  up  in  the  analysis  of  the  
moral philosophy of the canonical ‘great philosophers’. Hume’s lengthy 
discussions on civility and politeness have hitherto received no serious 
scholarly attention. For many scholars, therefore, his moral philosophy 
looks very much like that of Kant’s. And when Hume’s ideas of politeness 
have  been  studied,  it  has  been  carried  out  as  if  Hume’s  treatment  of  the  
subject was a secluded historical phenomenon with no relevance to his real 
philosophy.57 
 The intention of the dissertation is to change this. I argue that in his A 
treatise of human nature,  Hume was  putting  forward  a  theory  of  civil  society  
that has to be understood in the context of an intellectual tradition where 
outward behaviour, hypocrisy and pride were seen as qualities that enabled 
a large society to function. According to Hume, hypocrisy is not only 
allowable, but a requisite for our behaviour. If we, as the famous 
eighteenth-century proverb suggests, open our hearts in conversation we 
manage Hume asserted to do nothing but cause unpleasant sentiments in 
our interlocutor. I will further argue that the fact that Hume drew an 
explicit  analogy  between  the  ‘laws  of  nature’  and  the  ‘rules  of  good-
breeding’ is of great consequence. 
 David  Hume  endorsed  a  theory  of  politeness  similar  to  the  one  that  
Alexander Forbes had sketched a few years earlier and, furthermore, used it 
as the core of his more general theory of civil society. But, as I have already 
indicated, these two accounts were not isolated incidents in eighteenth-
century moral philosophy. On the contrary, Bernard Mandeville, a number 
of other British as well as French philosophers, and even Adam Smith 
analysed the role of politeness and outward behaviour in a large society as 
part of their moral philosophy. Instead of being rejected and denounced, 
hypocrisy and pride became central components in eighteenth-century 
moral philosophy. This will  also explain why it  was important for Kant to 
reject  the  idea  that  civility  is  part  of  morality.  He  was  not  just  arguing  
                                                        
56 Cf. Davidson, Hypocrisy and the politics of politeness, 2004, pp. 1–14. 
57 For example Nicholas Philpson, who has studied politeness and Hume in detail, 
does not bring to the fore the importance of the section ‘Greatness of mind’, T 3.3.2; 
SBN 592–602. 
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against a thesis that no philosopher held, but wanted to question the entire 
tradition of eighteenth-century moral philosophy. 
 As an outcome of this development, David Hume’s theory of civil 
society departed from the Hobbist egoistic system by making a distinction 
between  self-love  and  self-liking  and  by  admitting  that  there  are  natural,  
other-regarding affections in human nature.58 Due to structuring his theory 
in this manner, Hume was able to steer clear of the Hobbist argument that 
moral distinctions are invented by clever politicians. Although he did not 
reduce all human action to self-love and self-preservation, Hume did 
emphasise that it was only certain artificial moral institutions that enabled a 
large society to function. 
 I contend that the moral, political and social components of the Treatise 
can be read in the context of the philosophical tradition, in which Bernard 
Mandeville plays a positive role. Hume’s commentators have often been 
quick to downplay Mandeville’s influence on Hume.59 Mandeville has 
mainly been seen as a polemical target with little or no positive impact on 
the history of eighteenth-century philosophy. This is due to an 
unsatisfactory understanding of Mandeville’s thought. Thus, one of the 
main questions of my study is the connection between Mandeville and 
Hume. I argue that by studying Mandeville’s intellectual development we 
are  able  to  form  a  coherent  context  that  enables  us  to  understand  the  
essential features of Hume’s social and political thought. 
 We can detect a clear and crucial change in Mandeville’s philosophy. 
What began as a polemical, Hobbist paradigm turned into an original social 
theory. But this could not have happened without a rigorous revision of the 
initial premises and the renouncing of Hobbes’s theory of civil society. I 
argue  that  Mandeville  changed  his  mind  about  the  arbitrary  role  of  the  
politicians when he came to write Part II that was published in 1729 because 
he had developed a new hypothesis where justice and politeness are 
explained as decisive, artificial moral institutions based on previous human 
                                                        
58 Regarding Hobbism, David Fate Norton writes that ‘The reconstruction of a 
viable moral theory, I have suggested, was the most urgent concern of British philosophy 
in the hundred years following the publications of the major works of Thomas Hobbes.’ 
in Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician, Princeton University 
Press, 1982, p. 21. The centrality of Hobbes is also stressed by J. L. Mackie, Hume’s moral 
theory,  Routledge,  1980,  p.  7.  See  also  Daniel  E.  Flage,  ‘Hume’s  Hobbism and  his  anti-
Hobbism’, Hume Studies, 18, 1992, pp. 369–382 and Paul Russell, ‘Hume’s Treatise and 
Hobbes’s The elements of law’, Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas, 46, 1985, pp. 41–63. About 
Duncan Forbes’s reluctance to accept that Hume is a ‘Hobbesian’ and his emphatic 
defence of Hume as a representative of the modern, down-to-earth version of the natural 
law tradition, see Forbes, ‘Natural law and the Scottish enlightenment’, 1982, especially 
pp. 191–3. 
59 Cf. Norton, David Fate and Manfred Kuehn, ‘The foundations of morality’, in The 
Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy, Knud Haakonssen, ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 939–986. 
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conventions – and Hume would soon commit to this scheme.60 Thus, I 
deem  that  it  was  not  for  nothing  that  in  his  introduction  to  the  Treatise 
Hume  singled  out  Mandeville  as  one  of  the  modern  authors  ‘who  have  
begun to put the science of man on new footing’.61 
Commercial sociability 
Recent scholarship has also witnessed an emergence of a more tolerable 
attitude  towards  the  so-called  selfish  theory.  Many  scholars  have  come  to  
accept the at least partially positive impact of Hobbes and Mandeville. 
Especially the influence of Hobbism on economical thinking and different 
game theories has been noticeable during the last few decades.62 The  re-
emergence of Hobbes and Mandeville has also served as a road leading to 
sophisticated analyses of homo economicus as  the  outcome  of  the  
Enlightenment activity, which means that the economic questions, such as 
luxury, are above all moral and political questions.63 This general path was 
ploughed particularly by Albert Hirschman in his classic The passions and 
interests.64 Hirschman’s book has much to do with self-interest and it can be 
seen to mark the triumph, not only of the intellectual origins of capitalism, 
but also the centrality of self-love as the scholarly focus. However, this has 
                                                        
60 Burtt  for  example  alludes  that  self-liking  was  also  an  important  feature  in  the  
original Fable of the Bees. Burtt, Virtue transformed,  1992,  p.  130.  She simply does not take 
into account the paradigmatic difference between the original Fable of the Bees and Part II. 
Also, for example, R. A. Collins, ‘Private vices, public benefits: Dr. Mandeville and the 
body politic’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 1988, pp. 194–234 
writes an interesting chapter on ‘The discovery of manners, morals, and honour: self-
love, self-liking, and speech’, yet he does not make any concrete difference between The 
Fable of the Bees and Part II. The explanation is the customary view that ‘In contrast to Part 
I, Part II of the The Fable of the Bees displayed less of the satiric bite of its predecessor, its 
tone was superficially at least more elevated and less provocative’ (p. 328). 
61 T Introduction 7; SBN xvii. 
62 About recent studies on commerce and Hume, see R. G. Frey, ‘Virtue, commerce, 
and self-love’, Hume Studies,  21,  1995,  pp.  275–288 (an example of very narrow view of 
Mandeville, but genuine interest to engage with the topic); Loren Gatch, ‘To redeem 
metal with paper: David Hume’s philosophy of money’, Hume Studies, 22, 1996, pp. 169–
191 (a refreshing aspect about the importance of concrete money among economic 
historical studies of Hume) and Edward Soule, ‘Hume on economic policy and human 
nature’, Hume Studies,  26,  2000,  pp.  143–158.  It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  E.  J.  
Hundert’s primary interest in Hume was political economy, E. J. Hundert, ‘The 
achievement motive in Hume's political economy’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 35, 1974, 
pp. 139–143. 
63 Eloquently argued by John Robertson in his The case for the enlightenment. Scotland and 
Naples 1680-1760, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
64 After Albert O. Hirschman, The passions and the interests. Political arguments for 
capitalism before its triumph, Princeton University Press, 1977 there has been a renaissance 
of emphasis on passions and interests in political thought. For one recent example, see 
the collection of essays in Politics and the passions, 1500-1850, Victoria Kahn, Neil 
Saccamano, and Daniela Coli, eds., Princeton University Press, 2006. 
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not been a balanced development, because as the end result the concept of 
self-interest has been exaggerated, for example, in Mandeville and Hume’s 
thinking. Pierre Force’s Self-interest before Adam Smith is a recent landmark on 
this  path.  Force  puts  a  predominantly  strong  emphasis  on  the  concept  of  
self-interest and ‘tangible goods’.65 In  short,  what  he  does  is  to  show that  
the ‘Epicurean/Augustinian tradition’ leads to the idea of self-interest that 
lurks behind modern economic thinking.66 Bernard Mandeville, quite 
naturally, plays a key role in Force’s account. The analysis can be criticised 
for being too tightly attached to the concept of self-interest.67 
 The latest significant turn in Hume scholarship on his political 
philosophy has been that the juxtaposition between the republican and the 
natural law tradition has evolved into a discussion about commercial 
sociability, where the lines of different interpretive frameworks are 
stretched and the focus is concentrated on political economy. The 
importance of political economy as a moral and political question for David 
Hume  has  been  particularly  stressed  by  Istvan  Hont.68 Hont has pointed 
out that the ‘eighteenth-century republicanism’ has ‘emerged as a key 
intellectual resource for understanding capitalism’.69 Hont’s  work  on  
Pufendorf  has  also  led  others  to  look  for  the  roots  of  the  Mandevillean  
argument about commercial society from the natural law tradition.70 
Although Hont acknowledges the importance of both the republican and 
natural  law  tradition,  his  attempt  has  been  to  take  scholarship  towards  a  
different direction. Hont’s argument of the birth of modern political 
economy is that the reason of state was extended to consider the jealousy of 
trade in international relations in the European state system which resulted 
in the argument of political economy. 
                                                        
65 Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 38. 
66 Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 202. 
67 According to Force, ‘the first principle of Epicurean philosophy’ is ‘that all human 
action tends to maximize pleasure’. Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 49. In 
Mandeville’s case, for example, this goes astray. It misses the political nature of The Fable 
of the Bees. To argue against the role of reason, as Mandeville and Hume did, was to argue 
against interest calculations at the same time.  
68 See in particular Istvan Hont, ‘Jealousy of trade: An introduction’ in Jealousy of trade, 
2005, pp. 1–158. Earlier Hont made a great impact particularly with his ‘The rhapsody of 
public debt: David Hume and voluntary state bankruptcy’, in Wealth and virtue, 1983, pp. 
321–348. 
69 Hont, Jealousy of trade, 2005, p. 11. 
70 Robert Wokler, ‘Rousseau’s Puffendorf: natural law and the foundations of 
commercial society’, History of Political Thought, 15, 1994, p. 373–402. See also Wokler, 
‘Anthropology and conjectural history in the Enlightenment’, in Inventing human science. 
Eighteenth-century domains, Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert Wokler, eds., 
University of California Press, 1995, pp. 31–52. Workler follows Istvan Hont. For Hont’s 
Pufendorf, see Hont, ‘The language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and 
the theoretical foundations of the “four-stages theory”, in The languages of political theory in 
early modern Europe. Anthony Pagden, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 253–276. 
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 Hont’s narrative is appealing and it has gained many followers.71 But 
while  the  argument  about  jealousy  of  trade  and  relevance  of  political  
economy for the Enlightenment thinking has been expanding, the scope of 
Hume’s own thinking has simultaneously been narrowed down. The shift 
towards  political  economy  in  Hume  means  a  shift  away  from  A treatise of 
human nature and towards the essays that Hume wrote at a later stage in his 
career. Political discourses that can be described as political economy to a large 
extent were only published in 1752. While Hume’s early notebooks before 
the Treatise reveal  that  he  took  economic  questions  seriously  already  at  a  
young age, international market competition is not the focal point of the 
Treatise. The young Hume was not concerned with political economy when 
discussing politics and human nature for the first time. An essay entitled 
‘Jealousy of trade’ made its way to Essays and treatises only in 1758. Political 
economy is largely a later development for Hume – a direction which Hume 
turned  towards  the  later  part  of  his  career.  Yet,  the  Treatise set forward 
Hume’s science of man that he extends to also concern politics already in 
his first Essays. Certain essential aspects of commercial sociability feature 
also in the early essays. There are some references to Machiavelli and 
commerce in the ‘Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences’ essay, but 
the link between the science of man and political economy is by no means 
self-evident at this point. What is apparent is the necessary connection 
between the science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social 
distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. As this study is meant to 
establish, this was the primary point that the young Hume wanted to make 
with the connection of the science of man and politics.72 The relevance of 
                                                        
71 For example, we may notice a change in John Robertson’s views over time. His 
early interest was the civic tradition. In his The Scottish enlightenment and the militia issue, 
Robertson emphasised the role of the evolution of ‘Fletcherian’ arguments about military 
in David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s thinking. Robertson, The Scottish enlightenment and the 
militia issue, 1985, pp. 8, 16 and 65. Political economy for Hume and Smith has lately 
gathered Robertson’s attention while the view is detached from the originally Pocockian 
perspective. Political economy also functions as a uniting force for Robertson’s case for 
the enlightenment and according to Robertson, ‘we do not need to follow John Pocock 
in supposing that different contexts fashioned plural Enlightenments’. A common goal, 
‘political economy’ functioned as ‘the vehicle of a single Enlightenment’. Robertson, The 
case for the Enlightenment,  2005,  p.  377.  Hont’s  latest  work  on  the  luxury  debate  is  a  
consistent development of this line of thinking and particularly the emphasis put on 
Fénelon has opened up a new way of looking at the eighteenth-century politics. Istvan 
Hont, ‘The luxury debate in the early enlightenment’, in The Cambridge history of eighteenth-
century political thought, Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., Cambridge University Press, 
2006, pp. 419–442. 
72 Christopher Finlay in his Hume’s social philosophy has some problems with the 
distinction between self-interest and pride. He writes, for example, that ‘Hume’s account 
of pride was distinguished from Mandeville’s in that it could account for the 
circumstances in which pride arose, whereas Mandeville’s could not.’ Finlay, Hume’s social 
philosophy, 2007, pp. 89–90. More emphasis needs to be put on pride and politeness in 
order to grasp Hume’s meaning.  
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this  link  is  something  that  the  accounts  emphasising  the  role  of  political  
economy in Hume’s thinking fail to notice. 
 Instead  of  political  economy,  questions  such  as  courage,  honour  and  
greatness  of  mind  were  predominant  in  the  young  Hume’s  thinking.  And  
the relevance of these issues can be understood when we understand the 
role that Mandeville played in Hume’s intellectual development. At the 
same time the Hontian notions of questions of luxury, the European state 
system, wealth of nations and political economy can be seen as another 
symptom of the overstated role of the concept of justice and self-interest in 
David Hume’s political thinking and as part of the same development 
following Hirschman’s Passions and interests. My emphasis on the significance 
of the artificial institution of politeness is meant to balance this view. This, 
as I will try to demonstrate below, will eventually lead us to a different 
understanding of David Hume’s account of civilized monarchies.  
Regarding method 
According to James Fieser, commentaries on Hume ‘often fall into two 
extreme groups, each suited for specific purposes and audiences: (1) 
exegetical works, with minimal historical context, and (2) historical works 
with minimal exegesis’.73 The present work is meant to cover both of these 
grounds and offer something for the students of intellectual history and 
history of philosophy alike.74 
 Another  aim  of  this  study  is  to  show  how  a  relevant  reading  of  
Mandeville affects our understanding of Hume. In other words, we need to 
understand  how  Hume  himself  read  Mandeville  and  we  must  realise  the  
importance of Mandeville’s later writings for the young David Hume in 
order to understand his science of man. Once we realise the paradigmatic 
shift in Mandeville’s thinking, it will consequently affect our interpretation 
of Hume. At the same time, it becomes understandable that, for example, 
Charles Darwin, when formulating his theory of natural selection and the 
famous ship-analogy, had been reading Mandeville’s later works and Hume 
in particular, which together formed a coherent context for this later 
development as well.75 This can be characterised as a contextual approach 
to intellectual history.76 
                                                        
73 James Fieser, ‘Review of Hume and Hume’s connexions’, Philosophical Books, 39, 
1998, p. 246. 
74 I  am  not,  however,  attempting  a  holistic  reading  of  Hume  as  a  philosopher,  a  
political theorist and a historian. For such, recent account, see Claudia M. Schmidt, David 
Hume. Reason in history, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. 
75 ‘1840 April, Bernard Mandeville, Fable of the bees (vol. 2)’, followed by ‘1841 May, 
David Hume, Collected Essays’, ‘Chronology of relevant entries from Darwin’s lost of 
“books read” quoted in Alter, ‘Mandeville’s ship’, p. 459. 
76 For a recent and balanced account of the state of the contextual approach in 
political thought, see David Runciman, ‘History of political thought: the state of the 
discipline’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3, 2001, pp. 84–104. For one 
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 Arthur  Lovejoy  almost  fifty  years  ago  outlined  that  ‘the  history  of  the  
theory of human nature’ is, ‘or should be, one of the major fields of 
investigation  for  the  student  of  the  history  of  ideas’.77 Lovejoy’s  way  of  
doing  things  in  this  field  of  study  has  perhaps  lost  its  value,  but  he  was  
making a good point. We need to concentrate on the relevant questions. 
Unit  ideas  are  out  of  fashion  and  the  views  about  the  significance  of  the  
contextual  approach  are  also  changing.  The  reason  for  this  is  most  of  all  
practical. The electronic databases (such as ECCO, EEBO and MOMW of 
the  ones  that  are  more  advanced  at  this  particular  moment  in  time)  are  
changing  the  way  we  do  things.  Analysing  vast  amounts  of  texts  is  much  
easier these days than say, ten years ago. This is also a change that is taking 
place at a rapid pace. 
 This  is  also  why  a  bibliographical  approach  and  questions  about  texts  
and  manuscripts  as  physical  objects  are  all  the  more  relevant.  This  study  
seeks to cover new ground in using the methods of book history, when 
combining the interpretive tools of the contextual approach and a more 
careful reading of philosophical texts.78 No tool is used for the sake of using 
it, it is done so to enhance our understanding of the role of self-love and 
self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and 
David Hume. We need the book history approach in order to understand 
Bernard Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable. This 
way we can grasp the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking and how 
Hume read Mandeville’s works.79 We  also  need  to  study  the  unpublished  
                                                                                                                 
recent discussion about Cambridge and political philosophy, see ‘Political Philosophy: 
The View from Cambridge’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 10, 2002, pp. 1–19. 
‘Conversation convened by Quentin Skinner at the invitation of the Editors of the 
Journal of Political Philosophy and held in Cambridge on 13 February 2001’. Quentin 
Skinner, chair; Partha Dasgupta; Raymond Geuss; Melissa Lane; Peter Laslett; Onora 
O’Neill; W. G. Runciman; Andrew Kuper, rapporteur. 
77 Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on human nature, Johns Hopkins Press, 1961, p. 13. 
78 Deborah Baumgold writes: ‘a generation ago’ in Hobbes studies we ‘became 
preoccupied’ with ‘sophisticated applications of approaches as diverse as contextualist 
history and game theory’. Now, she maintains, ‘attention is turning to the nature of the 
texts themselves. The concern links Hobbes studies into the field of the “history of the 
book”, which treats the historical sociology of book and manuscript production’. 
Deborah Baumgold, ‘The difficulties of Hobbes interpretation’, Political Theory, 36, 2008, 
p. 827. The pioneer of this new wave in scholarship is Noel Malcolm. His Aspects of 
Hobbes is  a  prime  example  of  what  a  skilful  scholar  can  still  do  in  the  quest  for  
understanding his subject while others have already given up. Noel Malcolm, Aspects of 
Hobbes, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
79 According to Jennifer Welchman, no one really rebutted Bernard Mandeville, see 
Jennifer Welchman, ‘Who rebutted Bernard Mandeville?’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 
24, 2007, pp. 57–73. A direct answer to Welchman’s argument was published by Patricia 
Sheridan in her ‘Parental affection and self-interest: Mandeville, Hutcheson, and the 
question of natural benevolence’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24, 2007, pp. 377–392. 
Sheridan answers Welchman that Hutcheson rebutted Mandeville with parental affection. 
When we have proper bibliographical information, we look at these questions differently 
and  this  is  the  point  that  I  try  to  make.  As  I  will  show  in  the  course  of  this  thesis,  
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texts of the young David Hume in order to see the connection between 
Mandeville’s later writings and Hume’s Treatise. We need to contextualise 
certain aspects to understand the larger picture, but most of all we need to 
be philosophically aware of the different aspects of Hume’s science of man. 
We cannot fall in the gap between these disciplines or we risk losing sight of 
Hume’s meaning. 
Outline of the work 
Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard 
Mandeville and David Hume is divided into two parts. The first part, 
‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, argues that in the 
previous  scholarship  the  relevance  of  the  paradigmatic  change  in  
Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. The first three chapters draw a 
picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to 
an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. The 
intellectual context for this change is studied in detail. In order to make this 
change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The 
Fable of the Bees are also researched comprehensively. This interpretation, 
based partly on previously unknown material, challenges F. B. Kaye’s 
influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable as a uniform work 
of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual 
development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young 
David Hume when he encountered the new scene of thought in 1729. This, 
in  turn,  will  help  us  interpret  the  role  of  Greatness  of  mind  in  Hume’s  
science of man. 
 The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, 
explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics 
and the science of man in the Essays. This part will reveal the relevance of 
“Greatness  of  mind”  as  a  general  concept  for  David  Hume’s  moral  and  
political philosophy. The idea is to analyse the argument that Hume put 
forward  regarding  the  nature  and  the  development  of  civil  society.  The  
main argument of the study is the relevance of the division between self-
love and self-liking. Hence, much attention is paid to the question of how 
moral institutions are drawn from human nature and how Hume’s division 
between justice and politeness plays a role in all of his works. 
                                                                                                                 
Mandeville changed his mind also regarding the question of natural affection. In the 
original Fable he is forcefully denying its existence, in Part II he accepts it.  
SELF-LOVE AND SELF-LIKING 
 
22 
  
 PART I: 
 INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF BERNARD MANDEVILLE 
‘Vice is always bad, whatever benefit we may receive from it’ 
 
–Bernard Mandeville, Letter to Dion, 1732 
 
 1. Mandeville and the publishing history  
of The Fable of the Bees 
Bernard Mandeville has never been a neglected author. During his lifetime, 
he was taken seriously in Britain as well as abroad. The Italian works alone 
from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century include dozens of 
serious  attempts  to  grasp  Mandeville’s  thought,  especially  in  the  field  of  
economics.1 Of  the  present  day  Italian  scholars,  Andrea  Branchi  
characteristically emphasises the context of the Italian tradition of 
Mandeville studies when explaining his interest in the subject.2 The French 
development  is  no  different.  A bulk  of  Mandeville’s  works  was  translated  
into French: Free thoughts was  already  translated  in  1722  before  the  author  
became notorious in 1723 and the two parts of The Fable after  his  death.  
The works were also extensively reviewed and discussed in the French press 
during the eighteenth century.3 The late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
                                                        
1 E.g. Antonio Genovesi, Delle lezioni di commercio o sia d’ economia civile da leggersi nella 
Cattedra Interiana dell’ ab. 2nd ed, vol. 1, 1768, pp. 105, 152, 510. Ferdinando Galiani is also 
often mentioned in relation to Mandeville and the question of luxury in particular. About 
Galiani, see Koen Stapelbroek, Love, self-deceit, and money. Commerce and morality in the early 
Neapolitan enlightenment, University of Toronto Press, 2008. In addition, a search of the 
MOMW database reveals many other Italian sources discussing Bernard Mandeville by 
name in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century: Giambattista Gherardo D’Arco, 
Dissertazione sopra il quesito qual debba effere il bilancio della popolazione e del commercio, Mantova, 
1772, p. 32; Giuseppe Maria Galanti, Elogio storico del signor abate Antonio Genovesi, Napoli, 
[1772], p. 8; Giovanni Battista Roberti, Del lusso; discorso cristiano con un dialogo filosofico, 
Bassano, 1772, pp. 13, 25–26; Anon., Saggio sopra la legislazione relativamente all’ agricoltura. 
Discorsi accademici, Brescia, 1780, pp. 15–16; Anon., Opuscoli quattro sopra il lusso, [Bologna], 
[1787], pp. cxv–cxvii; Giuseppe Palmieri, Riflessioni sulla pubblica felicità relativamente al regno 
di Napoli, 1787, p. 227; Giovanni Serra, La scienza del commercio, vol. 2, Genova, 1793-1794, 
p. 181; Anon., Scrittori classici italiani di economia politica, vol. 9, Milano, 1803, pp. 236, 299 
and 392; Tommaso Gibellini, Elementi d’economia civile, Torino, 1805, p. 61; Pietro Verri, 
Opere filosofiche e d’economia politica, vol. 3, Milano, 1818, p. 115; Adeatato Ressi, Dell’ 
economia della specie umana, vol. 1, Pavia, 1817, pp. 224, 226, 267, 261 and 283–4 and Anon., 
Annali Universali di Statistica. Economia pubblica, storia, viaggi, e commercio, vol. 36, 1834, pp. 
252–254. 
2 Andrea Branchi, Introduzione a Mandeville, Roma-Bari, 2004. 
3 About the reviews of Mandeville’s works in eighteenth-century press, see F. B. 
Kaye, ‘The influence of Bernard Mandeville’, Studies in Philology, 19, 1922, p. 87: 
‘periodicals such as the Bibliothèque Britannique and the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans’ 
(footnote): ‘the Bibliotheque Angloise for 1725 gave the Fable 29 pages and Bluet’s reply to 
the Fable the same amount of space; the Bibliotheque Raisonée for 1729 reviewed the Fable 
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French  works  referring  to  Mandeville  are  also  many.4 With this long 
tradition in mind, it  is no wonder that the French system has been able to 
produce such an outstanding figure in Mandeville scholarship as Paulette 
Carrive.5 The Dutch have also discussed Mandeville with enthusiasm since 
the  eighteenth  century  and  lately  a  fresh  interest  in  the  second  son  of  
Rotterdam  has  been  raising  its  head.6 But, perhaps beyond any other 
European language communities, the German interest in Mandeville lead to 
a particularly blooming school of scholarship in the late nineteenth century, 
of which Paul Sakmann’s Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse in 
1897 was the most shining example.7 This  excellent  monograph  was  no  
freak accident. As Bernhard Fabian has shown, there had been a vibrant 
tradition of studying Mandeville’s thought in Germany since the publication 
of Mandeville’s works.8 
 The emergence of Frederick Benjamin Kaye (1892–1930) in the United 
States of America did however change the scene. His impact in the 
Anglophone  world  was  so  immense  that  it  still  seems  as  if  there  had  
practically been no Mandeville scholarship before him.9 Kaye’s style of 
scholarship was in many ways fit for his age: analytical, modern and precise. 
Kaye’s articles on the writings and influence of Mandeville were a step to a 
new level of scholarship.10 Nevertheless, I do not fully embrace the idea set 
                                                                                                                 
in  44  pages;  the  Bibliothèque Britannique in 1733 gave 52 pages to Mandeville’s Origin of 
honour; Maendelyke Uittrekses for  1723  devoted  71  pages  to  the  Free thoughts; and the 
Mémoires de Trévouz (1740) allotted the Fable over a hundred pages.’ 
4 E.g. Jean Baptiste Robinet, De la nature, Amsterdam, 1761, pp. 76–77; Anon., 
Ephemerides du Citoyen, ou bibliotheque raisonnée des sciences, morales et politiques, vol. 1, Paris, 
1767, pp. 185–9; François-André-Adrien Pluquet, De la sociabilité, 2 vols., Paris, 1767, I, 
pp. 279–282; and vol. 2, Paris, 1767, pp. 33–36 and 82–122; Alexandre-Auguste de 
Campagne, Principes d’un bon gouvernement, vol 1., Berlin, 1768, p. xxxi and vol 2., Berlin, 
1768, pp. 566–568; Voltaire, Questions sur l’encyclopédie, par des amateurs, vol. 5, 1771, p. 220; 
Jean Sauri, La Morale du citoyen du monde, 1777, pp. 58–65; Chrétien Leroy, Le commerce 
vengé, Paris, 1779, pp. 11, 74; Louis–Sébastien Mercier, Tableau de Paris, 2 vols., 
Amsterdam, 1782-88, II, p. 332; Victor de Riqueti (Mirabeau), Oeuvres, vol. 7, Paris, 1835, 
p. 140; Joseph Marie Gérando, De la bienfaisance publique, vol 1, Paris, 1839, p. xx and vol 
4, Paris, 1839, pp. 21–22 and Anon., Journal des Économistes, Paris, 1873, pp. 39–40. 
5 Paulette Carrive, La Philosophie des passions chez Bernard Mandeville, 2 vols., Paris, 1983 
and Carrive, Bernard Mandeville: Passions, vices, vertus, Paris, 1980. 
6 Search a web-site [www.bernard-mandeville.nl] organised by Arne C. Jansen, which 
has published some up-to-date facts and new discoveries about Mandeville. 
7 For example, the significance of self-liking was pointed out already by Paul 
Sakmann in Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienenfabel-controverse, Freiburg, 1897, p. 59. Also 
one might want to turn to Sakmann’s book regarding the role of luxus in Mandeville and 
Hume, ibid. pp. 257–60. 
8 Bernhard Fabian, ‘The reception of Bernard Mandeville in eighteenth-century 
Germany’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, 152, 1976, pp. 693–722. 
9 The immediate impact of Kaye after the publication of his edition of The Fable is 
evident for example in A. K. Rogers, ‘The ethics of Bernard Mandeville’, International 
Journal of Ethics, 36, 1925, pp. 1–17. 
10 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, pp. 419–467; F. B. Kaye, ‘the 
Mandeville canon: a supplement’, Notes and queries, 3, 1924, pp. 317–21 and Kaye, ‘The 
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forward in the introduction to the influential Mandeville Studies of 1975 that 
Kaye had single-handedly saved Mandeville.11 Already  in  the  light  of  the  
foreign reception of Mandeville this idea is hard to justify. 
 In  England,  of  course,  Mandeville  was  the  scandal  of  his  time.  But  he  
was  also  a  source  of  positive  inspiration  in  the  eighteenth  century  as  the  
case of Hume is meant to prove in this study. Later, quite crucially, Part II 
also served for example as a source of inspiration for Charles Darwin, when 
formulating his theory of natural selection.12 William Hazlitt was also an 
ardent reader of Mandeville among many other nineteenth-century 
philosophers. In addition, Mandeville, of course, plays a major role in Leslie 
Stephen’s The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century in 1876. 
Hence,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  his  influence  did  not  fade  away  in  England  
during the nineteenth century. A quick look at some general magazines and 
little-known works from the mid nineteenth century proves that in addition 
to Darwin’s notebooks, Mandeville was on the pages of many mediocre 
authors as well.13 When  we  add  this  to  the  fact  that  perhaps  the  greatest  
nineteenth-century collector of Epicurean moral philosophers, James 
Crossley,  addressed a discussion in the Notes and Queries presenting himself 
as  a  leading  author  on  Mandeville,  we  may  say  that  Mandeville  was  
everything but neglected in nineteenth-century Britain.14 Before Kaye, there 
had also been a rather serious attempt to categorise Mandeville’s thinking.15 
 Mandeville  had  not  been  ignored,  but  the  large  number  of  reviews  of  
Kaye’s edition of The Fable of the Bees in the English speaking press indicated 
otherwise. One reviewer exclaimed with positive enthusiasm that ‘after this 
                                                                                                                 
influence of Bernard Mandeville’, 1922, pp. 83–109. Kaye’s edition of The Fable of the Bees, 
particularly his introduction, is a source of many useful facts. 
11 Primer, ‘Introduction’, Mandeville studies, 1975. 
12 ‘1840 April, Bernard Mandeville, Fable of the bees (vol. 2)’, ‘Chronology of relevant 
entries from Darwin’s list of “books read” quoted in Alter, ‘Mandeville’s ship’, p. 459. 
13 E.g. Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, vol. 1, 1846, p. 56; 
Henry Raikes, Political economy as taught by the Bible,  Chester,  1850,  p.  45  and  Quarterly 
Magazine of the Independent Order of Odd-Fellows, Manchester, 1876, p. 209. 
14 ‘You refer  to “the collected edition of his  works,  four volumes,  1728.” Surely  no 
such  edition  exists.  If  there  be  a  collected  edition  of  his  writings,  of  which  nearly  a  
correct list will be found in Lowndes’s Bibliographer’s Manual, and Watt’s Bilbiotheca 
Britannica,  it  will  be a  surprise to me,  and I  shall  be very glad to make its  acquaintance,  
having been an assiduous collector of everything of and relating to Mandeville for many 
years past.’ Jas. Crossley [On more careful inspection of the copy of Mandeville’s Works, 
previously consulted, we find the lettering of the binder misled us. It is a collected edition 
of his pieces, but printed at different times, uniformly bound, and consecutively endorsed 
Vols. I. II. III. IV.]. These volumes (collected randomly out of well known editions) in 
question can be consulted in the BL, press number 1028.C.4.  
15 Norman Wilde, ‘Mandeville’s place in English thought’, Mind, 7, 1898, pp. 219–
232. For other “pre-Kaye” English articles on Mandeville see, F. E. Sandbach, 
‘Mandeville, Mr.’, Modern Language Quarterly, 3, 1900, p. 146; Paget Toynbee, ‘Mandeville, 
Mr. F. E. Sandbach on’, Modern Language Quarterly, 3, 1900, p. 38; Anon., ‘Bernard de 
Mandeville’, Poet Lore, 4, 1892, p. 143. Also Notes and Queries published different 
discussions of Mandeville at least in 1897, 1904, 1914 and 1919. 
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edition’ Mandeville, ‘will no longer be neglected in courses in eighteenth 
century English literature’.16 According to another reviewer, Kaye’s ‘notes 
upon the text are beyond praise in richness and accuracy’ and the ‘edition is 
a sound and brilliant contribution to American scholarship’.17 By and large, 
it  is  quite  difficult  to  find  anything  but  praise  from  the  many  reviews  of  
Kaye’s edition in the 1920s.18 
 In contrast to this almost unconditional praise from the Anglophone 
press,  a  German  reviewer  acutely  pointed  out  that  the  main  reason  why  
Kaye’s edition of The Fable of the Bees was of such importance is that 
Mandeville’s works had become rare.19 Mandeville’s works as physical 
objects  were  hard  to  get  one’s  hands  on  at  the  dawn  of  the  twentieth  
century. The Fable was not on the publishing list of Everyman’s library. This 
was  about  to  change.  Kaye’s  edition  was  first  published  by  Oxford  
University  Press,  and  later  when  it  was  signed  to  the  roster  of  the  Liberty 
Fund in  1988  as  an  exact  photographic  reproduction  of  the  Kaye’s  1924  
edition  (with  subsidised  prices)  it  was  certain  that  particularly  the  Kaye’s  
edition of The Fable of the Bees was within the reach of every modern student 
and scholar. This is where we are left today, Kaye’s edition of The Fable and 
the Liberty Fund distribution of it play a decisive role in people’s perception 
of Mandeville. 
 Kaye was a good scholar, and, for example, his work on Mandeville on 
the  origin  of  language  was  a  path-breaking  topic,  which  has  by  no means  
been exhausted to date either.20 Kaye realised the importence of 
                                                        
16 Louis  I.  Bredvold,  ‘F.  B.  Kaye's  The  Fable  of  the  Bees,  by  Bernard  Mandeville’,  
Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 24, 1925, p. 586. 
17 Odell Shepard, ‘Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees. (Book Review)’, Yale 
Review, 1927, 16, pp. 620–621. 
18 E.g. Richard Aldington, ‘Mandeville's Fable. (Book Review)’, Nation and the 
Athenaeum, 36, 1925, p. 614; B. C., ‘Mandeville B. "The Fable of the Bees: or Private 
Vices, Publick Benefits", with a Commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F. 
B. Kaye (Book Review)’, Critica, 23, 1925, p. 298; C. M. Perry, ‘Mandeville's The Fable of 
the Bees. By C. M. (Book Review), International Journal of Ethics, 36, 1925/1926, p. 431; 
Edwin Greenlaw, ‘Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees. Edited by F. B. Kaye 
(Book Review)’, Modern Language Notes, 41, 1926, p. 341; Anon., ‘Mandeville (Bernard). - 
The Fable of the Bees (Book Review)’, Revue internationale de sociologie, 34, 1926, p. 440. 
19 Binz,  ‘Mandeville,  The  Fable  of  the  Bees.  Ed.  by  F.  B.  Kaye  (Book  Review)’,  
Beiblatt zur Anglia, 36, 1925, p. 270. Kaye’s reception in German scholarship was generally 
positive. For example, a review in Kant-Studien did not criticise Kaye or his decision in any 
way. Rudolf Stammler, ‘Mandeville, Bernard. The fable of the bees (Book Review)’, Kant-
Studien, 33, 1928, pp. 293–295. See also F. T. Wood, ‘Mandeville, The Fable of The Bees: 
of Private Vices, Public Benefits. With a Commentary, Critical, Historical and 
Explanatory by F. B. Kaye. Oxford University Press, 1924 (Book Review)’, Englische 
Studien, 66, 1931/1932, p. 275. 
20 F. B. Kaye, ‘Mandeville on the origin of language’, Modern Language Notes, 39, 1924, 
pp. 136–142. Kaye crucially emphasises the significance of Part II (p. 138) for a modern 
theory of language and especially Condillac and Herder. See also Rüdiger Schreyer, 
‘Condillac, Mandeville, and the origin of language’, Historiographia linguistica, 5, 1978, pp. 
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Mandeville’s understanding of the evolution of society, his relationship to 
Bayle and conflict with Shaftesbury.21 By  and  large,  Kaye’s  notes  in  his  
edition of The Fable of the Bees have  served  as  a  source  that  later  scholars  
have repeatedly elaborated on. There are three aspects in particular that 
need to be raised when discussing Kaye: the eighteenth-century influence of 
Mandeville, the French aspect and the bibliographical innovativeness of 
Kaye. 
 Firstly, as Kaye himself indicates, the question of Mandeville’s influence 
was the most important point that he had to make.22 Kaye boldly stressed 
the influence of Mandeville by describing him ‘as one of the most 
important writers of the century, whose influence is to be compared with 
that of Hume and Adam Smith’.23 This was a crucial  point to make in the 
English-speaking  world,  which  has  also  been  largely  accepted.  Most  
Mandeville scholars today follow this path. The question of influence lead, 
for example, E. J. Hundert to call his important book published in a visible 
forum, Enlightenment’s Fable.24 By and large, it would be difficult to claim that 
Mandeville was not one of the most influential writers of the eighteenth 
century. This is much thanks to Kaye’s scholarship.  
                                                                                                                 
15–43 and E. J. Hundert, ‘The thread of language and the web of dominion: Mandeville 
to Rousseau and back’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 21, 1987-88, pp. 169–191. 
21 The eighteenth-century contemporaries were already broadly using this two-party-
distinction. For example, John Brown pointed out that Shaftesbury was the main 
character of the circle that taught ‘human Nature’ to be extremely ‘uniform and noble 
Thing’. According to Brown, the leading figures of the opposing school were Thomas 
Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and a variety of French philosophers. John Brown, Essays on 
the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury. (1751) Donald D. Eddy, ed., Georg Olms Verlag, 
1969, pp. 170–171, 204. See also Laurence Nihell, Rational self-love; or, a philosophical and 
moral essay on the natural principles of happiness and virtue. With reflections on the various systems of 
philosophers, ancient and modern, on this subject, Limerick, 1770, pp. 137–8, who is applying the 
same dichotomy after Brown. Mandeville was the one of the sceptical circle who 
according to Brown’s understanding, appeared as Shaftesbury’s main challenger, not as a 
mere shadow of Hobbes, but as a philosopher in his own right. See Brown, Essays on the 
Characteristics, passim. The whole book is structured as a commentary on the contrast 
between these two outlooks and captivatingly approving part of Mandeville’s criticism on 
Shaftesbury, especially pp. 204–227. Also Brown’s later, most famous work, Estimate of the 
manners and principles of the times, London, 1758 and the following answers to the vast 
criticism that the book received elaborates on this same discussion. About this, see also 
Max Levon Autrey, ‘The Shaftesbury-Mandeville debate and its influence in America’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, Wayne State University, 1965. 
22 For Kaye’s account of Mandeville’s influence, see especially Kaye’s introduction to 
The Fable, pp. cxiv–cxlvi. For an earlier version of it, see Kaye, ‘The Influence of Bernard 
Mandeville’, 1922, pp. 83–109. 
23 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 419. 
24 For useful articles by Hundert, see E. J. Hundert, ‘Performing the passions in 
commercial society. Bernard Mandeville and the theatricality of eighteenth-century 
thought’, in Refiguring revolutions. Aesthetics and politics from the English revolution to the romantic 
revolution, Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwickler, eds., University of California Press, 
1998, pp. 141–172 and E. J. Hundert, ‘Bernard Mandeville and the Enlightenment’s 
Maxims of Modernity’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56, 1995, pp. 577–593. 
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 Secondly, Kaye brought to the fore the fact that ‘the great source of 
Mandeville’s psychology was France’.25 Of course, Mandeville’s relationship 
to La Rochefoucault and Bayle had been concrete topics of discussion long 
before Kaye’s time, but he still played an important role in establishing the 
fruitful French context.26 Indeed,  as  Kaye  emphasised  in  all  of  his  works,  
‘Mandeville was one of the great connecting conduits between French and 
English thought’.27 This  is  also  a  path  approved  of  by  serious  modern  
scholars. E. D. James pointed out in the Mandeville Studies that ‘Mandeville’s 
discussion of human egoism echoes the French Augustinians’ and ‘what by 
them is called amour-propre’.  James  also  acknowledged  that  this  is  an  issue  
that has been discussed by many.28 Shelley Burtt, when making this same 
point a little later, maintained that it has been Kaye in particular who noted 
Mandeville’s indebt to the seventeenth-century French moral philosophy.29 
Indeed, we may happily remark that the context of the French Augustinian 
thought has been outlined well in several studies,30 and that Mandeville has 
been firmly placed within this tradition.31 
 The third point, namely, Kaye’s bibliographical innovativeness, is a 
more complicated matter. Perhaps, the most significant review of Kaye’s 
edition of The Fable regarded the questions of bibliography. The review was 
written by the renowned R. B. McKerrow and published in the Library in 
                                                        
25 Kaye, ‘Introduction’, The Fable of the Bees, p. xciv. 
26 See for example, W. Hasbach, ‘Larochefoucault und Mandeville’, Jahrbuch für 
Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 14, 1890, p. 1–43. 
27 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 419. 
28 James, ‘Faith, sincerity and morality: Mandeville and Bayle’, 1975, p. 53. 
29 Burtt, Virtue transformed, 1992, p. 130. 
30 For an elegant outline of this tradition in which ‘pessimistic analyses of human 
nature’ by the Augustinians are set aside and the main focus is on the ‘arguments for the 
constructive potential of human corruption’, see Rogers, ‘In praise of vanity’, 1994. The 
first systematic study of the French Augustinian thought is Levi, French moralists, 1964. 
About French moral thought of the period in general also, see Keohane, Philosophy and 
state in France, 1980. See also Isaac Nakhimovsky, ‘The enlightened Epicureanism of 
Jacques Abbadie: L’Art de se connoître soi-même and the morality of self-interest’, History of 
European Ideas, 29, 2003, pp. 1–14. 
31 Among Mandeville scholars, Laurence Dickey has lately successfully analysed the 
role of French thought in Mandeville and the importance of Pierre Nicole and other 
Jansenists. Dickey, ‘Pride, hypocrisy, and civility in Mandeville’, 1990, pp. 387–431. Of 
course, in the question of French influence on Mandeville, E. J. Hundert’s Enlightenment’s 
Fable cannot be ignored. For other more recent works on Mandeville and Jansenists see 
Kley, ‘Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the morality of enlightened self-interest’, 1987, pp. 
69–85. Anne Mette Hjort, ‘Mandeville’s ambivalent modernity’, Modern Language Notes, 
106, 1991, pp. 953, 959–964 also analyses Pierre Nicole’s influence. Ronald Commers, 
‘L'apologie radicale de l'hétéronomie morale de Bernard Mandeville. Un conservatisme 
précoce du début du dix-huitième siècle’, Tijdschrift voor de studie van de verlichting en van het 
vrije denken, 14/15, 1986/1987, p. 408 underlines Pierre Nicole as a source for Mandeville. 
Pierre Force has also discussed the Jansenists (quite rigorously, though) in the context of 
the ‘Epicurean/Augustinian tradition, which uses self-interest as its sole principle’. Force, 
Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, p. 5. See also Carrive, La Philosophie des passions chez 
Bernard Mandeville, 1983. 
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1925.32 McKerrow compliments on the one hand Kaye’s bibliographical 
innovativeness.33 On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  most  authoritative  
reviewers of Kaye’s The Fable severely criticised the edition, for example, 
regarding the use of miscellaneous unidentified reproductions of early 
ornaments and the unorthodox description of the different editions in 
Kaye’s work.34 But  the  most  vital  issue  that  McKerrow  singles  out  is  the  
question whether there ever was a Tonson edition in 1734 where the two 
parts of The Fable of the Bees were published together as two volumes. 
McKerrow points out that ‘the information which Mr. Kaye gives does not 
make it certain that he has got to the bottom of the matter’.35 It is 
interesting to notice that the path that McKerrow opened has not been 
followed.  
 Now, while we have several accounts of Mandeville’s influence and the 
French connection taking their lead from Kaye’s work, it seems that only a 
few scholars  (Irwin  Primer  and M.  M.  Goldsmith  leading  the  group)  have  
made scrupulous efforts to actually say something new about Mandeville 
regarding matters such as bibliography. Kaye worked extensively in order to 
establish the Mandeville canon.36 When discussing this canon, later 
additions  have  been  but  a  few.37 The most important and visible 
development has concerned Female Tatler.  In  the  1930s,  Paul  Buyan  
                                                        
32 R. B. McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, The Library, s4, VI, 1925, pp. 109–
111. 
33 Apparently, Kaye was the first person to use R. W. Chapman’s argument about 
press figures in his discussion of the sheet O of the first edition of Part II of 1729. 
McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, 1925, p. 110. About the printer’s numbers or 
press figures, see Gaskell, Phillip, ‘Eighteenth-century press numbers. Their uses and 
usefulness’, The Library, s5, IV, 1950, pp. 249–261. Gaskell’s point is that the use of press 
numbers had to do with calculating how many sheets each press had printed (when there 
was more than one in use). 
34 McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, 1925, p. 109. 
35 McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, 1925, p. 111. 
36 See his edition of The Fable, ‘Writings of Mandeville’ and Kaye, ‘the Mandeville 
canon: a supplement’, 1924, pp. 317–21. Kaye’s work was supplemented by Michael 
Boyd Wood in ‘Bernard Mandeville: sources, 1924-1979’, Bulletin of Bibliography, 40, 1983, 
pp. 103–7. There also exists a decent (updated in 2004) selected bibliography of 
Mandeville  by  Charles  W.  A.  Prior  to  be  found  online  as  part  of  Rutgers  c18  
Bibliographies On-Line –project (Jack Lynch, general editor): [http://andromeda.rutgers. 
edu/~jlynch/C18/biblio/mandeville.html]. 
37 One important piece of evidence establishing a link between Mandeville and Dr. 
Greenfield was published by Gordon H. Ward, ‘An unnoted poem by Mandeville’, Review 
of English Studies,  7,  1931,  pp.  73–6.  Also  in  the  1930s,  Kaye’s  attribution  of  the  Modest 
defence to Mandeville was questioned based on entries in Stationers’ Hall records in 
Johannes Hendrik Harder, ‘The authorship of A modest defence of public stews, etc.’ 
Neophilologus,  19,  1933,  pp.  200–3.  See  also,  M.  M.  Goldsmith,  ‘Two  more  works  by  
Bernard Mandeville?’, Notes and Queries, 23, 1976, p. 346. About bibliographical matters, 
see also Irwin Primer, ‘A bibliographical note on Bernard Mandeville’s Free thoughts’, 
Notes and Queries, 16, 1969, pp. 187–8. Pauline Carrive has since correctly pointed out that 
the money motive was not the only reason to publish the second edition of the Free 
thoughts because the second edition does include original material as well. 
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Anderson provided conclusive evidence making a clear and sound case 
about Mandeville’s involvement in Female Tatler.38 Later, Maurice Goldsmith 
in particular has emphasised the significance of Female Tatler in  the  
Mandeville canon.39 Meanwhile, the most important line of Mandeville 
bibliography, the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees and  the  
unresolved puzzles pointed out by McKerrow have remained untouched. 
 It is the intention of this chapter to augment these omissions and to tell 
a more complete story of Mandeville and the publishing of The Fable. This 
will bear importance for the interpretation of Mandeville’s philosophy, 
which will follow in the other chapters on Mandeville. I claim that there is a 
clear paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thought from The Fable of the Bees 
and other early works to Part II and later Mandeville. The intellectual 
change is not only visible in the content of the books and this can also be 
noticed by following the publishing history of Mandeville’s works. This is a 
path that has not previously been followed in Mandeville scholarship. For 
the first time in Part II Mandeville  is  trying  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  the  
question: how to derive fundamental moral institutions from human nature? 
The evolutionary model is not yet developed in the initial Fable. This is the 
reason why Part II was so important to Mandeville and the reason why he 
wrote  this  separate  book  to  begin  with.  There  is  a  change  from  political  
issues to a more abstract social  and moral theory. In Part II, Mandeville is 
not  attempting  to  defend  the  view  he  previously  set  forward.  He  turns  
against what he had been saying by asking different questions. In order for 
                                                        
38 Paul Buyan Anderson, ‘Splendor out of scandal: The Lucinda-Artesia papers in 
Female Tatler’, Philological Quarterly, 15, 1936, pp. 286–300. See also Anderson, ‘Innocence 
and artifice: or, Mrs. Centlivre and The Female Tatler.’ Philological Quarterly, 16, 1937, pp. 
358–75. Anderson’s other more fanciful Mandeville attributions (Anderson, ‘Bernard 
Mandeville’, TLS, 28 November 1936, p. 996; Anderson, ‘Cato’s obscure counterpart in 
the British Journal, 1722-25’, Studies in Philology, 34, 1937, pp. 412–38 and Anderson, 
‘Bernard Mandeville on gin’, PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of 
America,  54,  1939,  pp.  775–84)  were  later  questioned  by  Gordon  Vichert  in  an  
unreasonably critical article, even when some of Anderson’s attributions are clearly 
whimsical. Gordon Stewart Vichert, ‘Some recent Mandeville attributions’, Philological 
Quarterly, 45, 1966, p. 459. Mandeville’s involvement in the Female Tatler has proved to be 
the most important development in Mandeville scholarship and hence, Anderson should 
be more applauded than he is. 
39 About Female Tatler, see especially Goldsmith’s lengthy and well-documented 
‘Introduction’ in Mandeville, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler,. M. M. 
Goldsmith, ed., Thoemmes Press, 1999, pp. 11–72. About the role of Female Tatler in 
Goldsmith’s general interpretation of Mandeville, see especially M. M. Goldsmith, Private 
vices, public benefits: Bernard Mandeville's social and political thought, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, passim, which is further vindicated anew in Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits. 
Bernard Mandeville’s Social and political thought. Revised edition, Cybereditions, 2001. For more 
evidence provided by Goldsmith that Mandeville did write the Lucinda and Artesia 
papers, see Mandeville, By a society of ladies. Essays in The Female Tatler, 1999, p. 45. Female 
Tatler has also been published by Everyman’s Library in 1992. It was edited with an 
introduction by Fidelis Morgan. 
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us  to  clearly  grasp  this  change,  we  need  to  appreciate  the  bibliographical  
problems revolving around The Fable of the Bees. 
 At the same time, we start noticing points about Mandeville that call for 
improvement.  Kaye  and most  of  the  subsequent  scholars  tend to  say  that  
Mandeville does not mean what he says, even when this is precisely what he 
does. By and large, there exists a certain intriguing dichotomy regarding 
Mandeville’s  role  in  modern  scholarship.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  we  may  
reduce this to one concrete question of particular importance, namely the 
role of the politician inventing moral distinctions. This is a problem 
concerning the original Fable in  which  Mandeville  writes:  what  ‘first  put  
man upon crossing his appetites and subduing his dearest inclinations’ was 
‘the  skilful  management  of  wary  politicians’  and  ‘the  moral  virtues  are  the  
political offspring which flattery begot upon pride’.40 But  what  does  he  
mean?  
 Modern philosophers, who are often suspicious of the Dutch author, 
sometimes find this quote as a reason to dismiss Mandeville.41 On the one 
hand,  it  seems  to  show  that  to  Mandeville  the  moral  distinctions  are  an  
artificial and arbitrary invention. Mandeville denies the existence of other-
regarding affections, therefore he is not to be considered in relation to 
Hume, for example. On the other hand, the students of Mandeville are at 
pains  to  vindicate  their  master.  The  defence  usually  culminates  into  the  
claim that he is not to be read literally. Instead, we are supposed to take into 
consideration already here the evolutionary aspect of civil society and moral 
institutions. Kaye was eager to point out that ‘it is very important’ to 
understand ‘that Mandeville did not really believe that virtue was ‘invented’ 
on  particular  occasions;  he  was  at  pains  several  times  to  qualify  the  false  
impressions created by his Enquiry into the origin of moral virtue’.42 Now, all the 
evidence that Kaye has to show comes from Part II and Enquiry into the origin 
honour. Indeed, Mandeville changed his mind regarding these issues. 
However, the evidence does not indicate that Mandeville did not really 
mean that virtue was an arbitrary invention in the original Fable. 
 This aspect of Kaye justifying Mandeville by telling what Mandeville did 
not mean when he explicitly stated certain things was noted by a critical 
                                                        
40 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 51. 
41 Cf. Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982, ch. 2. Also J. L. Mackie writes 
that for Mandeville politicians are the ‘sole source of the moral virtues’, Mackie, Hume’s 
moral theory,  1980,  p.  85,  see also pp.  23–25.  It  is  usual  to put the emphasis  on the first  
part of The Fable, even by those who have more than just passing interest in the Dutch 
moralist. See for example, Donald Winch, Riches and poverty. An intellectual history of political 
economy in Britain, 1750-1834, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 2. There is of course 
nothing wrong with this, if we are interested only about the idea of private vices and 
public benefits. However, scholars mainly interested in history of moral philosophy 
ought to realize the difference. Schneewind, for example, does not notice the difference 
between The Fable of the Bees and Part II. Schneewind, The invention of autonomy, 1998, pp. 
323–329. 
42 Kaye, The Fable, I, p. 47 footnote. 
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German reviewer.43 Notwithstanding, in recent scholarship, the defence of 
Mandeville has often culminated in the same claim that Mandeville is not to 
be read literally. Instead, we are supposed to take in the original The Fable of 
the Bees the evolutionary aspect of civil society and moral institutions already 
into consideration. In some of the best works on Mandeville the question 
has  actually  turned  into  a  debate  whether  his  mature  position  was  
articulated already in Female Tatler in 1709–10 or in The Grumbling Hive in 
1705.44 My  simple  suggestion  is  that  when  we  consider  a  change  in  
Mandeville’s thought and consider his intellectual development this 
problem dissolves. 
 Kaye has been subjected to criticism other than bibliographical 
criticism.  For  example,  from  the  perspective  of  English  literature  it  has  
been claimed that The Fable of the Bees is  not  to  be  read  as  a  philosophical  
work at all, but completely as a satire.45 By and large, certain flaws in Kaye’s 
scholarship have been pointed out, but the most burning issue of them all is 
that the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees and  Kaye’s  decision  to  
publish the two separate parts of The Fable together has been left alone. The 
                                                        
43 Binz, ‘Fable of the Bees. Ed. by F. B. Kaye (Book Review)’, 1925, p. 270. 
44 This  is  a  position taken by Laurence Dickey in his  many ways outstanding article  
against Maurice Goldsmith’s emphasis on Female Tatler. Dickey, ‘Pride, hypocrisy, and 
civility in Mandeville’, 1990, p. 390. 
45 Phillip Harth, ‘The Satiric purpose of the Fable of the bees’, Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 2, 1969, pp. 321–340. The Fable and its style has of course been one of the 
favourite topics of English literature long before the 1960s. For a chronological run of 
the different sides of Mandeville’s prose and particularly The Fable in literary criticism, see 
Daniel Z. Gibson, Jr., ‘Critical edition of the poems of Bernard Mandeville’, unpublished 
PhD dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1939; Byno Ryvers Rhodes, ‘Swift and 
Mandeville as critics of society’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 
1951; Earl Roy Miner, ‘Dr Johnson, Mandeville, and ‘Publick benefits’’, Huntington Library 
Quarterly, 21, 1958, pp. 159–66; LeRoy Walter Smith, ‘Fielding and Mandeville: the ‘War 
against virtue’.’, Criticism, 3, 1961, pp. 7–15; Conrad Bertrand Suits, ‘The meaning of the 
Fable of the bees’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962; Thomas 
Robert Edwards, Jr., ‘Mandeville’s moral prose’, English Literary History, 31, 1964, pp. 
195–212; Bertrand Alvin Goldgar, ‘Satires on man and the ‘dignity of human nature’, 
PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, 80, 1965, pp. 535–41; 
George Hind, ‘Mandeville's Fable of the bees as Menippean Satire’, Genre, 1968, pp. 307–
315; Robert Allen Burns, ‘Mandeville’s satiric technique in First part of the Fable’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1974; Robert Walter Uphaus, 
‘Satire, verification and the Fable’, Papers on Language and Literature, 12, 1976, pp. 142–49; 
William Antony Stanton, ‘Bernard Mandeville’s ambiguity in Fable: A study in the use of 
literary traditions’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 1978; Irene E. Gorak, ‘The Satirist as Producer: Mandeville's "The Fable of the Bees 
Part Two"’, Genre, 23, 1990, p. 1–2; Jonathan Brody Kramnick, ‘“Unwilling to be short, 
or plain, in any thing concerning gain’ Bernard Mandeville and the dialectic on charity’, 
Eighteenth Century, 33, 1992, pp. 148–175; Timothy Dykstal, ‘Commerce, conversation, 
and contradiction in Mandeville’s "Fable"’, Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture, 23, 1994, 
pp. 93–110; Mandeville’s concrete influence on Fielding’s prose has also been recently 
stressed by Kevin L. Cole, ‘Mandeville’s and Fielding’s ‘Unmasked virgins’’, Notes and 
Queries, 45, 1998, pp. 459–460. 
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most focal point of criticism towards Kaye concerns his edition of The Fable 
of the Bees in general. Kaye, who died when he was only thirty-eight years 
old, made a choice sometime in the early 1920s that has had a deep impact 
on how Mandeville has been read and interpreted ever since. The choice in 
all its simplicity was to confirm the tradition of publishing the two parts of 
The Fable of the Bees together  that  developed  only  towards  the  end  of  the  
eighteenth century.46 Kaye edited The Fable of the Bees as his PhD dissertation 
when he was less than 25 years old. It seems that he cut a few corners that 
he  should  not  have.  As  a  result,  The Fable of the Bees and Part II are 
customarily  considered  as  two volumes  of  the  same work.  So,  the  natural  
idea is that Part II is just an enlargement of the first Fable. As we will learn, 
this is not the case. It also seems that in a material sense this was not meant 
to be the case either. 
 My reading of Mandeville, in a nutshell, is the following: in the original 
Fable Mandeville is preoccupied with a set of questions arising from a 
political  framework.  We  may  say  that  his  foremost  intention  was  to  
participate in an elaborated discussion about the European state system. In 
a manner familiar to us from seventeenth-century Dutch line of political 
thought Mandeville discusses questions such as the balance of power, 
political economy, luxury and other issues as such. Now, the theoretical 
foundation on which Mandeville bases these political arguments seems 
quite  clear-cut  to  me.  What  I  will  argue  is  that  up  until  1724  Mandeville’s  
theoretical understanding of human nature is a straightforward Hobbist 
interpretation that explains the ambiguity between Mandeville’s emphasis 
on the benefits of luxury and the repressive nature of his system. But this 
does change. Part II and Origin of honour are based on different “science of 
man”  and  Mandeville  is  trying  to  put  forward  an  original  analysis  of  the  
development of civil society and the nature of moral institutions.47 
                                                        
46 As Kaye wrote in his ‘prefatory note’, dated 31. December 1923, ‘This edition is an 
elaboration of a dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale 
University in 1917’ [when Kaye was 25 years old] (p. xii). 
47 For the differences between the two parts of The Fable in Mandeville scholarship, 
see especially J. Martin Stafford, ‘Introduction’, in Private vices, publick benefits: The 
contemporary reception of Bernard Mandeville, Ismeron, 1997. See also, Goldsmith, private vices, 
public benefits,  1985,  p.  62.  It  seems that  Goldsmith has later  become to appreciate more 
explicitly the difference between the first and the second part of The Fable.  See  for  
example his review of Hundert’s Enlightenment’s Fable, British  Journal  for  the  History  of  
Philosophy, 6, 1998, pp. 295–6. Also in his ‘Introduction’ to the By society of ladies, p. 50 
Goldsmith stresses the significance of Part II: ‘The suggestion in Female Tatler 62 (25-8 
November 1709) of a progressive evolution from primitive savagery to luxurious 
civilization eventually expanded into a conjectural history which formed a large part of 
Part II. That said, it needs to be pointed out that Goldsmith does not provide a theory 
that  explains this  nor the crucial  elements such as the role of  natural  virtues that  makes 
this expansion (should we desire to use this word) comprehensible. In short, for 
Goldsmith there is no paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thought. For Goldsmith, 
Mandeville only ‘extended and refined his view’ without actually changing it. Goldsmith, 
Private Vices, Public Benefits,  1985,  p.  65,  see  also  p.  107.  Goldsmith  confirms  this  in  his  
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Medicine and translations 
In 1705, Bernard Mandeville published a poem called The Grumbling Hive. 
He added long explanatory remarks and some essays to it in 1714. This was 
entitled The Fable of the Bees with  the  famous  paradox  added  as  a  subtitle:  
Private  vices,  public  benefits.  This  paradox  has  caused  great  problems  of  
interpretation ever since as a good paradox is supposed to.48 Before getting 
into the complicated question of the publishing history of The Fable of the 
Bees,  we  need  to  begin  our  story  from  the  beginning,  that  is  to  say  when  
Mandeville landed in London. 
 What did Mandeville do during his first decade in London before 
composing the poem called The Grumbling Hive? The facts that we currently 
hold are frustratingly few. He had arrived around 1693 (approaching his 
mid-twenties), practiced medicine, married and had a few children on the 
side.49 His hitherto known first literary fingerprint in England, a Latin poem 
                                                                                                                 
‘Preface for Cybereditions’ by underlining the importance of Female Tatler for Mandeville 
and that ‘the thesis of the book’ remains ‘unchanged’. M. Goldsmith, Private Vices, Public 
Benefits, 2001, p. 9. Other scholars have also been wondering this for a long time. Sterling 
Lamprecht formulated an interpretation that in Part II ‘Mandeville deliberately softened 
the asperity of his earlier expressions and sought to make his statements more clear and 
less likely to be misunderstood. But I find no change in doctrine from the verse and the 
remarks which formed the first volume of his work.’ Sterling P. Lamprecht, ‘The Fable of 
the bees’, The Journal of Philosophy, 23, 1926, p. 565. This is the same point of view that for 
example Hundert takes: ‘Perhaps as a way of responding to his philosophically minded 
critics of the 1720s, Mandeville virtually abandoned his earlier satiric mode of writing.’ 
Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994, p. 50. Even when Hundert is perhaps the best to 
notice the difference between the first and second part of The Fable, yet he still links them 
together. He does not notice the deliberate change of the paradigm. For the one who 
does, see Bert Kerkhof, ‘A fatal Attraction?: Smith's 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' and 
Mandeville's 'Fable,’ History of Political Thought, 16, 1995, pp. 219–33. 
48 For a chronological sweep of the varied discussions of the certain ambivalence of 
Mandeville between serious theory and satirical paradox (from the philosophical 
perspective), see Franz From, ‘Mandeville’s paradox’, Theoria, 10, 1944, pp. 197–215; M. 
J. Scott-Taggart, ‘Mandeville: cynic or fool?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 1966, pp. 221–32; 
John Coleman, ‘Bernard Mandeville and the reality of virtue’, Philosophy, 47, 1972, pp. 
125–139; Stephen Daniel, ‘Myth and rationality in Mandeville’, Journal of History of Ideas, 
47, 1986, pp. 595–609 and Dario Castilgone, ‘Considering things minutely: reflections on 
Mandeville and the 18th century science of man’, History of Political Thought,  7,  1986,  pp.  
463–488. 
49 The exact date of Bernard Mandeville’s arrival in London is yet to be confirmed. 
On November 17th, 1693, he was ‘summoned to appear by Royal College of Physicians’ 
for unlicensed practice, which means he had been practicing medicine in London for 
some time. It is possible that he left the Netherlands at the same time his father, Michael, 
was banished from Rotterdam, earlier that year. It is also possible that he already came in 
1692. See M. M. Goldsmith, ‘Mandeville, Bernard (bap. 1670, d. 1733)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17926>. I 
will refer to this article hence: Goldsmith, ‘Mandeville’, ODNB. The ground-breaking 
essay of Mandeville in the Netherlands before 1693 and particularly on the reasons why 
Mandeville might have left his home country is Rudolph Decker, ‘“Private vices, public 
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defending Joannes Groenevelt against accusations of malpractice put 
forward in the College of Physicians of London, can be traced back to 1698 
(below I present evidence of a translation by Mandeville published in 
1695).50 The first actual works that have until  now been attributed to him 
are a politically motivated Pamphleteers51,  in  which  he  defends  William III’s  
character and policies, and a translation of Fontaine’s Fables52 in – as late as 
– 1703 (late, that is judging by his future literary output). 
 Mandeville  was  not  a  poet  by  profession.  Verse  was,  as  he  himself  
conveys, a recreation, something he wrote in the ‘Hours’ when he ‘had 
nothing else to do’.53 When discussing his career in London, and especially 
the early years, we need to keep the medical side steadily on the horizon.54 
Throughout Mandeville’s early career we may detect a clear attempt to 
penetrate the inner circles of London’s medicine. As one would expect, he 
was also active, to a certain extent,  within the Dutch community,  but as a 
                                                                                                                 
virtues” revisited: the Dutch background of Bernard Mandeville’, translated G. T. Moran, 
History of European Ideas, 14, 1992, pp. 481–98. 
50 For Groenevelt, see the work of Harold J. Cook, particularly, ‘Groenevelt, Joannes 
(bap. 1648, d. 1715/16)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11651> and Cook, Trials of an ordinary doctor: 
Joannes Groenevelt in 17th-century London, London, 1994. 
51 Bernard Mandeville, The pamphleteers. A satyr, London, 1703. 
52 Bernard Mandeville, Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur de la 
Fontaine, London, 1703. An enlarged edition of the collection was printed for Richard 
Wellington in 1704 under the title Æsop dress'd or a collection of fables writ in familiar verse, in 
which the author is indicated as ‘B. Mandeville, M.D’. 
53 Mandeville, Some fables, 1703, preface, [iv–v]. Mandeville makes the point rather 
forcefully: ‘I could wish to have furnish’d you with something more worthy of your 
precious time: But as you’ll find nothing of very Instructive, so there’s little to puzzle 
your Brain’. 
54 For Mandeville placed in a perceptive manner within the seventeenth-century 
context of physicians, see Harold, J. Cook, ‘Bernard Mandeville and the therapy of “the 
clever politician”’, Journal  of  the  History  of  ideas, 60, 1999, pp. 101–124. The article is 
particularly valuable regarding ‘Gassendi’s epicurianism’. Regarding Mandeville and 
medicine, also e.g. James Hendrie Lloyd, ‘Dr. Bernard De Mandeville and his Fable of 
the bees’, Annals of medical History, 8, 1926, pp. 265–69; George Clark, ‘Bernard 
Mandeville, M. D., and eighteenth-century medical ethics’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 
1971, 45, pp. 430–444; Stephen Hanscom Good, ‘Bernard Mandeville: the physician as 
writer’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1972 and Collins, ‘Private 
vices, public benefits: Dr. Mandeville and the body politic’, 1988, which ‘examines the 
relationship between Mandeville’s medical and non-medical thought, to assess the 
relevance of the former for an understanding of the latter’. The thesis, however, is not 
convincing in its principal claim. The beginning of the work is on medical questions, the 
end on the social theory of The Fable – without establishing concrete link between the 
two subjects. For a recent and thoughtful reading of Mandeville in the medical context 
(along the lines of Richard Cook), see Neil de Marchi, ‘Exposure to strangers and 
superfluities. Mandeville’s regimen for great wealth and foreign treasure’, in Physicians and 
political  economy.  Six  studies  in  the  work  of  doctor  economists, Peter D. Groenewegen, ed., 
Routledge, 2001, pp. 67–92. 
MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES 
 
37 
doctor he managed to establish himself on a larger scale.55 An eighteenth-
century owner of The Fable described Mandeville on an endpaper to have 
‘practised physic not without success’.56 The ‘ingenious Doctor Mandeville’ 
and the ‘Hysterical Disease’ were discussed in print in 1724.57 Indeed, 
Mandeville  was  cited  in  print  as  an  authority  on  the  stomach  in  medical  
works during his lifetime and as late as 1777.58 This good repute of a doctor 
was not founded on Mandeville’s own medical work, Hypochondria or  the  
shock value of The Fable. It was, first and foremost, his character as a man 
of  quality  and  learning  which  gained  him  access  to  the  right  connections.  
This reputation was consciously constructed since the day he set foot in 
London. How exactly did he first establish himself as a doctor and as a man 
of  letters?  At  least  part  of  the  answer  lies  in  his  hitherto  virtually  
unacknowledged career as a translator. 
 Both, Pamphleteers and  (two  editions  of)  the  translation  of  Fontaine’s  
Fables came from the same publisher.59 In  order  to  make  a  plausible  
                                                        
55 Mandeville’s limited activity within the Austin Friars circles is indicated by the 
Latin poem in defence of Groenevelt in 1698 and the translation of Screvelius’s sermon 
in 1708. We also know that he retained a close connection to John and Cornelius Backer 
(who were active in Austin Friars and are in fact buried there). Nevertheless, Mandeville 
does not appear in the detailed records of the Dutch church in London and neither were 
his children baptised there. This, however, does not necessarily exclude his involvement 
with the community. 
56 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, vol. 1, Edinburgh, 1755. BL, pressmark 8405.ee.19. 
The copy has a bookplate of ‘The Honble Mr Murray’, with the clan motto: ‘“Furth 
Fortune and fill the Fetters”’. 
57 Peter Shaw, The juice of the grape: or, wine preferable to water. A treatise, wherein wine is 
shewn to be the grand preserver of health, and restorer in most diseases. With many instances of cures 
perform’d by this noble remedy; and the method of using it, as well as prevention as cure. With a word of 
advice to the vintners, London, 1724. The Fable of the Bees is discussed in Shaw’s more 
historical works, see for example, Peter Shaw, The tablet, or picture of real life, London, 1762, 
pp. 23–25. 
58 Mandeville’s opinion about wholesome food is quoted in the Society of Physicians 
in London, Medical observations and inquiries, London, 1757-84, VI, pp. 119–120. For 
Mandeville’s character in contemporary medical biography, see Benjamin Hutchinson, 
Biographia medica; or, historical and critical memoirs of the lives and writings of the most eminent 
medical characters, vol. 2, London, 1799, pp. 115–122. For Mandeville quoted as an 
authority in miscellaneous contemporary medical works, see for example Thomas 
Apperley, Observations in Physick, both Rational and Practical, London, 1731, pp. 183–4 and 
Thomas Withers, Observations on Chronic Weakness, York, 1777, pp. 115–6. It seems 
somewhat misleading to say that Mandeville’s medical expertise was hypochondria and 
hysteria (or vaguely passions). As a stomach-seated disorder, hypochondria naturally falls 
within his specialisation, but a better way of describing Mandeville’s specialisation in 
general, would be to say that he was an expert on the stomach. We should not be carried 
away by the fact that the title of his published medical work in 1711 was A treatise of the 
hypochondriack and hysterick passions. After all, in 1730 it was changed to A Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases.  
59 Both publications from 1703, Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur 
de la Fontaine and Pamphleteers include advertisements of Richard Wellington. The imprint 
does not give details of the author or publisher. The title-page of the 1704 edition of 
Fontaine’s Fables is a cancel. The explanation is the inclusion of the author and the 
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conjecture of Mandeville’s early days in London, we need to concentrate on 
Richard Wellington. According to Plomer, Wellington started his career as a 
printer  in  1693,  around  the  time  when  Mandeville  disembarked  to  live  in  
London.60 Richard Wellington was one of the most important and 
respected publishers of his time. John Dunton describes him as ‘industrious 
and indefatigable in his calling’, a publisher that ‘has the intimate 
acquaintance of several excellent pens, and, therefore, can never want 
copies; and trust him for managing and improving them’. Unlike some 
other famous publishers, Wellington was also commended for being a man 
who ‘has  a  pretty  knack  at  keeping  his  word’.61 What Plomer’s Dictionary 
does  not  tell  us  is  that  Wellington was  also  a  publisher  of  several  medical  
treatises and translations. 
 One  of  the  first,  and  largest  (based  on  a  page-count),  literary  
undertakings of Mandeville seems to have been a translation of François de 
la Calmette’s Riverius Reformatus from Latin into English.62 Richard 
Wellington  was  an  enthusiastic  advertiser  of  his  books.  Many  of  his  
publications  come  with  an  added  list  of  books  published  and,  like  many  
other publishers, he used the tails of the title-pages and blank versos to 
advertise forthcoming titles. The third edition of Etmullerus abridg'd printed 
for ‘Andrew Bell; and Richard Wellington, 1712’ includes advertisements of 
both publishers. The first book on Wellington’s list is ‘Riverius reformatus, or 
the  Modern  Riverius  …  ‘ranslated  from  the  third  edition,  in  Latin.  By  Dr.  
Mandeville’.63 This 534-page English translation was issued twice in 1706 and 
in 1713.64 Modern Riverius is a straightforward medical treatise, an attempt 
for ‘a Compleat Practical System of Physick’, as stressed in the 1706 preface 
                                                                                                                 
bookseller: ‘Some fables after the easie and familiar method of Monsieur de La Fontaine, Æsop 
dress'd or a collection of fables writ in familiar verse”. By B. Mandeville, M.D. London: printed 
for Richard Wellington’. 
60 In other words, Wellington made his first entry into Stationers’s Company’s Term 
Catalogues in 1693. Arber, Edward, ed., The term catalogues, 1668-1709 A.D. with a number 
for Easter Term, 1711, 3 vols., London, 1903-06, II, p. 475. 
61 John Dunton, The  life  and  errors  of  John  Dunton,  citizen  of  London  :  with  the  lives  and  
characters of more than a thousand contemporary divines and other persons of literary eminence, John 
Bowyer Nichols, ed., 2 vols., London, 1818, I, p. 212. 
62 The role of Mandeville translating Modern Riverius has previously been analysed in 
Francis McKee’s unpublished dissertation ‘The anatomy of power’. McKee looks at the 
classical theory of imitation and its relationship to the notion of digestion and frames 
Mandeville’s translations in the context as his main focus is on digestion.  
63 The first Geneva edition of Riverius Reformatus was published in 1688. The Lyons 
edition appeared in 1690. The second Geneva edition, that Mandeville says that he used 
as his copytext, came out in 1696. Before the English translation appeared, there was also 
a second Lyons edition of 1704. New Latin editions of Riverius Reformatus kept appearing 
well into the eighteenth century (at least in 1706, 1712, 1718 and 1735). 
64 The book was entered into the Term Catalogues by Wellington in [May] Easter 
term 1706 under ‘Physick’. Richard Wellington published also Michael Ettmüller, Opera 
omnia in compendium redacta, London, 1701. 
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by Mandeville.65 The translation is rather faithful to the second Geneva 
edition of 1696.66 The  translated  texts  in  the  two  issues  of  the  book  are  
identical.67 In 1713 Dr. Richard Mead’s Treatise of the power and influence of the 
sun and the moon on humane bodies: faithfully translated that has a separate 
pagination was annexed to the work.68 On both occasions, the translator is 
indicated  on  the  title  page  as  ‘a  Doctor  of  Physick’.69 Based  on  the  
identification  of  Mandeville  as  the  translator  in  the  advertisement  and the  
fact that Wellington was Mandeville’s early publisher, it is safe to conclude 
that this was one of the most important early literary undertakings of 
Bernard  Mandeville  (that  we  know  of).70 And  we  should  not  forget  that  
                                                        
65 François de la La Calmette, Riverius reformatus; or Modern Riverius, 1706 [translated by 
Bernard Mandeville], preface, A2r. About Mandeville’s understanding of ‘the great 
difference between the Speculative and Practical part of Physick’, see Mandeville, A 
Treatise of the hypochondriack, 1711, p. 59. 
66 The chapter headings correspond with the 1696 edition. The only exception is the 
last  chapter  of  the first  book.  The first  book of the 1696 edition has only 32 chapters,  
whereas the English translation has 33. I do not know where the chapter XXXII, ‘Of the 
Ischury and Strangury’ in the translation comes from. Other than that, without some 
exceptions, the chapters seem to be more or less a straightforward translation from the 
copytext. However, I have not undertaken the comparison of the whole book with the 
1696 Geneva edition. I have only checked some chapters that are interesting in the light 
of what we previously know about Mandeville’s inclinations. For example, Mandeville did 
not add anything of his own to the chapter, ‘Of hypochondriack melancholy’. It was still 
perfectly common to improve original works and translations in the eighteenth century. 
67 For an eye-opening analysis of the idea of textbook and the open-ended nature of 
any text (printed and other), see D. F. McKenzie, Bibliography  and  the  sociology  of  texts, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, passim. and p. 60 in particular. See also the discussion 
of the textbook used by Bernard Mandeville’s father below. The use of the concept ‘text-
book’ seems to have become standard in medical treatises by 1770s. See for example, 
Benjamin Gootch, Practical treatise on wounds and other chirurgical subjects, 2 vols., Norwich, 
1767, II, p. 50; Andrew Duncan, Elements of therapeutics, Edinburgh, 1770, p. iv and 
William Cullen, Institutions of medicine. Part I. Physiology. For the use of students in the University of 
Edinburgh, Second edition, corrected, Edinburgh, 1777, p. A1v.  
68 Even the advertisements of the books printed at the end of the work are the same 
in 1706 and in 1713.  Based on the ESTC, the first  time a part  of  the Riverius Reformatus 
was translated into English is Treatise of feavers in 1701 for E. Baldwin. The only existing 
copy identified in the ESTC is in the National Library of Medicine, Bethesda (Maryland). 
I have not had the opportunity to compare this translation with the Modern Riverius.  
69 It is rather telling of Mandeville’s private irony and critical self-reflection that 
already in the first edition of Hypochondria in 1711 there is a section ‘The various arts of 
getting into practice made use of by moderns’ where Mandeville outlines different ways 
for a young doctor to supplement his skill: ‘shew your self a Scholar, write a Poem, either 
a good one, or a large one; compose a Latin Oration, or do but Translate something out 
of that Language with your Name on it.’ These were all, more or less, practical means for 
a practical end that Mandeville had himself sought. The autobiographical nature of the 
Hypochondria is common knowledge. 
70 The only other Dr Mandeville in the early eighteenth-century material that I have 
come across is Dr. John Mandeville [not the medieval namesake]. He was, however, not a 
doctor of physic, but of divinity. Instead of translating medical works, he spent his time 
in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in foreign parts. 
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Riverius was  a  favourite  Classic  in  Leiden,  where  Mandeville  earned  his  
doctorate in medicine; and that there was also a tradition of translating 
Riverius into vernacular in Britain.71 
 What else did Mandeville translate? Along with La Fontaine’s Fables 
(1703/4) and Modern Riverius (1706),  a  third  item  that  we  know  of  is  A 
Sermon  preach’d  at  Colchester,  to  the  Dutch  Congregation.  On  February  1st 1707/8. 
Since at first glance it seems that the translation of Screvelius’s sermon fits 
ill in the Mandeville canon, it has previously been left without much 
attention – even when it is clearly signed by the translator, ‘B. M. M. D.’.72 
Why would the anticlerical  Mandeville translate sermons? Well,  the answer 
seems quite logical: because he was Dutch and a translator. The context of 
the “Screvelius sermon” is a triangle between consistories of the London 
Dutch Church, the Dutch community in Colchester, and Leiden. There was 
a shortage of Dutch ministers in England. In April 1707 a young Cornelius 
Pieter  Screvelius  was  appointed  as  an  assistant  minister  for  the  London  
Dutch church. The Dutch-community in Colchester, who at the time where 
without a minister, desperately wanted to appoint the same person and 
‘unanimously elected’ him ‘Pastor’ in November. However, the London-
Dutch Church was unwilling to release him before they received a new 
assistant minister from Holland. They wrote to Leiden insisting upon the 
matter, but competent people were difficult to get from Holland. On 23 
January, a letter was written from London to Colchester compromising that 
‘we cannot decide to discharge Dom. Screvelius’, but ‘we give him 
permission to do duty in your community for three Sundays, beginning 
from the next, being 25 January, under condition that he is to return at once 
to our community if our ordinary minister came unexpectedly to fall ill’. 
The sermon that Mandeville translated falls within this three week “loan-
period”  (On February  1.  1707/8).  It  clearly  had  significance  in  the  Dutch  
Church politics as a sermon preached by Screvelius in Colchester. Without 
further evidence, to answer the question whether Mandeville played any 
other role but that of a hired-pen would be a plain guess.73 
 The  Screvelius  sermon was  not  the  first  text  related  to  liturgy  and the  
Dutch point of view that Mandeville translated. It seems that the first 
hitherto unacknowledged literary undertaking by Mandeville in Britain was 
the translation of Petrus Francius’s An oration of Peter Francius, upon the funeral 
of the most august princess Mary II. Queen of Great Britain, France and Ireland from 
                                                        
71 I would like to thank Professor Harold Cook for reminding me of this in personal 
communication. 
72 The translation is listed in Kaye, ‘the Mandeville Canon: a supplement’, 1924, 
among “Doubtful”, instead of “Authentic works”. 
73 Screvelius continued as a travelling-minister for the spring of 1707-8. J. H. Hessels, 
ed., Eclesiae Londono-Batavae Archivum, 4 vols., London, 1887-1897, IV, pp. 2771–5. He 
ended up staying in Colchester for a few years and his son was baptised there in 1709. In 
‘March, 1710-11’ he ‘was recalled to London’. W. J. C. Moens, Register of baptisms in the 
Dutch  church  at  Colchester  from  1645  to  1728.  Edited  for  the  Huguenot  Society  of  London  with  
introduction and appendices, London, 1905, p. 90. 
MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES 
 
41 
Latin  into  English  in  1695.  The  Latin  epitaph at  the  end of  the  translated  
oration is signed: ‘B. D. Mandeville. Med. Doct.’74 Given all the evidence 
above  of  Mandeville’s  early  career  as  a  translator,  it  is  very  likely  that  the  
signed epitaph indicates that Bernard Mandeville was also the translator of 
the  oration.  To  my  knowledge,  this  is  a  new  discovery  and  it  has  not  
previously  been  discussed  in  Mandeville  scholarship  and  it  marks  the  
earliest literary undertaking of Mandeville in London, partly filling the gap 
from  1693  to  1703  and  confirming  one  hypothesis  of  this  study.  If  
Mandeville is the translator of the Oration of Peter Francius, it is possible that 
he translated some of the other funeral orations of the same occasion 
published by John Dunton (that follow the same format), which are not 
signed. The Dutch connection is evident in all the orations (funeral orations, 
pronounc’d by publick authority in Holland upon the death of the most serene and potent 
princess, Mary II) and the original orations were published in Delph. What 
this proves beyond doubt is that Mandeville had a career as a translator and 
maintained his link to the Dutch community in his early days in London. 
Since he laboured as a translator for both Wellington and Dunton, this also 
gives new light to comments made about Dunton about the relationship 
between Wellington and his employees. 
 As a result, here we already have four different works in three different 
languages translated into English by Mandeville. As Modern Riverius proves, 
he did not attach his name or initials to everything he performed. We may 
be moderately optimistic that more of his translations will be identified in 
the future; we should be particularly alert to translations that have 
something to do with the Dutch point of view between 1693 and 1703. It is 
also clear that Mandeville’s job as a translator was a crucial part of his early 
stay in Britain.75 But another possible translation that we ought to consider 
here  is  a  medical  text  and  directly  attached  to  the  1713  issue  of  Modern 
                                                        
74 Petrus Francius, An oration of Peter Francius, upon the funeral of the most august princess 
Mary II. Queen of Great Britain, France and Ireland, London, 1695, p. 24. The oration is also 
included in A collection of the funeral orations, pronounc’d by publick authority in Holland upon the 
death of the most serene and potent princess, Mary II· Queen of Great Britain, &c. By Dr. James 
Perizonius, professor of eloquence, history, and the Greek tongue, in Leiden. Dr. George Grevius, 
professor of theology, in Utrecht. P. Francius, of Amsterdam. Mr. Ortwinius of Delph. And, the learned 
author of the Collection of new and curious pieces. To which is added, the invitation of the chancellor of 
the electoral University of Wittenberg, in Saxony, to George Wilhain Kirchmais, to pronounce a funeral 
oration upon the Queen’s death, &c. Done into English from the Latin originals. London, 1695. 
75 One possible point of speculation is a translation of Giorgio Baglivi’s De praxis 
medica in 1704 as The Practice of Physic. As E. J. Hundert informs us, ‘Baglivi’s text was cited 
repeatedly’ in Hypochondria and ‘receives Mandeville’s greatest praise’. Hundert, 
Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994, p. 41. We may also note that the translation of Baglivi’s Practice 
and Part II share the motto: ‘Opinionum Commenta delet dies, Naturae judicia 
confirmat’. However, the use of this familiar quote of Cicero in the eighteenth-century 
publications was more of a routine than novelty. 
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Riverius, namely Richard Mead’s Of the power and influence of the sun and moon on 
humane bodies; and of the diseases that rise from thence.76 
 The first question that comes to mind is why “Dr Mandeville’s” role as 
a translator was leaked in an advertisement of 1712/3, when we cannot find 
even  the  familiar  initials  B.  M.  (or  B.  M.  M. D.) from the title-page of 
Modern Riverius,  either in 1706 or 1713? The reason may be that instead of 
taking the credit for Modern Riverius, Mandeville desired to – without making 
the point plain and rude – imply that he had done a service and tribute to 
Dr  Mead  by  translating  his  work.  Mandeville  clearly  had  the  habit  of  
marking  his  territory  as  a  translator  as  the  signed  epitaph  reveals.  What  
suggests that the 1712 translation of Sun and moon was not authorised by 
Mead, or that he may not have known about this undertaking before it was 
published, are the words ‘faithfully translated’ on the title-page. Anne 
Goldgar, in her study of scholarly practices in the eighteenth-century 
Republic of Letters, illuminates the tradition of unauthorised translations. 
Pierre Coste, for example, in the mid-1690s ‘was asked by the libraire Henri 
Schelte to translate John Locke’s Some Thoughts concerning Education into 
French’. ‘A task’, Goldgar informs us, ‘Coste took on in part to improve his 
English’. The translation was well received by the public and eventually by 
Locke, nevertheless, it ‘was made without Locke’s knowledge or 
permission’.77 Coste was obviously after patronage. 
 It  is  of  course  possible  that  Mandeville  did  not  translate  Mead.  
However,  this  would  hence  call  for  proof.  If  he  did  not  translate  Sun and 
moon,  why  else  would  Wellington have  ‘annex’d’  Mead’s  treatise  to  Modern 
Riverius,  since  the  work  was  also  issued  separately?  Who  supplements  a  
textbook with an unconnected work? ESTC recognises less than 250 
different  titles  that  include  the  word  ‘annex’d’.  A  quick  study  reveals  an  
obvious rule that annexed work is by the same author as the original title or 
that there is some other causal connection between the pieces. The 
exceptions are indeed few, and perhaps they all have a logical explanation. 
Therefore, we ought to take the fact that the translator, ‘Doctor of Physick’, 
comes  after  the  description  of  Mead’s  work  on the  title-page  in  1713  as  a  
                                                        
76 There are three independent eighteenth-century translations of Mead’s De imperio 
solis ac lunæ in corpora humana. The original work, first published in Latin in 1704, was first 
translated into English in 1708, under the title A discourse concerning the action of the sun and 
moon on animal bodies; and the influence which this may have in many diseases (appearing 
independently and also in the second edition of Royal Society’s Miscellanea curiosa in 1708). 
The 1712 translation was issued both separately and ‘annex’d’ to the Modern Riverius. 
Authorised translations of most of Mead’s works, including A treatise concerning the influence 
of the sun and moon upon human bodies, and the diseases thereby produced were undertaken by 
Thomas Stack in 1740s. Stack does not refer to either one of the previous translations 
and the work incorporates new corrections and additions by Mead. All three translations 
differ considerably from each other. 
77 Anne Goldgar, Impolite  learning.  Conduct  and  community  in  the  republic  of  letters,  1680-
1750, New Haven and London, 1995, pp. 117–118. 
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probable indication that the translator was the same person who translated 
Modern Riverius, namely Dr Bernard Mandeville. 
 In  1726,  John Woodward  was  instigating  Conyers  Middleton to  attack  
Mead. In his letter, the delightfully outspoken Woodward points out that 
‘Dr. Mead, who himself took his Degree abroad, set up for a grand Patron 
of all the foreign Graduates’. In addition, Woodward claims that Mead is an 
enemy to ‘the Church, Nation, and Constitution’. An important part of this 
argument was that ‘The wicked Principles, that have prevailed here so much 
of late, are imported partly by this foreign Education, and partly by so great 
a  Number  of  Foreigners  as  have  for  above  30  Years  past  been  poured  in  
[words struck out] upon us’. 78 We need not assume that Woodward is here 
necessarily referring to The Fable of the Bees, even when the letter was written 
while the heat of The Fable was most absorbing. It looks as if we would have 
enough proof indicating that there was at least some sort of a professional 
connection between Mandeville and Mead. Nevertheless, it is most 
unfortunate that only two of Mandeville’s letters have been found and we 
have to rely upon this kind of probable reasoning and conjectures in order 
to understand him and his career. 
 Maurice Goldsmith has suggested that Abigail Baldwin introduced 
Mandeville as a potential author, when replacing the previous publisher of 
Female Tatler.79 This is possible, although the trade publishing line that 
Goldsmith advances might mean that a trade publisher did not necessarily 
hold much authority in the literary circles.80 It could be that at the time, he 
                                                        
78 BL, Add. 32457, ff. 49 Woodward to Middleton, Nov. 14, 1726. Particularly 
Woodward’s letters suggests that the harsh competition between different camps of 
doctors in London was epitomised in the question of right treatment of small-pox. See 
for  example  CUL,  Add.  7647  ff.  123–125.  June  20,  1717,  Maurice  Emmett  to  John  
Woodward and CUL, Add. 8286, Sept. 21, 1699, John Woodward to Mr. Baker. Much of 
the  fighting  was  carried  out  in  print.  It  raises  the  question  of  the  involvement  of  
Mandeville’s sarcastic pen. The controversy seems to have also taken some dramatic 
turns. To further follow the interesting development of the conflict between Woodward 
and  Sloane,  see  Sloane  4026  ff.  295–6.  The  first  brief  document  states  that  Sloane  
declares ‘that he intended no offendent to Dr Woodward’ who likewise ‘declares he is 
sorry he misunderstood him and beggs his pardon’. In the next piece of paper Dr Sloane 
declares that he did not intend any Affront to Dr Woodward: but he is Sorry that he use’d 
any Actions or Gestures that Dr Woodward could believe were intended to Ridicule and 
Affront him’. The saga continues when ‘Dr Woodward declares that the Return he made 
to Dr Sloane was the Effect of his Resentment for that Scorn and Contempt which not 
only himself but Indifferent By-Standers apprehended to be Exprest by Dr Sloan’s 
Behaviour: but he is Sorry that his Mistake induce’d him to make that Return.’ It did not 
take long before Woodward was expelled from the Royal  Society.  Perhaps the talk of  a  
duel between Richard Mead and John Woodward was not merely a rumour. Was 
Mandeville in the middle of all of this? 
79 Goldsmith, ‘Introduction’, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, pp. 
46–7. Goldsmith’s conjectures this based on the fact that Baldwin printed the Grumbling 
Hive in 1705. I believe that the situation was much more complicated. 
80 For an imperative discussion of trade publishers, see Michael Treadwell, ‘London 
trade publishers 1675-1750’, The Library, s6, IV, 1982, pp. 99–134. 
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simply earned his slot in Female Tatler based on his increasing reputation. 
Nonetheless, Goldsmith has once again pointed us towards the right 
direction, namely, author-publisher relations. 
 It  is important for us to know that Mandeville had an early career as a 
translator. But equally important is that we now know that his relationship 
with Richard Wellington was substantial because of this career. This 
connection, it seems, was decisive for Mandeville’s development as a literary 
figure and for his reputation as such. His publishing career, both medical 
and literary, started under Richard Wellington’s wing. It is noteworthy that 
even in a miscellaneous work published by other hands Mandeville refers to 
Wellington as an authority. It was no-one else but ‘Wel[ling]ton’, who 
famously told Mandeville that his ‘Dish of Fables’  went  ‘down’  with  the  
general public ‘like chopt Hay’.81 Despite this commercial shortcoming, he 
was evidently one of the able pens that Wellington had at his disposal. Their 
publishing relationship continued for a decade, from 1703 to 1713, but the 
link might as well have been established some years earlier. 
 Richard Wellington was well connected to other publishers. His deep 
involvement with the Tonson publishing house particularly deserves our 
attention. After all, it is the younger Tonson who plays an important role in 
making the image of The Fable of the Bees such  as  we  see  it  today.  We may  
study the Wellington-Tonson co-operation through imprints. The first time 
these two names appear together on a title page is in 1697.82 Richard 
Wellington and Jacob Tonson (senior) published together the collected 
plays of some of the most important authors of their time, Aphra Behn, 
John Vanbrugh and John Dryden. Among other things, they co-operated 
on Butler’s Hudibras and  Congreve’s  works,  as  well  as  on  Milton.  Their  
partnership is best remembered through the shared ownership of William 
Shakespeare’s copyrights.83 The mutually beneficial collaboration between 
                                                        
81 Bernard Mandeville, Typhon: or the wars between the gods and giants: a burlesque poem in 
imitation of the comical Mons. Scarron, London, 1704, p. A4r. It is rarely remembered that 
Mandeville, like he said, did not publish the four remaining pieces of Typhon he  had  
already finished in 1704. They only appeared in the miscellaneous verse collection, Wishes 
to a Godson in 1712. 
82 Timothy Nourse, A discourse upon the nature and faculties of man, in several essays: with 
some considerations upon the occurrences of humane life, London: printed by J.O. for Jacob 
Tonson, and sold by R. Wellington at the Lute in St. Paul's Church-yard, and J. Graves, 
next White's Chocolate-house in St. James's street, 1697. 
83 Regarding Shakespeare copyrights, see Terry Belanger, ‘Tonson, Wellington and 
the Shakespeare copyrights’, in Studies in the book trade. In honour of Graham Pollard, The 
Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1975, pp. 195–210. For an earlier discussion of the same 
topic and a detailed analysis of the complicated nature of selling the Wellington-
copyrights, see Terry Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright: aspects of the London 
book trade, 1718-1768’, unpublished PhD dissertation in Columbia University, 1970. 
CUL, pressmark Munby.b.88 [copy of a typescript], pp. 123–133. 
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Tonson publishing house and Wellington’s descendants lasted long after 
Richard Wellington died in 1715.84 
 Mandeville’s transformation from almost complete obscurity into fame 
through the publication of the second edition of The Fable of the Bees in 1723 
has been exaggerated. It seems that he was well received and respected in 
the London medical and literary circles – which went very much hand-in-
hand  –  already  before.  It  looks  as  if  that  by  the  time  he  came  to  put  
together the second edition of The Fable, he had earned his spurs in and out 
of print. Even when the younger Tonson evidently had good sense for 
business, it is doubtful whether the only reason that The Fable was 
immediately picked up by the Tonson publishing house – after it started 
making noise and bustle – was because he recognised a future blockbuster. 
It is probable that there was a prior connection. For instance, Mandeville’s 
evident  skill  as  a  translator  might  have  reached  Tonson  senior’s  ears  
through Wellington already years before. In the light of the evidence that 
we have discussed, it could be seen as perfectly possible that Mandeville 
played second violin in one of the large and numerous translation projects 
orchestrated  by  Tonson.  The  one  that  particularly  comes  to  mind  is  of  
course Bayle’s Dictionary, set for printing in 1701 and eventually finished in 
1710.85 It is possible that Mandeville had not only ‘effectively “translated” 
Bayle for English readers’, as John Robertson has suggested.86 Perhaps we 
may  quietly  drop  the  quotation  marks  from  the  word  “translated”,  if  
Mandeville operated in the actual translation process as a hired pen. 
 This is not as wild a hypothesis as it may first appear to be. Mandeville 
did not only translate medical works. Fontaine’s Fables is a plain literary 
work translated from French. Moreover, the question of whether in fact 
Mandeville was involved in translating The World Unmask’d later in his life 
needs to be reconsidered.87 With his evident linguistic ability, it would 
indeed be surprising if Mandeville had not undertaken some prose 
translation.  We need  to  remember  that  such  a  work  as  Bayle’s  Dictionnaire 
                                                        
84 After  1715,  as  was  customary,  the  Wellington  books  start  to  appear  with  an  
indication of M. Wellington (for Mary, Richard’s widow) on the imprint before the 
business gradually transfered to their children and before the legal havoc took over. 
85 The front-matter of the first volume has a royal licence granted to Tonson for 
printing the Dictionary on 21 April 1701. Pierre Bayle, An historical and critical dictionary, 4 
vols., London, 1710. 
86 Robertson, The case for the enlightenment, 2005, p. 144. 
87 Kaye’s outright dismissal of Mandeville translating Marie Huber’s Le Monde Fou 
Préféré au Monde Sage based on ‘objective proof’ [sic!] that ‘Mandeville could have had 
nothing to do with this work’ because part of the translation was an answer to a work 
that  ‘did  not  appear  until  1733’  and  ‘Mandeville  died  in  January  of  that  year’  is  absurd.  
These are different pieces that could most certainly have been translated by different 
hands. The logic of the argument dismissing Mandeville’s Muralt translation based on 
this premise is also unreliable. The question whether Mandeville translated these pieces 
remains open. Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 466–7. It is perfectly 
possible that Mandeville’s career as a translator is not only an early career, but continues 
throughout his life. 
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was translated by several hands. The problem studying this line of argument 
is of course that the translators usually remain unidentified. There is no 
adequate study on the different translations of Bayle’s Dictionnaire into 
English  and  even  Pierre  Des  Maizeaux’s  role  (in  the  actual  translations)  
remains unclear. What is established to a point of commonplace is Bayle’s 
direct influence on Mandeville. It has been insinuated on several occasions 
that  Mandeville  studied  under  Bayle  in  Rotterdam  and  that  he  had  a  
personal contact with his predecessor. The question of Bayle’s direct 
influence on Mandeville is naturally interesting, just as whether Mandeville 
participated  in  translating  Bayle  or  not.  Since  thus  far  there  has  been  no  
actual  reason to  reflect  upon Mandeville  as  a  translator,  no  speculation  of  
his involvement in the Bayle-translations has been made.  
 Irwin Primer points out in the introduction to his edition of Free thoughts 
that ‘if there is anything original in [t]his highly derivative book, it is 
probably  the  fact  that  so  much  of  it  is  constructed  from  the  words  and  
thoughts of Pierre Bayle’.88 Indeed, regardless of the question whether 
Mandeville participated in the translation of Bayle’s works, his Free thoughts, 
even  by  the  eighteenth-century  standards,  is  plagiarism.  If  he  played  some 
part in translating Bayle, his actions become understandable, if not 
justifiable. Recycling Bayle is undeniably a question that contemporary 
criticism has touched upon. The only known letter addressed to Mandeville 
concerns Free thoughts. The anonymous author says to ‘have read your book’ 
and ‘wish for your own sake, you had write nothing but ye preface’. Among 
other things, the author claims that what ‘is good or solid in your book has 
been  a  thousand  times  said  before  you’  and  all  ‘ye facts you mention’ are 
‘from Bailes Dictionary’.89 A comparison between the 1710 edition of the 
Dictionary and Free thoughts confirms this point.90  
 One of the most disquieting contemporary criticisms on The Fable is 
Bluet’s Enquiry from 1725.91 He begs his audience to compare The Fable to 
Bayle.92 Bluet calls Mandeville ‘a blind follower of this Frenchman’ – adding a 
                                                        
88 Irwin Primer, Free thoughts on religion, the church and national happiness, New Brunswick, 
N. J., 2001, p. xviii. 
89 Bodl.,  Rawlinson  D.  1302  f.  152.  ‘A  letter  to  Bernard  Mandeville  containing  
animadversions of his Free thought on religion’. The letter is written in the same handwriting 
as 1302.f.50, which is Dr Daniel Waterland’s defence of Samuel Clarke. The letter to 
Mandeville seems to be a transcript. Since Mandeville’s correspondence does not survive, 
we have no way of knowing whether the letter was actually sent. It is addressed to the 
author of Free thoughts.  The nature of the letter  suggests  that  it  was written shortly  after  
the book was published in 1720. I have never seen a reference to this or any other letter 
addressed to Mandeville before finding this letter. 
90 It is unfortunate that Primer was unable to use the first Tonson edition of Bayle’s 
Dictionary in 1710. It is from this edition to Mandeville’s works that all the numerous, 
quotes come from. I have carried out an extensive comparison between Free thoughts and 
1710 edition of Bayle’s Dictionary. I will not however, start documenting this evidence 
here, because it only multiplies the evidence that has been established by Kaye.  
91 I follow Kaye’s example here. Other ways to spell the name are Blewitt and Bluett. 
92 Especially Bluet, Enquiry, 1725, pp. 121–138. 
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rider – ‘When I say Mr. Bayle, I would not be understood to mean Mr. 
Bayle in the original;  no, he must go one step further,  and take the English 
translator of him’.93 Indeed,  this  argument  that  Mandeville  has  not  copied  
the original Bayle, but ‘his English translator’, is repeated twice in Bluet’s 
Enquiry.94 Is  he  insinuating  that  Mandeville  was  himself  this  ‘English 
translator’ in the same way he insinuated that the author of The Fable had 
also written Hypochondria and Free thoughts? Perhaps not, but this leaves us 
with a strange dilemma. If Mandeville did not translate Bayle, and his 
copying of the recent English translations was this apparent to the 
contemporary audience, what can we say about his literary pursuit at this 
point  in  his  career?  Evidently,  in  this  respect,  he  transpires  to  be  lazy  and 
careless, even if his “innocent” concern was to approve and promote Bayle. 
After  all,  Mandeville  was  a  translator  himself.  For  him  to  copy  paragraph  
after paragraph from someone else’s English translation (without having 
any  connection  to  the  work)  seems  odd.  The  only  solid  conclusion  to  be  
drawn – before we find more fresh evidence – is that careful judgement is 
needed in order to see which are the original parts in Mandeville’s works 
and which are not. 
 We tend to forget that Mandeville first came to London as an immigrant 
medical doctor, a medical doctor with a family line of medical doctors. 
What he was occupied with in his early years in London was medicine, both 
as a practicing doctor as well as a medical author. Indeed, he developed one 
of the most influential social theories of the eighteenth century some 
decades later, but earlier he was mainly occupied with translating works 
such as An  oration  of  Peter  Francius,  upon  the  funeral  of  the  most  august  princess  
Mary II and Riverius reformatus from Latin into English. He was not a political 
theorist by profession. 
 It  has  been  previously  argued  that  we  need  to  look  at  Mandeville’s  
medical theories in order to understand his moral and political  thought.  A 
PhD dissertation in Oxford has examined ‘the relationship between 
Mandeville’s medical and non-medical thought, to assess the relevance of 
the former for an understanding of the latter’.95 The thesis is that there is a 
significant  bearing  of  the  former  to  the  latter.  There  is  some truth  to  this  
argument. However, the thesis is not as concerned about a change in 
Mandeville’s  thought  as  it  perhaps  should  be.  For  example,  in  the  
second/third edition of Hypochondria Mandeville  makes  a  36-page  addition  
to the work regarding mathematics (which to my knowledge has not been 
discussed in Mandeville scholarship).96 This added medical discussion is 
                                                        
93 Bluet, Enquiry, 1725, pp. 127–8. 
94 Bluet, Enquiry, 1725, p. 132 and pp. 121–138 passim. 
95 Collins, ‘Private vices, public benefits: Dr. Mandeville and the body politic’, 1988. 
96 The “mathematical” addition to the second (and third) edition of the Hypochondria 
runs from page 171 (‘Of the soul’s power without the body’) to (‘Many things are 
corporeal that seem to belong to the soul’) on page 207. The new Tonson edition of 
Hypo was first published under the title: Mandeville, Bernard. A treatise of the 
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important in order for us to understand Mandeville’s position regarding a 
priori truths, experimental method, and the relationship between medicine 
and moral science. It explains how Mandeville differs from some self-
claimed Newtonians  of  the  time.  It  also  clarifies  what  the  often  used,  but  
rather vague term “Newtonian philosophy” means in the contemporary 
setting. In Mandeville’s opinion it is plainly ridiculous to try to square 
goodness.97 He  has  respect  for  mathematics,  but  he  points  out  that  they  
should  not  be  brought  to  fore  in  places  where  there  is  no  use  of  them.98 
Medicine and morals are connected in a methodological sense simply 
because mathematics cannot be applied to either of them as they are applied 
in astronomy and natural philosophy.99 This  is  also  relevant  in  Hume’s  
context. The reason for the new addition was that Mandeville’s thinking 
developed and his later works ought to be our concern (in many different 
respects). 
 I  would  like  to  put  an  emphasis  on  the  point  that  we  need  to  look  at  
Mandeville’s medical practice to understand how it delays the development 
of his original thinking. My claim is that the original Fable is  still  but  a  
rhapsody, where Mandeville is advancing a simple, however clever Hobbist 
argument very familiar in the Dutch context. Like many of the educated 
Dutch people of that time, Mandeville was trained in the Hobbesian line of 
political thought.100 The basic argument of The Fable is also something to be 
                                                                                                                 
hypochondriack and hysterick diseases. In three dialogues. By B. Mandeville, M.D. The second 
edition: corrected and enlarged by the author, London, 1730. Since there had been an 
authorised second edition in 1715, in which the copyright of the work changed hands 
and the remaining of the stock was sold with a cancelled title-page, the title page of the 
1730 Tonson edition was also soon cancelled and changed to Mandeville, Bernard, A 
treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases. In three dialogues. By B. Mandeville, M.D. The 
third edition, London, 1730. It is highly relevant that Mandeville’s name is on the title-
page. 
97 Mandeville, Hypo, 3rd ed., 1730, p. 184. 
98 Mandeville, Hypo, 3rd ed., 1730, p. 185. 
99 Mandeville, Hypo, 3rd ed., 1730, pp. 199–200. 
100 The most informative and balanced account of Dutch naturalism, to which 
Mandeville plausibly belongs, is Hans Willem Blom, Causality and morality in politics. The rise 
of naturalism in Dutch seventeenth-century political thought.  Universiteit  Utrecht,  1995.  Of  
Mandeville, pp. 277–279. Blom shows how we have to understand how was it 
‘rhetorically useful for a Dutch political thinker to refer to Hobbes’, ibid., p. 29. Of 
Hobbes and Hobbism in seventeenth-century Dutch political thought, see especially ibid. 
pp. 101–156. Regarding the Dutch context of Mandeville, see also Cook, ‘Bernard 
Mandeville and the therapy of “the clever politician”’, 1999, pp. 110–118. Annie Mitchell 
also talks about the ‘Dutch Hobbesian republican tradition’ that is supposed to extend 
from Hobbes through de la Court brothers and other Dutch writers to Cato’s Letters and 
Mandeville. Annie Mitchell, ‘Character of an independent Whig – ‘Cato’ and Bernard 
Mandeville’, History of European Ideas, 29, 2003, p. 300. See also Mitchell, ‘A liberal 
republican “Cato”’, American Journal of Political Science, 48, 2004, pp. 598–9. About the early 
modern Dutch tradition of moral philosophy that particularly seeks to challenge the 
Anglophone (or Pocockian) hegemony, see the work of Jonathan Israel, especially 
Jonathan Israel, Radical enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, Oxford 
University  Press,  2001  (about  Mandeville,  see  pp.  623–627)  and  Jonathan  Israel,  ‘The  
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expected from a witty doctor and it is of little wonder that philosophers 
tend to sneer at it. At the same time it is forgotten that Part II is a result of a 
deep  analysis  how  this  first  attempt  failed  in  the  light  of  the  extensive  
criticism that The Fable received. 
 The reason why one should put such a strong emphasis on the medical 
side (practice, not theories) of Mandeville is because we cannot understand 
his intellectual development without it. It is doubtful whether his 
contributions to Female Tatler are the culmination of Mandeville’s moral and 
political philosophy, as Maurice Goldsmith would have it.101 It seems that 
Mandeville was not yet seriously developing his own views on civil society 
and social development – even when he expanded The Grumbling Hive into 
the  two  first  editions  of  The Fable of the Bees in 1714 and in 1723. For 
instance, still in Free thoughts of 1720 Mandeville was satisfied with collecting 
thoughts and sentences from Bayle on a massive scale and putting them 
forward  as  he  found  them.  This  is  not  to  say  that  these  works,  where  
Mandeville veils himself in borrowed garments are of no value. Undeniably, 
they form a clever and coherent stance on the political topics of the day. 
But Mandeville simply had not yet matured into the original social thinker 
that he would later become, which is perfectly understandable, also in the 
light of the great number and extent of his ongoing projects.  Mandeville’s 
early  political  writings  are  a  textbook  case  of  a  topical  Whig  in  Whig  
colours. 
Mandeville’s publishers and the steps away from The Fable of the Bees 
When discussing Mandeville’s publishers,  F. B. Kaye – following a pattern 
of seeing the two parts of The Fable as one work of two volumes – put his 
faith in James Roberts.102 The name of James Roberts appears on the title-
page of the first editions of The Fable of the Bees and Part II.103 When this is 
combined with the assumption that Mandeville owned the copyrights of his 
own  works,  it  seems  to  make  a  neat  case  about  the  idea  that  the  two  
different books are complementary pieces and intended by Mandeville as 
such. This is nevertheless a mistake. 
                                                                                                                 
intellectual origins of modern democratic republicanism (1660-1720)’, European Journal of 
Political Theory, 3, 2004, pp. 7–36 (see also the works cited there). However, it should be 
pointed out that the case that Israel makes about Mandeville belonging to this tradition is 
surprisingly weak. 
101 See  for  example  Goldsmith’s  review  of  E.  J.  Hundert’s  Enlightenment’s Fable and 
the updated introduction to his cyber-edition of his own book on Mandeville. 
102 For a brief biography of James Roberts, see Michael Treadwell, ‘London printers 
and printing houses in 1705’, Publishing History, 7, 1980, 43–44. 
103 Regarding the differences and difficulties of ‘printer’, ‘bookseller’ and ‘publisher’, 
see Peter W. M. Blayney, ‘The Publication of Playbooks’, in A New History of Early English 
Drama, John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan, eds., Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 
389–92. 
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 James Roberts, as Maurice Goldsmith has emphasised, was a trade 
publisher.104 A  trade  publisher  did  not  come first  in  the  pecking  order  of  
the London publishing industry. It seems to have been ‘an appropriate 
occupation for a bankrupt bookseller’ or ‘poor widow’.105 Basically, a trade 
publisher published in bulk for others without a serious input in the actual 
publishing process. To put it briefly, ‘in the case of trade publishers there is 
no shortage of imprints’.106 Michael Treadwell has informed us that ‘in the 
period from about 1675 to 1750 a substantial proportion of the London 
retail book trade, particularly the part concerned with pamphlets and 
periodicals,  was  in  the  hand  of  a  very  small  group  of  men  and  women  
known to their contemporaries in the trade as ‘publishers’.107 
 What  is  relevant  is  that  the  trade  publishing  business,  at  least  in  part,  
seems to have been politically motivated. The ‘major Whig’ trade publishing 
shop was located ‘near the Oxford Arms in Warwick Lane’, ‘opened at the 
time of  the  Glorious  Revolution  by  Richard  Baldwin,  and continued after  
his death in 1698 by his widow Abigail’.108 James  Roberts  married  into  it  
and  during  ‘the  first  twenty  years  after  taking  over  the  business  in  1713,  
James Roberts put his name to more books, pamphlets, and periodicals 
than anyone else in the trade’.109 Among those imprints are the first edition 
of The Fable of the Bees in 1714 and The fable of the bees. Part II in 1729. The 
obvious conclusion that Kaye reached was to assume hence that Roberts 
was the printer behind the two parts of The Fable.110 
 It  is indeed true that James Roberts’s shop was a place through which 
many of Mandeville’s books were distributed. In addition to The Fable of the 
Bees and Part II, also Free thoughts on religion in 1720, An enquiry into the causes of 
the frequent executions at Tyburn in  1725  and  A letter to Dion in  1732  passed  
through the shop as did numerous other books by various different authors. 
It  is  also  possible  that  the  Tonson editions  of  Mandeville’s  works  were  at  
least partly distributed by Roberts, although this is not indicated on the title-
page.111 But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  role  of  Roberts  in  Mandeville’s  
literary career makes a significant difference. This question has also played a 
significant role in the interpretations of Mandeville’s philosophy because of 
                                                        
104 For Goldsmith’s account of Mandeville and Roberts, see By society of ladies. Essays 
in the Female Tatler, 1999, pp. 46–47. 
105 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675-1750’, 1982, p. 102. 
106 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675-1750’, 1982, p. 107. 
107 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675-1750’, 1982, p. 99. 
108 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675-1750’, 1982, pp. 108–9. 
109 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675-1750’, 1982, p. 110. 
110 Goldsmith follows Kaye’s interpretation by only making a few reservations to the 
idea that ‘the Baldwin-Roberts dynasty was closely connected with virtually all of 
Mandeville’s important writings’ and that ‘Mandeville himself owned the copyright of his 
works’. Goldsmith, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, p. 47. 
111 About imprints, see M. A. Shaaber, ‘The meaning of the imprint in early printed 
books’, The Library, s4, XXIV, 1944, pp. 120–141 and A. T. Hazen, ‘One meaning of the 
imprint’, The Library, s5, VI, 1951, pp. 120–123. 
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a common assumption that the two separate parts of The Fable are  to  be  
read as one work.  
 Some crucial facts have hitherto been ignored. First of all, when we talk 
about  actual  publishers,  as  I  have  already  shown,  the  role  of  Richard  
Wellington as Mandeville’s first publisher was crucial and due to the 
attention paid to Roberts it has been missed in previous scholarship. In 
addition to this, many familiar names of the eighteenth-century publishing 
business appear on the imprints of Mandeville’s miscellaneous works (Pero, 
Illidge, Nutt, Morphew, Leach, Taylor, Woodward, Baker, Dodd, 
Rivington,  Jauncy,  Strahan,  Mears,  Stagg  and  Peele).  In  this  light,  
Mandeville’s involvement with Abigail Baldwin at the time of publishing 
The Grumbling Hive in 1705 tells us nothing else than that the whiggishness 
of the piece is most evident. It certainly does not indicate any lasting 
commitment between the two parties. Mandeville did publish through the 
Balwin-Roberts establishment, but other works came across other lines as 
well. 
 Secondly, it is somewhat striking that while the investigations regarding 
James Roberts and Abigail Baldwin have been extensive, Jacob Tonson’s 
role in publishing The Fable of the Bees and Mandeville’s other works has been 
almost ignored. Tonson publishing house was the largest player in the 
publishing scene of eighteenth-century London. Most certainly it was 
Tonson who played the most significant role in Mandeville’s publishing 
career. 
 Thirdly, the role of Mandeville’s later publisher, John Brotherton, who 
was  after  all  the  witness  to  Mandeville’s  will,  has  been  left  without  much  
attention. Towards the end of Mandeville’s publishing career, John 
Brotherton  played  the  same  kind  of  role  as  Richard  Wellington  in  
Mandeville’s early publishing career. Brotherton was the publisher of the 
second edition of Free thoughts on religion in 1729 and most importantly, he 
was  also  the  publisher  of  the  second  part  of  Part II in 1732, entitled An 
enquiry into the origin of honour.  But  because  Kaye’s  choice  was  to  argue  that  
The Fable of the Bees is  a work of two volumes, these points have not been 
fully established in Mandeville scholarship. At the same time, the intellectual 
development of Bernard Mandeville has not been articulated. 
 It  is  interesting  that  what  really  launched  Mandeville’s  career  as  a  
theorist of civil society, that he left The Fable of the Bees behind, was partly a 
development of the copyrights of this book.112 It is worth mentioning that 
                                                        
112 Richard Sher in a refreshing accout of the book history of Enlightenment puts his 
main argument against the exaggerated role of the copyright in the history of the 
eighteenth-century publishing. This is a valid point to make of the eighteenth-century 
book history in general, but in the case of Mandeville, the question of copyright is the key 
to understanding the publishing history of the book. About the exaggerated role of 
copyright and Sher’s argument, e.g. Richard B. Sher, The Enlightenment and the book. Scottish 
authors and their publishers in eighteenth-century Britain, Ireland, and America, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 25–34. 
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copyright laws changed during Mandeville’s publishing career.113 Previously, 
the copyright based on common law had been perpetual. The Copyright 
Act of Queen Anne in 1710 ‘limited the tenure of copyright already in 
existence to an additional twenty-one years’.114 It placed more emphasis on 
the author’s right to the published material. For example, if the copyright of 
a work had been sold to a certain publisher, the copyright switched back to 
the author after 21 years, if no agreement for new edition had been reached. 
In addition, the ‘legislation protecting the pre-1710 copies wore out in 
1731’.115 These are crucial pieces of information of the history of publishing 
Mandeville’s  works.  It  needs  to  be  remembered  that  ‘the  most  substantial  
profits in the eighteenth-century London bookselling world lay in the 
ownership of copyrights’ of best-selling books. It is quite obvious that 
instead of giving in to the new act,  the booksellers ‘continued (until  1774) 
to maintain that there was a common-law basis for perpetual copyright 
unaffected by the Act’.116 One  of  the  major  players  in  this  scene  was  the  
Tonson publishing house. 
 I have already pointed out that there is an important link between 
Richard Wellington’s publishing business and Tonson’s regarding the 
copyrights of Shakespeare’s collected works. As Terry Belanger has shown, 
these were ‘among the most valuable of the Tonson’s’ literary copyrights. It 
is also possible that Mandeville was involved with the Tonsons before the 
first Tonson edition of The Fable was published in 1724. The only existing 
argument  of  the  copyrights  of  Mandeville’s  works  is  that  most  likely  
Mandeville  owned  the  copyrights  of  all  of  his  works.  This  is  not  true.  
Mandeville’s first literary undertakings were translations that he carried out 
for Richard Wellington. Among Wellington’s literary remains were 
copyrights of Riverius Reformatus.  For example, on 17th of November, 1737 
in a sale of William Feales’s remains, lot 61 included the whole copyright of 
Riverius Reformatus and lot 51 consisted of a Wellington published book 
described  as  ‘Mead  on  the  sun  and  the  moon’.117 It  is  unlikely  that  
Mandeville would have owned the copyright to any work published through 
                                                        
113 Of copyright in the eighteenth century, see Alfred W. Pollard, ‘Some notes on the 
history of copyright in England, 1662–1775’, The Library, s4, III, 1922, pp. 97–114; Harry 
Ransom, ‘The date of the first copyright law’, Studies in English, 20, 1940, pp. 117–122 and 
Donald W. Nichol, ‘On the use of ‘copy’ and ‘copyright’: a Scriblerian coinage?’, The 
Library, s6, XII, 1990, pp. 110–131. 
114 Belanger, ‘Tonson, Wellington and the Shakespeare copyrights’, 1975, p. 195. 
115 Michael Harris, ‘Paper pirates: the alternative book trade in mid-18th century 
London’, in Fakes and frauds: varieties of deception in print and manuscript, Robin Myers and 
Michael  Harris,  eds.,  Oak Knoll  Press,  1996,  p.  48.  The second edition of Mandeville’s  
Virgin unmasked was published in 1731, which would make it a case of a work for which 
legislative protection wore out that year. The first edition of the Virgin unmasked was 
published in 1709. 
116 Belanger, ‘Tonson, Wellington and the Shakespeare copyrights’, 1975, p. 195. 
117 Bodl., John Johnson Collection, Ward catalogues. The Wellington copies feature 
in both Ward and Longman copies so frequently that there is no use in indicating all of 
the occasions. 
MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES 
 
53 
Wellington including Fontaine’s Fables. Richard Wellington was a serious 
copyright  owning  publisher.  It  would  be  very  unlikely  that  a  publisher  of  
such  character  would  act  as  a  trade  publisher  on  behalf  of  the  author.  
Mandeville did not own the copyrights to his earliest works. Hence, as we 
ought to assume, Mandeville worked for Wellington as a translator and as a 
miscellaneous author. 
 In contrast, Mandeville did own the copyrights of Hypochondria of 1711. 
He did not publish the book that introduced his own character as a doctor 
through Richard Wellington. Mandeville’s publishing career with Wellington 
ended with the second issue of Riverius reformatus in 1713 (as we remember, 
the advertisement of this book identified Mandeville as the translator). If we 
study Richard Wellington’s publishing profile towards the end of his life (he 
died in 1715), we notice that he only published a few works where his own 
name appears on the title-page and Hypochondria does not really fit into this 
profile. 
 Keith Maslen has described the practice of printing for the author in the 
eighteenth century. The procedure from the author-as-a-publisher 
perspective was not the easiest. An author ‘who wished for whatever reason 
to become his own publisher’ would ‘deal directly with the printer, relying 
on  the  latter  to  lay  in  paper,  which  was  a  costly  commodity  that  would  
otherwise have been sent in and paid for by the bookseller’. What was also 
needed was a ‘distributor’,  often ‘one or more of the ‘topping’ booksellers 
whose  prime  function  he  had  just  usurped’.  The  other  choice  that  the  
author  had  was  to  distribute  the  books  himself  (as  Mandeville  partly  did,  
because of the nature of Hypochondria,  which  is  a  work  that  advertised  his  
medical practice). More ‘often’ than not in the eighteenth century the 
author ‘shared the venture with the bookseller’.118 This kind of practice was 
by no means unusual. Gentlemen often published their own books relying 
on publishing through subscription. Aspiring authors often had difficulties 
finding booksellers willing to publish their work. The ‘booksellers may have 
been  the  more  ready  to  oblige  a  new  author  who  had  shouldered  all  the  
financial risk, in the hope of the future business. Later editions of works 
first  printed  for  the  author  were  often  taken  over  by  the  bookseller,  as  
imprints indicate’.119 Hypochondria might be one of these cases. 
 Mandeville owned the copyright of the first edition of The  Fable  of  the  
Bees.120 The  Baldwin-Roberts  establishment  was  a  natural  place  to  print  a  
                                                        
118 Keith Maslen, ‘Printing for the author: From the Bowyer printing ledgers, 1710–
1775’, The Library, s5, XXVII, 1972, p. 303. 
119 Maslen, ‘Printing for the author’, 1972, p. 305. 
120 James Roberts entered The Fable for Mandeville into the register of the Stationer’s 
Hall in 1714. It should be noted that not all licensed books were systematically entered in 
the registration of the Stationer’s Company. For example, a Royal Licence did at times 
operate as an alternative for the registration. In the case of Free thoughts there was no royal 
licence involved, obviously. The entries in the Stationer’s Company’s register simply are 
not fully accurate. Of the Royal licences in general, see Shef Rogers, ‘The use of Royal 
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whiggish work such as the original The Fable of the Bees. After all, also The 
Grumbling Hive had been printed in the same shop. Since the book came 
through a trade publisher, it is understandable that Mandeville would own 
the copyright himself. Mandeville owned the copyrights of the second 
edition as well, this time published by Edmund Parker.121 The  book  was  
entered into the Stationer’s Hall register for Mandeville by the printer 
Edmund Parker, whose publishing profile mainly consists of theological 
works.122 What  is  interesting  about  Parker’s  publications  with  regard  to  
Mandeville  is  that  in  1724,  a  year  after  the  second  edition  of  The Fable, 
Parker’s list of publications includes the only English edition of Pierre 
Nicole’s four volumes of moral essays, uniting the work into a sensible 
whole.123 
 Mandeville’s ownership of the copyright of the two first editions of The 
Fable is of minor consequence compared to the question of what happened 
when the younger Jacob Tonson took over the business of publishing The 
Fable of the Bees.  ‘The  most  substantial  profits  in  the  18th-century London 
bookselling world’ – Terry Belanger has informed us – ‘lay in the ownership 
of copyrights,  not the retailing of books whose copyrights were owned by 
                                                                                                                 
licences for printing in England, 1695–1760: A bibliography’, Library, s7, I, 2000, pp. 
133–243. 
121 Nine years lapsed from the publishing of the original Fable of the Bees to the second 
edition of 1723. It is generally assumed that The Fable of the Bees was not known before the 
1723 Parker edition. This was Kaye’s basic assumption. It is also confirmed by Burtt, 
Virtue transformed, 1992, p. 129. This is however not entirely accurate. In a list advertising 
‘Books printed for T. Jauncy’ included in the second, corrected edition of a poem entitled 
The last guinea,  with the year  1720 on the title-page,  Free Thoughts is  advertised as a  book 
‘by the author of the The Fable of the Bees’. Since Jauncy died in 1720, it would be difficult 
to see why his books would be advertised in 1723 (assuming that The Fable of the Bees was 
not known before that year and that the publication date of the second edition of Last 
guinea could be false). Hence, it is quite likely that The Fable of the Bees was already known 
before the 1723 edition, since Free thoughts was advertised as a book ‘by the author of the 
Fable of the bees’. Francis McKee has found out that Grumbling Hive was noted already in 
Queen Zarah also in 1705. McKee, ‘Early criticism of the Grumbling Hive’, 1988, pp. 176–
7. Yet, it is obvious that the attention that it received was nothing compared to the 
second edition. After the second edition in 1723 had been published it seems to have 
become customary to advertise Mandeville’s other works by mentioning Mandeville’s 
name as the author as well as that he was the author of the The Fable of the Bees. Cf. Daily 
Journal, February 17. 1723–4: ‘This Day is publish’d, The Virgin unmask’d, or Female 
dialogues. Betwixt an elderly maiden lady and her niece, on several diverting discourses: 
On love, marriage, memoirs and morals, &c. of the times. By Bernard Mandeville, author 
of the Fable of the bees. Printed and sold by J. Stag in Westminster-Hall; W. Mears at the 
Lamb without Temple-bar; and G. Strahan at the Golden Buck in Cornhill. Price 4s.’ 
122 The sign of his shop was an ornament of Bible and Crown. 
123 The edition of Nicole’s essays itself is not of the best quality and the text is 
precisely the same as in ‘the third edition, with amendments’, printed for Samuel Manship 
in 1696. But the idea of this fourth edition to bring the works into an accessible form in 
two  books  is  important.  The  moral  essays,  as  a  whole,  make  much  more  sense  in  this  
edition than before.  
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other men’.124 The rule of thumb is that an important bookseller most likely 
entirely  or  partly  owned  the  copyright  of  the  book  that  included  his  
name.125 Quite naturally, ‘the booksellers whose names are the most familiar 
... The Tonsons, the Lintots, ... Andrew Millar, and so forth – all were large 
copyright owners (and thus wholesalers), even though they all had 
substantial retail shops as well’.126 Important  booksellers  were  also  very  
conscious and proud of their profession. John Peele, for example, in his 
private memorial described that his ‘proper business is that of a Publisher’, 
not a printer.127 Among the familiar names of London booksellers, ‘there is, 
perhaps, no name recorded in literary history of one who contributed so 
little directly, and yet is so inseparably connected with certain and important 
parts of’ the history of English bookselling than that of Tonson.128 The 
Tonsons are a textbook case of a copyright owning publisher.129 Tonson 
publishing business made the most significant part of its fortune by owning 
the copyrights and not printing or distributing books.130 ‘The Tonson 
copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10000’.131 And  this  was  at  a  
moment  when the  dynasty  was  coming  to  an  end,  not  at  the  height  of  its  
glory. 
 The story about the two eighteenth-century generations of Tonson 
publishing – Tonson, the elder and the younger (his nephew) – seems to be 
an  epic  saga.  The  older  Kit-cat  publisher  is  often  presented  as  a  literary  
                                                        
124 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 3. 
125 Terry Belanger, ‘Booksellers trade sales, 1718–1768’, The Library, s5, XXX, 1975, 
pp. 281–302. 
126 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 3. 
127 CUL pressmark P75 15. 
128 William Roberts, The earlier history of English bookselling, London, 1889, p. 150. For 
Roberts’s account of Tonson, ibid., pp. 159–187. 
129 Tonson’s copyrights did not only consist of books entered into the Hall-book. 
Tonson’s royal licences from 1701 to 1728 included such major works of the time as 
Bayle’s Dictionary, Selden’s Latin works, Echart’s History, Nicholson’s poems and 
posthumous work of Newton. Rogers, ‘The use of Royal licences’, 2000, pp. 149–150. 
130 Regarding the eldeer Tonson,  see the ODNB article  and also Harry M. Geduld,  
Prince of publishers: a study of the work and career of Jacob Tonson, Bloomington, IN, 1969 and 
George F. Papali, Jacob Tonson, publisher: his life and work (1656–1736), Auckland, 1968. 
These books have been (unfavourably) reviewed by Terry Belanger, ‘book reviews’, 
Library, s5, XXV, 1970, pp. 166–8. See also K. M. Lynch, Jacob Tonson: Kit-Cat publisher, 
Knoxville, TN, 1971. If the scholarship on Tonson the Elder is rather thin, the younger 
Tonson is even a less studied figure in the publishing history. The elder Tonson kept‘a 
voluminous correspondence with his nephew. John C. Hodges, William Congreve. Letters 
and documents,  London:  Macmillan,  1964,  p.  78.  However,  most  of  the  letters  (at  least  
included in BL, Add 28276) are very topical having more to do with the retirement of the 
elder Tonson and brewing cider. They do not reveal much about their publishing 
business. Some other letters have been edited in Sarah Lewis Carol Clapp, Jacob Tonson in 
ten letters by and about him, The University of Texas Press, 1948. I would like to thank 
professor Raymond N. MacKenzie for confirming my ideas regarding the scholarship on 
Tonsons and discussing other matter regarding the Tonsons in personal correspondence. 
131 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 5. 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF BERNARD MANDEVILLE 
 
56 
patron  caring  for  his  authors.  The  younger  Tonson  seems  to  have  been  
more of an opportunist. Even when the scholarship on Tonsons is not so 
strong in order for us to fully dismiss all the possible romantic notions that 
this setting includes, it also has a kernel of truth, even if the older Tonson 
was not as loving and caring as he is sometimes presented to be. 
 This contrast between the two Tonsons becomes apparent, for example, 
upon comparing how they handled editing Milton. One commentator has 
pointed out that ‘Jacob Tonson the Elder had kept very tight control over 
the publication of Milton’s works, and clearly prided himself on his fidelity 
to Milton’s texts. His nephew seems to have taken a more mercantile 
approach to publishing’.132 Regarding the later editions of Milton’s works, it 
has been suggested that ‘the motive on Tonson’s part was quite simply to 
exploit  Alexander  Pope’s  ‘reputation  as  a  critic  and  a  man  of  taste’  by  
including him as the editor of the works. Pope agreed that his name would 
be included in ‘a sumptuous edition’ of Milton, but he declined Tonson’s 
further  ideas  of  how  to  cash  in  with  his  reputation.133 In  addition,  ‘the  
younger Tonson saw the publication of Bentley’s Milton as a similarly 
profitable venture, and the resulting controversy as good for business’. 134 
By and large, in the words of Stuart Benett,  
The younger Tonson does not seem to have been well-loved by his writers, and the 
rise to prominence and acquisition of authors like Pope and by publishers such as 
Bernard Lintot corresponds to the time when the younger man took control of the 
Tonson publishing empire.135 
The younger Tonson also attracted some major authors of the time. We 
have many existing examples of different contracts and agreements between 
the eighteenth-century booksellers and the authors.136 Before any book 
projects, a contract was typically made also between Tonson and his literary 
employees. These contracts were detailed, especially for larger literary 
undertakings. One of such contracts survives in the British Library between 
the  younger  Tonson,  Pierre  Des  Maizeaux  and  another  co-author  of  St  
Evremond’s works. The contract is very particular when giving details 
about the presentation copies and charges and expenses of paper and 
print.137 Perhaps the most famous case of a signing by the younger Tonson 
                                                        
132 Stuart Benett, ‘Jacob Tonson. An early editor of paradise lost?’, The Library, s6, X, 
1988, p. 247. 
133 Maynard Mack, Alexander Pope: A life, New Haven and London, 1985, p. 418. 
134 Benett, ‘Jacob Tonson. An early editor of paradise lost?’, 1988, p. 247. 
135 Mack, Alexander Pope, 1985, p. 418. 
136 For example, BL, Add. 38728, ‘Original assignments of manuscripts between 
authors and publishers principally for mathematical and elementary works: from the year 
1707 to 1818; collected by William Upcott of the London Institution. 1825’ includes 
several informative agreements between John Nourse, the publisher and his authors. 
137 BL,  Add.  4289  f.  91.  For  Tonson’s  agreements  with  Alexander  Pope,  see  BL,  
Egerton 1951. Joseph Almagor has noted in his inventory of PDM letters and papers that 
this item ‘contains also later additions dated: 2.8.1699; 9.8.1699; 4.7.1699. Joseph 
Almagor, Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673-1743), Journalist and English correspondent for Franco-Dutch 
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is that of Joseph Addison’s. The selling of the copyright of the Spectator has 
been presented to us in detail.138 As  a  result,  after  1715  the  Tonson  
publishing  house  remained  as  the  sole  owners  of  the  Spectator, which they 
reprinted in its entirety or partly several times. The copyright of the Spectator 
was remarkably expensive at the time and raised particular questions about 
the new copyright act. A contemporary source tells us that ‘there is a reason 
to  think  that  it  would  belong  to  him  [Tonson]  ‘for  ever’.139 Immediately 
after Joseph Addison died, the younger Tonson published also Addison’s 
Works.140 This was a controversial move in its opportunism, because 
Tonson did not possess the copyrights of all of Addison’s works. He 
nonetheless printed them. It is inconceivable that the Tonson publishing 
house would not have owned the copyrights to The Fable once they started 
printing it. Once the second Parker edition of 1723 had become infamous, 
started selling and was cleared of the charges from the Grand-Jury, the 
younger Tonson stepped in.  
The 1724 edition of The Fable 
Mandeville  was  a  consciously  provocative  author  starting  from  his  first  
publications in Britain. Pamphleteers in  1703,  for  example,  is  a  satirical,  
topical and direct work. When the reactions to The Fable of the Bees started 
pouring  in  twenty  years  later,  they  must  have  been a  shock  to  the  author,  
even when with the “charity school” –essay Mandeville was practically 
                                                                                                                 
Periodicals, 1700-1720. With the Inventory of his correspondence and papers at the British Library 
(Add. MSS. 4281-4289), London. Amsterdam and Maarssen, 1989, p. 231. 
138 ‘the purchase of the Spectator was concluded in three different bargains; Joseph 
Addison and Richard Steele sealed at the Fountain Tavern on  10  November  1712  the  
surrender of a part of their rights in the first seven volumes of the periodical to Jacob 
Tonson junior for a consideration of 575 pounds [Hist. MSS. Comm., Rep. II, Appdx, p. 
71];  at  the  same  time  they  had  sold  the  other  “moiety”  for  an  equal  amount  to  Sam  
Buckley [BL, Add. 21110] Buckley sold his right to Jacob Tonson Junior for 500 pounds 
paid to him on 13 October 1714 [Endorsement on the reverse of BL, Add. 21110] And 
Joseph Addison did, by a further deed-poll dated 27 August 1715, ‘bargain, sell and sign 
to the said Jacob Tonson all that his full and sole right in and to the copy of the 8th 
volume of the Spectator from no. 556 inclusive to no. 635 inclusive which said copy to be 
and remain unto the said Jacob Tonson Junior, his heirs, assigns for ever. [BL, Add. 
36193]’ Papali, Jacob Tonson, Publisher, 1968, p. 40. In comparison, fly leaves inserted in the 
BL, Add. 38728, from Gent. Mag., Apr. 1824 read: ‘Joseph Addison on 7th April, 1713, 
received  of  Tonson  £107  10s. for the copyright of Cato.’ The money was hence 
substantial that Tonson paid to Addison at the height of his fame. 
139 BL, Add. 36193 f. 100. The Spectator is  also  discussed  in  detail  regarding  the  
history of the printing and the selling of the copyright in BL, Add. 36193 f. 109. About 
the disagreements regarding the common law and Queen Anne’s act in general, see ff. 
93–146, also for arguments such as ‘the common law knows no thing of Literary 
property’ (BL, Add 36193 f. 110). 
140 Papali, Jacob Tonson, Publisher, 1968, pp. 41–42. See also, BL, Add 28275, f. 86. The 
Spectator is also discussed in detail regarding the history of the printing and selling of 
copyright in BL, Add. 36193 f. 109.  
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begging for trouble. Edmund Parker’s first advertisement of the second 
edition of The Fable of the Bees appeared in the British Journal on  April  20th 
1723. In the same journal,  on 15th of June 1723 appeared Cato’s essay ‘Of 
charity  schools’.  The  news  section  in  British Journal on  July  13th 1723 
announced that ‘The last day of the term the Grand jury of Middlesex, of 
which Sir Thomas Clarges was foreman, presented The British Journal, no. 26, 
35, 36, and 39, and The Fable of the bees’.141 After the second edition of The 
Fable was  published,  it  took  less  than  three  months  for  Mandeville  to  end 
up in front of the grand jury. 
 The presentment of the Grand-Jury of 1723 includes the usual accusations of 
‘diabolical attempts against religion’, which in the case of The Fable of the Bees 
is more of a curiosity.142 It is possible that the political nature of the book is 
one reason why The Fable received such a hostile welcome.143 However, it is 
undeniable that the “charity school” –essay combined with some of the 
more controversial passages of the book were unusually provocative 
regarding  current  affairs  that  concerned  many.  The  real  accusation  of  the  
presentment hence is ‘a direct tendency to propagate infidelity, and 
consequently to the corruption of all morals’. 
 After the presentment, Mandeville’s own approach rapidly changed 
from  a  confrontational  attack  to  a  careful  defence  of  his  own  reputation.  
On  August  the  10th 1723  a  vindication  of  The Fable was published in the 
London Journal.144 This vindication was also included in the later editions of 
                                                        
141 The Grand Jury indictment and advertisement of the second edition of The Fable 
can be found in the same issue of the Evening Post,  the  issue  from Saturday  July  13  to  
Tuesday July 16 1723, 
142 The presentment of 1723 is included in The presentment of the Grand-Jury for the county 
of Middlesex, to his Majesty’s court of King’s-bench, at Westminster, against infidels and sodomites, and 
impious books, London, 1728. 
143 For consideration of the political nature of the Grand Jury affair, see W. A. Speck, 
‘Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury’, Eighteenth Century Studies, 11, 1978, 
pp. 362–74. Speck’s suggestion is that much of the controversy regarded the fact that the 
makeup of the jury was Tory at heart.  
144 Kaye, The Fable of the Bees,  p.  xi.  Kaye’s  stipulation about the vindication is  to be 
found in Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, p. xxxiv. Kaye writes, ‘this defence he had reprinted 
upon sheets of a size such that they could easily be bound up with the 1723 edition’. The 
evidence that Kaye offers for this is a reference to p. 7 of Letter to Dion where Mandeville 
discusses  the  vindication.  Mandeville  writes,  ‘I  took  care  to  have  this  printed  in  such  a  
manner,  as  to  the  letter  and  form,  that  for  the  benefit  of  the  buyers,  it  might  be  
conveniently be bound up, and look of a piece with then the last, which was the second 
edition’. Bernard Mandeville, Letter to Dion, London, 1732, p. 7. I have no knowledge of 
any evidence of the vindication to have been published as a six-penny pamphlet nor that 
it was bound with the second edition. Hence, I have an alternative hypothesis that I will 
present below. Perhaps at the time of writing the Letter to Dion Mandeville did not 
remember all the facts. I believe that Mandeville was responsible for printing the 
vindication in a form that was added to The Fable (which was not the original idea at the 
time of printing), however this did not concern the second edition, but the third. I would 
like to thank Richard Noble for discussing this with me in private correspondence. He 
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The Fable. The point of publishing it in the London Journal and including it in 
The Fable was the same, that is to say, Mandeville started defending his own 
character. 
 F.  B.  Kaye  was  struck  (and  simultaneously  stuck)  with  an  argument  
about ornaments used in the eighteenth-century books. He also proposed a 
rather far-reaching plot claiming that there are some similarities between the 
ornaments in different Mandeville books that can be used as evidence. For 
Kaye, the ornaments bridge a void, indicating that James Roberts acted as 
the  printer  of  all  of  Mandeville’s  major  works  and  Mandeville  owned  the  
copyrights. Kaye’s general assumption was that more or less any book that 
we  could  find  with  the  same  ornaments  would  be  that  of  Mandeville’s,  
because he owned the woodcuts. To me this seems too complicated. What 
particularly captured Kaye’s fancy was what I have come to call the “Ugly 
Lion” –ornament. For example, Kaye’s entire case for claiming that 
Sakmann mistakenly denied the attribution of Mischiefs that ought justly to be 
apprehended from a Whig-government of  1714  to  Mandeville  is  based  solely  on  
this ornament.145 I  think  this  is  all  too  problematic.  The  ornament  most  
likely belonged either to the printer or the actual artist carving woodcuts 
compiled several of the same ornament and sold them to separate (or 
somehow)  linked  publishers  or  printers.  I  just  do  not  see  an  eighteenth-
century author walking to a printing house with a manuscript in one hand 
and a couple of woodcut blocks in the other.  
 We cannot make such far-reaching conclusions based on the use of 
ornaments in printed books. If we follow the use of ornaments in 
eighteenth-century London we face a different reality. We come to accept 
the bibliographical fact that it is extremely difficult to make plausible 
arguments based on single ornaments. There is no straightforward 
correlation between the used ornaments and the publisher, or the printer of 
the work. With little effort we come to notice that they are used in several 
books that have different names on the imprint. 
 This case can be made by examining the use of two different motifs 
from 1714 that are similar and can be seen as variations of each other. One 
motif widely used in the early eighteenth century was one that I have come 
to call “satyr and his thorns” –ornament. In the books printed in 1714 (the 
                                                                                                                 
pointed out to me that we have good grounds to question whether the vindication was 
ever published separately as a six-penny pamphlet. 
145 The pamphlet has the same “Ugly Lion” that is to be found in the 1714 edition of 
The Fable and Free thoughts, therefore the manuscript ascription in the Bodl. copy of this 
work to Mandeville, according to Kaye has to be correct, even when he is sceptical of the 
title-page annotations elsewhere. By this rationale, A detection of the sophistry and falsities of 
the pamphlet, entitul’d, the secret history of the white staff... Part II. London: Printed for J. 
Roberts, near the Oxford-Arms in Warwick-Lane, 1714 is also by Bernard Mandeville 
since it has the “Ugly Lion” on page 1. The work is anonymous, but this answer to 
Defoe’s pamphlet is usually attributed to John Oldmixon, (which of course could also be 
wrong). Kaye himself says he was unable to locate this ornament elsewhere despite 
extensive research (he did not have the privilege of using online databases). 
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year that the first edition of The Fable was published), “satyr and his thorns” 
appears in at least one item that has James Roberts on the title-page146, in 
two books of John Morphew147,  in  four  of  John  Baker148,  in  two  of  
Ferdinand Burleigh149, in two of John More150, in one of anonymous 
printer151 and in one in which the publisher is not indicated but which was 
sold by Andrew Dodd152.  If  we  take  another  ornament  from  1714,  very  
similar to the “satyr and his thorns”, we notice that it also was widely in use. 
I call this ornament “flowers with horns”. This ornament and its slight 
variations were even more common in the 1714 books than “satyr and his 
thorns”.  While  I  was  able  to  detect  “satyr  and  his  thorns”  in  thirteen  
different books with seven possible publishers/printers, “flowers with 
horns” appears in a much larger number of books.153 There is no necessary 
                                                        
146 Anon., Advice to Whigs and Tories. [London: Printed for James Roberts], 1714, p. 3. 
147 Anon., A letter to the author of the history of the Lutheran church, [London: Printed for 
John Morphew], 1714, p. 3; Anon., The present ministry justify’d: or, an account of the state of the 
several treaties of peace, [London, Printed and Sold for J. Morphew], 1714, p. 5. 
148 Francois Fénelon, A demonstration of the existence, wisdom and omnipotence, of God,  2nd 
ed., [London, Printed for W. Taylor ... and J. Baker], 1714, p. 1; Anon., The French book of 
rates. [London, printed for Andrew Bell... and John Baker], 1714, p. iii; Anon., The 
seraphick world: or, celestial hierarchy, [London, Printed for J. Baker], 1714, p. 5; Anon., The 
secret history of the white staff... Part II, [London: Printed for J. Baker], 1714, p. 3. 
149 Anon., A speech to the people against the pretender, [London: Printed, and to be Sold by 
Fer. Burleigh], 1714, p. 5; Charles Johnson, The victim.  A tragedy, [London, Printed: And 
Sold by Ferd. Burleigh], 1714, p. 1. 
150 Daniel Defoe, Memoirs of John, Duke of Melfort,  2nd ed., [London, Printed for J. 
Moor], 1714, p. 3; Anon., The resolutions of the house of commons in Ireland, [London: Printed 
for J. More], 1714, p. 1. 
151 John Fisher, A treatise concerning the fruitful saying of David, the King and Prophet, in the 
seven penitential Psalms. [Printed in the year MDCCXIV], p. 1. 
152 Anon., A secret of one year, [London: Sold by A. Dodd], 1714, p. 1. 
153 Variations of the “flowers with horns” ornament can be found in William 
Stephens, A second deliverance from popery and slavery, [London: Printed for John Philips... and 
Sold by J. Roberts], 1714, p. 1; John Mackey, A journey through England, [London: Printed 
by J. Roberts, for T. Caldecott], 1714, p. 1; Hugh Boulter, A sermon preach’d at the visitation 
of the clergy, [London, Printed for Timothy Childe], 1714, p. 3; Anon., Poems on several 
subjects, [London: Printed for T. Caldecott... sold by J. Roberts], 1714, p. 1; James 
Thompson, A sermon preach’d before Oliver Cromwell Protector, [London, Printed for J. 
Morphew], 1714, p. 5; Anon., Some thoughts concerning deity, [London: Printed in the Year 
MDCCXIV], p. 5; Anon., Poems and translations, [London: Printed for J. Pemberton], 1714, 
p. 1; Timothy Brocade, A genuine epistle, [London: Anno Salutis MDCCXIV], p. 1; Walter 
Lynn, An essay towards a more easie and safe method of cure in the small pox, [London: Printed 
for R. Knaplock], 1714, p. 1; Thomas Bennet, A confutation of popery,  4th ed., [London: 
Printed by M. J. and sold by James Knapton], 1714, p. 1; Anon., A companion to the altar. 
7th ed., [London: Printed for Edmun[d] Parker], 1714, p. 1; Anon., Prae-existence, [London: 
Printed for John Clark], 1714, p. 1; John Johnson, The unbloody sacrifice, [London: Printed 
for Robert Knaplock], 1714; Anon., Poetical miscellanies, published by Richard Steele 
[London: Printed for Jacob Tonson], 1714, p. i; John James Heidegger, Arminius. An 
Opera, [London: Printed for Jacob Tonson], 1714, p. i; Mathew Hole, Practical discourses on 
all the parts and offices of the liturgy of the Church of England, [London, Printed by J[ohn]. 
D[arby]. for W. Taylor... and H. Clements], 1714, I, p. i; Anthony Shaftesbury, An essay on 
MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES 
 
61 
connection between the possible publishers and printers. The names of 
Roberts, Pemberton, Knaplock, Knapton, Parker, Curll and Tonson can all 
be found in the imprints. We cannot make a connection from the ornament 
to the publisher. But even more so, to make assumptions of a particular 
eighteenth-century author and the use of a certain ornament would be 
absurd.  Based  upon  the  evidence  of  “flowers  with  horns”  ornament,  we  
may say for example that John Darby used “flowers with horns” in some of 
the books that we know he printed for different publishers, but it would be 
a  mistake  to  assume  that  the  use  of  this  ornament  indicates  that  he  is  
necessarily in any way connected to a work that includes such an ornament. 
The  “flowers  with  horns”  printing  blocks  were  evidently  in  use  in  many  
printing houses in 1714.154 
 Based on this evidence, it seems that the manufacturers of woodcuts 
carved  several  blocks  with  the  same  motif  that  they  sold  to  different  
printers, which would be a natural thing to do. They also most likely 
developed variations  of  certain  motifs.  Once  the  old  blocks  wore  out,  the  
printers would buy new blocks from the artists, who naturally were inclined 
to  base  their  new  blocks  upon  the  old  motifs.  The  artists  were  in  the  
business  of  making  a  living.  It  is  a  fact  that  there  are  several  similar,  yet  
slightly different ornaments to be found among different publishers and 
printers of the early eighteenth-century. Although there were no assembly 
lines in place in the eighteenth century, it  was only natural for a craftsman 
to reproduce what one (or someone else) had previously created. The 
conclusion is that no publishing argument can only be based upon the fact 
that certain ornaments can be found in certain books. 
 This  further  refutes  Kaye’s  ideas  about  the  strong  link  between  
Mandeville  and  James  Roberts.  Once  Kaye  kept  on  following  the  line  
emphasising James Roberts, Jacob Tonson was more or less forgotten. But 
                                                                                                                 
painting, [London, Printed by John Darby... and sold by J. Roberts], 1714, p. 3; Claudius 
Claudianus, The rape of Proserpine. [London, Printed by J[ohn]. D[arby]. and sold by Ferd. 
Burleigh, 1714, p. iii; Anon., The Medleys for the year 1711,  2nd ed., [London: Printed by 
J[ohn] D[arby] and are to be Sold by Tho. Corbett], p. iii; Humphry Ditton, A discourse 
concerning the resurrection of Jesus Christ. 2nd ed., [London, Printed by J. Darby... Sold by Andr. 
Bell... and R. Lintott], 1714, p. iii; John Henley, Esther Queen of Persia, [London: Printed 
for E. Curll, and J. Pemberton ... and A. Bettesworth], 1714, p. 1; Abel Boyer, Memoirs of 
the life and negotiations of Sir W. Temple. [London: Printed for W. Taylor], 1714, p. 1. 
154 Further development of this ornament where the flowers become fewer and 
larger can be found for example in Homer, Iliad, translated by Mr. Ozell, Mr. Broom, and 
Mr. Oldisworth, 2nd ed., [London, Printed for Bernard Lintott], 1714; Horace, The odes of. 
Part I, 2nd ed., [London: Printed for Bernard Lintott], 1714, p. i: Anon., A short essay on the 
scurvy, [London: Printed for A. Dodd], 1714, p. 1; Benjamin Hoadly, A letter to a friend in 
Lancashire. [London, Printed for John Baker], 1714, p. 5; George Sewell, More news from 
Salisbury, [London: Printed for E. Curll], 1714, p. i; Thomas Baker, Reflections upon learning, 
[London Printed for J. Knapton... and R. Wilkin], 1714, p. i; Theophilius Lucas, Memoirs 
of the lives, intrigues, and comical adventures of the most famous gamesters and celebrated sharpers in the 
reigns of Charles II, [London, Printed for Jonas Brown], 1714, p. 1 and William Hall, A new 
and true method to find the longitude. [London, Printed for the Author], 1714, p. 3. 
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what is likely to have happened is that once the business of the presentment 
to  the  grand  jury  was  resolved,  the  younger  Jacob  Tonson  bought  the  
copyright of The Fable and  printed  it  so  that  it  was  published  late  in  1723  
(the imprint indicates 1724).155 James Roberts might have been involved in 
the publishing process, but his role can by no means be described as 
essential at this point in Mandeville’s publishing career. 
 Once a copyright had been turned over to a bookseller,  a contract for 
the further editions was usually made, in which the author received a fixed 
monetary compensation and a certain amount of the printed book, which 
he could either give out as a presentation copy or sell for his own profit.156 
This is most likely what happened to The Fable of the Bees once Tonson 
became the publisher of the work. He simply bought the copyright from 
Mandeville and an agreement was made regarding the fixed compensation 
that Mandeville received for the subsequent editions. At the same time, the 
right to print The Fable of the Bees as it was, was turned over to Tonson. It did 
not  take  long  for  Mandeville  to  have  no (or  extremely  limited)  role  in  the  
publishing process of the further editions of The Fable. 
 What is evident is that once one started working for Tonson, one joined 
something resembling a publishing “factory” that followed certain practices 
for  all  the  published  works.  F.  B.  Kaye  has  tried  to  emphasise  the  unique  
nature  of  the  editions  of  The Fable of the Bees.  He  was  so  charmed  by  the  
book that he included some of the early eighteenth-century ornaments in 
his 1924 edition for Oxford University Press. It is however noticeable that 
The Fable of the Bees looks like any other of Tonson’s books. Particularly 
striking upon comparison are the similarities between The Fable of the Bees of 
1724 (and 1725) and Laurence Echard’s The history of the revolution of 1725. 
The history of the revolution was entered in the register of the Stationer’s hall on 
May 24, 1725 for Jacob Tonson. Hence, we know for a fact that the 
younger Jacob Tonson owned the copyright of this work. These two 
different works were printed as if they had come from the same mould. If 
one ignores the content, the front-matter of each of the books could easily 
be  mistaken  to  be  from  the  other  work.157 It  is  very  clear  that  Tonson  
                                                        
155 Applebee’s original weekly journal, 18 Jan 1723/4 p. 3198 has a likely advertisement of 
the 1724 edition of The Fable by Tonson. 
156 An example of this kind of contract is the one made between Thomas Woodward 
and Pierre Des Maizeaux,  BL,  Add.  4289 f.  335 April  27.  1724:  ‘In consideration of Mr 
Des  Maizeaux  his  having  assigned  over  to  us  the  Copy  of  his  Historical  and  Critical  
Account of the Life and Writings of Mr Chillingworth we promise (over and above what 
he has already received) to deliver him thirty of the said Books in Sheets [word crossed 
out] as soon as it is first printed and to pay him five Guineas on its being reprinted in any 
Form. Tho. Woodward’. 
157 The history of the revolution looks very much like the first Tonson Fables. The preface 
commences on A2r with the same ornament of two angels looking away from a triumph 
in the middle that is to be found in The Fable on top of the Preface of the 1724 edition. 
Also the contents pages end with a nonchalant decorated ornament that is to be found 
on p. 44 of the 1725 printing of The Fable. But above all, the sheet that would have first 
been printed (that came after the front-matter in a bound book), B1r of The Fable of the 
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printing industry reused different moulds and skeletons between the works 
published  around the  same time.  And why wouldn’t  they?  The  end result  
that  we  still  see  today  is  that  the  bound  books  look  very  much  alike.158 
There are also other works in which case we know that Tonson owned the 
copyright as well as the ornaments and the book resembles that of the 
Tonson’s Fable.159 
 But a book that is particularly interesting considering the publishing 
history of Mandeville’s works is Satire III of The universal passion by Edward 
Young. This is a work that on the title-page is said to have been ‘printed for 
J.  Roberts’  in  1725.  The  copyright  was  owned  by  Tonson  and  the  later  
editions in 1740s were printed for J. and R. Tonson. The similarities to The 
Fable are  also  striking.  The  ornamented  L  that  commences  the  Universal 
passion on  p.  1  is  precisely  the  same  as  the  “L”  in  the  beginning  of  the  
sentence ‘Laws and government are to the Political Bodies...’ in the preface 
to the 1725 edition of The Fable. What is likely is that Tonson was the owner 
of the copyright and the actual publisher of these works even when the title 
page  states:  ‘printed  for  J.  Roberts’.  It  might  be  that  Roberts  acted  as  the  
printer. Especially, if Tonson publishing house used to divide the work at 
hand between different printing shops, this is indeed possible. It is evident 
that Tonson made use of several printers instead of publishing with just his 
own press.160 However,  it  could  also  be  that  the  reason why the  name of  
James Roberts is on the title-page of so many Tonson books is that he was 
the main retailer, nothing more and nothing less. As Michael Treadwell has 
pointed  out,  ‘vastly  the  most  important  group  to  make  use  of  the  trade  
publishers was formed by copyright-owning booksellers, and the two 
principal motives which inspired them were concealment and 
                                                                                                                 
Bees (1724 and 1725) and B1r in The history of the revolution (1725) are strikingly similar. The 
ornament is the same and the decorated letter has the same pattern (“I” in Revolution, “A” 
in The Fable). There are also other similarities between the works. The paper, however, is 
different. It should also be pointed out that only the preface of the History resembles The 
Fable. Also the type seems different. It might be that The Fable of the Bees and History of the 
revolution came from different printers, but the copyrights were owned by Tonson. It 
could also be that the preface of the History was printed by the same printer as The Fable 
of the Bees and for the rest of the book Tonson used a different printer. 
158 The part of the book that was printed last, but read first by the buyer was of 
course the front-matter, which was hence the most relevant part of the book from the 
publisher’s perspective. The beginning of the book had to be appealing. Hence, it might 
be that a better printer, more lavish ornaments etc. were used for printing the front-
matter and the actual text was given to a cheaper press with less ornaments and inferior 
type. This could be the case with Etchard’s History of the revolution. 
159 For example, Thomas Southerne’s play Money the mistress that was entered to the 
Stationer’s Hall register in March 11, 1725/6 for Jacob Tonson. Stationers’ Company, 
Index of titles and proprietors of books entered in the book of registry of the Stationers’ Company ... from 
28th April 1710 to 30th Dec. 1773, [London, 1910]. Also the seventh edition of the Spectator 
of 1724 fulfils this criteria and includes the same decorated letters as the Tonson Fable. 
160 Papali, Jacob Tonson, publisher, 1968, p. 51. 
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convenience’.161 As W. W. Greg has stressed, it  is  always safest to assume 
that ‘any work bearing the imprint of a known trade publisher was published 
for someone else’.162 It  is  evident  that  Tonson  used  trade  publishers.  He  
might have been involved with different congers as well. There are also 
other clear incidents when the name of Roberts appears in works belonging 
to Tonson.163 So it seems likely that Tonson owned the copyright of The 
Fable of the Bees after 1724 and Mandeville was no longer in charge of what 
happened to this work. 
 The 1724 edition has been researched rather extensively in the process 
of preparing this study.164 Regarding the edition, it should be first remarked 
that the paper and the quality of the book improved noticeably from the 
second (Parker) edition of 1723 to the printing of the first Tonson edition 
of The Fable in 1724.165 The  paper  that  was  used  for  1724  edition  of  The 
Fable is presumably Italian.166 Except for the two last gatherings the paper 
of the first Tonson Fable came from a stock with an IO watermark, and CC 
                                                        
161 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675–1750’, 1982, p. 120. 
162 W. W. Greg, Some aspects and problems of London publishing between 1550 and 1650, 
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 34. 
163 Treadwell, ‘London trade publishers 1675–1750’, 1982, p. 117. 
164 I am grateful to the staff of various institutions (including the 32 libraries listed 
below) that have helped me with my inquiries regarding their copies of the third edition 
of The Fable of the Bees of  1724.  The ESTC lists  little  over 60 known copies of  the first  
Tonson edition of The Fable (the ESTC list is not fully accurate and there are some other 
known copies in public libraries as well. My assumption is that one could perhaps find 
75-100 existing copies of this edition that are within public access). However, a much 
smaller portion of the edition is enough for us to make a plausible conjunction regarding 
the edition as a whole. I have confirmed information regarding 35 copies. The following 
institutions were more than helpful in either assisting and allowing me to investigate the 
copy in their possession or confirming that their copy matches my description if I was 
unable to travel in order to investigate the copy myself: British Library; King’s College 
Library (Keynes library), Cambridge; Trinity College Library (Sraffa library), Cambridge; 
Bodleian Library, Oxford; The National Library of Finland; National Library of Scotland; 
Northwestern University Library; University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Hugh Owen 
Library; London Library; University of Tennessee, James D. Hoskins Library; University 
of North-Carolina at Chapel Hill, Wilson Library; Bowdoin College Library; Cornell 
University Library; Bryn Mawr College, Canaday Library; Memphis State University 
Library; Connecticut College Library; University College, Dublin, James Joyce Library; 
University of Wisconsin, Madison Libraries; University of Oklahoma Libraries (2 copies); 
University of Iowa Library (2 copies); Purdue University Libraries; Birmingham 
University Library; Trinity College Library, Dublin; University of Virginia Library; Trinity 
College Library, Hartford, Watkinson Collection; University of Oregon Library; John 
Rylands University Library, The University of Manchester (2 copies); Boston Public 
Library; Amsterdam University Library; Emory University Candler School of Theology 
Library; Brown University, John Hay Library; University of St Andrews Library. All of 
the abovementioned copies match the description regarding the paper. 
165 I examined a copy of the 1723 edition of The Fable in CUL (pressmark Nn.17.24). 
The paper is of worse quality than the Tonson Fable and the quality of the printing clearly 
inferior. 
166 I would like to thank Richard Noble of Brown University for the suggestion that 
the paper of the work is most likely Italian. 
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counter/cornermark  in  the  same  half  of  the  sheet.  Paper  in  the  two  last  
gatherings is different from the rest of the edition. This can be easily 
detected because of the visible difference in the quality of the paper (after 
page  449).  The  last  gatherings  are  of  thinner  paper.  The  pages  in  many  
copies have been yellowed more than in the rest of the book (or the paper 
noticeably darkens and becomes rather splotchy). The paper is evidently of 
less quality and has far more impurities than what precedes in the book. 
There is also more show-through from the printing on the other side. The 
main paper stock of the third edition of The Fable can be described as fine 
paper and the two last gatherings are of ordinary (British) quality at best.167 
The watermarks are also missing from the two last quires.168 
 What  does  this  evidence  of  the  paper  tell  us?  In  Letter to Dion, 
Mandeville quite surprisingly brings to the fore his own role in publishing 
the  vindication.  ‘I  took  care’,  he  declares,  ‘to  have  this  printed  in  such  a  
manner, as to the letter and form, that for the benefit of the buyers, it might 
be conveniently be bound up, and look of a piece with then the last, which 
was the second edition’.169 Kaye took this possibility seriously and assumed 
that the vindication would have been published as a six-penny pamphlet to 
be bound up with the second (Parker) edition. There is no evidence that the 
vindication had been published immediately after it appeared in the London 
Journal and  reissued  in  a  format  matching  that  of  The Fable and then 
incorporated in the subsequent editions. There are no known copies of the 
second edition that would include the vindication either. What we do have 
is the entire third edition with the vindication published on different paper 
than  the  rest  of  the  work.  The  last  part  of  a  book  to  be  printed  was  the  
front-matter.  The  title-page  and  the  introduction  of  the  1724  edition  are  
printed on presumably Italian paper, because enough of it had been 
reserved  for  this  purpose.  This  also  explains  why  the  title-page  is  not  a  
cancel, even when the vindication was added to the book after the bulk of 
the text had been printed. It is also noticeable that the errata was printed at 
the end of the vindication and thus the vindication is by no means a part 
that was bound to the third edition. We can also stipulate that the errata to 
                                                        
167 The three main qualities of eighteenth-century paper defined by Gaskell were 
‘fine, second, and ordinary’. Phillip Gaskell, ‘Notes on eighteenth-century British paper’, 
The Library, s5, XII, 1957, p. 34. 
168 The CC cornermark shows in the gatherings, on the fore-edge of the tail in one of 
the four leaves with a signature [B1, B2, B3, B4...F1, F2, F3, F4... etc.]. CC countermarks 
in the BL copy [pressmark 8405.e.31], for example are on leaves A3, B4, C4, D2, [E 
missing], F4, G1, H4, I2, K3, L3, M1, N3, O3, P2, Q4, R1, [S missing], T1, U2, X4, Y4, 
Z4, 2A4, 2B3, 2C1, 2D1, 2E1, 2F4. The CC is missing from the two last gatherings (2G–
2H). The CC corner- (or countermark) itself is most likely a meaningless set of initials 
‘generally chosen from among ten or a dozen conventional and apparently meaningless 
ciphers, names and initials’, which does not necessarily indicate a connexion between the 
countermark and quality. Gaskell, ‘Notes on eighteenth-century British paper’, 1957, p. 
37. 
169 Mandeville, Letter to Dion, 1732, p. 7. 
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this particular work was quite likely prepared by the author. While preparing 
the errata, Mandeville came to the conclusion that the vindication must be 
printed with the work, mainly for the purpose of defending his character. 
Hence, it seems that simply at the time of writing Letter to Dion Mandeville’s 
memory was hazy or, more likely, with the second edition he plainly points 
to the first Tonson edition in 1724. 
 What the evidence of the paper tells us above all is that the vindication 
was  not  originally  planned  for  the  third  edition  at  all.  Had  it  been,  surely  
enough  paper  would  have  been  reserved  for  the  vindication  (and  if  for  
some reason they had ran out of the original stock of paper, surely the two 
last  quires  would  not  systematically  have  been  on  different  paper  in  the  
entire edition). Percy Simpson in his classic account has informed us that in 
the eighteenth century a new custom was introduced in the printing 
industry  of  charging  for  extra  corrections  from  the  author.  ‘These  extra  
charges’, Simpson writes, ‘must have been made for author’s revision of the 
proof-sheets, especially for additions and cancels’.170 In  other  words,  if  an  
author wanted to add or change something at a late stage of publishing, he 
ended up paying for the additions and changes himself. Simpson also 
introduces a number of examples of this practice.  In order to get his later 
corrections in a printed book, the author had to go through a painstaking 
and costly process. This is most likely the case of the vindication being 
added at  a  late  stage  of  printing  of  the  third  edition  of  The Fable in 1724. 
Mandeville did indeed himself pay for publishing the vindication in such 
form that it would be incorporated in subsequent editions of The Fable and 
the  third  edition  of  1724  in  particular.  It  was  not  however  a  six-penny  
pamphlet. But also because Mandeville paid for this himself, it is of little 
wonder that he underlined his role in his description of the incident in Letter 
to Dion. 
 This fact about the paper also tells us about the intentions of the author. 
My suggestion is that it was in fact the author Mandeville (not Tonson, the 
publisher)  who  desired  to  add  the  vindication  to  the  third  edition  of  The 
Fable of the Bees at a very late stage of printing and this is the explanation why 
the two last gatherings came from different stock than the rest of the book. 
What the question about paper also suggests is that Mandeville started to be 
excessively worried about his own reputation and what that The Fable might 
have been doing to it. Adding two quires of material to a work at his own 
expense  was  no  small  matter  for  an  author  like  Mandeville.  It  is  also  
relevant that there are no relevant author’s changes or corrections to be 
found in The Fable in  the  editions  that  came  after  1724.171 Hence, if this 
                                                        
170 Percy Simpson, Proof-reading in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Oxford 
University Press, 1935, pp. 165–6. 
171 As a curiosity it can be mentioned that there are some claims that no proper 
bibliographical arguments have been established about the role of paper. I believe that 
the case of Mandeville and the vindication functions as an example that this is however 
possible. 
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hypothesis is true, the vindication added to The Fable of the Bees surely is the 
greatest part that Mandeville himself played in editing The Fable after it had 
been cleared from the charges of the grand jury. 
 There are two significant differences between the 1724 and the 1725 
octavo editions of the Tonson Fable. The 1725 (fourth) edition was printed 
in full on the paper that was used for the sheets of the 1724 edition (except 
for the two last quires).172 The use of this particular paper was not a default 
practice of the Tonson printing house.173 The fifth edition of The Fable in 
1728 was printed on different paper, but of similar quality.174 The most 
significant change between the 1724 and the 1725 editions is that on page 
465 there is one line less of text in the 1725 edition compared to the 1724 
edition, hence the pages from here on start to run in a different order until 
the  end of  the  book.  Kaye  points  out  that  the  ‘next  edition,  in  1725,  was  
identical except for a number of slight verbal alterations, some of which are 
probably by Mandeville’.175 The significance of the alterations is in fact very 
slight and the evidence pointing to Mandeville as their origin also thin.  
 A fact is that Mandeville did not make any substantial alterations to the 
1725 edition that would have called for resetting the type and increased the 
price of printing. At the time, Mandeville must have been extremely keen 
on making alterations and corrections because this was the time when The 
Fable and Mandeville’s character were under the most intense attack. For 
example, John Dennis’s direct offensive against The Fable of the Bees had 
been published in April 1724.176 Around the same time, in August 1724, A 
defence of Charity Schools addressing The Fable of the Bees was also published 
(not  in  1725  as  the  imprint  and ESTC indicate).177 The end result did not 
however yield any substantial changes to the subsequently published edition 
of The Fable of the Bees. What is significant from the point of view of printing 
the fourth edition is simply the purposeful alteration of the order in which 
                                                        
172 The CC countermarks can be found for example in a copy of the 1725 edition in 
CUL (pressmark 7720.d.444) from the leaves: A1, B4, C?, D2, E1, F2, G3, H1, I2, K3, 
L2, M4, N1, O1, P1, Q3, R3, S4, T1, U4, X1, Y4, Z3, 2A3, 2B3, 2C3, 2D2, 2E2, 2F1, 
2G4, 2H4. 
173 Other Tonson octavo-books in CUL from 1723 to 1725 that I have examined 
were  not  printed  on  the  same  stock  of  paper  –  they  do  not  have  the  water-  or  CC-
cornermarks: Richard Steel, The conscious lovers. A Comedy, London: Printed for J. Tonson 
over-against Katharine-Street in the Strand, 1723 (CUL, pressmark, Williams.667); John 
Gay, The captives. A tragedy, London: Printed for J. Tonson at Shakespear’s Head in the 
Strand, 1724 (CUL, pressmark 5721.d.70.20(3)); John Windus, A Journey to Mequnez; the 
residence of the present Emperor of Fez and Marocco. On the occasion of Commodore Stewart’s embassy 
thither for the redemption of the British captives in the year 1721, London: Printed for Jacob 
Tonson in the Strand, 1725 (CUL, pressmark Ll.35.16) and Laurence Echard, The history 
of  the  revolution,  and the  establishment  of  England in  the  year  1688. London: Printed for Jacob 
Tonson in the Strand, 1725 (CUL, pressmark, 7540.d.58). 
174 CUL, pressmark, 1028.c.1. 
175 Kaye, Intro, p. xxxv. 
176 Advertisement in the Evening Post, April 9 to April 11 1724. 
177 Advertisement in the Evening Post, August 25 to Aug 27 1724. 
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the text ran towards the end of the book. It was a logical way to establish 
that the book is a different edition from the 1724 printing while the same 
skeletons were used to print the bulk of the book. The fourth edition had 
everything  to  do  with  sales,  nothing  with  defending  the  character  of  the  
author through the means of editing the book. Mandeville’s defence of his 
character and thinking was carried out on a different front than editing The 
Fable. 
 Bernard Mandeville ‘apparently left no literary MSS’.178 To  be  sure,  I  
have conducted a systematic study of the different depositories and auction 
sale  catalogues  in  order  to  locate  Mandeville’s  letters,  manuscripts  and  to  
find out more information about the publishing history of The  Fable  of  the  
Bees.  The study confirms that there is apparently very little to be found on 
Mandeville compared to Hobbes and Hume.179 During the rather extensive 
research, only one letter was found addressed to Mandeville that has not, to 
my knowledge, been previously discussed in Mandeville scholarship. What 
happened to Mandeville’s own manuscripts is not known. It might be that 
Mandeville  was  one  of  the  old  fashioned  authors  who  actually  took  care  
that his private papers were burned. But for whatever reasons here lies the 
true  Mandevillean  paradox.  Several  scholars  today  agree  that  he  was  an  
original thinker who belongs to the same class as Hobbes and Hume. Yet, 
quite  unlike  Hobbes  and  Hume  today,  Mandeville  is  still  seen  as  an  
anomaly. While the biographical material that reveals the man behind the 
myth is lacking, it is still easy to conclude that he was the Man Devil instead 
of a man with original thoughts. The most likely scenario in the case of the 
preservation  of  Mandeville’s  manuscripts  and  letters  is  that  it  became  a  
vicious circle where no one took care of collecting or preserving them, 
                                                        
178 Margaret M. Smith, ‘Mandeville’ in Index of English literary manuscripts, Vol. III, 
1700–1800. Part 2, Mansell, 1989, p. 185. The almost complete lack of primary sources of 
Mandeville was noted by Kaye; this was reiterated by Irwin Primer in Mandeville studies, p. 
ix. 
179 The researched material relating to different auction sale catalogues of autograph 
letters in microfilm has been rather extensive (I have covered autograph letters at 
Sotheby’s 1734–1936, Puttick and Simpson catalogues 1846–1870, Thomas Thorpe’s 
catalogues 1818–1851 and a number of other miscellaneous records). In clear contrast 
with Mandeville, the correspondences of Hobbes and Hume form consistent bodies for 
detailed biographies. Meanwhile, Mandeville remains a mystery, although there is no 
reason to assume that he would not have engaged in at least a moderately extensive 
correspondence typical of a man of quality and learning. However, there is a total of 210 
letters in the Hobbes correspondence. The current editions of Hume’s letters include 642 
letters and these do not include the letters addressed to Hume. In this company, 
Mandeville’s fate seems truly sorry. Only two of his autograph letters have been found to 
date (both in BL). Regarding my search of auction sale catalogues and the 
correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, see Noel Malcolm and Mikko Tolonen, ‘The 
correspondence of Hobbes. Some new items’, Historical Journal, 51, 2008, p. 485. 
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instead of him being a victim of a conspiracy to remove his letters from the 
respectable collections.180 
 Manuscript  material  directly  relating  to  Bernard  Mandeville  is  thus  
scarce. One interesting affiliated item of the 1724 edition can be found in J. 
M. Keynes’s collection in King’s College, Cambridge.181 The copy includes 
an  annotated  index  with  more  than  80  different  manuscript  additions  and 
cross-references in ink amending the first Tonson printing of The Fable. The 
reason  why  this  item  is  interesting  is  that  it  is  possible  that  this  was  the  
author’s  copy  of  the  1724  edition  and  the  corrections  were  meant  for  a  
future edition of The Fable of the Bees.  
 The location of the copy in Keynes’s collection is essential. Apart from 
being  avid  collectors  of  Thomas  Hobbes  and  David  Hume,  Keynes  and  
Pierro Sraffa, who worked together in bibliographical matters, also collected 
items relating to Bernard Mandeville.182 As  collectors  and  scholars,  their  
impact on the history of philosophy has been significant.183 In fact, Sraffa 
and Keynes made the single most significant twentieth-century finding of 
Hume scholarship by discovering that David Hume himself composed the 
abstract to the Treatise. Keynes’s collections of Mandeville are impressive. 
They  incorporate  most  of  his  works,  including  both  issues  of  the  first  
edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1714. Keynes had also acquired many rare 
Mandeville items, for example a unique copy of Aesop dress’d of  1704  that  
includes some additional material printed for the first time.184 
 Keynes was not the first collector working on Mandeville for ideological 
reasons.  James  Crossley  of  the  Chetham Society  in  the  second half  of  the  
nineteenth century had also collected Hobbes, Mandeville and Hume. In 
the Notes and Queries,  Crossley  acted  as  a  leading  authority  on  Mandeville,  
                                                        
180 I am unwilling to conclude, however, that the attributes that help preserve the 
correspondence of one leading author of its time would be fully accidental. If the initial 
collection was destroyed or did not exist, more than two letters should have turned up. 
The most probable reason for the small number of Mandeville’s letters seems that he has 
been overlooked. People have not been actively searching for Mandeville’s letters as they 
have in the case of Hobbes and Hume. Extensive searches for Hobbes’s and Hume’s 
letters have been carried out on several occasions. The groundwork on Mandeville still 
relies on Kaye’s efforts in the 1920s. Of course, the question of censorship and wilful 
destruction of sources is another matter of speculation. Hobbes and Hume were 
controversial characters, but Mandeville was even worse according to the general public 
at the time. It is possible that someone played a private hangman when organising, for 
example, Hans Sloane’s library or other collections at the British Museum. 
181 Pressmark Keynes.F.19.34. 
182 References to the Keynes Papers, located at King’s College, Cambridge, will be to 
KP. KP: PP/55A MS is an autograph manuscript accession list of philosophical and 
literary works in J. M. Keynes' library. It includes a full checklist of Mandeville’s works. 
183 About  Keynes  as  a  collector,  see  the  fascinating  essay  by  A.  N.  L  Munby,  ‘The  
book collector’, in Essays on John Maynard Keynes, Milo Keynes, ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, pp. 290–298 (which, however does not establish the importance of Sraffa). 
184 The importance of this item is discussed in a letter from M. M. Goldsmith to 
Keynes, 14.6.1965, enclosed with the book, pressmark Keynes.F.19.20. 
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one  who  had  been  following  everything  related  to  him  for  decades.  As  a  
Hobbes scholar, Crossley was able to gather ten per cent of the letters in 
Noel Malcolm’s edition of Hobbes correspondence from different sources 
and his efforts on Hume were no less considerable. When Crossley died, 
unfortunately his vast collections were sold at auction and dispersed in 
different directions. Nevertheless, what we do know about Crossley is that 
one  of  the  main  sources  of  his  acquisitions  was  Thomas  Thorpe,  whose  
catalogues from 1818 to 1851 have been preserved. A manuscript 
annotation on a blank verso of the Keynes’s copy of the 1724 edition of The 
Fable of the Bees in King’s College, Cambridge refers to Thorpe’s catalogues 
in 1820 and to a relatively high price of 14 shillings. Given the nature of the 
copy and its possible origin, it would not be surprising if the copy in 
question and now in the Keynes’s collection had passed through Crossley’s 
hands. 
 Unlike  rare  book collectors  today,  when J.  M.  Keynes  bought  his  rare  
books, he had the privilege to choose the copy that he liked best. For 
example, in the case of a later edition of The Fable of the Bees, Keynes bought 
the item, but returned it to the seller because he did not like what he saw.185 
His aim was to collect all the impressions of all the editions of Mandeville’s 
works.186 Most  of  the  copies  that  he  acquired  are  crisp,  clean  items  –  the  
best copies available in the early twentieth century. The only copy that 
strangely  sticks  out  breaking  this  pattern  of  Keynes’s  collection  of  
Mandeville’s works is the 1724 edition of The Fable.187 
 The 1724 edition of The Fable of the Bees as such is not in any particular 
manner rare. Thirtyfive copies of this book have been inspected for this 
study  and,  according  to  the  enquiries  that  have  been  made,  none  of  the  
copies are in as bad shape as the Keynes copy. The edges of the Keynes 
copy are characteristically untrimmed. The condition of the binding is of 
noticeably low quality.188 The  boards  are  loose  and  the  binding  cracking.  
The  book is  barely  held  together  with  6  or  7  stitches.  Some of  the  pages  
have  been  folded  over  the  years.  There  are  stains  and  different  sorts  of  
                                                        
185 KP: PP/56/11/20 ‘McLeish & Sons 1932 Sept 23 Mandeville Fable of the bees, 
1795; 10s’. There is an annotation by Keynes indicating that he returned it, because he did 
not want it ‘now that I see it’. 
186 KP: PP/56 booksellers bills 1903–46. Includes bills of dozens of Mandeville 
purchases, but not the 1724 edition. 
187 Regarding the prices that we know that Keynes paid for Mandeville items: two 
invoices from B. H. Blackwell in 1934 regarding Mandeville books (that do not specify 
what work was in question) stand out because of their high price. Keynes paid on 
February 12, 1934 £12 10s. for one Mandeville item and on August 20, 1934 £7 10s. for 
another. KP: PP/56/13/3,28. In comparison, when Keynes bought Hume’s Abstract 
from Pickering & Chatto in October 1933, he only paid 18s. The high price, however, 
does not necessarily indicate the importance of a particular item. Collectors have always 
been herding around certain items, which naturally raises the prices (i.e. obsession about 
the first impression of the first edition). 
188 KP: PP/57/1/33 indicates that Keynes usually seems to be very particular about 
the bindings. 
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impurities throughout the book. There is a noticeable amount of ink-stains 
left from the printing process and there are also letters printed on the right 
hand side  of  the  margin  on different  pages.  Some of  the  pages  have  been 
purposely pierced and some of the leaves have been cut from the margin. In 
short,  adding  this  evidence  to  the  elaborated  and  precise  annotations  and  
additions to the index, the Keynes copy fulfils precisely the description of 
the author’s copy in bibliographical reference books.  
 The manuscript annotations in the copy have been done in at least three 
different hands, two of them are from a later origin than the eighteenth 
century. What matters is that the annotations to the index are consistently 
written  in  an  eighteenth-century  hand.  Whether  the  hand  is  that  of  
Mandeville’s, upon comparison to the two autograph letters and 
Mandeville’s will reproduced in the Liberty Fund edition of Keye’s Fable it 
is  difficult  to  say.  Mandeville’s  use  of  loops  and  descenders  on  certain  
characteristic letters is not uniform. However, the most characteristic 
formation of a letter in Mandeville’s handwriting is the lower case h, which 
is different in the annotated index. At the same time, the formation of some 
other letters (d, p, e) is very similar upon comparison of the Keynes copy 
and the letter to the Parker in 1726, which might indicate that the items are 
from the same author. Without comparing the annotated index to more 
Mandeville  manuscripts  from the  same period  (that  we  do not  have),  it  is  
difficult  to  tell  whether  the  handwriting  is  that  of  Mandeville’s  or  not.  
However,  if  it  proves  that  the  hand  is  not  that  of  Mandeville’s,  the  
annotations could still be his. 
 The annotations themselves, the virtue of their nature, and the trouble 
of making annotations to a copy of such improper quality indicate however 
that they were meant for a further edition of The Fable.  Many  of  the  
additions  point  to  the  ideas  that  Mandeville  elaborated  in  his  later  works.  
For  example,  one  of  the  new  entries  points  out  a  part  in  The Fable that 
discusses  ‘Self  Love’  and  ‘how  to  guard  against  it’.  One  addition  to  the  
index stresses ‘Self preservation’ and another stresses how ‘Vanity will make 
a man despise death’. It is also interesting to notice that quite a few of the 
additions refer to the author of the work. One entry states that the ‘Author, 
seeks not the approbation of the multitude’, another claims that ‘to be good 
the  author  lays  down  as  first  principle’.  There  is  also  another  entry  that  
points directly to the ‘opinion’ of the ‘author’. There are also other 
additions,  such  as  the  one  advising  how  to  guard  against  flattery,  that  
indicate that one reason for making additional entries to the index is to 
underline that the author of The Fable did  not  claim  that  vice  is  to  be  
commended, quite the contrary. On the other hand, there are also many 
detailed and seemingly insignificant points among the many additions to the 
index: Fryars, Gin, Conquest of Mexico, Mahomed Eddendi, Nuns, 
Ptolemy and how hospitals are built... By and large, not only the substantial 
matters are noted in the additions to the index, but also the kind of points 
that would not be made by an ordinary reader of the work. 
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 What is evident (besides the question whether part of the intention of 
the index was to defend the author by clarifying what he was saying) is that 
at the time of publishing the third edition in 1724 Mandeville evidently did 
have the urge to emphasise that the public did not understand what he was 
saying. When publishing the third edition, he had made the effort himself to 
change public opinion by including the vindication in The Fable, even when 
this most likely meant that Mandeville had to pay for it  himself.  However, 
the vindication did not change the public view. At the same time there was 
a further need for Mandeville to defend himself. What was Mandeville to 
do? 
 One plausible scenario is that Mandeville first thought about amending 
The Fable of the Bees.  After  all,  this  is  what  the  eighteenth-century  authors  
customarily  did.  David  Hume spent  a  third  of  his  active  life  as  an  author  
editing his works barely producing any new material. An obvious choice for 
Mandeville would have been to make several additions to the index that 
point  to  the  correct  pages  in  The Fable in  order  to  prove  what  he  was  
actually saying. But a fact is that whether the new entries to the index were 
compiled by Mandeville or not, the additions did not make it to any edition 
of The Fable. Why didn’t they? A plausible explanation is that the publisher 
was not willing to reset the type. The Fable was a book that sold rapidly in 
1724 and 1725. It was of vital importance to get a new edition out as soon 
as  possible.  If  Mandeville  had  sold  the  copyright  to  Tonson,  he  did  not  
have much saying regarding further editions or possible changes. It’s very 
possible that the picture of the younger Tonson and his money-grabbing-
hand is not completely faulty. If some corrections or additions such as the 
annotated  index  had  been  published,  it  would  have  required  resetting  the  
type in an entire gathering, which would have cost money and delayed 
printing. It is very interesting to notice that instead of making any further 
additions or changes to The Fable of the Bees,  the third edition, which is the 
first Tonson edition is in effect the last edition of the work. The rest of the 
editions are just reprints with some typographical changes that do not affect 
the copytext. From the printer’s and publisher’s point of view, one does not 
need to reorganise the type after the first Tonson edition in order to print 
subsequent editions. Mandeville had to find different channels to voice his 
opinions. 
 F.  B.  Kaye  writes  that  ‘the  editions  of  1728  and  1729  are  unchanged  
except  for  small  variations  which  are  probably  due  to  the  compositor’.189 
We are better off pointing out that there are hardly any changes to The Fable 
of the Bees after  the  first  Tonson  edition  was  published  in  1724.  It  is  also  
certain that the variants to the 1729 printing did not originate in Mandeville 
or Tonson’s printing house because the “first” sixth edition of 1729 is a 
pirated edition.190 This pirated edition includes an advertisement on an 
otherwise blank verso after the preface: ‘Just published, the tenth edition of 
                                                        
189 Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, p. xxxv. 
190 I have consulted the 1729 pirated edition in BL (pressmark 8407.bb.29). 
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Puffendorf’s introduction to the history of the principal kingdoms and 
states of Europe. With an appendix, containing an introduction to the history 
of the principal sovereign states of Italy; particularly Venice, Modena, Mantua, 
Florence, and Savoy’.  This  is  a  book  published  by  Samuel  Fairbrother  in  
Dublin.191 Upon examining the 1729 edition, it does not take long to realise 
that  the  title-page  is  false  and  the  1729  edition  of  The Fable did not have 
anything  to  do  with  Tonson.  The  ornaments  are  a  few  and  the  printing  
cheap, as it usually is in pirated editions. This pirated edition is accompanied 
with a pirated duodecimo version of Part II in 1730, which also includes an 
advertisement of Samuel Fairbrother.192  
 By and large, since it  became famous, The Fable of the Bees was a prime 
example  of  the  fact  that  ‘the  London  Trade  owned  the  copyrights  of  the  
most important and widely sold books and maintained a near monopoly 
over their distribution nationally’.193 The  battle  for  literary  property  was  
mainly fought between London copyright-owning booksellers and the 
printers of Scottish and Irish editions. The authors were usually mere pawns 
in this game. That The Fable was,  of  course,  still  in  the  later  half  of  the  
century  topping  sales  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  it  was  included  in  John  
Whiston’s list of the most likely pirated works.194 The question of copyright 
of The Fable of the Bees also resulted in the fact that Mandeville did not have 
much to do with the work after he had relinguished the copyright. 
 Instead of pointing this out, Kaye incorporated textual changes from a 
pirated printing of The Fable into his edition simultaneously omitting most 
of the changes derived from the errata. About Mandeville as an editor, Kaye 
writes, ‘the variations between the editions show Mandeville to have been a 
conscious stylist, carefully polishing’.195 This  is  an  exaggeration.  There  are  
only few significant changes after the first Tonson edition was published, 
                                                        
191 Samuel Fairbrother has an entry in M. Pollard, A dictionary of members of the Dublin 
book trade. 1550–1800. based on the records of the Guild of St Luke the Evangelist, Dublin. 
London Bibliographical Society, 2000, p. 195: Fairbrother, Samuel: b. c. 1684 –1712–1753 
d. 1758? (1714–1750) Printer, bookseller, bookbinder. King’s stationer 1723–1750. For a 
balanced account arguing that the importance of eighteenth-century Dublin publishing 
has unnecessarily been ignored as mere pirated editions, see Sher, The Enlightenment and the 
book, 2006, pp. 443–502. 
192 I have consulted the pirated edition of Part II of  1730  in  Bodl.  (pressmark  
Vet.A4f.403). It cannot be an approved Dublin reprint of Tonson’s sixth edition, because 
the sixth edition does not appear before 1732. 
193 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 4. 
194 Whiston’s list runs: ‘Spectators, Tatlers, Guardians, Shakespear, Prior, Gay’s 
fables and poems, Swift’s works, Temple’s works, Prideaux’s connection, Barrow’s 
works, Rollin’s ancient history, etc. Gil Blas, Whiston’s Josephus, Burnet’s theory, 2 vols, 
Young’s works, Thomson’s seasons, etc. Milton’s poetical works, Parnell’s poems, 
Hudibras, Waller’s poems, Fable of the bees, 2 vols, Young’s night-thoughts, Turkish 
Spy, Travels of Cyrus’. Whiston, John, Some thoughts on the state of literary property, p. 18; 
quoted in Gwyn Walters, ‘Bookseller in 1759 and 1774: The battle for literary property’, 
Library, s5, XXIX, 1974, p. 292. 
195 Kaye, intro, p. xxxv. 
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most of them are so slight that it cannot be said whether they were made by 
the printer or the author. Compared for example to David Hume, 
Mandeville  did  not  act  as  the  editor  of  his  own works  at  all.  In  short,  he  
finished the work, sold it to the publisher and moved on. This was basically 
what Mandeville did with The Fable of the Bees in 1724. 
Part II and the turn away from private vices and public benefits 
Defending  his  character  was  a  common  topic  for  Mandeville  after  1724.  
The preface of Part II dated October 20th 1728 commences with a sentence: 
‘Considering  the  manifold  clamours,  that  have  been  rais’d  from  several  
quarters, against The Fable of the Bees,  even  after  I  had  publish’d  the  
Vindication of it, many of my readers will wonder to see me come out with a 
Second Part, before I have taken any further notice of what has been said 
against the First’.196 Mandeville was disappointed that the vindication had 
not  served  the  purpose  that  he  had  designed  for  it.  He  had  an  urge  to  
defend  himself  but  it  was  not  the  first  time  he  tried.  Indeed,  ‘from  the  
appendix that has been added to the First Part ever since the third edition’, 
Mandeville announced, pointing to the vindication, ‘it is manifest, that I 
have been far from endeavouring to stifle, either the arguments or the 
invectives  that  were  made  against  me’.  About  the  different  ways  of  
defending himself, Mandeville mentions that he ‘once thought’ of compiling 
‘a  list  of  the  adversaries  that  have  appeared  in  print’.  The  reason why this  
plan  was  given  up,  according  to  Mandeville,  was  that  the  adversaries  were  
too  many  and the  points  they  were  making  too  few.  The  reason given  by  
Mandeville for his apparent five-year silence was that simply reading ‘some 
part or other, either of the Vindication or the book it self’ should prove the 
raised accusations against The Fable wrong.197 An annotated index or other 
similar corrections might have, of course, served as a guide in pointing out 
these relevant parts in the text. No corrections or additions were made and 
Mandeville sought other ways to defend his character. 
 Despite  his  public  silence  as  the  author  of  The Fable of the Bees, 
Mandeville  tells  that  he  had  compiled  a  full  manuscript  defending  himself  
already in 1726. It is surprising how little notice this has received in 
Mandeville scholarship. ‘I have wrote’, Mandeville exclaims in the preface, 
‘and  had  by  me  near  two  years,  a  Defence  of  the  The Fable of the Bees’, in 
which I have stated and endeavour’d to solve all  the objections that might 
reasonably  be  made  against  it,  as  to  the  doctrine  contain’d  in  it,  and  the  
detriment  it  might  be  of  to  others’.198 Hence, one simple explanation why 
                                                        
196 Mandeville, Part II, p. i. 
197 Mandeville, Part II, p. ii. The vindication is mentioned for the third time on p. iv 
of the preface. 
198 Mandeville, Part II, p. ii. Kaye argues that Remarks upon two late presentments of the 
Grand-Jury of the county of Middlesex would be the defence of The Fable that Mandeville is 
discussing in the preface. Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, pp. 457–8. I 
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making alterations to the first part of The Fable was not necessary for 
Mandeville was that he started writing a separate defence.199 Most evidently 
Mandeville wanted to make his thoughts understood. What did he do about 
it? He dropped The Fable altogether in Tonson’s hands. Instead of editing 
the  book in  order  to  answer  critics,  he  turned  to  writing  a  new book as  a  
full-fledged answer. It would be important to verify the existence of this 
manuscript defence.200 What Mandeville says about the manuscript is that ‘a 
considerable part of the Defence I mention’d, has been seen by several of 
my  friends,  who  have  been  in  expectation  of  it  for  some  time’.201 It  is  
doubtful that Mandeville would be making up that many of his friends had 
seen the manuscript. Mandeville also clearly states that his intention was to 
publish  the  defence.  ‘I  have  stay’d’,  he  says,  ‘neither  for  types  nor  paper,  
and yet I have several reasons why I do not yet publish it’. But ‘whenever it 
comes out’, ‘most of my adversaries’ will ‘think it soon enough, and no 
body  suffers  by  the  delay  but  my  self’.202 Even  if  we  are  never  able  to  
                                                                                                                 
find this unlikely. Particularly because Mandeville’s main point is that it is a work that has 
not been published and the Remarks was already published in 1724. 
199 Kaye has proved that Mandeville was not the author of True meaning of the Fable of 
the bees of 1726 and certainly this is not the defence of The Fable that Mandeville refers to. 
This work has been mistakenly attributed to Mandeville, for the correction, see Kaye, 
‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, pp. 463–4. The anonymous author of True 
meaning of the Fable of the bees defends  a  view  that  all  moral  distinctions  are  made  by  
politicians tricking men to act against their passions. Anon, True meaning of the Fable of the 
bees, London, 1726, p. 10. He also tries to reduce all the passions to self-love. Anon, True 
meaning of the Fable of the bees,  1726,  p.  71.  These  are  the  kind  of  claims  that  Mandeville  
wanted to take distance from by writing Part II.  The author of True meaning might have 
captured one meaning of The Fable, but by 1726 Mandeville’s own thinking had started to 
change. 
200 I have no knowledge of previous efforts to locate it. While researching the matter, 
I  found  out  that  there  is  a  manuscript  (Bernard  Mandeville,  The  fable  of  the  bees  
accompanied with explanatory notes. James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn 
Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University) entitled “The 
fable of the bees accompanied with explanatory notes in which the author defends 
himself against the charges brought against the work by the interested clergy and others 
who had commenced a prosecution against him because he had affirmed that no ‘nation 
was ever great and powerful without being at the same time wicked’” in Beinecke library, 
which might be taken to point towards this “lost manuscript”. This partial manuscript 
transcript of the first part of the The Fable of the Bees does not, unfortunately, include any 
of the explanatory notes mentioned in the title. I would like to thank Richard Serjeantson 
for aqcuiring a microfilm of the manuscript. 
201 One affiliated and possible point of interest is that Malcolm Jack has identified 
passages in Hutcheson’s Enquiry that are not to be found in The Fable of the Bees, even 
when they are indicated by Hutcheson as passages from The Fable. It is thus possible that 
more of Mandeville’s manuscripts relating to The Fable of the Bees were in circulation, if 
Hutcheson is not in fact quoting from some other work. Malcom Jack, ‘Hutcheson and 
Mandeville’, Notes and Queries, 24, 1977, pp. 221–22. Kaye has also identified passages that 
point towards circumstances that Mandeville had consulted some of Joseph Butler’s 
poems in manuscript form. Hence, it would not be impossible that Mandeville was in 
direct contact with these famous authors customarily circulating different manuscripts. 
202 Mandeville, Part II, p. iv. 
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recover this manuscript, what is beyond doubt is that Mandeville had a need 
to defend himself and he was more than willing to take action. At the end 
of  the  preface  to  Part II, for example, he spends five pages denying 
accusations that he had publicly burned The Fable of the Bees.203 
 Newspapers were an important channel that Mandeville used in the 
1720s to express his views. While Mandeville’s role in Female Tatler has 
received  attention,  it  is  rather  seldom  pointed  out  that  Mandeville  was  in  
fact involved in different journals throughout his career. The detailed article 
on Mandeville appeared in Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique in the 
1750s and emphasised ‘le Journal Anglois’ among Mandeville’s 
publications.204 This is interesting because it seems that British Journal also 
played  a  larger  part  in  Mandeville’s  career  than  for  being  just  a  venue  for  
publishing An enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn for the 
first time.205 
 We need to see Mandeville’s involvement in British Journal in  a  larger  
context. Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard published Cato’s letters in 
London Journal until  September  22,  1722.  From  that  date  on  Cato  started  
writing for British Journal. It is very likely that this particular date also marks 
Cato’s concrete political switch from the opposition to a publicly more 
favourable approach to Walpole’s government. The switch of Cato’s Letters 
from London Journal to British Journal was  not  a  small  matter.  An  
advertisement in Evening Post of  a  collection  of  Cato’s  Letters  added  that  
‘Cato’s  Letters  which  were  formerly  printed  in  the  London  Journal,  and  
which alone occasion’d the great sale of it, will for the future be publish’d 
only in the British Journal’.206 These letters were introduced in British Journal 
by a claim that because ‘the managers of London Journal’ have ‘made some 
difficulty to publish some of Cato’s letters’ it is ‘necessary for him to 
publish these letters hereafter in this Journal; where care will be taken, that 
no such remora’s will be thrown in their way’. Somewhat mysteriously, ‘the 
publick’ was ‘left to judge’ if ‘Cato has, in any instance, chang’d his conduct 
or his politicks’.207 It is quite probable that money had exchanged hands.208 
Later in his career, Thomas Gordon dedicated his translation of Tacitus to 
Walpole. 
                                                        
203 Mandeville, Part II, pp. xxvi–xxx. 
204 Jacques George de Chaufepié, Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique, pour servir de 
supplement ou de continuation au dictionnaire historique et critique, de Mr. Pierre Bayle. 4 vols., 
Amsterdam, 1750–6, p. 16. 
205 Frequency of executions at Tyburn was still discussed in Robert Hovenden, Crime and 
punishment, or the question how we should treat our criminals, practically considered, London, 1849, 
pp. 35–36. 
206 Evening Post, From Tuesday February 12 to Thursday February 14. 1723. 
207 British Journal, September 22, 1722. 
208 However, according to Simon Targett, Thomas Gordon was not bought with 
money to Walpole’s side. His financial situation was secure enough anyway. He had 
admired Walpole for a long time. Targett, Simon, 'Sir Robert Walpole's newspaper, 1722–
1742: propaganda and politics in the age of Whig supremacy', unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1991, p. 148. 
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 In British Journal, there was an editorial atmosphere favourable to the 
likes of Bernard Mandeville and the court Whigs. Edmund Parker also used 
British Journal extensively in 1723 to advertise the second edition of The Fable 
of the Bees.209 As the Cato introduction promised, no restrictions of 
expressions of confrontational views upon topical issues were made. The 
‘Of charity-schools’ –essay of Cato’s letters appeared in British Journal on 
June 15, 1723. This was a piece that set the wheels in motion and landed the 
authors of The Fable of the Bees and Cato a presentation to appear in front of 
a grand-jury. Since then, it took little more than a month for Cato to end his 
career in British Journal.  In  July  27,  1723  Cato  claimed  that  he  had  done  
nothing  wrong and therefore  ‘I  shall  now with  chearfulness  lay  down this  
paper,  which  I  am well  informed will  be  continued by  an  able  hand’.  The  
new pen taking  over  was  called  Criton.  On August  3,  1723  Criton  started  
his career in British Journal by sighing: ‘Cato is no more!’ The aftermath of 
the grand-jury incident was that Cato gave his letters up, while Mandeville’s 
involvement with British Journal was just beginning. 
 A  new  author  taking  over  Cato’s  slot  meant  that  an  even  more  direct  
and confrontational approach was taken in the British Journal.  It  is  
noteworthy how much in line Criton is with Mandeville’s opinions. In his 
first letter Criton manifested: ‘In politicks I am an Englishman; and my zeal 
embraces the good of the whole. I never enter’d into the fierceness and 
partiality of party, nor received its wages. I was born neither Whig nor Tory, 
and have liv’d long enough to condemn the excesses and ridiculous 
antipathies of both’. There was, however, no doubt that Criton had grown 
up as a Whig.210 
 Early on in his letters Criton unravelled the philosophy behind his 
political views by stressing how ‘self-love is no more separable from men 
than the love of life; and partiality is inseparable from self-love’. In a 
Mandevillean sense, Criton claimed that this ‘blindness’ is in fact ‘a blessing’ 
because it ‘sanctifies their failings’, enabling ordinary people to be happy. 
Only ‘where education and acquired prepossessions have concurr’d to 
heighten the innate vanity of men, it is a great misfortune to themselves, 
and makes them always unsociable to others’.211 Other  crucial  topics  for  
Criton were charity and charity schools as well as the ‘condition of great 
ministers’.212 Clearly,  beyond  any  other,  a  favourite  topic  for  Criton  was  
good breeding, which he evaluated on several occasions during his spell in 
British Journal that lasted precisely for one year (August 3, 1723 to August 1, 
1724).213 Criton did not just extol politeness. He emphasised that it was the 
                                                        
209 Parker advertisements of The Fable appeared at least on April 20, May 4, June 20, 
July 20 and July 27 in the British Journal. 
210 British Journal, August 3, 1723. 
211 British Journal, September 7, 1723. 
212 British Journal, November 30, 1723. 
213 Letters concentrating solely to analyse the nature of politeness appeared at least 
on British Journal, August 31, 1723; October 5, 1723 and November 16, 1723.  
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‘frailties  and  passions,  so  natural  to  men’  that  ‘make  what  we  call  good  
breeding so requisite amongst men’.214 These views present a clear overlap 
with Bernard Mandeville’s later writings. 
 As  Mandeville,  Criton  also  praised  Pierre  Bayle.  In  one  of  his  letters,  
instead of presenting his own material, Criton published what he referred to 
as ‘an excellent passage out of Mr. Bayle’s Miscellanous thoughts upon the 
comet’.  According  to  Criton,  it  was  ‘one  of  the  best  books  that  ever  was  
conceived  by  the  heart  of  man  against  superstition:  for  learning,  wit,  and  
reasoning, it stands in the first rank of modern or antient productions’. 
Criton, as he himself emphasised, made ‘use of the English translation’, and 
so did Mandeville.215 
 The most important item linking Criton to an atmosphere favourable to 
Mandeville was published in British Journal on  May  30,  1724.  It  was  
addressed as a letter to Criton on Criton’s usual slot. It was signed A. B. and 
it included a full chapter from Mandeville’s Free thoughts (namely, chapter 9, 
Of Toleration and persecution). The letter presenting the piece is just as 
interesting: Criton, ‘you have, not long since, given us several papers upon 
charity and persecution’, it commenced. Because the subject is important 
and  difficult,  let  me  ‘present  to  you  with  a  very  good  paper  out  of  an  
excellent book, too little known. It is Dr. Mandeville’s Free thoughts on religion, 
&c.’. The presentation also emphasised that ‘to the reproach of our taste, it 
has been twice translated into French,  and  yet  is  scarce  known  in  England’ 
and that it  had been written ‘for the interest of the establishment; and yet 
the friends of the establishment have, for want of reading it, not promoted 
it’. At least the publishers of British Journal were doing their best to promote 
Mandeville.216 
 Taking all this evidence into consideration, it would be unsurprising if 
Mandeville himself was in fact more involved with the pieces published in 
British Journal in the early 1720s than the available proof we have shows. 
What is beyond doubt is that the publishing atmosphere in British Journal 
was favourable for Mandeville’s views. After Criton’s contract expired in 
August 1724, Pomponius took over for a short period of time. His style and 
opinions (how, for example, a man with his sublime reason should have 
authority  over  a  woman)  were  quite  different  from  the  court-Whigs  and  
Mandeville. 
 While the vindication that Mandeville mentions on so many occasions 
first appeared in London Journal in 1724, in the words of F. B. Kaye, ‘the six 
chapters of’ An enquiry into the causes of the frequent executions at Tyburn ‘were 
contributed  as  letters  to  as  many  issues  of  the  British Journal’.217 This 
happened just  a  year  after  the  vindication  and the  first  Tonson edition  of  
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The Fable had been published. Mandeville’s case follows the same pattern of 
Cato’s Letters, changing from one Whig-newspaper to another. The form in 
which the chapters were published was the same as the communications 
presented by Cato and Criton. 
 Mandeville signed these chapters of Frequent executions at Tyburn as 
Philantropos. Kaye also notes that beside these weekly communications 
between  February  27  and  April  3,  1725,218 ‘there  is  also  a  Letter  to  the  
British Journal signed  Philantropos,  in  issues  April  24  and  May  1,  1725’,  
hence continuing the pattern of weekly communications.219 Kaye does not 
make any further comments about these letters. The first additional letter 
concerns the famous eighteenth-century outlaw Jonathan Wilde. The 
second letter is an answer to a letter received from a reader of the journal 
regarding  Wilde.  What  is  interesting  is  the  way  in  which  Mandeville  
responds to this letter. He acts as if he was one of the editors. This answer 
to  the  correspondent  is  signed  Philantropos  and  it  reads:  ‘Our  kind  
correspondent will find that we have made use of all his favour, and left out 
nothing  but  his  excuses  for  not  having  better  digested  and  polish’d  his  
letter, which we thought superfluous’.220 Following the chronological order 
of publishing the Philantropos-communications in British Journal, it 
necessarily comes to mind that Mandeville might have been more involved 
in the journal than what is commonly assumed. 
 The most interesting part of the weekly communications of 
Philantropos from February until the end of May 1725 is however not what 
came  after  the  chapters  of  Frequent executions at Tyburn, but what actually 
preceded them. In February 20, 1725 (Kaye does not note this issue),  one 
week before Mandeville started publishing the chapters under the name of 
Philantropos a solitary letter by Philanthropos was published. The spelling 
of  the  name  is  different  (with  an  extra  h),  but  we  must  take  into  
consideration the connection this pseudonym might have with Mandeville 
because  the  topic  is  so  crucial  regarding  what  Mandeville  advanced  in  
Part II. 
 The author argues contrary to ‘different writers concerning human 
nature’ who have presented man as an evil creature. Instead, Philanthropos 
stressed that man has ‘a natural affection to the species, and an inclination 
to serve and do good to mankind’. According to Philanthropos, the 
individual  is  ‘a  sociable  creature,  which  he  cannot  be  without  a  natural  
affection towards his own species’. In the end Mandeville also accepted the 
possibility of natural affection. This makes a difference in the evolution of 
the Mandevillean doctrine from a simplistic Hobbist outlook of The Fable 
towards  a  more  nuanced  view  presented  in  Part II. As we will learn, 
accepting the possibility of natural affection fitted quite well in Mandeville’s 
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new doctrine and it is therefore quite telling that the correspondence of this 
topic  was  published  under  a  similar  pseudonym  as  Mandeville’s  a  week  
before he started publishing his chapters of Frequent executions in British 
Journal.221 It is also important to understand that all these different episodes 
that took place after Mandeville had given up The Fable of the Bees and before 
he started writing Part II three  years  later  had  an  impact  on  the  change  
occuring in Mandeville’s thinking. 
 The reason for concentrating on the circumstances before Part II was 
published is that there is a change in Mandeville’s political theory. In fact, I 
will argue that this change is so vast that it was one of the reasons why the 
two separate parts of The Fable were not to be published together before 
1755. In the preface of Part II,  Mandeville writes about the work at hand: 
‘The reader will find, that in this Second Part I have endeavoured to 
illustrate and explain several things, that were obscure and only hinted at in 
the First’.222 Mandeville had come to realise that the doctrine he had been 
advancing in The Fable was  a  torso.  Naturally,  the  rhetoric  in  which  he  
described The Fable was  subtler  than  the  actual  meaning.  It  is  debatable  
whether the parts ‘that were obscure and only hinted at in the First’  really 
exist. Mandeville had simply changed his mind on certain issues and there is 
a clear contradiction in some parts when comparing these two different 
works. 
 Part II was  published  in  mid-December  1728  (title-page  indicates  the  
year 1729, the preface is dated October 20th 1728).223 It is also evident from 
internal evidence that Mandeville did not write Part II before he had been 
able  to  react  to  most  of  the  vast  criticism  in  his  defence  of  The Fable 
manuscript. The likely time of Mandeville composing the bulk of Part II is 
between 1727 and 1728. As Kaye perceptively notices, ‘Mandeville was 
writing  the  second dialogue’  of  Part II after  the  time when ‘Gibraltar  was  
fruitlessly besieged by Spain’ from ‘Feb. 1727 to Mar. 1728’.224 There is also 
more proof confirming this estimate to be the likely time of the 
composition of Part II.225 It  means that the new work was composed after 
Mandeville had finished the manuscript of the defence of The Fable, which 
he clearly found insufficient for a reason or another – he did not go 
through the trouble of publishing it, although he was a veteran in publishing 
                                                        
221 British Journal,  February 20,  1725.  There is  also a third pseudonym quite close to 
these two contributing to the British Journal in the 1720s. However, the letters signed 
Philanthropus (from 1723 until 1729) are quite different from Mandeville in particular. 
Philanthropus writes mainly about theological issues, such as war against false religion 
(September 19, 1724). 
222 Mandeville, Part II, p. vi. 
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different kinds of literary works at this point in his career. The suggestion of 
this study is that the reason is that Mandeville himself found the doctrine of 
The Fable of the Bees insufficient and desired to craft his moral and political  
thinking anew.  
 What we need to understand about eighteenth-century publishing is the 
impact  of  the  printer  and  the  publisher  on  the  final  decisions  of  the  end  
product  (the  printed  book).  It  was  often  greater  than  the  impact  of  the  
author.  It  is  also  interesting  that  it  seems  that  the  opportunities  for  an  
ordinary author to influence the printing process got worse by eighteenth 
century. Percy Simpson, in order to demonstrate the ‘normal practice’ of 
‘the ruthless determination of the printer to treat the author as an intruder if 
he offered to set foot inside the printing-house’ discusses the case of 
Charles Viner in the eighteenth century, who uttered that against the 
printers ‘the State of authors I find by experience is like the State of war’.226 The 
authors did not always have the opportunity to have a say how their work 
was presented in print. W. W. Greg has discussed the case of a seventeenth-
century play, which included autograph corrections, a new added title and 
instructions  for  the  stage.  To the  surprise  of  many,  it  turned  out  that  the  
author was responsible for the corrections and annotations, but it was the 
director of the theatre who had added the instructions and the new title of 
the play.227 Hence,  it  might  be  that  things  were  not  that  different  in  the  
seventeenth century either. We have also the case of James Roberts, the 
trade publisher,  altering a title of a work. This happened in the process of 
publishing  a  theological  pamphlet.  In  his  diary,  the  first  Earl  of  Egmont  
complains  that  the  ‘title  I  gave  it  was,  A dialogue between a church of England 
man affectionate to the government and a dissenter concerning the taking off the test; but 
the publisher has given it’ a completely different title when it was 
published.228 
 Hence, in the case of Part II,  we  may  take  into  consideration  that  the  
publisher and the printer could have easily influenced the title of the work. 
After the enormous publicity of The Fable of the Bees,  there  was  an  urge  to  
profit from the title anew. In the case of Part II, the likely explanation why 
the book is entitled Part II of The Fable of the bees is the money motive. What 
is  also  significant  about  the  title  is  that  while  the  memorable  part  of  The 
Fable of the Bees was the subtitle, “private vices, public benefits”, it does not 
feature in Part II.  It  was  this  thesis  that  Mandeville  wanted  to  distance  
himself from. 
                                                        
226 Simpson, Proof-reading in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 1935, p. 43. 
227 W. W. Greg, ‘Massinger’s autograph corrections in “The Duke of Milan,” 1623’, 
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 In all likelihood, both the publisher and the author profited from Part II. 
So, I am not claiming that Mandeville would not have been at least partly 
responsible for the title.229 When one actually compares The Fable of the Bees 
and Part II, one realises that they do not have that much in common besides 
the title and the author. Hence, why do we still read them as two volumes 
defending the same thesis? 
The publisher of Part II 
Who  was  the  publisher  of  Part II?  In  Pierro  Sraffa’s  collection  in  Trinity  
College, Cambridge there is an interesting rebound set consisting of the first 
Tonson edition of The Fable of the Bees of 1724 and Part II of 1729.230 The 
back  of  the  books  read  ‘Fable  of  the  bees,  Vol.  I’  and  ‘Vol.  II’,  a  clear  
indication that they were bound anew at a later date. The notes that Sraffa 
made regarding the cancelled title-page of Part II are interesting. He noticed 
that beside the obvious indication of stubs after the title-page, wire lines on 
the  title-page  and  the  following  leaf  do  not  match  and  the  title-page  ‘is  
certainly a cancel’.231 Further research had taken Sraffa to Keynes’s Library 
where  he  had  found  a  copy  of  the  same  book  including  evidence  of  the  
original, cancelled title-page.232 Sraffa did not find out what the imprint in 
the original title-page was, but he assumed that this concerned the role of 
James Roberts. A copy in the National Library of Finland confirms Sraffa’s 
assumptions.233 Measuring the different words on the cancellandum234 
                                                        
229 It was customary in eighteenth-century publishing to use famous titles in different 
ways to prop up sales. For example, in 1708 William Taylor printed a second edition of a 
translation entitled The art of speaking. This was advertised on the title-page as a book 
‘written in French by Messieurs Du Port Royal: in pursuance of a former Treatise, 
Intituled, The Art of Thinking’. The authors of the French work were not Nicole and 
Arnauld, but Bernard Lamy. The connection between this work and the original was 
mostly imaginary. The obvious reason for advertising the work as a sequence to the Art of 
thinking was of course to increase sales. This was not uncommon at all in the eighteenth 
century and the case of Part II is similar. 
230 Pressmarks Sraffa 344/1 and Sraffa 344/2. 
231 ‘Wire lines of A1 (t.-p.) and A2 (i–ii) should coincide exactly (as they do between 
A3 and A4). But they do not: and actually A1, has a different wire (see two close vertical 
lines near edge) from all other pages of A. Therefore, t.-page is certainly a cancel’. Sraffa 
also noted that ‘offcast at the back of the title-page is doubled’. Sraffa 344/2. 
232 In the words of Sraffa: ‘at the back of t.-p. the set-off is partly of a t.p. and partly 
of p. i of Preface (sig A2) showing clearly that when the present t.p. was superimposed 
there was still in position part of a torn t.-p’. What Sraffa noticed was that the ‘main 
difference in what is left is in the imprint: the word “printed” is much closer to the left 
vertical rule and is not followed by a colon. Also difference in the vertical spacing of the 
counterpartments: the top comp. (title) being shorter + the bottom one (imprint) longer’. 
233 Pressmark H69.VI.22. This is also a rebound set of the 1724 Fable and 1729 Part 
II. The fact that the title-page is a cancel is obvious. The partly torn, original title-page is 
to be found on the last page of the book before the index (ee8v; p. 432). In a copy in 
NLS (pressmark L.C. 2092) the impression of the title-page is on p. xiv (a8v). The copy 
in the National Library of Finland is more legible giving the details of the missing words. 
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reveals that the line originally read: ‘Printed for J. Roberts in Warwick-
lane’.235 So,  what  is  different  in  the  original  page  and  the  title-page  that  
ended in the published book is that the original page reads: ‘Printed for J.  
Roberts in Warwick-Lane. / MDCCXXIX’. The cancellandum reads: 
‘London, Printed: And Sold by J. Roberts in / Warwick-Lane. MDCCXXIX’. 
What Sraffa maintains about the vertical spacing is hence true. 
 One definition of ‘a misleading imprint’ is that ‘while containing actual 
place, date, names, and addresses’ it ‘presents the information in such a way 
as to misrepresent, deliberately or not, the actual roles of the various people 
involved’.236 According to this definition, the imprint of Part II counts  as  
such,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  conceals  the  actual  publisher.  The  original  
imprint, ‘printed for J. Roberts’, indicates that Roberts would have been the 
printer  and the  publisher.  This  imprint,  however,  was  cancelled.  Why?  As  
we know, the form ‘London: printed and sold by A. B.’ does not necessarily 
indicate  ‘Printed  by  A.  B.’,  but  more  often  it  simply  means  ‘Printed  in  
London  and  sold  by  A.B.’.  The  use  of  the  phrase  ‘London  printed’  was  
common in the eighteenth-century book trade.237 We also know that ‘there 
exist  a  large  number  of  imprints  which  describe  a  work  as  ‘printed  for’  
someone who neither owned the copyright nor in any sense financed the 
operation of its publication’.238 If  the  original  imprint  (‘Printed  for  J.  
Roberts’)  had  been left  standing,  this  would  have  been misleading  indeed.  
Roberts  was  not  the  publisher  of  Part II,  as  he  was  not  the  publisher  of  
Tonson editions of The Fable of the Bees. The cancellandum (‘London, 
Printed: And Sold by J. Roberts’) is more accurate, because according to the 
common eighteenth-century standards, it simply indicates that the main 
distributor  of  the  book  was  Roberts.  But  the  cancellandum  is  also  
misleading, because it does not reveal the actual publisher. My assumption 
is  that,  just  like  in  the  case  of  The Fable of the Bees after  1724,  the  actual  
publisher of Part II was Jacob Tonson. The similarity between Tonson 
editions of The Fable and Part II is strong enough for us to assume that they 
came  from  the  same  publisher  or  press.  Also,  the  fact  that  Tonson  did  
publish the second edition of Hypochondria in 1730 (as the imprint indicates) 
is a reason to assume that the publishing relationship between Mandeville 
and Tonson continued in 1729–30. 
                                                                                                                 
The word printed is about half a centimetre closer to the border than the cancellandum. 
Also the year, ‘MDCC...’ [ripped partly] is much closer to the centre of the page, which 
means that ‘Warwick-Lane’ was not set on the same line with the publishing year, 
MDCCXXIX. After the word ‘Printed’ there is a recognisable ‘o’, from ‘for’. Also, there 
is an upper-case ‘R’ and lower-case ‘b’, which comes from Roberts. 
234 Cancellandum: ‘Warwick-lane’ (2,5 cm), ‘J. Roberts in’ (3,3 cm). If you place these 
(5,8 cm) on the line of the cancelled title-page, it fits precisely. 
235 After this there would have been a border and the year ‘MDCCXXIX’ would 
have been on its own line. The measurements fit. The year is more or less in the centre. 
236 Greg, Some aspects and problems, 1956, p. 30. 
237 See Hazen, ‘One meaning of the imprint’, 1951, p. 120. 
238 Greg, Some aspects and problems, 1956, p. 32. 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF BERNARD MANDEVILLE 
 
84 
 Tonson had  plenty  of  reasons  to  conceal  that  he  was  the  publisher  of  
Part II. Mandeville appeared in front of the grand-jury, not once, but twice. 
What is important to understand is that the people who were tried in this 
kind  of  cases  were  the  authors,  printers  and  publishers  –  not  the  
distributors of the book. The second time The Fable was tried happened in 
1728  and  it  concerned  the  fifth  edition  published  the  same  year.239 This 
time, the presentment did not only concern Mandeville but also the 
publisher, the younger Tonson, who was also named in the presentment.240 
The reasons given for The Fable to be charged were just as vague as the first 
time. This time, however, the presentment included a reference to the first 
presentment:  
we beg leave humbly to observe, that this infamous and scandalous book, entituled, 
The Fable of the bees, etc. was presented by the Grand-Jury of this county, to this 
honourable court, in the year 1723, yet notwithstanding the said presentment, and in 
contempt therof, an edition of this book has been published, together with the 
presentment of the said Grand-Jury, with scandalous and infamous Reflections 
thereon, in the present year 1728.  
Because of Tonson’s involvement the second presentation was naturally a 
serious  occasion.  Tonson was  an  important  figure.  In  1729,  he  was  ‘made  
the Prince’s Stationer’.241 It only is natural that he would, at the same time, 
push  for  publishing  Mandeville’s  new  work  riding  the  fame  of  The Fable 
while leaving out his own involvement in the imprint. 
 A vital piece of bibliographical evidence strongly suggesting that the two 
parts of The Fable are different works and intellectually apart, is that Part II 
has a sequel whereas The Fable of the Bees does not. Enquiry into the origin of 
honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war of 1732 is the volume two of Part 
II. It continues the dialogues between the same characters as in Part II, but 
most importantly, it elaborates the same theory about the correspondence 
between human nature and civil society that Mandeville first put forward in 
Part II (not in The Fable of the Bees). Kaye published his edition of The Fable of 
the Bees and Part II as  a  work  of  two  volumes.  At  the  same  time,  he  left  
Origin of honour without a single mention in the section of his edition entitled 
‘History of the text’. He does not mention the fact that Origin of honour is the 
continuum of Part II.  It  seems  that  if  we  were  to  publish  the  different  
“parts” of The Fable of the Bees in more than one volume, we should at least 
include the third volume, Origin of honour. 
 Why isn’t Origin of honour entitled The Fable of the bees, Part III? Maurice 
Goldsmith  has  considered  the  matter.  He  finds  this  as  a  ‘mystery’  and  
speculates that ‘perhaps Mandeville thought that a new title would catch 
new trade’.242 A  new  title  does  not  seem  to  be  such  a  mystery  when  we  
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consider that Part II should have had a different title to fit  the content.  In 
the case of Part II, Mandeville and the publisher were driven by the money 
motive  when  choosing  the  title.  But  when  it  came  to  the  sequel  of  this  
work, it was only natural that Mandeville took further distance from The 
Fable of the Bees by giving the book a different title. It was sufficient to notify 
that the author of the book was the same as that of The Fable of the Bees.  
 What we witness in Origin of honour is Mandeville expanding the theory 
presented in Part II to consider the phenomenon of honour in more detail. 
This is a book about manliness, courage and greatness of mind. The actual 
theory  on which  the  analysis  of  the  topic  is  based  in  this  book is  a  direct  
continuum of Part II. It is these two works that ought to be read together, 
as for example the young David Hume did naturally because of his age. He 
was 18-years old when Part II was published and 21-years of age when 
Origin of honour emerged from the printing press. To publish Origin of honour 
under  a  different  title  also  marks  the  final  step  that  Mandeville  took  away  
from the burden of The Fable of the Bees,  even when he, at times, hints that 
these thoughts would be in line with the first work, which in reality they are 
not.  We need to understand that Mandeville was most of all  defending his 
own character when defending The Fable of the Bees. He simply could not 
publicly announce that he had changed his mind. But what happened with 
the Origin of the honour was inevitable:  in the end, a new thesis resulted in a 
new title. 
 Another factor adding up to the circumstances that Origin of honour is not 
The Fable of the Bees, Part III is the change of publisher. Origin of honour was 
not  published  by  Tonson  and  it  was  not  printed  in  the  same  press  as  
Tonson’s editions of The Fable.243 There is no reason to doubt the imprint 
(printed for J.  Brotherton) and the most likely publisher of Origin of honour 
was John Brotherton. Therefore, Tonson did not own the copyright of 
Origin of honour. For one reason or another, Mandeville had parted ways with 
Tonson and started working for Brotherton. John Brotherton was, after all, 
also the publisher of the second edition of Free thoughts of 1729. A different 
publisher in this case probably meant a different copyright holder. 
 Towards the end of the eighteenth century the custom of rebinding The 
Fable of the Bees and Part II with matching covers developed.244 It  is  
nevertheless debatable whether this is an indication that the two different 
parts of The Fable were commonly read as two volumes outlining a unitary 
                                                        
243 I have examined the three copies in BL (pressmarks): 1028.c.4(2); 855.d.26; 
G.16237 and two copies in Keynes Library in King’s College Cambridge (pressmarks): 
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enquiry into the origin of honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in war, London, 1732. 
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thesis. For example, when The Fable was translated for the first time into 
German in  1761,  it  was  ‘a  translation  of  Part  Two of  the  Fable only’.  The  
original Fable of the Bees was not published in German until 1818.245 We have 
also other British eighteenth-century comments noticing the difference 
between the  two parts  of  The Fable. One commentator for example noted 
that ‘in the preface to the Pastoral Letters of the Bishop of London’ it has 
been  pointed  out  that  Mandeville  published  a  ‘second  part,  in  which  the  
author endeavours to soften what he said in the first’ part of The Fable of the 
Bees.246 
 F. B. Kaye came to a different conclusion. In his ‘Writings of Bernard 
Mandeville’, Kaye puts a strong emphasis on the alleged fact that ‘after 
1732, the two volumes were published together’.247 For him, this seems to 
have functioned as the decisive evidence and justification for publishing the 
two parts of The Fable as two volumes. Kaye underlines that Jacob Tonson 
advertised ‘The two-volume edition’ of The Fable ‘under the date of 1734’ in 
London Magazine in December 1733.248 This however, does not indicate that 
the  two-volume  edition  was  actually  published.  R.  B.  McKerrow,  in  his  
review of Kaye’s Fable raised doubts about Kaye’s decisions.249 Kaye, after 
all,  had  not  seen  an  actual  copy  of  the  1734  edition.  He  based  the  
information about the two-volume edition on the advertisement only. 
Instead  of  outlining  that  ‘after  1732,  the  two  volumes  were  published  
together’,  we might want to consider putting an emphasis on the fact that 
during  Mandeville’s  lifetime,  the  two  parts  of  The Fable were never 
published together. As it seems, the first time the two parts were published 
at the same time was in 1755 in a pirated Edinburgh edition. We may also 
remark that in this edition, Part II is called Part II and not volume two. 
 It  is  however  true  that  the  1734  two-volume  set  was  advertised  by  
Tonson. Hence, there was at least an indication that the edition was to be 
published. There exist a handful of copies in which the title-page indicates 
that  it  would  be  a  copy  of  this  edition.250 The  title-leaves  in  all  of  these  
                                                        
245 Fabian, ‘The reception of Bernard Mandeville in eighteenth-century Germany’, 
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1726 and again in 1765. It should perhaps be pointed out that none of these were a 
commercial success. 
246 Antonio Valsecchi, Of  the  foundations  of  religion,  and  the  fountains  of  impiety. 3 vols., 
Dublin, 1800, III, p. 456. 
247 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 433. 
248 Kaye, ‘The writings of Bernard Mandeville’, 1921, p. 433. Also, in an issue of 
Daily Journal of December 6, 1733 there is an advertisement of an octavo, ‘New edition of 
The Fable of the bees’, ‘Printed for J Tonson’. This small advertisement was not repeated 
in further issues of the journal. Most of the ‘next week will be published’ advertisements 
were printed for many weeks in a row (and hence were not all fully accurate). 
249 McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, 1925, pp. 109–111. 
250 There are three known copies of a complete set of the supposed 1734-edition in 
Amherst College Library, Guelph McLaughlin Rare Books Collection and Arizona State 
University Libraries. Different catalogues also indicate a fourth copy in Walter H., and 
Leonore Annenberg Rare Book & Manuscript Library University of Pennsylvania, but 
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books, however, are cancels. Actual facts about these existing copies of the 
supposed 1734 edition signal that the edition was not published.251 The text 
in all the known copies of the supposed 1734 edition matches precisely the 
1755 edition. The physical description of the book is the same as the one 
given in the ESTC for the 1755 edition.252 The few ornaments in the books 
also match precisely the 1755 edition. And most importantly, the book 
(except for the title-leaves) is a duodecimo, with chain lines horizontal, 
gathered in twelves, just like the 1755 Edinburgh printing of The Fable. All 
the Tonson editions of The Fable (and other Mandeville titles) were octavo 
books, with chain lines vertical, gathered in eights. Tonson also advertised 
the forthcoming 1734 edition as an octavo edition of two volumes. There is 
no reason to think that he would have changed the format all of a sudden in 
1734. 
 Most  likely  all  the  copies  in  question  are  copies  of  the  pirated  1755  
edition  with  a  fictional  title-page.  Furthermore,  between  1724  and  1732,  
Tonson published four editions of The Fable of the Bees (his name never 
appears in the imprint of Part II before this “1734-Edinburgh edition”) and 
he also published several other Mandeville items. Of all the genuine Tonson 
editions we have dozens, if not hundreds of copies that have survived. And 
since Mandeville, one of the great controversialists of all times, had passed 
away  in  1733,  it  would  be  natural  to  think  that  Tonson  (a  businessman)  
would have cleared up with an extensive edition (as he did after Joseph 
Addison had died and which clearly was his intention). If Tonson would 
have published the two-volume set of The Fable after Mandeville’s death, it 
is certain that we would have many copies of this edition available. We have 
no  real  evidence  indicating  that  the  book  was  actually  printed  or  that  it  
would have been distributed to the booksellers. Hence, the conclusion is 
that the 1734 edition was not put on the market as other Tonson editions 
of The Fable. 
 What is interesting is the question of the cancelled title-leaves. It does in 
fact seem, as McKerrow points out, that the publisher of the pirated edition 
of 1755 had gone through an unusual amount of trouble when pirating the 
edition.253 It  is  a  small  mystery  that  the  title-leaves  are  probably  octavo  
                                                                                                                 
this is an incomplete set, only containing the first “volume”. I would like to thank Daria 
D'Arienzo in Amherst College Library, Darlene Wiltsie in Guelph McLaughlin Rare 
Books Collection and Marilyn Wurzburger in Arizona State University Libraries for their 
kind help in investigating the copy in their possession and giving detailed answers to my 
questions. 
251 The edition was not entered into the Stationer’s Hall’s register. Many magazines 
and journal had registers of books published every month. At least in the register of 
Gentleman’s magazine for December 1733 and January-April 1734 there is no sign of the 
1734 two-volume edition of The Fable. The index for the volume of 1734 does not 
register the book either. 
252 Namely: Vol. 1: ix, [1], 374 p.; vol. 2: [2], xxii, 345, [27] p. 
253 McKerrow, ‘Fable of the bees. Book review’, 1925, p. 111. 
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leaves because of the vertical chain lines, unlike the bulk of the book with 
horizontal chain lines of a duodecimo book. Why is this the case? 
 As we recall, The Fable was one of the books mentioned in the ongoing 
publishing war between the London and Dublin-Edinburgh booksellers in 
the  1760s.  It  is  clear  that  the  1755  Edinburgh  edition  itself  was  not  
legitimate and called for some sort of a cover-up from the publisher. But to 
produce such a clever plan of issuing the pirated edition with a cancelled 
title-page of an edition that was advertised but never printed, does indeed 
sound quite  incredible.  In  order  to  do  that,  the  Edinburgh printer  should  
have  had  access  to  the  1734  title-page.  Even  when  this  does  sound  far-
fetched, this is a possibility that should be taken into account, given that the 
title-leaves most likely came from an octavo-sized book. 
 Another possibility is that the printer went through the trouble of 
printing the title-leaves so that the book appeared to be an octavo printing 
and hence he printed the fake title-leaves on different stock of paper than 
the rest of the book. This, while of course possible, would indeed be a very 
unusual sign of determination in a pirating printer. When one looks at some 
of  the  pirated  editions  (for  example,  the  Dublin  printing  of  The Fable in 
1729), one realises that no particular care was usually shown in the printing 
process.  The  quality  of  the  printing  in  a  pirated  edition  compared  to  an  
original one, usually suffered drastically. 
 The bookseller of the 1755 edition had a good reason to cancel the title 
page  in  some  of  the  copies  and  to  insert  a  fake  title  page  of  a  previous  
edition,  in  order  to  prove  that  the  edition  was  genuine.  If  the  fake  title-
pages originated from an original printing, what would be better for 
counterfeiting purposes? This sounds more plausible than the printer going 
through the trouble of printing these fake title-leaves himself. It is possible 
that  the  1734  Tonson edition  had  been printed  but  not  distributed  to  the  
booksellers.  Therefore, it  is  possible that a bulk of the title-leaves had also 
been saved. This, however, is also an unlikely scenario because it is likely 
that the paper would have been recycled by 1755. 
 Yet, the mystery remains and there exist copies of the 1755 edition with 
1734  title-leaves.  How is  this  possible?  It  is  a  fact  that  Tonson advertised  
this edition as forthcoming. Jacob Tonson seems to have been an efficient 
advertiser of his products.254 His intention was actually to publish the two 
volumes in 1734. The edition was not published, perhaps the actual printing 
never  took  place,  it  was  stopped  during  the  print  run  or  the  copies  were  
destroyed before they reached the customers. Since the advertising took 
                                                        
254 This is also indicated by a letter from Lawrence Theobald to Jacob Tonson on 2 
Jan. 1733. Theobald writes to Tonson: ‘As I have very few days left before I must close 
my list, I beg for these next six days, Shakespeare may every day be advertis’d in Daily 
Post,  Daily  Journal  and  Daily  Advertiser,  &  in  Evening  Posts.  (These  infrequent  &  
scattering advertisements do me no manner of service.) I have sent a number of my 
printed advertisements herewith for this purpose.’ BL, Add. 28275. 
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place in newspapers, perhaps title-page advertising also took place.255 By 
title-page advertising I refer to a practice of printing extra-sets of title-leaves 
to  be  used  as  posters  and circulating  them in  coffee-shops  etc.  Publishing  
the two parts of The Fable together for the very first time immediately after 
the  author  had  died  would  have  been  a  major  literary  occasion.  It  most  
obviously did not go through as planned since there are no surviving, real 
copies of the edition. Nevertheless, if the edition had already been widely 
advertised,  some  of  the  title  page  advertisements  might  have  survived.  
Therefore, it would explain how the copies of the 1734 title page would 
have reached the counterfeiting Edinburgh bookseller. So, if there used to 
be  a  tradition  of  advertising  books  by  printing  extra-copies  of  their  title  
pages and using them as advertisements, the puzzle can be solved. If such a 
tradition of advertising existed, then naturally the Dublin and Edinburgh 
illegal printers in general would have been eager to get their hands on 
original title-pages so they could insert them in some of their copies in 
order to prove that their stock was legitimate (for example, while they were 
upon the act of transporting the pirated books to London). The war against 
counterfeiting was fierce in the eighteenth century. The puzzle still remains, 
but this is one hypothesis that seems quite logical. 
Conclusion 
Quite evidently, when first publishing The Fable of the Bees in 1724, the 
younger  Jacob  Tonson  owned  the  copyright  of  the  book.  He  is  also  the  
most likely candidate to have originally owned the copyright of Part II. Why 
then, would he not have printed the two volumes together in 1734? By this 
time it  is very probable that Tonson had sold the shares of the copyrights 
forward  to  other  publishers.  It  was  a  common practice  to  sell,  divide  and 
resell the copyrights that one had.256 In fact, ‘joint ownership of copyrights 
was if anything more common after 1710 than before; the more booksellers 
concerned in a copyright, the less chance that a pirate would risk the wrath 
of its owners by infringing their rights’.257 Also, ‘small shares of popular 
books were commonplace’.258 This idea of breaking the copyright to smaller 
pieces seems to be a likely later distribution pattern of The Fable of the Bees.  
 The Tonsons gradually dispersed their copyrights of Shakespeare. The 
remaining ‘Tonson copyrights were sold in 1767 for about £10000’.259 The 
                                                        
255 A very general introduction to the question of title and book itself stressing the 
commercial significance of a title page in early modern history is Eleanor F. Shevlin, ‘“To 
reconcile book and title, and make ’em kin to one another”: the evolution of the title’s 
contractual functions’, Book History, 2, 1999, pp. 42–77. p. 52: ‘Since published titles were 
typically devised not by the author but by the publisher they were frequently generated 
with solely sales – and not the subject – in mind.’ 
256 Belanger, ‘Booksellers trade sales, 1718–1768’, 1975, pp. 281–302. 
257 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 3. 
258 Belanger, ‘Booksellers trade sales, 1718–1768’, 1975, p. 285. 
259 Belanger, ‘Booksellers’ sales of copyright’, 1970, p. 5. 
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records of the sale indicate that the Shakespeare copyrights formerly owned 
by the Tonsons had already been scattered over to several booksellers. A 
similar pattern most likely concerned The Fable of the Bees.  The  famous  
Tonson sale of 1767 does not include the copyright of The Fable or Part II, a 
possible reason is that the copyrights had been divided into smaller pieces 
and sold to other booksellers. Mandeville’s works, including The Fable of the 
Bees, feature occasionally in different sales of books in quires in Longman 
and Ward catalogues, but the only conclusion to be drawn from these sales 
is  that  in  the  1730s  and  1740s  the  two  parts  of  The Fable were  sold  
separately by many different booksellers.260 There are no traces of copyright 
sales of Mandeville’s works in these catalogues. The only larger Mandeville 
related  item  in  the  Tonson  sale  were  350  books  in  quires  of  the  Tonson  
edition of ‘Mandeville’s diseases’ [Hypochondria].261 But  we  need  to  
remember that public sales of the copyrights were only the tip of the 
iceberg. Much more was going on behind closed doors. 
 In any case, the idea of Mandeville owning the copyrights himself seems 
highly unlikely (after the first Tonson edition). A plausible scenario is that 
the copyrights had been handed through Tonson over to a printing conger. 
This  would  also  be  a  probable  explanation  that  caused  the  controversy  of  
the 1734 edition that ended in having it recalled from the market. 
Therefore, the actual reason why the two parts of The Fable were not 
published as two volumes concerned business. Tonson did not own the 
right to publish the two parts of The Fable as a posthumous edition. Hence, 
the other parties involved with the copyrights stopped Tonson before the 
1734 edition was actually published and distributed to customers. The irony 
is  that  this  is  what  Mandeville  would  have  probably  desired.  After  all,  the  
two parts of The Fable are intellectually wide apart. 
 Mandeville defended his own character until the bitter end. Tonson’s 
vision about bookselling was quite different. For him, good controversy 
always meant good business. It is of little wonder that Tonson is the 
publisher of George Berkeley’s Alciphron: or, the minute philosopher in 1732. It 
was the first Berkeley book that Tonson published and Tonson was also the 
owner of the copyright.262 In  1732,  Mandeville,  once  more,  attempted  to  
defend himself and answered Berkeley in print with his Letter to Dion. This 
time, however, Mandeville was not in the need stressing that private vices 
are not promoted in The Fable of the Bees and ‘to be good is pointed out as a 
first  principle’  in  the  book.  This  time,  he  was  able  to  draw  from  the  
                                                        
260 When bookseller Edward Symon’s stock was sold in 1741, he had six copies of 
Part II in his stock, and none of the first. Evidence that they were, indeed, separate 
books. A catalogue of books in quires, and copies, being the stock of Mr. Edward Symon, deceased. 
Which will be sold by auction to a select number of booksellers of London and Westminster only, at the 
Queen’s-Head Tavern in Pater-noster-Row, on Tuesday the 1st of September [1741]. 
261 BL, C.170.aa.1(156) Longman sale catalogues, Catalogue of books in quires, being the 
genuine stock of Jacob and Richard Tonson, Esqrs. which will be sold by auction, to a select number of 
the booksellers of London and Westminster... on Tuesday, May 26, 1767, p. 2. 
262 Indicated in the Longman sale records. 
MANDEVILLE AND THE PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE FABLE OF THE BEES 
 
91 
arguments presented in Part II and Origin of honour.  In other words, he was 
still  answering  same  accusations  that  he  faced  in  1724,  but  now  he  was  
defending a different thesis. But history has not been as kind to Mandeville 
as it has been to Berkeley. As a hint of this irony, the day after Mandeville 
died, ‘his Majesty’ promoted ‘Dr. George Berkeley, Dean of Derry, to the 
Bishoprick of Cloyne’.263 
* * * * 
Kaye has remarked that Mandeville made several apologies for the ‘lowness’ 
of his similes.264 Mandeville’s overtly ironic style might be one reason why 
his legacy was not as respected as that of George Berkeley’s. Direct attacks 
on his character followed even after his death. An unconfirmed 
contemporary report tells us that Bernard Mandeville ‘was no hermit in his 
diet’. The intention of the eighteenth-century gossiper was of course to 
question the philosopher’s character and with his ad hominem –argument 
introduce Mandeville as an epicurean whose philosophy did little more than 
justify his own sensual inclinations. Indeed, it does seem that Mandeville 
was  no  hermit.  His  works  are  filled  with  colourful  dietary  remarks.  Even  
when someone’s lifestyle does not bring to question his or her philosophy, 
it is important to know the inclinations of the author because it helps us to 
understand his prose, analogies and metaphors. 
 In Mandeville’s case an important simile is that between wine and civil  
society.  They  both  are  topics  that  are  particularly  dear  to  the  author.  We  
may also notice a change in this respect between The Fable of the Bees and 
Part II.  In  ‘the  moral’  of  The Grumbling Hive in the original The Fable of the 
Bees, Mandeville concludes: ‘Do we not owe the Growth of Wine / To the 
dry shabby crooked Vine? / Which, whilst its shoots neglected stood, 
Choak’d  other  Plants,  and  ran  to  Wood,  /  But  blesst  us  with  its  Noble  
Fruit,  /  As  soon  as  it  was  ty’d  and  cut’.265 What Mandeville is effectually 
claiming in The Fable of the Bees – as will be demonstrated shortly – is that it 
is  the  skilful  management  of  the  politicians  first  with  fear  and  then  with  
flattery that makes men sociable. This is also precisely what the wine simile 
in the ‘Moral’ of The Grumbling Hive indicates.  
 Mandeville’s use of the wine simile in Part II changes. He now 
emphasises  that  ‘Nature  has  design’d  Man  for  Society,  as  she  has  made  
Grapes for Wine’ and instead of hinting to any management by politicians, 
or tying and cutting, he brings to the surface a new concept, fermentation. 
Instead  of  saying,  like  he  did  in  The Fable of the Bees, that naturally vicious 
human nature needs to be shackled, he chose a different route. As he in the 
                                                        
263 London Gazette, Saturday 19 to Tuesday January 22. 1733. 
264 Kaye, Fable of the bees, p. 105 (e.g. Free thoughts (1729), pp. 100 and 390, Executions at 
Tyburn, p. 37, Modest defence of publick stews (1724), p. xiv and The Fable, p. 354 and Part II, p. 
322.) 
265 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, pp. 36–37. 
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index of Part II points out, ‘Mutual commerce is to Man’s Sociableness what 
Fermentation is to the Vinosity of Wine’. Mandeville’s philosophical 
perspective changed. In Part II, he was pointing out that individuals become 
sociable by living together in society. This is a turn away from private vices 
and public benefits. I will now turn to consider in philosophical detail this 
intellectual change and show why it is important. 
  
 
2. Early Mandeville and Pierre Nicole 
On several occasions Bernard Mandeville has been considered in the Whig 
context of Walpolean England.1 According to Isaac Kramnick, the heart of 
Walpolean political thinking was flat-out defence of corruption, which has 
since been debated.2 Simon Targett,  for example, has pointed out that the 
defence of corruption was not the heart of the Walpolean political thought, 
but vigorous emphasis on institutional settings in civil society.3 Although 
Targett’s report of his research is by no means conclusive, the point he is 
making is however a valid one.4 It is precisely the emerging emphasis on the 
institutional setting of the government that explains how the early modern 
republican thinking was finally abandoned.5 Especially regarding authors 
like William Arnall, the concept of virtue simply lost its meaning while the 
emphasis changed towards the question of institutional organisation of civil 
society.6 This is where Mandeville played a crucial role.7 
                                                        
1 Regarding court Whigs in general, see H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and property. Political 
ideology in eighteenth-century Britain,  Holmes  and  Meier  Publishers,  New  York,  1977  and  
Reed Browning, Political and constitutional ideas of the court Whigs, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982. Consult also J. W. A. Gunn, Beyond liberty and property, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1983. For Walpole’s politics in general, see H. T. Dickinson, Walpole and 
the Whig supremacy, English Universities Press, 1973. 
2 Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his circle, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 121. 
In accordance with the works of Browning, Dickinson and Gunn, see Thomas A. Horne, 
‘Politics in a corrupt society: William Arnall’s defence of Robert Walpole’, Journal  of  the  
history of ideas, 41, 1980, pp. 601–614. 
3 Simon Targett, ‘Government and ideology during the age of the Whig supremacy: 
The political argument of Sir Robert Walpole’s newspaper propagandists’, Historical 
Journal, 37, 1994, p. 300. See also Targett, ‘Sir Robert Walpole's newspapers, 1722-1742’, 
1991. 
4 David Armitage has been particularly unsatisfied with the evidence provided by 
Targett. David Armitage, ‘Introduction’, in Political writings of Henry Bolingbroke, David 
Armitage, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. xxxiv. 
5 Among old Whig-discussions of opposition and court parties of Walpole etc. there 
are some fresh views considering court as an extra-parliamentary dimension to political 
life.  See  particularly  Hannah  Smith,  ‘The  Court  in  England,  1714-1760:  A  Declining  
Political Institution?’, History, 90, 2005, pp. 23–41. 
6 There is very little scholarship on William Arnall. The best account of his career 
and thinking is  Horne,  ‘Politics  in a  corrupt society’,  1980,  pp.  601–614.  I  have studied 
Arnall in more detail, but decided to leave these parts out of the thesis. 
7 On Mandeville and court Whigs, see Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his circle, 1968, p. 
201, Thomas A. Horne, The social thought of Bernard Mandeville. Virtue and commerce in early 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF BERNARD MANDEVILLE 
 
94 
 The most emphatic overall account of Mandeville as a political thinker 
has been put forward by Maurice Goldsmith.8 During the later part of the 
twentieth-century stress was usually placed on Mandeville’s economic 
thinking.9 Goldsmith  would  have  none  of  it.  He  extensively  argues  that  
Mandeville is not an economic theorist.10 Goldsmith sees Female Tatler as 
the foundation for all the relevant aspects of Mandeville’s political thinking. 
He puts well the levelheaded position that Mandeville holds: ‘The general 
message of Free thoughts on religion is the same as that of The Fable of the bees, 
do not complain and grumble, but enjoy life’s real comforts and blessings’.11 
He  also  succeeds  in  making  a  consistent  story  of  Mandeville  as  a  critic  of  
the civic tradition (private and public virtue) and Mr Bickerstaff in Tatler in 
                                                                                                                 
eighteenth-century England, Columbia University Press, 1978. The book is based on Horne’s 
PhD  thesis  (with  the  same  title)  in  Columbia  University,  1976.  See  also  Thomas  A.  
Horne, ‘Moral and political improvement: Francis Hutcheson on property’, in The politics 
of a fallen man: essays presented to Herbert A. Deane, M. M. Goldsmith and T. A. Horne, eds., 
Exeter, 1986; H. T. Dickinson, ‘Bernard Mandeville: an independent Whig’, Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 152, 1976, pp. 559–570 and Burtt, Virtue transformed, 
1992, p. 128. 
8 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985. 
9 On Mandeville’s economic theory related to his political thought, see for example, 
Nathan Rosenberg, ‘Mandeville and laissez-faire’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 24, 1963, 
pp. 183–96; Alfred F. Chalk, ‘Mandeville’s Fable of the bees: a reappraisal’, Southern 
Economic Journal, 33, 1965, pp. 1–16; Louis Dumont, ‘The emancipation of economics 
from morality: Mandeville’s Fable’, Social Science Information, 14, 1975, pp. 35–52; H. 
Landreth, ‘Economic thought of Bernard Mandeville’, History of Political Economy, 7, 1975, 
pp. 193–208; Salim Rashid, ‘Mandeville’s Fable: laissez-faire or libertinism?’, Eighteenth-
Century Studies,  18,  1985,  pp.  313–330  and  Lawrence  S.  Moss,  ‘The  subjectivist  
mercantilism of Bernard Mandeville’, International Journal of Social Economics, 14, 1987, pp. 
167–184. 
10 It is interesting to notice how much Goldsmith’s view is in line with F. A. Hayek 
and J. M. Keynes, who were perhaps the greatest economists of the twentieth century. 
They were also fierce intellectual rivals. One common point of interest for Hayek and 
Keynes was Bernard Mandeville. For both, Bernard Mandeville represented the anti-
rational, sceptical tradition materializing in the Enlightenment. This tradition, according 
to Hayek resulted in a theory about the ‘spontaneous evolution of society’, an idea, which 
Hayek himself developed in his own theories. F. A. Hayek, ‘Dr. Bernard Mandeville’, 
Lecture on a Master Mind series, Proceedings of the British Academy, 52, Oxford University 
Press, 1966. On the idea about spontaneous order, see Ronald Hamowy, The Scottish 
enlightenment and the theory of spontaneous order, Southern Illinois University Press, 1987. 
Another commentator states that in ‘Volume II of the Fable’ Mandeville sets forth ‘a 
general theory of spontaneous self-organizing systems that goes far beyond the narrow 
economic focus of the paradox of private vices and public benefits’. A. ‘Mandeville on 
the Sources of Wealth’, Population and Development Review, 17, 1991, p. 325. Keynes’s 
interest had more to do with Mandeville as an epicurean philosopher and his link to 
George Berkeley. But what is evident is that only later commentators interested in 
economics have been keen to consider Mandeville as a more straightforward economic 
theorist. For Hayek and Keynes, Mandeville was first of all a moral philosopher. Hence, 
we may also remark that the trend of separating Adam Smith and others as economical 
theorists is a late development indeed. 
11 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 103. 
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particular.12 Indeed, if anything, Female Tatler mocks Richard Steele.13 This is 
one  story  about  Mandeville  that  is  worth  telling.  The  problem  with  
Goldsmith is that he wants to see Mandeville’s position as a consistent one 
                                                        
12 Annie Mitchell has used Mandeville by linking Cato’s Letters to his position as an 
outright attack on the question of republicanism of Cato’s Letters against the Pocockian 
interpretation. It is a rather simplistic argument, and not entirely successful. Mitchell, 
‘Character of an independent Whig – ‘Cato’ and Bernard Mandeville’, 2003, pp. 291–311 
and Mitchell, ‘A liberal republican “Cato”’, 2004, pp. 588–603. It needs to be pointed out 
that Pocock’s interpretation has been under attack from different directions since the 
publication of the Machiavellian moment. 
13 Regardless of the question whether the following note in Mary Cowper’s diary is 
true or not, it is evident that Mandeville’s mocking stance towards Richard Steele was 
evident to contemporaries. Mary Cowper writes in 1716: ‘Mr Horneck [Philip Horneck, 
author of an Ode to the earl of Wharton] who wrote The high  German doctor, came here. 
He is  just  made a solicitor  of  the Treasury,  a  place worth 200l. per  annum. He told me 
that Sir Richard Steele had no hand in writing the Town Talk, which was attributed to 
him; that it was one Dr. Mandeville and an apothecary of his acquaintance that wrote that 
paper;  and  that  some  passages  were  wrote  on  purpose  to  make  believe  it  was  Sir  R.  
Steele.’ Mary Cowper, Diary of Mary Countess Cowper (1714-1716). London, 1864, p. 64. In 
the Library of the University of Cornell there is a second edition of The Fable from 1723, 
signed ‘M Cowper’ with a bookplate of ‘Lord W. Kerr’. Lord Walter Talbot Kerr (1839-
1927) married into the Cowper family, which explains why he was in the possession of 
Mary Cowper’s copy of The Fable. It should also be pointed out that William Cowper was 
a very good friend of Macclesfield’s. Mandeville was linked to lord Macclesfield, but most 
of the details of this relationship are still missing. Kaye’s assumption was that the final 
curtain might be raised by studying Macclesfield’s commonplace books, to which he had 
no access. G. S. Rousseau, who did have the access, later proved that there was nothing 
to be found. G. S. Rousseau, ‘Bernard Mandeville and Macclesfield’, Notes and Queries, 18, 
1971, p. 335. The Macclesfield library has since famously been sold. Although the 
cataloguing of the Macclesfield papers moved to CUL has not yet been finished, it seems 
unlikely that any of Mandeville’s papers will appear in Cambridge. A useful historical 
detail that has not received attention in Mandeville scholarship is the link between the 
Backer brothers and Thomas Parker. These Dutch merchants and the earl of 
Macclesfield have both independently been linked to Mandeville as potential patrons, but 
the link between these two parties has not been made. A biographical piece on 
Mandeville in the European Magazine points out that Mandeville ‘had a pension from some 
Dutch merchants in this country, which Mr. H. a very eminent attorney in the city, used 
to pay him’. European Magazine, Feb. 1790, vol. 17, pp. 96–9. The Dutch merchants are of 
course Cornelius and John Backer, naturalised in 1719 by the House of Lords. Now, the 
eminent lawyer H seems to be Macclesfield’s lawyer Henry Hatrell. The 
“Correspondence of Lord Macclesfield etc. 1704–1739” in Stowe collection in British 
Library (that includes the only remaining letter from Mandeville to Macclesfield) indicates 
that Mr Hatrell was Macclesfield’s lawyer. BL, Stowe 750 f. 273. A curious detail is that 
Remarks upon two late presentments of the Grand-jury of the county of Middlesex: wherein are shewn, 
the folly and injustice of mens persecuting one another for difference of opinion in matters of religion, By 
John Wickliffe, London, 1729 (that has sometimes been attributed to Mandeville) has 
also been indicated to have been written by Henry Hetsell,  also a barrister,  who died in 
1762. Even when the approximation of Hatrell and Hetsell is obvious and Hatrell’s link 
to Mandeville and the presentment of the Grand-jury is evident, further research is 
needed in order to get to the bottom of the matter of Henry Hs and the Remarks upon. 
The possibility that this is in fact the same person still remains. Hence, it seems clear that 
Thomas Parker had a hand in the question of Mandeville’s livelihood. 
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ranging from Female Tatler of  1709  to  Letter to Dion of 1732. This eschews 
our understanding of The Fable of the bees and slips towards Kaye’s idea that 
Mandeville  does  not  mean  what  he  says.  It  is  true  that  the  original  Fable 
(and Female Tatler) includes some seeds of the rather revolutionary theory of 
the evolution of civil society, but the original Fable is mainly a topical work, 
and indeed an attack on Steele and Addison. 
 This topicality of Mandeville’s early prose is something that needs to be 
stressed further. The strong political (and topical) commitment is present 
already in the 1703 Pamphleteers, which was painted in thick Whig colors.14 It 
is also true that The Fable of the Bees should not perhaps be read as a direct 
defence of Walpole’s government or corruption per se. After all, we have no 
evidence tying Mandeville directly to the Walpolean mob. However, the 
message of The Fable is quite straightforward and it is as Whig as it can be. 
Hence, the limited connection to defending the Walpolean political thinking 
is a valid one to make. 
 The original Fable functions almost as a single-minded thesis applicable 
on different topical issues as clever hack-like writing does. It contains a very 
simplistic argument that is put to operate on specific issues. What are these 
issues? Well, nothing that has not been discussed in previous scholarship: 
The charity school question, the issue of reformation of manners15 and the 
Whig question in general. The main point about Mandeville’s whiggishness 
is that everything functions at a very topical level until things change. The 
concrete role of the politicians in Mandeville’s thinking before Part II ought 
to attract our attention. What is most important is the change regarding the 
institutional setting from The Fable of the Bees to Part II.  This  idea  is  not  
developed in the first Fable. Originally, the emphasis is solely on the role of 
rigid government and managing ordinary people from above. Only later 
Mandeville starts to consider the evolution of the institutions itself. 
 In contrast, Goldsmith consistently stresses that ‘the skilful politician 
need not be taken literally’16 and  that  ‘this  device,  the  ‘skilful  Politician’,  
stands for the long, gradual development of social institutions’17. Goldsmith 
                                                        
14 Francis McKee has suggested that also Grumbling Hive of 1705 was strongly Whig 
in character supporting the Duke of Marlborough. Francis McKee, ‘Early criticism of the 
Grumbling Hive’, Notes and Queries, 1988, 35, pp. 176–7. 
15 Throughout his works Harold Cook has emphasised the impact of society for the 
reformation of manners in Mandeville’s works and the possible effect that this has on the 
development from the first to the second Fable. See especially, Cook, ‘Bernard Mandeville 
and the therapy of “the clever politician”’, 1999, pp. 101–124. About the Reformation of 
Manners Societies, see also Jennine Hurl-Eamon, ‘Policing male heterosexuality: the 
Reformation of Manners Societies’ Campaign Against the Brothels in Westminister, 
1690-1720’, Journal of Social History, 37, 2004, pp. 1017–1035. The significance of this 
article is that it underlines that the movement was not only directed towards the poor, 
but the middle-class men alike based on first-hand material in London Metropolitan 
Archives. For another recent contribution, see Faramerz Dabhoiwala, ‘Sex and societies 
for moral reform, 1688-1800’, Journal of British Studies, 2007, pp. 290–320.  
16 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 62. 
17 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 64. 
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is reaching quite far when making these claims. True enough, since the time 
of Female Tatler Mandeville did ponder upon questions such as how the arts 
and sciences have developed over a long period of time by incremental 
stages.18 But the story about the politicians in The Fable is yet what it is. 
Skilful politicians play a clear role in deceiving men without the connection 
to the question of arts and sciences. This might be explained partly due to 
the  satirical  style  in  which  Mandeville  writes,  but  we  still  need  to  wait  for  
Part II to see the story change. 
 There might be some elements of the evolutionary theory of civil 
society present in Female Tatler, as Goldsmith claims. But even more so, the 
main elements that feature in The Fable of the Bees are similarly emphasised in 
Female Tatler, namely, the explicit denial of man as a ‘sociable creature’ and 
the claim that ‘the greatest numbers may be made subservient to one 
another, and by skilful management compose a lasting society’.19 Indeed, 
precisely as he does in The Fable, Mandeville states in Female Tatler that ‘it is 
the business of the skilful politician, to make every thing serve in its proper 
place, and extract good from the very worst, as well as the best’ and ‘happy 
is the land, whose constitution is so well fenc’d with wholesome laws, that 
fear and prudence may supply the place of honesty’.20 There  is  no  choice  
but also to take the role of the skilful politician literally in Female Tatler.21 
The Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees 
In The Fable, Bernard Mandeville establishes his arguments on Hobbism. As 
Jon Parkin’s Taming the Leviathan shows  us,  the  history  of  Hobbism  is  an  
entangled  story  with  many  byways  and highways.  But  when we take  some 
distance from the particulars, basic arguments directed against Hobbism in 
the eighteenth century appear to be rather simple. Accusations of Hobbism 
after  Hobbes  principally  consisted  of  two claims:  that  it  is  atheism due  to  
materialism  and  that  it  is  a  political  argument  couched  on  self-
                                                        
18 Goldsmith, Private vices, public benefits, 1985, p. 62. 
19 Mandeville, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, no. 62, pp. 96, 99. 
20 Mandeville, By society of ladies. Essays in the Female Tatler, 1999, no. 62, pp. 105–7. 
21 There are clearly two schools among scholars regarding the issue of politicians. 
Most take after Kaye that Mandeville never really claimed the importance of politicians 
and emphasised from the start the evolutionary scheme. Even when Goldsmith’s 
variation of this line of interpretation regarding Mandeville’s use of politicians as a 
symbol of society has been quite generally accepted, there are other scholars who put 
weight on the concrete role of politicians. For example, J. W. A. Gunn has stressed with a 
reference to Goldsmith’s works that there are also several occasions when Mandeville 
uses the term politician in a narrow sense. See especially Gunn, ‘Mandeville: poverty, 
luxury, and the Whig theory of government’, in Beyond liberty and property, 1983, pp. 102–3. 
Jacob Viner made a different point along the same path that ‘skilful management’ means 
government planning. Jacob Viner, The long view and the short: studies in economic theory and 
policy, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958. But beyond any other previous scholar, Shelley 
Burtt has emphasised the role of politicians extensively. Burtt, Virtue transformed, 1992, pp. 
137–8. 
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preservation.22 As Noel Malcolm writes,  on most occasions the charges of 
Hobbism ‘had little to do with Hobbes’s philosophical arguments’.23 I  am 
not concerned about getting the full story straight. What I am interested in 
is how the accusations of Hobbism in 1720s affected Mandeville’s thinking. 
As we will see, the allegations of Hobbism in the eighteenth century 
switched quite considerably towards questions of moral philosophy rather 
than questions of atheism. Traditionally after 1650s ‘to call something 
Hobbist was to infer that it was heterodox, blasphemous and 
unacceptable’.24 I do not use the umbrella of Hobbism in this sense at all. In 
fact, I leave the question of religion and theology mostly aside. 
 By Hobbism, I understand a general theory that a) claims that all moral 
distinctions are artificially invented b) is put forward to explain all human 
action by ultimately reducing it to self-love and self-preservation c) based 
on the previous two points claims that fear is the only useful passion that 
civilises  men.  It  might  well  be  that  this  was  not  Thomas  Hobbes’s  own  
stratagem when he strongly emphasised the last point. In his Leviathan, 
Hobbes maintains that out ‘of all passions’ fear is the one ‘which enclineth 
men least to break the lawes’. Furthermore, ‘it is the only’ thing ‘that makes 
men keep them’.25 It  is  possible  that  Hobbes  was  not  applying  such  a  
doctrine that would incorporate all of the above mentioned points. Perhaps 
he was simply describing the nature of a political society through 
hypothetical speculation. However, this was not the way that Hobbes’s 
contemporaries understood his theory. According to some calculations, 
there are more than fifty accounts specifically written to argue against 
Hobbes before the turn of the century.26 Many  of  these  solely  deal  with  
religion and atheism, but there are also several interesting moral arguments 
that reveal that along the obvious point c, also the other two (a and b) were 
closely linked to the early conception of Hobbism.27 
                                                        
22 Regarding self-preservation, John Shafte’s use of self-preservation (in John Shafte, 
The great law of nature, or Self-preservation, examined, asserted, and vindicated from Mr. Hobbes his 
abuses. In a small discourse; part moral, part political, and part religious, London, 1673) reveals 
that there is a problem with Hobbism as a political argument that is completely different 
from the logic of justice in the self-love / self-liking distinction. About Shafte and self-
preservation, Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan. The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas 
of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640–1700, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 270–1. 
23 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 2002, p. 23. 
24 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, 2007, p. 202. 
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, [1651], Richard Tuck, ed., Cambridge University Press, 
1991, ch. 27, p. 206. 
26 Sterling P. Lamprecht, ‘Hobbes and Hobbism’, The American Political Science Review, 
34, 1940, p. 32. It is highly likely that this number has increased considerably in some 
calculations that are more “up-to-date”. However, even if someone would have recently 
counted that there were actually 300 critical accounts, this does not change anything. 
Hobbes simply created a lot of negative responses.  
27 It should be pointed out that there are also seventeenth-century British authors 
who openly praise Hobbes. Walter Charleton, an early member of the Royal Society, for 
example, was a public admirer of Hobbes and the epicurean tradition. In his introduction 
EARLY MANDEVILLE AND PIERRE NICOLE 
 
99 
 We may look at some examples from the 1670s. Thomas Tenison, in his 
Creed of Mr Hobbes examined, claims that Hobbes had only ‘mention’d certain 
natural laws’. In Tenison’s opinion, Hobbes should not be considered part 
of  the  natural  law  tradition,  because  he  does  not  derive  ‘them  from  the  
reason and equity of their nature’, but merely ‘from self-preservation’.28 
John Eachard, likewise, points out that in the Hobbist theory ‘self interest is 
to  be  looked  upon  as  the  first  principle of nature’ and ‘the world is wholly 
disposed  of,  and  guided  by’  it.29 The  list  of  the  critics  who  argue  that  a  
Hobbist  doctrine  is  entirely  based  on  self-love  and  self-preservation  goes  
on.30 To put it briefly, a Hobbist moral theory was coined, not so much by 
Thomas Hobbes himself, but mainly by his critics.31 It  was  self-love,  self-
                                                                                                                 
to the Natural history of the passions (1674) he writes that regarding ‘the description of many 
of the passions’ he has ‘interwoven some threds taken from the webs of those three 
excellent men, Gassendus, Des Cartes, and our Mr. Hobbes; who have all written most 
judiciously of that obstruse theme.’ (pp. xxxvi–xxxvii) Thus, Charleton does not merely 
praise Hobbes, he acknowledges that English people should be proud that one of the 
contemporary greats is their Mr. Hobbes. Regarding Hobbes’s influence, especially 
Charleton’s understanding of laughter seems to be based on Hobbes’s theory (Natural 
history, pp. 144–147). By and large, Natural history of the passions is an interesting book that 
relies heavily, along with the abovementioned ‘three excellent men’, on the works of two 
of Hobbes’s friends, namely Kenelm Digby and Thomas Willis. It is no news to scholars 
that Charleton publicly admired Hobbes (cf. Jon Parkin, ‘Hobbism in the later 1660s: 
Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker’, Historical Journal, 42, 1999, p. 91. Parkin points out 
that already C. D. Thorpe, The aesthetic theory of Thomas Hobbes, Michigan, 1940, pp. 176–88 
lists Charleton’s many references to Hobbes.) Nevertheless, this raises the interesting 
question of whether there was a self-sustaining tradition of Hobbism and Epicurean 
principles among seventeenth-century physicians, not only on the continent, but also in 
Britain?  
28 Thomas Tenison, The creed of Mr Hobbes examined. London, 1670, p. 146. 
29 John Eachard, Mr Hobbs’s state of nature considered in a dialogue between Philautus and 
Timothy, London, 1672, p. 156. 
30 According to Lambrecht, at least twenty-nine hostile writers prior to 1681 were 
concerned with Hobbes’s political ideas, Lamprecht, ‘Hobbes and Hobbism’, 1940, p. 31. 
31 The classic study of Hobbism is Samuel I. Mintz, The hunting of Leviathan: seventeenth-
century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Cambridge University 
Press, 1962. Also the concept of a Hobbist and Hobbism was widely used in eighteenth-
century Britain. For example, Matthew Tomlinson wrote about the ‘principles of the 
Hobbists, those late pretenders to reason and philosophy, who would have all religion to 
depend upon the laws and edicts of princes, and the will of the magistrate; nor can any 
supposed utility, however speciously pretended, support so groundless and anti-scriptural 
a doctrine.’ Mathew Tomlinson, The protestant’s birthright, or the Christian’s right of judging for 
himself in matters of religion. A sermon … preached at Worksop in Nottinghamshire, June 1, 1743 … 
and now published, as a seasonable antidote against popery, Methodism, modern Hobbism, the author of 
Christianity not founded on argument, and some other late writers, London, 1746, p. 21. Another 
commentator noted in 1718 that ‘Hobbism has has long been thought a heresy in 
politicks, and buried in contempt and ignominy’ but now Dr. Broughton ‘has thought fit 
to revive this monster, and fright the world afresh with the divine right of power, a 
notion destructive, as well of religion, as of government.’ George Smith, A vindication of 
lawful authority: against some principles lately advanc’d to undermine the same or, a confutation of 
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interest and self-preservation that were generally understood as the 
axiomatic  foundation  of  this  theory.  This,  of  course,  raises  a  further  
question: if Hobbes was not a Hobbist and the entire concept was created 
by his critics while renouncing such a theory, then, who is a Hobbist? If we 
want to keep on advancing this line of thought,  we do not have to end in 
the conclusion that there never was a pure Hobbist in the world. There is 
no reason to deny that Bernard Mandeville in his first part of The Fable is a 
Hobbist.  
 Attention should be paid to what Bernard Mandeville says about his 
theoretical position at different times. In the preface to Part II, the author 
makes  a  comment  stating  that  already  ‘two  years’  ago  he  composed  an  
unpublished ‘defence of the Fable of the bees’.32 Perhaps Mandeville did not 
publish it because he had given up his original doctrine. However, what he 
says  about  the  ‘defence’  tells  us  a  great  deal  about  his  scientific  principles  
and what he thought of his own work. According to Mandeville, ‘the only 
thing’  that  he  ‘ever  had  any  concern’  for  were  the  ‘objections  that  might  
reasonably be made against’ – not the work itself – but ‘the doctrine 
contain’d in it’. These objections that actually challenged the original theory 
were the ones worthy of being ‘stated and endeavour’d to solve’.33 Thus, 
this tells us two things. Mandeville closely followed the criticism that The 
Fable received.34 He took the criticism seriously because he was not a mere 
                                                                                                                 
Hobbism in politicks, as it is reviv’d by some modern doctors; wherein Dr. Broughton’s grand apostacy is 
consider’d…, London, 1718, p. 4.  
32 The vindication published in the London Journal that  was  later  added  to  the  first  
part of The Fable was  published  already  in  1723,  thus  this  is  not  the  defence  that  
Mandeville was pointing at in the preface. Kaye’s hypothesis is that this defence may have 
‘formed part of Remarks upon two late presentments, 1729, if this work is, as is very possible, 
by Mandeville.’ Kaye, The Fable of the Bees, p. 4, footnote 2. I do not find this plausible. In 
the ESTC the work is commonly attributed to John Wickliffe i.e. Henry Hetsell/Hetrell. 
33 Mandeville, Part II, p. 4. 
34 It should be pointed out that, even when Mandeville was more often criticised 
than approved of, he nevertheless had imitators who obviously approved of his 
reasoning, but did not acknowledge the source. For example, regarding the central 
relationship between pride and behaviour, Erasmus Jones in his The man of manners: or, 
plebeian polish’d,  London,  1737,  p.  23 quotes a  crucial  part  of  The Fable almost verbatim: 
‘The Man of Sense and Education never exults more in his Pride than when he hides it 
with the greatest Dexterity; and in feasting on the Applause, which he is sure all good 
Judges will pay to his Behaviour, he enjoys a Pleasure altogether unknown to the short-
sighted Subalterns of the Guards, or the simple City Common-council Men, that shew their 
Haughtiness glaringly in their Countenances, and neither pull off their Hats, nor deign to 
speak to an Inferior.’ Cf. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, pp. 79–80. About Mandeville’s 
influence on Erasmus Jones, see also Erasmus Jones, Luxury, pride and vanity, the bane of 
British nation, London, 1736. Regarding the same issue, Henry Fielding also wrote ‘I have 
often thought that such wise men as conceal their vanity, make a large amends to 
themselves by feeding this passion with contemplation on the ridiculous appearance of it 
in others.’ Henry Fielding, Champion, London, 1740, p. 107. It is also interesting that 
while the first criticisms of The Fable begins in 1723, so do the positive reactions. For 
example, Robert Burrow in his sermon preched in September 1723, argued that some of 
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polemist, but a philosopher who was advancing a specific doctrine. 
Mandeville was committed to his work. If his doctrine was proved wrong, 
he  was  willing  to  change  his  position.  I  believe  that  this  is  precisely  what  
happens in Part II,  which  is  not  a  vindication  of  The Fable, but bases its 
arguments on a whole new theoretical foundation.  
 But  what  is  this  specific  doctrine  that  Mandeville  claims  to  have  
advanced in The Fable? Is it  that private vices will  produce public benefits? 
This is the famous paradox that plays a crucial role in The Fable,  but  I  
believe that this is a side product of the theory and not the doctrine itself.35 
One occasion when Mandeville reflects upon his doctrine is one of the last 
additions to The Fable of the Bees –  before  he  stops  making  these  additions  
altogether. When pondering upon the negative responses that The Fable 
receives, Mandeville sighs, ‘I sincerely believe, that it is chiefly self-love’, not 
the defence of luxury or private vices, ‘that has gained this little treatise (as 
it was before the last impression) so many enemies’.36 I believe Mandeville 
was right. A Hobbist theory does not receive a positive response because 
the overriding presence of self-love is contrary to human experience. This is 
what  Mandeville  came to  accept  and this  is  the  reason why he  wrote  two 
new books where he based his arguments on a new theory different from 
his preceding Hobbism. 
 We do not have to sink knee-deep into Mandeville’s philosophy in order 
to find out what his first doctrine was. It is enough if we look at the table of 
contents.37 The  clearest  topical  proof  that  in  the  first  part  of  The Fable 
Mandeville  advances  a  Hobbist  doctrine  comes  from  such  entries  as  ‘The 
first rudiments of morality were broach’d for the ease of governors’,38 ‘All desires tend to 
self-preservation’  and ‘Man is civiliz’d by his fear’.39 In other words, as I defined 
earlier, Mandeville manifestly claims a) moral distinctions are artificially 
invented, b) all human actions centre in self-preservation and c) moreover, 
fear plays a great role in taming the savage in a peculiarly Hobbist manner. 
To  emphasise  my  general  argument,  I  think  that  Mandeville  drops  these  
axioms in Part II, where moral distinctions are no longer considered 
straightforward artificial tricks played by politicians upon ignorant people. 
                                                                                                                 
the dictates of The Fable are not necessarily contrary to religion, Burrow, Civil society and 
government vindicated, 1723. 
35 In the literature one can find an extensive discussion on the paradox and its true 
meaning. For this discussion one might want to consult Charles Prior’s comprehensive 
selected bibliography of Bernard Mandeville in http://www.c18.rutgers.edu/biblio/ 
mandeville.html. I do not want to say that the paradox does not play a great role in 
Mandeville’s thought, only that I believe that Mandeville was quite sincere in his Letter to 
Dion, 1732, p. 38 when he pointed out that the reason for the paradox in the title was 
mainly to ‘raise attention’. A successful choice, indeed. 
36 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 230. 
37 It should be pointed out that the table of contents was not printed after the second 
edition. Kaye, ‘Descriptions of the editions’, Part II, p. 388. 
38 Kaye, ‘Descriptions of the editions’, Part II, p. 388.  
39 Kaye, ‘Descriptions of the editions’, Part II, p. 391. 
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The role of politicians is completely different, the definition of self-
preservation changes, fear is no longer staunchly emphasised and, what’s 
more, Mandeville admits that all human actions cannot be reduced to self-
love and self-preservation. 
 In order to do justice to Mandeville’s genius, instead of trying to prove 
that he does not really mean what he emphatically stresses, it is reasonable 
to  admit  that  in  some ways,  The Fable of the Bees is  just  as  defective  as  the  
critics claim. For the doctrine contained in it, the skilful politician is not a 
literary device. The arbitrary, and almost sudden, invention of morality is a 
particularly strong element underlying the overall thesis. Mandeville is not 
even close to the subtle and nuanced conception of the long evolutionary 
process  of  civil  society  and  moral  institutions  that  he  later  develops.  And  
the reason why the role of politicians who artificially invent morality is so 
strong is that in every single case that he can think of, Mandeville is trying 
to apply a theory where all human actions are reduced to self-love and self-
preservation. He is a Hobbist and there is no reason why we as Mandeville 
scholars, should not admit it. 
Passions, desires and self-preservation 
Even when I  think  that  the  table  of  contents  tells  us  that  Mandeville  is  a  
Hobbist,  we  should  perhaps  dip  our  toes  into  his  prose.  Throughout  The 
Fable, Mandeville holds as his first foundational premise that whatever a 
human  being,  or  any  other  animal,  does,  it  is  naturally  done  in  order  to  
please the agent. ‘All untaught animals are’ so ‘solicitous of pleasing 
themselves’  that  it  is  only  through  a  learned  process  that  they  start  
‘considering the good or harm’ that their actions ‘will accrue to others’.40 
Mandeville holds fast to this definition. He does not allow that an individual 
could naturally have any other end for his passions or desires. Whether we 
are ‘savages or politicians’, it is simply ‘impossible that man, mere fallen 
man’,  Mandeville  writes,  ‘should  act  with  any  other  view  but  to  please  
himself’. Not even ‘the greatest extravagancy either of love or despair’, he 
emphasises, ‘can have no other centre’.41  
 For Mandeville being pleased and avoiding pain is just another way of 
saying that an individual is acting for his self-preservation. It is ‘the law of 
nature’ that ‘no creature’ is ‘endued with any appetite or passion but what 
either directly or indirectly tends to the preservation either of himself or his 
species’.42 Ultimately, it is ‘nature’ that ‘obliges every creature continually to 
stir  in  this  business  of  self-preservation’.  There  are  different  ‘means’  to  
promote this end and this is why ‘desires’  are ‘grafted in’ a man. Different 
passions ‘either compel him to crave what he thinks will sustain or please 
him, or command him to avoid what he imagines might displease, hurt or 
                                                        
40 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 41. 
41 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 348. 
42 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 200. 
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destroy him’. Mandeville’s idea is to reduce all our ‘desires’, ‘passions’, ‘all 
their different symptoms’ and ‘various denominations’ to self-
preservation.43 The entire doctrine contained in the first part of The Fable is 
based on the idea that eventually everything that is natural in a living 
creature,  even  ‘our  love  of  company’  and  ‘aversion  to  solitude’,  they  ‘all  
center in self-love’.44 
 We may look at this same question from a slightly different perspective. 
What Mandeville is aiming at, is to point out that experience effectively 
proves that ‘the real pleasures of all men in nature are worldly and sensual’. 
Mandeville explains what he means by ‘men in nature’.  The only ones who 
hypothetically make an exception are ‘devout Christians’, who have been 
‘regenerated and preternaturally assisted by the divine grace’. Thus, what 
Mandeville is doing is using a rigorous, Jansenist definition of virtue to 
support his Hobbist doctrine. After excluding the ones who have efficient 
grace  from  his  account,  it  turns  out  that  an  individual  can  be  said  to  be  
virtuous only through self-denial. Since all ‘the real pleasures’ point towards 
‘worldly and sensual’,  the only way, Mandeville thinks, anyone can be said 
to have ‘a rational ambition of being good’, is if he is willing to sacrifice his real 
pleasures.45 This  is  indeed  self-denial.  At  the  same  time,  if  we  reject  this  
definition and hold on to some ‘imaginary notions that men may be 
virtuous without self-denial’, we are turning towards ‘a vast inlet to 
hypocrisy’.  We give way to our natural desires while imagining that we are 
doing something different. Once this becomes ‘habitual, we must not only 
deceive others, but likewise become altogether unknown to our selves’.46 
Mandeville  defends  himself  by  claiming  that  he  ‘cannot  see  what’  is  the  
‘immorality’  in  revealing,  in  a  similar  manner  as  the  Jansenists  had  done,  
‘the secret stratagems of self-love’ and ‘the origin and power’ of ‘passions’ 
that  ‘so  often,  even  unknowingly’  lead  a  person  ‘away  from  his  reason’.47 
However, this is not the problem with The Fable. The problem is that 
Mandeville is bending everything to match this Hobbist doctrine. 
 Mandeville uses the idea of self-denial to make a distinction between 
‘real and counterfeited virtue’. ‘Actions’ that are really virtuous are only 
those that ‘proceed from a victory over the passions’. By the same token, 
the good actions that are ‘the result of a conquest which one passion 
obtains over another’ are not. They are ‘counterfeited virtue’.48 Meanwhile it 
turns  out,  as  some  of  the  critics  point  out,  that  Mandeville’s  rigorous  
definition becomes virtually useless. Any action produced through the 
stratagem of countervailing passions is only a counterfeited virtue. This 
allows  Mandeville  to  support  his  paradox  that  private  vices  (here  vice  is  
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understood  in  the  widest  possible  sense  and  such  passions  as  pride  and  
envy  are  thought  of  as  vice)  produce  public  virtue,  but  what  is  the  point  
besides sophistry? Why define virtue in this manner if it turns out that it is 
humanly impossible to attain and one does not have any other normative or 
religious doctrine to offer instead? 
 We may detect a similar, exemplifying case in Mandeville’s treatment of 
charity.  Mandeville  defines  that  ‘charity’  is  a  ‘virtue  by  which  part  of  that  
sincere love we have for ourselves is transferr’d pure and unmix’d to others’ 
who  are  ‘not  tied  to  us  by  the  bonds  of  friendship  or  consanguinity’  and  
who ‘we have no obligation to, nor hope or expect any thing from’ them. If 
we lessen, Mandeville claims, ‘any ways the rigour of this definition, part of 
the virtue must be lost’.49 Mandeville  is  framing  a  virtue  that  according  to  
his own definition, is humanly impossible. Then he says that if we lessen the 
definition, some of the virtue is lost. This is a confusing argument. Instead, 
Mandeville  could  just  as  well  say  that  according  to  his  naturalistic  
interpretation, the idea of ‘pure and unmix’d’ charity is contrary to human 
nature. 
 Mandeville also makes some highly polemical examples to demonstrate 
his idea that real virtue necessitates self-denial and all our actions and 
desires lean towards self-preservation. For example, he famously claims that 
‘there  is  no  merit  in  saving  an  innocent  babe  ready  to  drop into  the  fire’.  
This action ‘is neither good nor bad’, because if we did ‘not strove to hinder 
it, it would have caused pain, which self-preservation compell’d us to 
prevent’.  Thus,  Mandeville  claims  that  we  do not  chose  to  act  because  of  
the infant, but ‘we only’ oblige ‘our selves’.50 He aims to prove that, in the 
end,  the  actions  that  we  think  virtuous  are  performed  for  our  own  sake.  
The same holds true, for example, for ‘a man’ who ‘acts in behalf of 
nephew or nieces’. He is not really virtuous, but he is performing the action 
‘partly for his own sake’. Mandeville’s rationale is that if he did not ‘have a 
greater regard to’ his kin ‘than for strangers’, he would have to ‘suffer in his 
character’ and ‘reputation’.51 This might well be partly true, but there is no 
need  to  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  this  proves  the  meanness  of  human  
nature, or that the man could not have any other than a selfish motive when 
he helps his nephew. My intention when pointing out these examples is not 
so much to criticise Mandeville (other writers have done this often enough), 
but my idea is rather that through these examples it  becomes evident that 
there is a clear doctrine in The Fable.  The  doctrine  is  that  our  self-
preservation and self-love are the source, means and end of all our actions. 
 We may also look at Mandeville’s speculation upon a noble,  seemingly 
other-regarding  action.  There  is  nothing,  he  claims,  that  can  make  us  
perform ‘a noble action’ if we are not ‘conscious’ that by performing it we 
shall receive some worldly pleasure, which in this case is ‘the applause’ that 
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we expect from others. Thus, it may be said that ‘a noble action’ is joined to 
‘superlative felicity’ that the agent acquires by performing it, but in the end, 
he is feasting ‘in self-love’ and there is nothing of real virtue in the action 
itself.52 Even  ‘the  humblest  man  alive’,  according  to  Mandeville,  ‘must  
confess,  that the reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that 
ensues  upon  it,  consists  in  a  certain  pleasure  he  procures  to  himself  by  
contemplating on his own worth’.53 Since  we  are  performing  the  noble  
action in order to enjoy our self-love, this is counterfeited virtue at best. But 
is there really a point in claiming that a virtuous action is not really virtuous 
since it is accompanied by the satisfaction of doing a virtuous deed? 
 In The Fable of the Bees,  Mandeville seems to think that he may logically 
deduce  all  the  passions  from  the  preceding  doctrine.  What  particularly  
caught the eyes of his critics, and what perhaps later made Mandeville re-
evaluate his position is his treatment of natural affection. With a firm belief 
in  the  overriding  presence  of  self-love,  Mandeville  picks  up  the  topic  and 
maintains that even when some claim that ‘mothers naturally love their 
children’, does not actually mean anything more than saying that a man 
naturally loves his beautiful house. A mother’s love for her child is ‘a 
passion’ among others. Since ‘all passions center in self-love’ it might, just 
as well, be subdued by any superior passion, to sooth that same self-love’.54 
But he does not stop here. He carries on denying the originality of natural 
affection and that it would be particularly independent of self-love. He 
claims that ‘our love to what never was within the reach of our senses is but 
poor and inconsiderable’. In other words, ‘women have no natural love to 
what  they  bear’  while  pregnant  and  ‘their  affection  begins’  only  ‘after  the  
birth’. And, moreover, ‘even when children first are born the mother’s love 
is but weak’. Natural affection, according to the interpretation given in The 
Fable, only ‘increases with the sensibility of the child’ – once the child starts 
to  give  a  reciprocal  response  to  the  mother’s  affection.  Thus,  even  such a  
categorical, seemingly real virtue as natural affection is directly linked to the 
idea of ‘pleasing our selves’ in the first part of The Fable.55 And, since there 
is ‘no merit’ in self-love, even natural affection is dubbed morally 
indifferent. Mandeville clearly believed that everything is to be explained 
away with self-love. 
 Mandeville’s description of other passions, such as envy, is also deduced 
from the same line of reasoning. He claims that ‘it is impossible’ that a man 
‘should wish better for another than he does for himself’, if there is the 
slightest chance that he may ‘attain to those wishes’. What this means is that 
‘when we observe something we like’ and do not have, this causes ‘sorrow 
in  us  for  not  having  the  thing  we  like’.  According  to  Mandeville,  ‘this  
sorrow  is  incurable’  when  ‘we’  actually  ‘esteem’  the  ‘thing  we  want’.  But,  
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since we are not able to get what we desire, ‘self-defence’ that is ‘restless’ 
and ‘never suffers us to leave any means untried how to remove evil  from 
us’ steps in. In the end, ‘experience teaches us, that nothing in nature more 
alleviates  this  sorrow  than  our  anger  against  those  who’  have  ‘what  we  
esteem and want’. Thus, our anger is working for our self-preservation and 
‘we cherish and cultivate’ it in order ‘to save or relieve our selves, at least in 
part, from the uneasiness we felt’ because we did not get what we esteem.56  
 But  envy  is  not  the  only  passion  that  Mandeville  reduces  to  self-
preservation. In an analogous manner, more or less everything is linked to 
self-love and there is no other end to Mandeville’s Hobbist doctrine. ‘As 
every body would be happy, enjoy pleasure and avoid pain if  he could, so 
self-love  bids  us  look  on  every  creature  that  seems  satisfied,  as  a  rival  in  
happiness’.57 The same line of reasoning is used when explaining friendship, 
love58 – even politeness.59 And, of course, love between sexes is considered 
analogous to the previous examples,  since it  ‘prompts us to labour for the 
preservation of our species’.60  
Politicians, moral distinctions and civil society 
After learning the logic of The Fable, we are ready to pick up the notorious 
claim that all moral virtues are an artificial invention of the politicians.61 I 
seek  to  argue  that  Mandeville’s  original  position  is  extreme  and  that  the  
formation of civil society is emblematically described, not as a long 
evolutionary process, but almost as a sudden stroke ‘after which savage man 
was broke’.62 Indeed,  an  individual  is  truly  comparable  to  a  wild  horse  in  
this  account  –  first  fully  intractable,  but  after  being  tamed  by  force  and  
tricks played by the politician, becomes an obedient and beneficial creature 
as a result.  
 We may also point out another reason besides the obsessive idea of the 
prevalence of self-love for the rigid position that Mandeville adopts. In The 
Fable, the importance of small, family society in the development towards a 
civil society is utterly dismissed. In fact, Mandeville outright denies any role 
that natural affection might play in the formation of civil society, which is 
not considered social evolution, but a crude display of power and deceit. ‘If 
by  society’  we  understand  ‘a  number  of  people,  that  without  rule  or  
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government should keep together out of a natural affection’ as ‘a heard of 
cows or a flock of sheep, then’, Mandeville writes, ‘there is not in the world 
a more unfit creature for society than man’. Only ‘under’ authentic 
‘subjection’  and  ‘fear  of’  a  ‘superior’  any  set  of  men  can  ‘live  together’  
without ‘quarrelling’.63 Thus, since Mandeville’s idea of human nature is so 
categorically pessimistic, it is unsurprising that an acting sovereign in a 
Hobbesian manner is considered important for civil society. 
 Indeed, the role of a politician in The Fable is concrete and emphatic.64 
He is given the essential part in the establishment of civil society and, what 
Mandeville defined as, ‘real’ and ‘counterfeited virtue’. Mandeville 
emphasises that it is the ‘chief thing’ of the ‘lawgivers and other wise men, 
that have laboured for the establishment of society’ to ‘make the people 
they were to govern, believe that it was more beneficial for every body to 
conquer  than  indulge  his  appetites,  and  much  better  to  mind  the  publick  
than what seem’d his private interest’.65 It  is  the  politician  that  in  a  very  
concrete manner invents moral distinctions and what Mandeville calls ‘real 
virtue’. As plainly as Mandeville himself put it, ‘the first rudiments of 
morality’ are ‘broach’d by skilful politicians’ in order ‘to render men useful 
to each other as well as tractable’. The moral distinctions ‘were chiefly 
contrived’ so ‘that the ambitious might reap the more benefit from, and 
govern vast numbers of them with the greater ease and security’.66  
 It  is  the  politician  that  first  deceives  people  so  as  to  believe  in  the  
significance of real virtue. However, it is doubtful ‘whether mankind would 
have ever believ’d’ in it. In fact, Mandeville reminds us that it is unlikely 
‘that any body could have persuaded’ people ‘to disapprove of their natural 
inclinations, or prefer the good of others to their own, if  at the same time 
he  had  not  shew’d  them  an  equivalent  to  be  enjoy’d  as  a  reward  for  the  
violence, which by doing so they of necessity must commit upon 
themselves’.67 This  is  why  the  politician  also  invents  the  scheme  of  
‘counterfeited virtue’ where the dialectics of countervailing passions is set 
forward.  It  is  for  this  very  reason,  Mandeville  tells  us,  that  the  politician  
came to realise that ‘flattery must be the most powerful argument that could 
be  used  to  human  creatures’.  In  other  words,  men  are  tricked  into  self-
denial – to conquer their natural inclinations.68 Thus,  we  are  only  a  step  
away from the claim that what ‘first put man upon crossing his appetites 
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and subduing his dearest inclinations’ was ‘the skilful management of wary 
politicians’ and ‘the nearer we search into human nature, the more we shall 
be convinced, that the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery 
begot upon pride’.69  
 Additionally,  we  might  want  to  trace  the  detailed  description  of  the  
origin of civil society that Mandeville provides. The Fable introduces a mixed 
idea of politicians first suffocating people’s passions and later taking 
advantage of them. By and large, this account is inconsistent and reveals the 
problems of Mandeville’s original Hobbist conceptions. 
 Mandeville begins his outline of the formation of civil society by 
considering the concept of anger, the desires causing it and the significance 
of fear. He indicates that the two principal causes of anger are hunger and 
lust. Men, like all other animals, become angry when their desires, roused by 
either  one  of  these  appetites,  remain  unsatisfied.  Both  of  the  original  
‘appetites’  point  directly  to  ‘the  pursuit  of  self-preservation’.  Not  a  single  
creature could ‘subsist without food’ and no species could continue ‘unless 
young ones’ are ‘continually born as fast as the old ones die’.70 Mandeville 
makes a descriptive distinction between different types of animals. ‘The 
beasts  of  pray’,  such  as  wolves,  must  ‘perpetuate  as  well  as  increase  their  
hunger’, which ‘becomes constant fuel to their anger’. In contrast, 
Mandeville indicates a different group of animals, such as ‘bulls and cocks’, 
whose anger is aroused by ‘lust’. Those ‘creatures, whose rage proceeds 
from hunger, both male and female, attack every thing they can master, and 
fight obstinately against all’. The other animals, ‘whose fury is provoked by 
a venereal ferment, being generally males, exert themselves chiefly against 
other males of the same species’.71 The human being is not an exception. 
Human behaviour is directed by both these appetites. The influence of 
hunger on men might be ‘less violent than that of wolves’ and ‘lust in man 
is  not  so  raging  as  it  is  in  bulls’.  Nevertheless,  according  to  Mandeville,  
these primary appetites of self-preservation are the original foundation that 
set men in action.72 
 As one might expect,  Mandeville starts his description of the origin of 
civil society by deriving all the principle appetites from self-preservation. In 
The Fable, pride does not function as one of the original appetites. It is not 
described  as  being  in  anyway  characteristic  of  a  man  in  his  original  state.  
Pride  only  begins  to  operate  at  a  later  stage  in  the  development.  It  is  an  
instrument that politicians are thought to adopt in order to flatter subjects 
into  subjection.  It  seems  as  if  pride  does  not  affect  savage  men.  This  is  
clearly  defined  in  the  Remark  R  as  well  as  in  ‘The  search  into  nature  of  
society’, where Mandeville writes, that ‘hunger, thirst and nakedness are the 
first  tyrants  that  force  us  to  stir’  and  only  ‘afterwards,  our  pride,  sloth,  
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sensuality  and  fickleness  are  the  great  patrons  that  promote  all  arts  and  
sciences, trades, handicrafts and callings’.73 This  categorical  distinction  of  
the effects that passions have on the different stages of historical 
development adds up to a fair amount of confusion in Mandeville’s first 
account of civil society. 
 In  a  Hobbist  manner  Mandeville  denominates  ‘Fear’,  ‘laws’  and  ‘self-
preservation’  as  the  predominant  factors  for  the  establishment  of  civil  
society. The difference between a barbaric and a civilized state of men is 
that in the latter people do not vent their natural impulses of anger.  Great 
trust has to be placed on the force of laws. Mandeville emphasises that it is 
‘the first care’ of all governments to inflict ‘severe punishments’ in order to 
‘curb’ a man’s hurtful anger. Mandeville carries on to give a description how 
laws are highly effective in increasing fears and preventing ‘the mischief’ 
that  anger  ‘might  produce’.  ‘When  various  laws’  are  ‘strictly  executed’  in  
order to restrain a person ‘from using force’, we are led to realize that ‘self-
preservation  must  teach  him  to  be  peaceable’.  Mandeville  tries  to  bring  
home the point that, ‘as it is every body’s business to be as little disturbed as 
is possible, his fears will be continually augmented and enlarged as he 
advances in experience, understanding and foresight’. Thus, Mandeville 
reaches  the  summit  of  his  first  theory  of  the  origin  of  government.  From 
the previous premises he concludes that ‘as the provocations’ of ‘anger will 
be infinite in the civilized state, so his fears to damp it will be the same, and 
thus in a little time he’ll be taught by his fears to destroy his anger, and by 
art to consult in an opposite method the same self-preservation for which 
the  nature  before  had  furnished  him with  anger,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  
passions’.74 
 As we can see, Mandeville’s theory of the origin of civil society is based 
on self-love. Self-preservation alone ought to do the trick of turning 
passions against each other. In the ‘Search into the nature of society’ 
Mandeville repeats that a man ‘is a fearful animal, naturally not rapacious’, 
in  other  words,  a  creature  that  ‘loves  peace  and quiet’.75 In  both  of  these  
accounts Mandeville principally draws his conclusions from what he calls 
‘the business of self-preservation’.76 The concluding essay of The Fable 
ought  to  demonstrate  that  ‘sociableness’  of  a  man  ‘arises  only  from  two  
things’, the ‘multiplicity of his desires, and the continual opposition he 
meets in his endeavours to gratify them’.77 Only self-preservation can teach 
an individual to suppress his anger. Mandeville’s first analysis of society is 
couched on self-love. The idea of pride is detached from the principles 
Mandeville thought to be prevailing in nature. 
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 Within his initial system, Mandeville faces a problem when explaining 
how  an  individual  who  is  first  suppressed  by  rigid  laws  finally  starts  to  
cultivate his passions and to benefit the society at large. Mandeville’s 
solution is to furnish cunning politicians with even greater power. First, 
they  curb  man’s  anger  with  inflexible  laws.  Now  they  have  to  alter  the  
matter and enable themselves to benefit from the same passions they had 
suffocated. When Mandeville discusses the unavoidable fact that at some 
point in history a society ‘may have occasion to extend their limits further, 
and enlarge their territories, or others may invade theirs, or something else 
will happen that man must be brought to fight’, he provides a solution that 
is inconsistent with his initial theory. Later he quietly dismisses this first 
account and constructs a new system of sociability on completely different 
principles described in the various dialogues between Horatio and 
Cleomenes. 
 Nevertheless, the politicians who manage to shake off man’s natural 
anger are now in The Fable obliged to ‘take off some of man’s fears’ in order 
to make him ‘fight’.78 Mandeville  presses  the  point,  in  stark  contrast  with  
the republican political ideals, that ‘natural courage’, anger, is not just brutal, 
but ‘altogether useless in a war to be managed by stratagem’. Yet, something 
‘equivalent for courage’ is needed to ‘make men fight’.79 This is, of course, 
honour. The ‘principle of honour’ is appointed as ‘the tye of society’. ‘There 
would be no living without it in a large nation’, Mandeville instructs.80 The 
politician’s task is to persuade men to believe that they possess a ‘principle 
of valour distinct from anger’.81 Since the principle itself is fully artificial, 
valiant men in reality feel ‘nothing’ of it and are in fact ‘mistaking pride for 
courage’.  Hence,  a  lawgiver  has  ‘to  take  all  imaginable  care  to  flatter  the  
pride of those’ who brag of valour.  In due course ‘the fear of discovering 
the  reality  of  his  heart,  comes  to  be  so  great  that  it  out-does  the  fear  of  
death it self’. Mandeville brings the line of thought to a close with a lesson 
teaching us: ‘Do but increase man’s pride, and his fear of shame will ever be 
proportioned to it; for the greater value a man sets upon himself, the more 
pains  he’ll  take  and the  greater  hardships  he’ll  undergo  to  avoid  shame’.82 
Pride is not presented as a socially constructive passion. The cultivation of 
one’s  own  worth  is  an  object  that  society  should  pursue  only  because  it  
increases the sense of shame. The ‘artificial’ courage is considered ‘useful to 
the body politick’, but only when it is thought of consisting ‘in a superlative 
horror against shame’.83  
 In Mandeville’s later theory honour is also described as an artificial 
principle of utmost importance. What is different is its primary function. In 
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the earlier version it supposedly inspires a man ‘with as much horror against 
shame, as nature has given him against death’.84 Later  it  is  coined  as  the  
ultimate  proof  of  civility,  epitomizing  that  men are  ready  to  sacrifice  their  
lives  (self-love)  in  order  to  prove  the  notion  of  their  own  worth  (self-
liking).85 In other words, concerning honour, Mandeville’s focus shifts from 
the fear of shame to the cultivation of pride. It comes as no surprise that in 
The Fable he feels justified when claiming that ‘nothing civilizes a man 
equally as his fear’.86 
 Mandeville sustains that ‘nature’ is ‘always the same, in the formation of 
animals’, which in his first outline of civility simply means that also ‘men, 
whether they are born in courts or forests, are susceptible to anger’.87 This 
anger might be useful to ‘a single creature’ living ‘by himself’, but ‘society’ 
has ‘no manner of occasion for it’.88 Structuring his primary analysis from 
the concepts of ‘anger’, ‘appetites’, ‘pride’ and ‘fear’, Mandeville concludes 
that ‘fear’  is ‘the only useful passion then that man is possessed of toward 
the  peace  and  quiet  of  a  society’  and  a  man  ‘will  be’  more  ‘orderly  and  
governable’ the more you ‘work upon it’.89 In this first outline of the origin 
of civil society pride has only an instrumental value, which is unsurprising. 
It is, after all, a Hobbist doctrine. 
Lust, women and fear 
When examining the appetite of lust, Mandeville again affirms his primary 
interest in self-love. The authority of fear and its close connection to self-
preservation turn out, once more, to be the key issue. Lust, being a natural 
source of desire, does not obviously evaporate once a civil society has been 
established. It makes an impression upon virtually all the young and ‘healthy 
people  of  either  sex’,  but  now  it  is  kept  a  secret.  Mandeville  indulges  his  
fascination with paradoxes by noting that even when lust is ‘most necessary 
for the continuance of mankind’, it has become ‘odious’ and the ‘epithets 
commonly joined to’ it are ‘filthy and abominable’. Hence, ‘among well-bred 
people’ it is ‘highly criminal to mention before company any thing’ related 
to this appetite ‘in plain words’.90  
 Why  is  lust  ‘never  to  be  talked  of  in  publick’?  Evidently  because  ‘the  
peace and happiness of the civil society’ requires it. This is simply a further 
elaboration of the idea that passions leading to anger distort the peace and 
quiet of the society and have to be repressed. Overwhelming fear is once 
more  harnessed  as  the  key  instrument  performing  the  task  of  reverting  
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odious  passions.  In  civil  society  ‘where  the  rules  of  religion,  law  and  
decency, are to be followed, and obeyed before any dictates of nature, the 
youth of both sexes are to be armed and fortified against this impulse, and 
from their infancy artfully frightened from the most remote approaches of 
it’.91 Especially  women  seem  to  be  in  a  very  awkward  position  with  their  
natural inclinations.  
 In  order  to  avoid  shame,  women  have  to  ‘flatly’  disown  ‘all  the  
symptoms’  of  lust,  and  if  possible  ‘with  obstinacy’  deny  that  they  were  in  
any  way  ‘affected  by  them’.  Lust  for  women  is  a  prime  example  of  how  
Mandeville’s Hobbist doctrine unintentionally turns into a repressive 
system, where there is nothing pleasing for the agent in certain actions, and 
the objective is to avoid shame. This is very interesting because Mandeville 
carefully explains elsewhere in The Fable that  for  example  ‘a  man of  sense  
and  education  never  exults  more  in  his  pride  than  when  he  hides  it  with  
greatest dexterity’.92 Why couldn’t the same principle apply to women and 
their  lust?  Why  couldn’t  they  as  well  take  pride  in  hiding  their  appetites?  
The reason is simple. All the primary passions are directly connected to self-
love  in  this  first  analysis.  Pride  is  a  very  odd component  in  this  structure.  
Mandeville  is  unable  to  fully  operate  with  it  while  it  is  cemented  to  a  
Hobbist theory. Instead, Mandeville corners himself into a contradictory 
position when trying to cope with strong, original appetites. Compared to 
them pride is only secondary. Thus, the only solution Mandeville has at this 
point is to keep these primary appetites firmly in awe by suppressing them 
with  fear  rising  from  self-preservation.  Yet,  he  spells  out  that  ‘lust,  pride,  
and selfishness’  are ‘passions’ that ‘ought’  no more than to be hidden ‘for 
the happiness and embellishment of the society’.93 Mandeville also visibly 
stresses  that  ‘good  breeding  merely  requires’  that  ‘we  should  hide  our  
appetites’.94 He just does not give a plausible explanation in The Fable of 
how it would be humanly possible to hide an original passion since it is so 
strong that it only may be restrained with overwhelming fear. He even 
describes in a colourful passage how a virgin may submit herself to a 
gentleman in the silence of the night and when the sun rises no-one would 
speak ‘a word of what they have been doing’.95 Nevertheless, Mandeville is 
unable to show how these remarks are connected to the Hobbist theory 
that  he  introduced.  Instead,  he  resorts  to  a  rigid  position  when  trying  to  
explain how women remain chaste. Mandeville concludes, ‘it is the interest 
of society to preserve decency and politeness’ which means that ‘women 
should linger,  waste,  and die,  rather than relieve themselves in an unlawful 
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manner’.96 These contradicting accounts are not plausibly fixed in The Fable. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that  Mandeville  tries  to  build  his  entire  theory  of  
passions and society on self-love. After introducing self-liking and 
constructing a novel theory, the outcome is different in this respect also. 
 In The Fable,  Mandeville  classifies  pride  and  shame  as  two  distinct  
passions.97 In Origin of honour,  Cleomenes  tells  Horatio  that  this  was  ‘an  
errour’ that he knew the author was ‘willing to own’.98 If we keep our focus 
on lust, we can detect a different view in Origin of honour. ‘Fear of shame’ is 
indicated as an important principle, but in a different manner than the one 
stated  in  the  first  analysis.  It  is  described  to  have  its  ‘foundation  in  self-
liking’ and ‘manifestly derived from that and no other passion’. There is no 
need to note that shameful women might try to avoid showing any signs of 
their passion during the daylight and act in the opposite manner during the 
night. Instead, Cleomenes reminds Horatio that they both are ‘acquainted 
with women’, who might be in the dark ‘in the midst of temptations’ with ‘a 
passionate, deserving lover, whose person they approve of and admire’, 
where no-one would ever know what they are doing and still they resist the 
temptation. The tables are turned. In a high note Cleomenes declares that 
‘the motive therefore of these women is no other, than what I have called it, 
their  vanity,  the  undoubted  offspring  of  self-liking,  a  palpable  excess,  an  
extravagant  degree  of  the  passion,  that  is  able  to  stifle  the  loudest  calls  of  
nature,  and  with  a  high  hand  triumphs  over  all  other  appetites  and  
inclinations’.99 Mandeville  no  longer  needs  to  make  passions  arising  from  
the same source, self-love, work against each other, which had led him to a 
blind alley. Now he has a new spring, self-liking, that could intelligibly be 
described to concur all the appetites materializing from self-love. To bring 
the point safely home, Cleomenes stresses the argument with a clarifying 
question.  ‘Would  you mortify  or  flatter;  lessen  or  increase’  the  passion  of  
self-liking in women ‘in order to preserve their chastity?’100 Horatio replies 
that this is obviously a rhetorical question, since his interlocutor has already 
provided in their previous discussions ‘plausible reasons why pride should 
be more encouraged in women than in men’.101  
 As we have learned, this is not apparent in The Fable, where the civilizing 
method is to curb the passions with fear. The mortifying ‘ingredient’ of 
‘shame’ is indicated as highly necessary ‘to make us sociable’. In accordance 
with everything said above, Mandeville affirms again that ‘all creatures are 
ever  labouring  for  their  own  defence’.  Man  would  strive  to  ‘conquer  his  
shame’, but this would be ‘detrimental to the society’. This ‘sense of shame’ 
is something that ‘we endeavour to increase instead of lessening or 
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destroying’ in education. Mandeville is determined to remark that 
‘politicians would sooner take away’ a man’s ‘life’ rather than to ‘rid or cure 
him’ from his shame.102 Since pride and shame are defined as separate 
passions, this plainly means that Mandeville wants to keep people in awe.  
Politeness and self-interest 
There is little doubt that in the original Fable Mandeville follows a well-
established tradition of court civility.103 The idea of a ‘courtier’ denotes ‘the 
well-bred  gentleman’  who  ‘places  his  greatest  pride  in  the  skill  he  has  of  
covering it with dexterity’.104 Nevertheless, the Dutchman also argues that 
‘all passions centre in self-love’105, which he refutes in Part II. The 
usefulness  of  pride  is  directly  connected  to  self-love  in  helping  men  to  
acquire wealth. In The Fable, everything is connected to self-interest, and 
politeness makes no exception.  
 When embracing pride and pressing the point that ‘we are possessed of 
no other quality so beneficial to society, and so necessary to render it 
wealthy and flourishing as this’, Mandeville implicates its materialistic value 
instead of social function.106 ‘Pride’ has no ‘equivalent’  for ‘the support of 
trade’.107 The topics of material well-being and trade are picked up, because 
they are supposed to be undisputable examples of how private vices could 
further elaborate a man’s self-love through possessions. Throughout the 
centuries, some of Mandeville’s commentators have insisted on a self-love 
theory couched on self-interest and on an automatic transformation of vices 
into wealth. They are right if they are discussing the first part of The Fable. 
In this version of the description of civil  society Mandeville thinks that ‘it  
would be utterly impossible, either to raise any multitudes into a populous, 
rich and flourishing nation, or when so raised, to keep and maintain them in 
that condition, without the assistance of what we call evil both natural and 
moral’.108 But  when  we  turn  to  Mandeville’s  later  works,  it  is  a  different  
matter altogether.  
 Until 1729, when Mandeville published the first dialogues between 
Cleomenes and Horatio, pride is considered with its connection to self-
interest. Before the distinction between self-love and self-liking Mandeville 
was facing difficulties in explaining how a person could take pride in 
something that is not directly connected to her self-interest as we saw in the 
case  of  lust.  Naturally  people  might  even  use  unlawful  means  in  order  to  
pursue their own interest. The only explanation for prudential behaviour is 
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the sense of shame, which is considered a separate passion from pride. 
Hence, the overwhelming effect of self-love results in the conclusion that a 
person would not remain within the boundaries of equitable judgement 
simply because he took pride in it.  Instead, the only incentive is that he is 
afraid of social punishment.  
 In his ‘Search into the nature of society’ Mandeville gives two examples 
of how politeness connects to self-interest. The first illustration considers 
two  ‘Londoners, whose business oblige them not to have any commerce 
together’. These men may daily meet ‘upon the Exchange’, yet they treat each 
other ‘with not much greater civility than bulls would’. But if they meet at 
‘Bristol’,  the  matter  is  then  different.  Now they  ‘pull  off  their  hats,  and  on 
the least opportunity enter into conversation, and be glad of one another’s 
company’. The other example consists of men who are ‘at enmity’. They 
would never have anything to do with each other,  but if  they were ‘forced 
to travel together’ their behaviour would alter accordingly. Now they would 
be ‘affable and converse in a friendly manner, especially if the road be 
unsafe,  and  they  are  both  strangers  in  the  place  they  are  to  go  to’.  
Mandeville indicates that these examples are given in order to counter the 
‘superficial  judges’,  who  ‘are  attributed  to  man’s  sociableness,  his  natural  
propensity to friendship and love of company’.109 The fundamental purpose 
at  this  point  is  to  firmly  establish  that  the  goal  of  politeness  is  only  ‘to  
strengthen  our  interest’  and  the  only  ‘causes’  that  we  ‘are  moved  by’  are  
founded on this self-interest. In short, Mandeville’s first analysis on civility 
is based on the idea that ‘the various motives’ behind ‘our love of company’ 
undoubtedly ‘center in self-love’.110 Politeness is not copiously described as 
containing the character that would enable the transformation of natural 
desires  into  a  behaviour  that  would  benefit  society  and  pleases  the  
individual. Instead, Mandeville places a heavy accentuation on self-
preservation and fear, which are the main components of the Hobbist 
theory of society constructed around the concept of self-love.  
 The  charm  of  politeness  is  that  it  can  be  simultaneously  beneficial  to  
society as well as pleasing to the individual. Without the concept of self-
liking, this idea does not materialize even when peculiar instances of it  are 
described in The Fable. Hence, fear plays a dominant role. Even if in a civil 
society there has been a shift concerning fear from direct physical 
punishment to the fear of shame and the judgement of the audience, 
Mandeville, who lays such a substantial importance on natural instincts, has 
not  yet  provided  a  scrutinized  solution  to  the  question  of  how  these  
inescapable instincts could be directed in a way that benefit society. He has 
not  found  a  way  out  of  his  own  paradox.  His  only  concern  is  how  to  
suppress anger. Instead of formulating his system to readjust men’s desires, 
Mandeville concentrates on countering their effects. The case is rather 
different in Part II. 
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The critique of Hobbism in the 1720s 
Perhaps one of the most path-breaking of Kaye’s findings concerns Joseph 
Butler’s role as a critic of The Fable and, moreover, what effect this had on 
the development of Mandeville’s thought.111 What  I  attempt  to  do,  is  to  
locate Butler’s criticism, which in my opinion was not so much a reaction 
against The Fable per se,  but  in  Hobbist  system  in  general  that  The Fable 
epitomised, in its intellectual context. I argue that the incentive that pushed 
Mandeville to reconsider his views and swap from straightforward Hobbism 
to Nicolean naturalism was the impact of the criticism of the 1720s on his 
system.112 The contemporary attack on Hobbism (not only on Mandeville, 
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which  I  think  is  vital  to  understand)  did  not  only  result  in  Mandeville  
adding  self-liking  to  his  system,  but  moreover  made  him  accept  the  
possibility of fully natural other-regarding affections (out of which parental 
affection towards children is the prime example). And what more, these 
new ingredients amounted to a novel theory about the evolution of civil 
society and moral institutions. 
 The critique on Hobbism culminates in the question of whether there is 
any de facto other-regarding affection natural to man. The basic idea of the 
critics  is  that  if  we  can  prove  that  such  a  passion  exists  then  the  Hobbist  
scheme of reducing all  human action to self-love is invalid.  As Butler puts 
it, if we can show that there is ‘some degree’ of ‘real good-will in man towards 
man’,  it  is  ‘sufficient’  to  prove  that  ‘the  seeds  of  it’  are  ‘implanted  in  our  
nature’.113  
 Now, as I have emphasised, we have to see this discussion on Hobbism 
as an extensive process, starting from Hobbes and changing its face through 
decades of debate. The significance of the first part of The Fable is that it 
epitomised Hobbism in the early eighteenth century. This is also why it 
received such a vast amount of negative responses.114 The matter of natural 
affection that parents have for their children sums up the whole dispute of 
the 1720s.115 At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  natural  affection  
was not such a commonplace as it might seem to us.  
 An interesting question is what Thomas Hobbes thought himself about 
this particular issue. The answer is that, at least in what we understand as his 
most important political  works, he did not think about it  much at all.  It  is 
true that in Leviathan,  Hobbes  does  mention  that  there  is  some  kind  of  
‘natural inclination of the sexes one to another, and to their children’.116 In 
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Elements of law, Hobbes also briefly touches upon ‘natural affection of parents 
to their children’ by explaining that it is ‘contained’ in the concept of ‘good-
will and charity’ and that ‘the Greeks’  explained  it  to  be  ‘that  affection  
wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them’.117 But whatever 
Hobbes meant by this, it does not play any consequential role in his political 
or moral philosophy. And, as we have learned from The Fable, it could be 
explained away in a Hobbist system by claiming that it  is just one passion 
arising from self-love, which may be countered by any stronger passion 
arising  from  the  same  source.  However,  I  do  not  think  that  this  was  
Hobbes’s intention and he certainly does not put forward clear and distinct 
arguments pointing towards this direction. In short, he does not trouble 
himself refuting natural other-regarding affections simply because he is not 
concerned  with  such  issues.  When  deriving  duties,  rights  and  obligations  
from jurisprudential perspective, the question of whether some inclinations 
or passions are natural is quite negligible.  
 The long discussion on parental dominion in chapter IX of De Cive does 
not take into account the natural affection that parents might have for their 
children. If Hobbes had concerned himself with this matter he would not 
have written that ‘he who is  newly  born is in the Mothers power before any 
others,  insomuch as she may rightly,  and at her own wil,  either breed him 
up, or adventure him to fortune’.118 This does not mean that he necessarily 
was a Hobbist claiming that mothers do not really feel for their children but 
only for themselves. Hobbes’s concern lies elsewhere. In De Cive,  he  is  
continuously equating a ‘subject’, ‘sonne’ and a ‘servant’.119 He does not see 
any difference between their relationships towards the authority in question. 
To put in other words, because Hobbes wants to draw the symmetry 
between the subjection of a son to his parent and a subject to a sovereign in 
order  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  institutional  relations,  the  question  of  
natural affection has no room to play in this project.  
 Also the treatment of parental dominion in Leviathan solely concerns the 
question of who has the ‘right of dominion’ and what this sovereignty in its 
effects means.120 When Hobbes characterises a family, it does not only 
include  parents  and children,  but  also  servants.  In  fact,  sons  and servants  
are once more thought to stand in equal position towards the head of the 
family. The ‘soveraign power’ is equally distributed over ‘children, and 
servants’.121 The idea that parents naturally love their children, or any effect 
that it might have, simply does not materialise. It does not, of course, mean 
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that Hobbes would necessarily deny that such an affection might be de facto 
real, but in his system it has no relevance.  
 My intention is not to analyse Hobbes’s political theory in any further 
depth, it is to make the point that when Mandeville, who is often seen as a 
Hobbist psychological egoist, in Part II he admits that parents have natural 
affection  towards  their  children,  this  is  something  that  Hobbes  never  did  
(regardless  of  what  was  actually  Hobbes’s  own  position).122 Subsequently, 
this bears an immediate and momentous consequence for Mandeville’s 
system. If we are of the speculative kind, we might hypothesize that 
Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville (in his later works) were not 
Hobbists  in  this  respect  at  all.  Hobbes,  because  this  was  not  an  issue  for  
him,  and  Mandeville  because  he  came  to  realise  that  his  early  Hobbist  
position was verifiably false. 
 Whether based on the misconception of Hobbes’s works or not, a 
Hobbist doctrine was coined by his critics and it started immediately to 
draw countering arguments. One line of attack took the question of natural 
affection highly seriously. In 1675, a commentator writes against Hobbes 
that you must be ‘an atheistical fool’ in order to deny that generally speaking 
all of God’s creations ‘love another better than ones self’. A simple look at 
‘bears,  dogs,  hens,  bees,  lions’  and  ‘ants’  shows  that  ‘they  die  for  their  
young-ones’. The same goes for ‘fathers’, ‘mothers’ and even ‘friends’.123 
Most of these critical assessments were just lashes in the air. It seems that 
the late seventeenth-century authors were generally agitated about the 
possibility of a system where everything is reduced to self-love and self-
interest. 
 Another characteristic and somewhat more constructive account comes 
from a female philosopher towards the end of the century. Anne Conway 
uses  the  idea  of  natural  affection  to  prove  a  general  point  about  universal  
benevolence. The foundation of her argument is the undeniable fact proved 
by experience that ‘even wicked men and women’ love ‘their children’.124 
They  do  it,  because  all  creatures  ‘cherish’  their  offspring  ‘with  a  natural  
affection’. According to Conway, this sentiment is natural and you have to 
be ‘extremely perverse’ if you are ‘void of parental love’. But Conway goes 
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further  in  her  materialist  philosophy.  The  reason  that  there  is  natural  
affection  is  that  ‘children  are  of  the  same  nature  and  substance’  as  their  
parents. Therefore parental love is as real as loving one self. And since there 
is some kind of a resemblance in everything, Conway concludes, there must 
also remain ‘something of universal love in all creatures, one towards 
another’ because ‘in regard of their first substance and essence’ everything 
was ‘all  one and the same thing, and as it  were parts and members of one 
body’. In other words, everything in this world is somehow related and thus 
universal benevolence is something natural and real.125  
 Now, if we advance in time to the eighteenth century we start to notice 
a general rupture also among contract theorists regarding natural affection. 
For example, Mathew Tindal departs from Hobbes’s parallel between 
children towards parents and subjects towards sovereigns. He points out 
that  the  nature  of  these  two  relationships  is  different.  The  only  ‘relation’  
that ‘is call’d a natural relation’ is ‘between parents and children’, ‘because it 
does not come by compact and agreement, as all others do which men enter 
into for their own sakes’. What this means is that ‘the duty which children’ 
owe ‘to their parents’ has a natural foundation and it should not cease when 
the interest ceases. This family relationship is contrasted with most of the 
other ‘relations of life’ that are ‘reciprocal dutys’ that ‘oblige’ men ‘no 
longer’  than  ‘they  receive’  their  ‘suitable  return’.  In  government,  for  
example, ‘the dutys are conditional’. When subjects do not ‘receive’ 
‘protection’ from the ‘government’, they no longer have ‘to pay obedience’. 
However, the ‘gratitude’ that children have for their parents does not end 
even  if  the  interest  ends,  because  the  relationship  is  not  founded  on  a  
compact or an agreement. The relationship is natural and it is not designed 
to serve mutual interests.126 
Francis Hutcheson and natural affection 
When examined from a wider perspective, the critique of Hobbism in the 
1720s transpires to be unsurprising. For example, Francis Hutcheson’s 
target, when seen in this earlier context, is altogether familiar. Even if it is 
true  that  ‘he  could’  not  give  a  ‘lecture  from his  chair  at  Glasgow without  
criticizing Mandeville’, we have to realise that it was not solely Mandeville 
that was the focus of his criticism.127 Especially in Inquiry, Hutcheson aims 
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at Hobbism in general.128 As James Moore has well summarised, 
Hutcheson’s ‘project in his philosophical treatises of the 1720s was to prove 
that our ideas of beauty and virtue and our kind affections and desires were 
real ideas, perceived by internal senses whose sensibilia were quite distinct 
from the dependent and contingent sensations of the external senses’.129 A 
main feature of this project was to argue against Hobbism and prove that 
beyond  any  doubt  men  have  other-regarding  affections.  It  is  notable  that  
when natural affection is considered, Hutcheson’s argument is presented 
with particular care.  
 We have, Hutcheson claims, ‘practical dispositions to virtue implanted in 
our nature’ and thus, a Hobbist system is evidently false.130 One of 
Hutcheson’s important arguments concerns the existence of moral 
vocabulary. If all moral distinctions were artificial, as the Hobbists claim, 
and there were no real ideas of moral virtue, it would be impossible to have 
such an extensive moral vocabulary as we do. However, even ‘Lucretius and 
Hobbes’ themselves, as Hutcheson points out, ‘are full of expressions of 
admiration, gratitude, praise, desire of doing good; and  of  censure, disapprobation, 
aversion to some forms of vice’. They plainly show ‘themselves in innumerable 
instances struck with some moral species’.131 This argument is interesting for 
two reasons. Firstly, the idea of the undeniable existence of moral 
vocabulary points directly towards Hobbes and Hobbism. Secondly, on 
several occasions when Hume touches upon this issue, he plainly concurs 
with  Hutcheson,  which  gives  us  further  reason  to  reconsider  what  is  his  
actual position and what are simple concessions towards Hutcheson and 
other likeminded moral philosophers.132 
 Hutcheson’s  list  of  virtues,  that  are  always  approved  of  and  natural,  
includes ‘natural affection’, ‘gratitude’, ‘pity’ and ‘friendship’.133 However, of 
these four, it is ‘natural affection’ that particularly receives a careful analysis. 
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In Inquiry, Hutcheson takes up as his task to ‘establish’ a ‘true’ virtue that is 
‘some determination of our nature to study the good of others; or some instinct, 
antecendent to all reason from interest, which influences us to the love of others’. 
Hutcheson boasts that ‘this disinterested affection may  appear  strange  to  men 
impress’d with notions of self-love as the sole motive of action’.134 To put it  
more bluntly, the one who upholds a selfish hypothesis to explain human 
actions is a mere ‘sophist’.135 These Hobbists are a collection of confused 
‘philosophers’, who do not rely on experience, but only based on some 
farfetched system, try to deny what even a plain ‘farmer’ undoubtedly feels. 
Every normal person ‘studies the preservation and happiness of his children’. 
He indisputably ‘loves them without any design of good to himself’.136 Any 
argument claiming that this natural affection is caused by ‘self-love’ is futile. 
Hutcheson juxtaposes this disinterested love with a hypothetical example of 
‘merchants’ whose ‘partnership’ occasions mutual ‘gain’. According to 
Hutcheson, their partnership is a ‘plain’ example of ‘conjunction of 
interest’.  In  no  way  is  the  ‘affection’  that  ‘parents’  have  towards  their  
‘children’ comparable to it.137 In a similar vein, it would be absurd to claim 
that ‘child’s sensations’  could  ‘give  pleasure  or  pain  to  the  parent’.  As  
Hutcheson confidently concludes, natural affection is ‘antecedent’ to any 
‘conjunction of interest’. Parental love towards children is ‘the cause of’ a 
possible  conjunction  of  interest  –  ‘not  the  effect’  –  and  it  ‘then  must  be  
disinterested’.  
 An argument (resembling what Anne Conway advanced) stating that 
‘children are part of our selves, and in loving them we but love our selves in 
them’  is  plain  sophistry  to  Hutcheson.  He turns  the  argument  on  its  head  
and  says  that  we  do  love  our  children  as  much  as  we  love  ourselves,  but  
only because we have ‘natural affection’ that is an instinctive quality and not 
because we would be ‘conscious of their sensations’.138 Neither  can  one  
argue that ‘the affection of parents’ is ‘founded on merit or acquaintance’. Natural 
affection is not only ‘antecendent to all  acquaintance’ that ‘might occasion 
the love of esteem’, but, moreover, it ‘operates where acquaintance would 
produce hatred’. No man would willingly associate with a malicious person, 
but parental affection points ‘even toward children’ who are ‘apprehended to 
be vitious’.139 And, of course, this does not mean that ‘natural inclinations’ 
could not, ‘in many cases’, be ‘overpower’d by self-love, where any opposition 
of interests’ takes place.140 But this is not the point. The point is that natural 
affection is an original passion – it cannot be reduced to self-love. 
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 After arming himself with such a battery of arguments for proving the 
existence of natural affection, Hutcheson turns his scope towards the arch 
of  Hobbism  –  the  first  part  of  The Fable. He easily refutes Mandeville’s 
derivative of the self-love system, namely that ‘natural affection in parents is 
weak, till the children begin to give evidences of knowledge and affections’.141 
Hutcheson’s quip is that all that The Fable proves is that ‘moral capacity can be 
the occasion of increasing love without self-interest’,  which  was  of  course  
contrary to Mandeville’s own intentions.142 By and large, Hutcheson’s 
treatment of natural affection is conducted in a way that mocks Mandeville. 
He wittingly manages to turn his opponent into ridicule and to reconsider 
his views. 
 But natural affection is only the sticking point for Hutcheson. Taking 
his cue from here, he proceeds further. Even when parental affection is the 
most important example of an original other-regarding affection, 
Hutcheson wants to extend his analysis also to ‘gratitude’ and ‘some other’, 
somewhat unspecified, ‘disinterested tie’.143 According to Hutcheson, ‘there is 
the  same kind  of  affection’,  as  ‘in  parents towards children’, ‘among collateral 
relations, tho in a weaker degree’.144 It  is  particularly  the  ‘disinterested’ and 
‘strong determination in our nature to gratitude, and love toward our benefactors’ 
that supposedly proves Hutcheson’s idea of universal benevolence and 
moral  sense  right.  According  to  Hutcheson,  ‘nothing  will  give  us  a  juster  
idea of the wise order in which human nature is form’d for universal love, and 
mutual good offices, than considering that strong attraction of benevolence, which we 
call gratitude’.145 Thus, Hutcheson thinks that he dismantled Hobbism, 
grounded moral virtue solely on our internal and natural sense of morality 
and made sure that the author of The Fable will not raise his ugly head ever 
again. Little did Hutcheson know that an elaborated counterattack was 
looming in his own backyard. 
Joseph Butler, passions and unintended consequences 
The most original and versatile eighteenth-century criticism on Hobbism 
came from Joseph Butler’s pen.146 Butler’s general argument is consciously 
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directed against ‘persons’ advancing ‘a system which excludes every 
affection’ that ‘tends to the good of our fellow-creatures’. Butler ironically 
notes that these men have a ‘pleasant method to solve’ the affections that 
seem to  be  of  this  kind.  They  ‘tell  you’  that  ‘it  is  not another you are at all 
concerned about, but your self only’. Instead of admitting the existence of a 
‘manifest fact’ the Hobbists ‘substitute’ the affection with ‘another, which is 
reconcileable to their own scheme’. According to Butler, it was particularly 
‘Hobbs’ himself who argued, for example, that ‘fear and compassion are the 
same idea, and a fearful and a compassionate man the same character’.147 
The fact that Butler does not name Mandeville or The Fable as the target of 
his criticism should tell us that his focus was not just on Mandeville alone, 
but on Hobbism in general. 
 Butler’s refutation of psychological egoism is constructed of two parts. 
First, like Hutcheson, the idea is to show that experience proves that there 
is real other-regarding affection in human nature. Second, unlike 
Hutcheson, Butler wants to point out that human nature is more complex 
than philosophers have previously presumed. The question is not whether it 
is self-love or benevolence that explains our actions. Similarly, we have a 
number of different passions that cannot be reduced to either one of these 
sources.  
 As many others do, Butler takes the seemingly obvious fact that parents 
disinterestedly love their children as the point of his departure. ‘Affection of 
parents to their children’, Butler writes, is the prime example of a ‘natural’ 
other-regarding passion.148 This ‘natural affection’ manifestly ‘leads’ parents 
‘to take care of, to educate’ and ‘to make due provision for’ their children.149 
Butler’s argument of natural affection is particularly directed against 
Hobbes  himself.  It  seems  that  Butler  took  Hobbes  as  a  person  who  
attempts  to  reduce  natural  affection  to  the  desire  of  power.  The  passage  
from which Butler constructs this idea, and which he directly quotes, is the 
only section in the Elements (or the 1650s abridgement, ‘Human nature’, that 
Butler used) where Hobbes discusses natural affection. Hobbes writes that 
‘there can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find 
himself able not only to accomplish his own desires,  but also to assist men 
in theirs’.150 Butler’s  contention  is  that  it  is  ridiculous  to  claim  that  the  
appearance of ‘good-will’ or ‘good-nature’ could always be reduced to 
‘desire of power’.151 I  do  not  think  that  this  was  necessarily  what  Hobbes  
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148 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 33. 
149 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 14. 
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wanted to claim.152 However, Butler’s argument functions as a refutation of 
Hobbism  in  general.  ‘If  there  be  any  such  thing  as  the  paternal  or  filial  
affections’,  Butler  insists,  ‘if  there  be  any  affection  in  human  nature’  in  
which ‘the object and end’ is ‘the good of another’ then ‘this is itself 
benevolence, or the love of another’. Thus, to show that natural affection 
exists is to show that benevolence is something real and natural. ‘Be it ever 
so short,  be it  in even so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined’,  to 
Butler  it  ‘proves’  the  ‘assertion’  that  we  have  a  ‘natural  principle  of  
benevolence’.153  
 After establishing that men have natural affection towards their children 
and generalising that this undoubtedly proves that men have natural other-
regarding affections, Butler notes that we have efficiently proved that self-
love and benevolence are both natural passions – or as he calls them – two 
sides of an individual. Butler’s analysis of self-love and benevolence is 
written  in  a  smooth  style  that  gives  the  impression  that  the  entire  fuss  
around the issue has been futile. He sees no problem in reconciling self-love 
and benevolence. Men have two different natures: one obliging him to take 
care of himself and another ‘having respect to society, and tending to 
promote public good, the happiness of society’. According to Butler, ‘these 
ends do indeed perfectly coincide’.154 They ‘are different’, but ‘we can scarce 
promote one without the other’.155  
 From here Butler advances to the original part of his analysis. In order 
to refute Hobbes and others who stressed the prevalence of self-love, it is 
not sufficient to prove that there evidently is a thing called benevolence. 
Additionally, we need to show that our inward frame is constituted of many 
other  passions  and  affections  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  self-love  nor  
benevolence.156  
 In  fact,  there  is  no  reason for  Butler  to  try  and refute  that  ‘every  man 
hath a general desire of his own happiness’  that ‘proceeds from, or is self-
love’.157 However, what is crucial for Butler’s argument is that self-love has 
to be understood in connection with reason. Self-love, Butler claims, is 
directly linked to those ‘sensible creatures’ that have the ability to ‘reflect 
upon themselves’.158 This  is  also  why  Butler  keeps  talking  about  ‘cool  
principle of self-love’.159 ‘The  object’  of  self-love  ‘is  somewhat  internal’,  
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namely ‘our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction’, but additionally what 
is required is the faculty of reason to chose the means to satisfy this general 
desire.160 By making this point Butler is bringing a staunch contrast to the 
surface. In addition to self-love, there ‘likewise’ exists ‘a variety of particular 
affections, passions, and appetites’ that solely tend ‘to particular external 
objects’.161 These ‘affections’ are ‘distinct from reason’ and the ‘pleasure 
arising from them’. They are passions that seek their object without reflection. 
Indeed, at times they might serve our general interest, but the point is that 
this is not their end. ‘The principle we call  self-love never seeks any thing 
external  for  the  sake  of  the  thing,  but  only  as  a  means  of  happiness  or  
good’, while ‘particular affections rest in the external things themselves’. 
They both are an equally important ‘part of humane nature’ and we cannot 
possibly claim that all our passions center in self-love, even when we were 
able to explain away benevolence and natural affection.162  
 Butler  constructs  his  own  version  of  the  argument  emphasising  the  
usage of common language.163 If it was true that ‘no creature whatever can 
possibly act but merely from self-love’, this would also mean that ‘we 
should want words to express the difference, between the principle of an 
action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own 
advantage’ and ‘an action’ proceeding from some passion seeking the 
external thing itself. However, ‘this is not the language of mankind’. There 
is  a  clear  difference  in  the  way  we  discuss  cool  self-interest  and,  for  
example, ‘revenge’ or ‘friendship’, where ‘a man runs’ even ‘upon certain 
ruin,  to  do  evil  or  good to  another’  without  further  reflection  on his  own 
interest.164  
 Thus,  ‘it  is  manifest’  that  ‘the  principles  of  these  actions  are  totally  
different’. Indeed, it is true that both of them ‘are done to gratify an 
inclination in man’s self’. However, ‘there is’ a ‘distinction between the cool 
principle  of  self-love,  or  general  desire  of  our  own  happiness’  and  ‘the  
particular affections toward particular external objects, as another part of 
our nature, and another principle of action’. Consequently, everything 
cannot possibly be ‘allowed to self-love’ or that it  would ‘be the whole of 
our inward constitution’ since ‘there are other parts or principles which 
come into it’.165 These ‘particular affections’ that ‘tend towards particular 
external things’ function independently of the question ‘whether’ their 
object is ‘our interest or happiness’. Therefore, we make a distinction 
between ‘an interested action’ and ‘an action’ that ‘has its denomination of 
passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the particular 
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appetite or affection from which it proceeds’. In short, Butler claims to 
have ‘stated and shewn’ that ‘self-love’ is ‘one part of humane nature’ and 
‘the several particular principles’ (in ‘themselves, their objects and ends’) are 
‘the other part’.166  
 What is interesting about Butler’s distinction between the passions that 
are inclined towards external objects and the self-love that aims to private 
advantage,  is  that  even  when  Butler’s  intention  is  to  make  a  strong  case  
against Hobbism, he is also criticising the Hutchesonian idea that public 
virtues are solely founded on benevolence. Human nature is constituted of 
passions, tending to private good, that cannot be reduced to ‘self-love’, but 
there are affections and passions that promote ‘public good’ even when 
they are different from ‘benevolence’.167 In short,  ‘men have various other 
passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love, and 
from benevolence’.168  
 This paves the way to the question about the unintentional effects of 
passions. Butler is very sensible of the fact that men often act in order to 
gratify a certain passion, but unintentionally benefit the public and ‘no body 
will call the principle of this action self-love’. Butler’s prime example is the 
‘desire of esteem’.169 The desire of esteem is a ‘publick passion’ that is ‘given 
to us’ in order ‘to regulate our behaviour towards society’ and it cannot be 
reduced  to  ‘self-love’.  The  reason  why  Butler  calls  it  a  ‘public  passion’  is  
because he thinks that it cannot ‘be gratified without contributing to the 
good of society’. When men act ‘merely from regard’ of ‘reputation, without 
any consideration of the good of others’, they commonly ‘contribute to 
public  good’.  As  indicated  by  Butler,  in  this  case  men  are  ‘plainly  
instruments’ in the hands of ‘providence, to carry on ends, the preservation 
of  the  individual  and  good  of  society,  which  they  themselves  have  not  in  
their view or intention’.170  
 Another passion closely linked to ‘desire of esteem’ that cannot be 
reduced to self-love is the ‘natural passion emulation’. According to Butler, 
‘emulation is merely the desire or hope of equality with or superiority over 
others, with whom we compare our selves’.171 Just like in the case of desire 
of  esteem,  desire  of  superiority  often  turns  out  to  be  a  passion  that  has  a  
positive public effect. ‘If that peculiar regard to ourselves’, Butler writes, 
‘leads us to examine our own character with this greater severity, in order 
really to improve and grow better, it is the most commendable turn of mind 
possible, and can scarce be to excess’.172  
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 In Butler’s argument of human nature, sociability and civil society prove 
to be a stronger case against Hobbism than Hutcheson was able to provide. 
Butler establishes benevolence as a natural passion, but avoids the pitfall of 
making a naïve case about man’s naturally virtuous nature. Instead, he 
refutes Hobbism on its own ground by proving that a theory based on the 
prevalence of self-love is too simple and cannot possibly give an accurate 
analysis of the world.  
 The  most  original  part  of  this  refutation  is  that  with  the  examples  of  
desire for esteem and emulation Butler is able to prove that our idea of the 
self is completely dependent upon the opinion of others. Therefore, it truly 
turns out to be a ‘speculative absurdity’ to consider ‘ourselves as single and 
independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our 
fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice’.173 If the Hobbist argument 
is that man naturally avoids pain and desires pleasure, experience proves 
contrary to it. As for Butler, ‘mankind is so closely united’ that ‘there is such 
a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of 
another,  that  disgrace  is  as  much  avoided  as  bodily  pain,  and  to  be  the  
object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods’.174 I 
would call this constructive criticism. Butler’s account was designed to 
counter Hobbism – not to build a Newtonian system of human nature. The 
unintended effect it had on Mandeville was that it provided a path to evolve 
from a  straightforward  Hobbism into  a  system that  cannot  be  reduced to  
psychological egoism. 
John Balguy, reason and brutes 
An interesting  reaction  against  Hobbism –  as  well  as  Hutcheson –  comes  
from John Balguy, a year before the publication of Part II when Mandeville 
must have been already working on it.175 In modern philosophy, Balguy is 
usually considered a “rationalist” alongside Samuel Clarke and others. They 
stand  at  the  receiving  end  when  Mandeville  and  Hume  argue  that  reason  
ought to be the slave of the passions and morality does not have its 
foundation on reason. I believe that this is a rather accurate description of 
the  relationship  between  Balguy’s  thinking  and  that  of  Hume  and  
Mandeville’s. When Balguy is considered in his immediate intellectual 
context,  this  broadens  our  understanding  of  some  aspects  of  Mandeville  
and Hume’s moral philosophy, which does not only counter Balguy’s 
rationalist position, but also uses some of its components to bolster its own 
case. 
 In his Foundation of moral goodness, Balguy considers the familiar 1720s 
criticism of Hobbism. ‘Without countering experience’, he concedes, one 
                                                        
173 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, p. 18. 
174 Butler, Fifteen sermons, 1729, pp. 16–17. 
175 John Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness: or a further inquiry into the original of our 
idea of virtue, London, 1728. 
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cannot  deny  that  ‘in  our  minds’  there  are  ‘benevolent affections towards others’. 
Balguy recognises that a common trend in moral philosophy is to call these 
benevolent sentiments ‘natural affection’, which is, not only undeniable 
through experience, but an ‘instinct’ in human nature. Balguy thinks that it is 
particularly Francis Hutcheson who claims that this ‘natural affection’ is the 
‘true ground and foundation’ of virtue.176 However, Balguy expresses his 
doubts whether Hutcheson is right when claiming that this ‘affection’ and 
‘moral  sense’  are  the  ‘only  two  pillars  on  which  moral  goodness  rests’.  
Indeed, ‘virtue should’ not ‘be looked upon as wholly artificial’177, but as Balguy has 
it,  Hutcheson’s  idea  of  virtues  ‘depending  entirely  upon Instincts’ is equally 
wrong.178 
 Balguy’s  reaction  is  interesting  for  different  reasons.  It  confirms  the  
contemporary trend in moral philosophy. The so-called instinctive virtue 
under investigation is first and foremost ‘natural affection’ that is 
commonly understood as being directed towards the ‘offspring’.179 
Alongside natural affection other virtues that Balguy describes as natural (in 
the strict sense of the word) are ‘gratitude’ and ‘relief of a person in 
distress’.180 Balguy admits that we have instincts in our nature that turn us 
towards these virtues. However, he is genuinely worried about Hutcheson’s 
idea  of  grounding  all  virtue  on  natural  affection  and  moral  sense.  The  
problem with Hutcheson’s philosophical position, in Balguy’s 
understanding, is that it undermines morality. We have to make a clear 
distinction between natural and moral good. If all morality is founded on 
human  nature  and  instincts,  it  would  mean  that  all  ‘acts  of  kindness  are  
unchosen and unavoidable’, thus ‘they are no kindness at all’ nor could we 
‘infer’ any ‘obligation’ from them.181  
 Balguy’s  own  philosophical  position  is  evident.  We  have  to  look  at  
virtue as ‘rational’ – and not as purely ‘instinctive’.182 What  this  means  is  
that ‘there is something in actions, absolutely good’, which is ‘antecedent’ to 
both ‘affections’ as well as ‘laws’. In this common Voluntarist perspective, this 
‘moral goodness’  is,  of course, God’s will,  and the pivotal point about the 
role of reason is that we may rationally grasp it  – even if we did not have 
any natural inclinations or laws that binded us to certain type of actions. It 
is only God’s orders that give us a moral obligation. ‘Deriving virtue merely 
from natural affection’,  Balguy  writes,  ‘implies  it  to  be  of  an  arbitrary  and  
                                                        
176 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 7. About ‘natural instinct’ and our 
aptness ‘to restrain natural affection to our kindred’ see also John Balguy, The duty of 
benevolence and brotherly love and the ill effects of a party spirit, London, 1727, pp. 1–2. 
177 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 8. 
178 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 9. 
179 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 18. 
180 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 12. This should be kept in mind 
when examining natural virtues in the Treatise. 
181 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 10. 
182 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 21. About rational capabilities, see 
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changeable  nature’  and  moreover  ‘our  judging  and approving  it  by  a  moral 
sense implies the same’.183 
 Thus, Balguy’s conclusion is that (even in the strongest possible case) 
we may only claim that a ‘benevolent instinct’ supports morality, but it does 
not  mean  that  without  it  we  would  be  ‘altogether  incapable  of  virtue’.184 
The  point  is  that  our  instincts  assist  and  push  us  towards  certain  type  of  
virtuous behavior (in some cases more than in others), but nevertheless, 
even without these instincts the virtues would exist, although they might be 
more rare to come across.  
 I  have  revisited  Balguy’s  own  rationalist  position  so  that  we  may  see  
how the discussion about natural affections and instincts evolves. The 
rationalists and moral sense philosophers sit around the very same table and 
participate in a dialogue. It is not surprising that this also has an immediate 
bearing on the naturalistic moral accounts. What is particularly noteworthy 
in  Balguy’s  case  is  his  idea  to  consider  natural  affection  and  moral  sense  
among brutes. The arguments derived from this analysis are above all meant 
to highlight the difference between natural and moral good. 
 The question that Balguy asks is Baylean in nature. Are ‘brutes’ capable 
of virtue? In nature it is apparent that all kinds of animals ‘shew affection to 
their respective kinds, and a strong degree of love and tenderness towards 
their offspring’.185 If they have natural affection, how can we say that this is 
moral  virtue?  According  to  Balguy,  we  cannot  do  this  without  seriously  
undermining morality. Thus, if we argue, like Hutcheson does, that virtue is 
solely depended upon instincts and natural affection, we run into a situation 
where we would have to admit that even brutes are virtuous. Evidently they 
are also capable of ‘kind affections, and suitable actions’.  But what Balguy 
claims is that these brutes might have ideas about ‘natural good’, but ‘none 
of moral’.186  
 To prove his point, Balguy develops a moral calculus based on natural 
affections (clearly motivated by Samuel Clarke and the idea of perfect and 
imperfect  duties  in  the  natural  law  tradition).  The  further  a  person  is  
removed from us, the more moral value our kind action towards him has. 
Thus, ‘an act of kindness done to a child, or a friend, is certainly less’ virtuous 
‘than doing the same to a stranger’.  Why? Because ‘to be determined to the 
doing of good action, merely by the reason and right of the thing, is genuine 
goodness’.187 Moreover, the calculus also works in the opposite direction – 
‘the stronger the instinct, the more vicious is the violation of it’.188 Thus, to 
lack natural affection is not only morally wrong it is also unnatural.  
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184 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 12. 
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186 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 15. 
187 Balguy, The foundation of moral goodness, 1728, p. 16. 
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 In the case of natural affections, as well  as in the case of moral sense, 
Balguy picks up the topic of brutes and assumes that they are also in some 
measure capable of this supposed moral sense. ‘If the reasons and relations 
of things are out of the question, and this moral sense means no more than a 
natural determination to receive agreeable or disagreeable ideas of certain 
actions; I think it  will  be very difficult to prove brutes incapable of such a 
sense’.189 From Mandeville and Hume’s perspective Balguy is right. All they 
have to do is turn this into a positive principle by accepting it. The irony is 
of  course  that  Balguy  is  using  this  argument  about  brutes  as  a  proof  that  
Hutcheson’s argument is inadequate because brutes cannot be virtuous. 
What happens is, that this is precisely what Mandeville and Hume go on to 
use  as  the  argument  that  enables  them  to  hold  on  to  Mandeville’s  initial  
claim that the virtues that uphold civil  society are artificial  and yet they do 
not  have  to  reduce  all  human action  to  self-love  and self-preservation.  By  
turning  Balguy’s  argument  on  its  head  Mandeville  and  Hume  are  able  to  
admit that there are natural other-regarding affections in human nature. 
Nevertheless, our moral sentiments depend on artificial conventions. 
 Interestingly, Balguy attempts to elaborate his case by considering 
different kinds of societies. He picks up a comparison between a clan-based 
society, where the patriot leader is led by his natural affections to govern 
the society on a deserted island and another kind of society, where there are 
‘no equal attachment of nature’, but still the ‘equal number of people’. If the 
‘legislator’ manages to rule this society with ‘equal care, prudence, 
gentleness, and moderation’ as the chief in the family society, as maintained 
by Balguy, it is evident that this second ruler would deserve more merit for 
his virtue. Balguy goes on to point out that in the first case, ‘a great share of 
the merit would be placed to the account of Natural affection, commonly so 
called. In the latter, expecting the weaker attachment of common humanity, we 
discover  nothing  but  pure  virtue,  and  a  sense  of  honour  and  duty’.190 
Mandeville’s and Hume’s argument against these speculations would be of 
course that societies are never formed in the way that Balguy describes in 
his second example. However, Balguy’s criticism of Hutcheson’s idea of 
moral sense comes surprisingly close to the position adopted later by 
Mandeville and Hume. 
Pierre Nicole’s Essays: the outlines of amour-propre 
Pierre Nicole’s essays were mainly composed in the 1670s. The first 
translated volume was published in England already in 1680. John Locke 
compiled his own translations of three of Nicole’s essays between 1675 and 
1678. By the turn of the century Nicole’s essays were widely known in 
Britain. However, it was not before 1724 that they were published together 
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in a same edition. The publisher of the 1724 edition was Edmund Parker.  
Incidentally,  Parker  was  also  the  publisher  of  the  second  edition  of  The 
Fable of the Bees in  1723.  I  am  not  arguing  that  there  is  a  necessary  
connection between Bernard Mandeville and Edmund Parker publishing 
Nicole’s essays. However, it is only in Mandeville’s later works that Nicole’s 
direct influence is apparent (even when Mandeville’s rigid idea of virtue in 
the original Fable is clearly influenced by Jansenist thinking). My general 
point about Nicole is that it is his analysis of amour-propre and civil society 
that makes a clear impact on the intellectual development of Bernard 
Mandeville. This is the reason why I break the natural chronology of 
treating Nicole as a seventeenth-century author before the first Fable and 
place my analysis of Nicole’s essays between Mandeville’s Hobbism and his 
later writings.  
 Pierre Nicole’s essays can be read in different ways. We may read them 
with  a  view  on  a  normative  doctrine,  which  spells  out  in  terms  of  basic  
Christian  principles  of  toleration,  charity  and  respect.  We  could  even  
consider Nicole’s view of Christian politeness. However, Nicole’s essays 
also include a perceptive, naturalistic analysis of civil society based on basic 
principles of human nature. The descriptive account may be seen as 
independent from the normative side of Nicole’s essays. In this study 
Nicole’s essays are interpreted as a blueprint towards the development of 
moral and political philosophy in the works of Bernard Mandeville and 
David Hume. It will solely concentrate on this descriptive side of Nicole. 
 The concept of concupiscence plays a crucial role in the Augustinian 
moral tradition to which Pierre Nicole belongs.191 For Pierre Nicole it  is a 
general term referring to the position of the fallen man that has left him in 
direct  contrast  with  God.  Nicole’s  argument  is  geometrical  in  design.  He  
claims that a man is either motivated by God or this worldly ‘inclination’ 
that, in short, is a ‘general propensity of our corrupt nature’.192 Nicole is not 
attempting to pin down the actual concept in all its implications, but points 
out  that  all  the  ‘sentiments  of  concupiscence’  are  ‘contrary  to  the  law  of  
God and his eternal justice’.193 This, however, does not imply that the 
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outward actions motivated through these sentiments would necessarily be 
in conflict with God’s will.  
 It is important to notice that concupiscence is characterised as an 
inclination. We are either drawn towards God or pulled away from him. 
Nicole explains this dichotomy by writing that in ‘the bottom of the heart’ 
we can find two separate,  conflicting principles,  the love of ‘God’ and the 
love of ‘creature’.194 The matter is epistemologically simple. Either our 
actions are motivated by the love of God or concupiscence. Only a few live 
in God’s grace and sincerely love God. This is possible only if  God’s will,  
placed  in  the  heart,  touches  the  person  in  a  certain  way,  which  in  other  
words means that he has been given efficient grace. Such person treats 
other people with charity. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the role of 
grace is to say that the ones who act through grace have God’s will as their 
motivating principle. Their love of God “spills over” towards other people 
as charity. The rest are sinners. They have God’s light in their heart, but it 
does not sensibly motivate them.  
 The idea that the soul needs to be sensibly touched by God is important 
for  Nicole.  It  is,  he  thinks,  perfectly  logical  to  state  that  God’s  justice  is  
implanted in every human heart, but only a select few are effectively moved 
by  it.  The  idea  of  being  touched  is  important  also  in  other  respects.  For  
example, Nicole does not have to revert to an unconvincing argument that 
God’s light or justice would be dim or weak in some people and stronger in 
others. God is the truth and there cannot be any variations of it. This also 
explains how most people are motivated by another principle. Only from 
the ‘insensibility towards’ God ‘springs’ our ‘sensible and lively esteem for 
creatures’. The human soul simply ‘cannot be without some inclination, and 
must always fix her self on some object’.195 Thus, if  it  is  not God and our 
love  for  him that  moves  us,  it  must  be  something  else,  which  in  Nicole’s  
vocabulary is termed as concupiscence.  
 This dichotomy is the root of Nicole’s rigorous Jansenist conception of 
sin. However, by constructing his theory in this way, Nicole leaves a third 
option open. A sinner can become a good Christian by trying to reform the 
wicked state of his soul and desiring to live according to God’s law. Since 
God’s light is implanted in the soul, even when it does not sensibly 
motivate  us,  everyone  is  able  to  know God’s  eternal  law and will.  In  fact,  
not even the worst of human beings are able to escape the ‘penetrating rays 
of his justice’.196 Thus, everyone who truly desires (and is capable of using 
his  faculty  of  reason)  is  able  to  learn  ‘the  law’,  ‘the  will’  and  ‘the  order  of  
God’.197 However, for these sinners God’s justice is not an intrinsic, 
motivating  principle  for  the  soul  and  it  never  will  be  if  God  does  not  
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change their inner constitution. These men have to strive for the truth by 
trying to conquer the contrasting inclination, concupiscence, which is a 
naturally the motivating principle of the heart. The main point of Nicole’s 
normative doctrine is the idea that it is possible for men to consciously 
carry  out  good  acts  (those  that  God  wills  us  to  do  and  that  are  in  
accordance with his law and order) and lead the life of a good Christian, 
even  when  they  do  not  have  efficient  grace  and  God’s  will  does  not  
efficiently move them.198  
 My interest in Nicole does not lie in his normative doctrine, but in the 
naturalistic description of the world and human nature. On most occasions 
Nicole uses concupiscence as a rather vague, general term referring to an 
overall inclination to drift away from God. Amour-propre, on the other hand, 
when directly linked to this propensity, is a faculty that is more precisely 
pinned down. In fact, Nicole’s significance as a moral philosopher should 
perhaps be evaluated as an attempt to analyse this difficult concept and 
form a logical system of its implications. 
 It has perhaps always been a somewhat empty truism that man is a more 
or  less  selfish  creature  who  does  not  care  too  much  about  anything  but  
himself. Even the theorists that consider selfishness as man’s first principle 
and revert to psychological egoism are often rather vague about what they 
actually mean.199 It  is  precisely  the  fact  that  this  highly  relevant  feature  of  
human nature had become an empty truism that Pierre Nicole had set out 
to challenge. The aim of his moral essays is to render amour-propre under a 
painstaking  analysis  that  would  help  us  ‘to  form’  a  ‘true  idea  of  it’.  He  
emphasises  that  a  reference  to  the  fact  that  a  man  loves  himself  ‘is  not  
sufficient to make us know its nature’ because ‘we may love our selves 
divers ways’.200  
 For Nicole amour-propre is the first principle. The idea of concupiscence 
might remark the fact that our souls are inclined towards creatures, but we 
are not really drawn to all the creatures. Nicole’s way of further unravelling 
this inclination is with a necessary reference to amour-propre. A man is in love 
with himself instead of God. When describing our fallen state, Nicole 
remarks that ‘we bring into the world with us a will totally taken up with the 
love of itself, and incapable of loving any thing but with relation to our 
selves’.201 A man does ‘not only love himself’. He ‘loves himself without 
limits, and without measure; loves only himself, and refers all to himself’. 
He  simply  cannot  even  desire  anything  that  does  not  stand  in  a  certain  
‘relation to himself’.202 It  is evident that without efficient grace there is no 
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possibility for a universal benevolence, but how does Nicole’s account 
differ  from  the  Hobbists  who  also  claim  that  a  man  is  an  utterly  selfish  
creature, naturally incapable of other-regarding affection?  
 Some commentators think that it does not differ at all. Pierre Force has 
emblematically argued that ‘Nicole agrees entirely with Hobbes on the 
description of human nature’.203 I agree that there are passages in Nicole’s 
essays that might give the impression that his understanding of human 
nature is in accordance with what has often been taken as Hobbes’s view. 
Nicole argues that we have ‘a secret inclination to seek all things’ for 
ourselves.  A man, Nicole writes,  has a natural propensity to ‘make himself 
the center of all’. This principle is also characterised as ‘a natural tyranny’.204 
This ‘tyrannical disposition’ to centre everything to us is irresistibly 
‘stamped in the bottom of’ our ‘hearts’. It ‘renders’ us ‘violent, unjust, cruel, 
ambitious, flatterers, envious, insolent and quarrellous’. As Nicole 
dramatically rounds off his argument – it is truly ‘a monster’ that ‘we 
harbour in our bosoms’.205 
 It  might  well  be  a  monster,  but  it  is  not  a  Hobbist  monster.  In  a  
Hobbist  system  the  reason  why  self-love  engages  men  to  hurt  others  is  a  
battle for survival. We may debate whether this was Thomas Hobbes’s own 
first principle, but we have to accept this when we talk about Hobbism. In 
this  theory,  self-preservation  is  the  beginning  as  well  as  the  end.  Nicole  
agrees that all our wrongdoings are caused by amour-propre. It certainly 
‘includes the seeds of all  the crimes, and of all  the misdemeanors of men, 
from the smallest, even to the most detestable ones’.206 ‘The  love  of  our  
selves’, Nicole underscores, is the ‘fountain of all our maladies’ and it ‘gives 
us a violent inclination for pleasures, for promotion, for all that doth 
nourish our curiosity’ and it ‘disposes us to procure’ our ‘desires by all sorts 
of  means  how unjust  and how criminal  soever  they  may  be’.  But  Nicole’s  
conception of amour-propre is different from that maintained by Hobbism. 
First of all,  Nicole’s idea of what makes us revert to unjust means is not a 
struggle  to  preserve  ourselves  no  matter  what.  The  only  reason  why  our  
worldly inclinations are so violent is that by centring everything around us, 
we are desperately trying ‘to full up’ that ‘terrible vacuity which the loss of 
our true happiness hath caused in our hearts’.207 
 This  wretched  state  of  the  soul  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  a  fallen  
man. A man cannot ‘bear the interior reproach’ of his ‘disorder’.208 He does 
not become aware of his disorder by a conscious process, but has felt it ever 
since the day he was born and thus ‘inclines continually to fly from himself’. 
It is because of this desperate misery of not being touched by God that we 
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revert to means that are unjust and criminal. ‘A man without grace’ is such 
‘a great punishment to himself’ that he ‘looks’ even ‘upon himself in some 
sort as his own great enemy’.209 We  are  unconsciously  trying  to  put  
ourselves in God’s place. Inevitably Nicole thinks that this is an uphill 
battle. The urge to succeed is so violent that without outward restrictions 
we might turn to any means necessary. Simultaneously, our miserable life is 
uncontrollably swayed by ‘violent passions’ that ‘spring from an unknown 
root’ and ‘proceed from a hidden abyss’.210 Nicole does not understand the 
prevalence of amour-propre as simple self-preservation. He is constructing his 
theory from a different perspective. Meanwhile, he has no problem in using 
and modifying Hobbes’s ideas.  
 When we understand the foundation of Nicole’s point of view, another 
vital aspect of amour-propre becomes comprehensible. The inherent need to 
centre everything around ourselves is not called a tyrannical propensity for 
nothing. The simplest and most primitive way of trying to fill up the 
emptiness of our soul is to ‘dominate over’ the ‘fellow-travellers in the same 
unfortunate road’.211 A  fallen  man  is  never  fully  cured  of  this  instinctive  
quality and all men ‘inevitably’ have an inclination ‘of domineering and 
lording over’ other ‘men’.212 This desire manifests itself in all the possible 
aspects of life. It does not only concern material and physical premises. A 
particularly strong feature of human nature is a ‘desire of domineering over 
the minds of others’.213 Once  a  man  has  obtained  some  opinion,  he  is  
‘naturally  wedded  to’  it,  not  necessarily  because  it  is  a  token  of  good  
judgment in particular, but because he is ‘never free from a desire of lording 
it over others by all ways possible’.214  
 It is clear that the simplest and most inevitable function of amour-propre 
is to covet ‘sovereignty’. Once we are ‘regarded and looked upon by others 
as  great  and powerful’  and  ‘we  stir  up  in  the  hearts  of  others  motions  of  
respect and submission’,  this grossly supports our secret design to put our 
own image in the place of God’s.215 This is the self-love part of amour-propre 
that is derived directly from Hobbes’s account and which is couched to 
material goods and self-preservation. Like Hobbes, Nicole claims that in a 
society where there is no government, ‘every one would be master, and 
tyrannize  over  others’.  In  this  state  it  would  be  ‘a  necessity’  that  ‘the  
stronger become lords, whilst the weak remain subject’.216 Pierre Force is 
correct when he writes that Nicole agrees with Hobbes about the origin of 
government.217 Indeed, in his key essay, ‘Charity and amour-propre’, Nicole 
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follows Hobbes’s description of the origin of the government to the letter. 
But  I  think  that  in  order  to  understand Nicole’s  argument  we  have  to  see  
what he is doing when he agrees with Hobbes. Nicole’s idea is to redefine 
the Hobbist conception of amour-propre.  In  this  particular  essay  he  retains  
parts of Hobbes’s argument while his concrete point is to criticise the actual 
theory. 
 If the idea is to ‘represent’ the ‘disposition of the hearts of men’ towards 
‘one another’ in the hypothetical state of nature, we may plausibly state that 
it is, of course, a ‘condition of war’ and ‘each man is naturally an enemy to 
all other men’.218 Nicole carries on in this Hobbist vein. The only way that 
the ‘multitude of people’, who ‘only endeavour the ruin of one another’, can 
be rendered into ‘societies, commonwealths, and kingdoms’ is when amour-
propre ‘which is the cause of this war’ changes its ways and eventually guides 
people  how  to  ‘live  in  peace’.  A  man  ‘loves  domination’.  He  ‘loves  to  
enslave all the world to it’, but he ‘loves yet more life and convenientness, 
and an easie life more than domination; and sees clearly that others are no 
ways disposed to suffer themselves to be domineered over’.219 Once men 
realise the ‘impossibility of succeeding by force’ in their tyrannical designs, 
they are obliged ‘to submit ones self to the care of his own preservation’ by 
uniting  with  other  men.  ‘To  strengthen  this  union,  laws  are  made,  and  
punishments ordered for those who violate them. Thus by means of 
tortures, and gibbets set up in publick, the thoughts and tyrannical designs 
of  every  particular  mans  self-love  are  withheld’.  It  is  indeed  true,  Nicole  
thinks, that ‘fear of death is then the first tye of civil  society,  and the first 
check of self-love’.220 
 Consequently, after a government and laws have been enforced, the way 
that the self-love side of amour-propre and our bid for power operate change. 
Since ‘open violence’ is ‘excluded’ from men’s options, they ‘seek other 
ways’ to win the worldly contest. They ‘substitute craft for force’. When 
men can no longer keep on ‘tyrannizing over’ others, they have no other 
option  but  ‘to  content  the  self-love  of  those  whom  they’  need.221 There 
could not be a clearer expression of the Hobbist idea of how justice and 
self-interested  commerce  come  into  the  world.  The  idea  is  still  to  
overpower everyone else and beat others in the competition of gathering 
supplies needed for self-preservation, which is the most obvious way a man 
can reinforce the idea that everything centres around him. It is not, Nicole 
reminds his audience, that ‘this tyrannical inclination which makes us have a 
desire to rule and govern by force over others’ would be lost after a 
government  and laws  have  been installed.  It  is  still  ‘lively  in  the  hearts  of  
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men’.  In  his  darker  moments  Nicole  even  hints  that  men  are  ‘forced  to  
dissemble it, until they are strengthened by gaining others by sweet ways, to 
have afterwards the means to bring them to their bent by force’.222 Thus, 
the only thing that has actually changed concerning the self-love side of 
amour-propre is that the means are different and now we have laws and justice 
that restrict how men play their little game. The greatest restraint in men is 
obviously  the  fear  of  ‘the  punishment,  which  the  laws  threaten  to  those  
who have recourse to violent ways’.223 Consequently, since men are ‘forced’ 
to ‘obey the laws’,  they at least momentarily ‘forget these vast thoughts of 
domination’ because it is ‘so impossible’ for ‘them to prosper therein’.224  
 Self-interest and commerce replace the physical struggle concerning the 
self-love side of amour-propre in a political society. Pierre Nicole is very 
specific in his description of this interested commerce. He uses such terms 
as ‘utilities’, ‘interests’, ‘gifts’, ‘mony’, ‘labours’, ‘toyls’, ‘services’, ‘real 
goods’, ‘merchandises’, ‘traffick’, ‘trade’, and ‘commerce’ in the same 
paragraph to describe it. According to Nicole, even the exchange of 
civilities can be seen as part of this interested commerce, if the idea is that 
for ‘vain complacencies we obtain effective commodities’.225 It is indeed ‘by 
the  means  and  help  of  this  commerce,  all  necessaries  for  this  life  are  in  
some sort supplied for’.226 I  suppose  that  this  kind  of  thinking  has  
motivated modern scholars to study the concepts of amour-propre, self-love 
and self-interest in the early modern period. However, what I find 
interesting is that this self-love side of amour-propre is for Nicole something 
that  has  to  be  accounted  for  before  getting  to  the  actual  point  that  he  is  
making. 
Self-love and pride 
As  we  have  seen,  up  to  this  point  everything  seems  to  be  in  complete  
agreement with a common perception of a Hobbist account of the origin of 
civil  society.  But  all  of  a  sudden  a  rapid  change  takes  place  in  Nicole’s  
argument.  After  saying  all  that  he  says  about  laws,  justice,  self-love  and  
interested commerce, Nicole is quick to point out there are ‘many people’, 
whose ‘inclination of making themselves be beloved is stronger than that of 
domineering and lording over men’. Thus, we have not said enough about 
amour-propre. It is only now that Nicole starts to develop an original part of 
the analysis. The previous observation is the key to Nicole’s moral 
philosophy. Nicole’s argument is that amour-propre has  two  different  sides,  
the self-love side, which in the Hobbist theory is more or less accounted 
for, and another side, which has been forgotten. This theoretical distinction 
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is once more geometrical in design. The self-love side of amour-propre makes 
us  want  ‘to  be  rich  and  powerful’,  but  this  inclination  is  often  
overshadowed by another side of amour-propre,  which  takes  into  
consideration  the  ‘judgements’  of  others  and makes  us  avoid  their  ‘hatred  
and aversion’.227 Like self-love, this is a universal propensity and there is not 
a human being that would ‘not desire to be loved’ and take ‘great pleasure’ 
when others are ‘turned towards them’ and look favourably upon them.228 
 When examined from this perspective, it seems clear that Nicole’s 
attitude  towards  Hobbism  and  the  self-love  side  of  amour-propre is  in  fact  
uninspired. Nicole freely borrows the idea of the origin of government 
from Hobbes. He runs fast through it, without giving it too much thought, 
in order to get to his actual point. Nicole is generally fascinated by the idea 
that we are often completely unaware whether our motives are sincere or 
not.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  self-love  side  of  amour-propre we often 
‘easily’ distinguish ‘what we do, either through human fear or through gross 
interest’.229 In other words, there is no real intellectual challenge here for 
Nicole. The matter is completely ‘different regarding the subtlety of the 
love and esteem for men’.230  
 This  distinction  between  the  two  different  sides  of  amour-propre leads 
Nicole into a theoretical conclusion about civil society. Because of this 
division in amour-propre, Nicole maintains that there are three attributes that 
ultimately render the existence of civil society possible. Two of these seem 
to be directly borrowed from Hobbes. First, amour-propre hinders us 
‘through fear of chastisement’ and death ‘to violate the laws’ and removes 
us ‘by this means outwardly from all the crimes’. Second, amour-propre 
‘comforts the necessities of others’ in ‘the sight of’ man’s own ‘proper 
interest’ (thus, the idea of justice and interested commerce.) These two 
principles, in Nicole’s understanding, are the quintessence of Hobbes’s 
conception of self-love. But Nicole’s point is that in human life ‘there are 
many occasions, where neither fear nor interest have any place’.231 
Therefore we additionally need to take into consideration a third feature of 
amour-propre in  order  to  form  a  coherent  theory  of  it.  ‘The  most  general’  
passion that ‘springs from amour-propre’  is  ‘the  desire  of  being  loved’  that  
Hobbes did not take into consideration.232 Nicole’s insight is that ‘there is 
hardly any action’ that we would take in order to ‘please God’, ‘whereunto 
amour-propre cannot engage us to please men’.233 Out  of  these  three  
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principles, it is the third, the inclination that renders us to please others, that 
is the most effective in upholding civil society. As a feature of amour-propre it 
is ‘much more extended than the two others’.234 This is the core of Nicole’s 
redefinition of amour-propre and  his  criticism of  Hobbism.  If  the  idea  is  to  
form a theory of civil society based on human nature and this third feature 
is missing from our definition of amour-propre, it is unsurprising that civility 
and politeness are not an integral part of the Hobbist understanding of civil 
science. Simultaneously, it becomes overtly clear that theoretically, 
politeness has little to do with commerce. 
 But  what  is  precisely  this  other  side  of  amour-propre?  Men  desire  to  be  
loved  and therefore  they  please  others.  Does  this  not  sound more  like  an  
insignificant detail rather than an original insight in moral philosophy? 
Indeed, this would be a commonplace, if it was just a passing comment and 
not burdened with theoretical implications. When Pierre Nicole discusses 
this other side of amour-propre, it is precisely what Mandeville later pointed at 
when he wrote about self-liking. 
 The reason why ‘we desire to be belov’d’, Nicole emphasises, is ‘that we 
may love our selves more’. The sole object of this propensity is to support 
the good opinion that we have of ourselves. ‘The love which others bear us 
makes us judge we deserve to be belov’d, and makes us frame of our selves 
a more lovely idea’.235 For  Nicole,  people’s  approval  is  ‘the  object  of  our  
vanity’ and ‘the nourishment of amour-propre’. But in fact, Nicole highlights, 
it  is  more  than  this.  It  is  ‘the  bed  or  couch whereon our  weakness  rests’.  
Our opinion of ourselves is laid on such a vulnerable ground that ‘it cannot 
sustain it self without being under-propt by the approbation and love of 
others’.236  
 All human beings, except perhaps the ones who have efficient grace, are 
proud  and  vain  to  some  extent  and  eager  to  entertain  a  good  opinion  of  
themselves. It is unquestionably a token of vanity if we love ourselves 
instead of God. On several occasions Nicole calls attention to the fact that 
this self-liking side of amour-propre is directly linked to what is commonly 
called pride. ‘Pride’, Nicole in one of his essays defines, is ‘a swelling of the 
heart, by which man dilates and magnifies himself in his own imaginations’. 
Men have an inherent inclination to overvalue themselves, which ‘imprints’ 
them with fantastic ideas of ‘strength’, ‘greatness’ and ‘excellence’.237 The 
only reason why we additionally so passionately ‘desire’ the ‘approbation of 
others’ is that when we acquire it ‘we are settl’d and fortifi’d in the idea we 
have  of  our  own  excellence’.  It  simply  persuades  us  that  ‘we  are  not  
mistaken in the opinion we have of our selves’.238 It is the ‘greatest pleasure 
of a proud man’ to ‘contemplate the idea which he makes of himself’, which 
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‘is the origin of  all  his  vain  satisfactions’.  In  the  human  mind  practically  
everything is related to this idea of the self and for a proud man ‘nothing 
pleaseth  him but  in  proportion  as  it  contributes  to  puff  it  up,  to  adorn  it,  
and to render it more lively’.239 In brief, when ‘the world looks on us with 
esteem’, we ‘settle in us a better opinion of our selves’.240 By and large, ‘the 
true end and aim of the ambitious and voluptuous man, is but to underprop 
and hold up his weakness by some externe support’.241  
 Inevitably, since the approbation of others is ‘so necessary to keep up 
our  hearts’,  ‘we  are  naturally  inclin’d  to  seek  and  procure  it’.242 Human 
weakness might perhaps not be anything to rejoice in, but when judged 
from the perspective that underlines social cohesion in a secular world, the 
attitude  seems  to  be  much  more  ambivalent.  There  is  indeed  a  positive,  
natural  effect  of  the  fact  that  ‘we  must  be  flattered  and  caressed  like  
children to be kept in a good humour’ or ‘in our fashion we fall a crying, as 
children do in theirs’.243 It is only from the supposition of our weakness 
that  Nicole  may  conclude  that  ‘there  is  hardly’  anything  that  makes  a  
stronger ‘impression upon the mind’ than ‘the fear of mens judgements’ 
that ‘springs only from vanity’.244 It is the insecurity of the opinion of 
ourselves  (for  Nicole  a  human being  is  always  an  insignificant  being,  thus  
this insecurity is always apparent) that makes us desirous of other people’s 
approval, which in turn renders us sociable. 
Self-love, pride and politeness 
Nicole  reminds  his  audience  that  men have  a  natural  desire  to  boast  their  
pride and expose it for all the world to see. ‘There is’, he writes, ‘a pleasure 
in hearing amour-propre speak when it is not disguised at all’.245 In fact, ‘every 
one’ has ‘a desire either to disparage others, or to distinguish himself from 
them’.246 The  implication  is,  of  course,  that  since  everyone  is  affected  by  
these very same drives, amour-propre takes a different route. Perhaps we are 
not too far from Nicole’s point if we say that human life in a civil society is 
a balancing act on a fine line between these two opposite inclinations. We 
want to please people and we desire their approval, yet we are not deprived 
of the need to differentiate ourselves from everyone else.  
 Nicole calls attention to the fact that we are unable to fully understand 
the workings of our own amour-propre because it cunningly deceives us, but 
we are extremely sharp ‘when we perceive it’ somewhere else. In others it 
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‘appears’ to us ‘under its natural form, and we hate it by so much more as 
we love our selves’. But why do we hate it? Simply because of the fact that 
amour-propre of  ‘other  men opposes  all’  our  own ‘desires’.247 Consequently, 
this has a direct impact on the development of civil society. Once people 
have been living in a society for some time, everyone becomes perfectly 
sensible that he is not the only one that has the urge to speak freely and to 
express the sentiments of the esteem that he has for himself. They learn 
that ‘nothing’ draws as much ‘aversion’ as this inclination. Amour-propre 
simply ‘cannot shew it self without exciting it’. Men ‘are not able to suffer’ 
pride when they ‘discover it’.  Thus, ‘it  is  easie’  for them to ‘judge’ that the 
case will not be any different when others discover their true sentiments.248 
It is this experience of the world that ‘inclines those who are sensible of the 
hatred of men’ to try ‘not to expose themselves thereunto’. As a result, they 
withdraw their amour-propre ‘from the sight of others’, they ‘start to disguise 
and counterfeit it’ and from henceforth they never ‘shew it under its natural 
shape’. The method is simply ‘to imitate the behaviour of those who would 
be intirely exempt from it’.249 These might be somewhat common notions 
in seventeenth-century France, but it is Nicole’s original contribution to 
moral philosophy that shows us how the rules of good-breeding and 
politeness are derived from the self-liking side of amour-propre – in a parallel 
manner  as  laws  and  justice  are  derived  from  the  self-love  side  of  amour-
propre. 
 The  core  of  politeness  is  simply  that  pride  should  not  be  visible.  It  is  
‘this suppression of amour-propre’,  Nicole  stresses,  ‘  which  makes  human  
civility’.250 Politeness  is  ‘but  a  kind  of  traffick’  of  the  self-liking  side  of  
amour-propre, ‘wherein we endeavour to’ lure ‘the affection of others by 
owing a kindness for them’.251 We may easily point out the connotations to 
commerce and trade in this quote, but we have to be careful not to make 
the mistake of assuming that there is some sort of material interest involved 
in the trafficking of the self-liking side of amour-propre.  In  humane  civility  
there are no gross interests involved. Nicole indeed wants to indicate the 
analogy between the interested commerce (that is the way self-love side of 
amour-propre functions in civil society) and the reciprocal nature of 
politeness. However, he is even more eager to keep these two different 
institutions  apart.  There  is  a  good  reason  why  useful  and  agreeable  are  
separate concepts. Of course, material interest and cupidity can motivate 
individuals to behave politely, but as we saw earlier, in Nicole’s theory this 
kind  of  behaviour  falls  under  the  realm  of  interested  commerce  and  self-
love, not humane civility and self-liking. If one flatters a person in order to 
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get some money from him, one’s behaviour is part of the interested 
commerce (that Nicole looks down with contempt). If one flatters the same 
person, so that he would approve of one’s character so that one may 
entertain a better opinion of oneself, this is humane civility (towards which 
Nicole’s attitude is much more ambivalent). In practice, it might perhaps be 
impossible to keep these two spheres from overlapping, but theoretically, it 
is important for Nicole that they are not confused as being the same.  
 Nicole also demonstrates how politeness keeps evolving. He points out 
that  ‘these  demonstrations  of  affection  for  the  most  part  are  false’.  They  
‘run into excess’ and ‘we make a shew of more love than we have’. In fact, 
‘in  the  room  of  real  love,  we  substitute  a  language  full  of  affection’.252 
Plainly put, the ‘discourses of civility’, which are ‘so ordinary in the mouths 
of men’ are far apart ‘from the sentiments of their heart’.253 
 But if the development brings about a custom of flattery and insincerity, 
moreover, men will soon learn to ‘keep themselves generally to a distance 
from all that seems vanity’. Hence, the tolerable appearance of ‘modesty’ 
comes into the world.254 In fact, ‘civility’ does not only make men 
dissimulate and smooth the appearance of their ‘base vain glories’ (which 
they actually are so eager to show). Since men in general are so ‘extremely 
subtile in discovering the by-ways which may be taken to make manifest in 
us what we desire to shew’, ‘civility renounces these small crafts, and studies 
to avoid them’. Simultaneously, a new fashion comes about and, at least in 
theory, soon there is nothing ‘more simple and humble’ than the 
‘discourses’  of  the  world.  Because  of  the  nature  of  amour-propre, it is 
rendered as ‘a general rule’ that a man is ‘never to speak of himself’. If he is 
forced to make a comment about himself, it has to be done ‘with more 
coldness and indifferency than of others’.255 However, this does not mean 
that people who have adopted this new fashion would actually be humble. 
As Nicole points out, ‘pride’ is ‘born with man’ and it ‘never abandons him’. 
Therefore, ‘in the conduct’ that seems humble we may often find ‘a more 
cunning and delicate sentiment of this pride’.256  
 It goes without saying that Nicole’s normative position is different from 
his naturalistic description of politeness. However, I have no interest in 
attempting to show Nicole’s conception of Christian civility. Additionally, 
the actual methods of how to operate politeness (or laws that protect self-
love)  and the  locus  where  they  are  practised  are  not  of  much concern  for  
this study. The idea is to examine the theoretical foundation behind artificial 
moral  institutions  and  how  they  are  derived  from  human  nature.  ‘It  is  
manifest’, Nicole clearly points out, that all ‘conduct’, which falls under the 
institution of politeness, is in the end aiming ‘directly’ at the self-liking side 
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of ‘amour-propre’, since the idea is to ‘obtain the esteem of the friendship of 
men’.257 In  my opinion,  what  is  crucial  for  Nicole  is  this  link  between the  
moral institution of politeness and the passion (self-liking side of amour-
propre) and the idea that this is analogous to justice and the self-love side of 
amour-propre.  
 However,  what  I  do  find  intriguing  is  that  even  when  Nicole  stresses  
that the expressions of civility are exaggerated and often false, the 
institution compels us ‘to praise voluntarily what is praise-worthy, to set a 
value  as  great  as  we  can  on  other  mens  good  qualities,  and  not  to  refuse  
even to our enemies our testimonies of esteem which they deserve’. If we 
fail to follow these obvious guidelines, we are very unlikely to meet with any 
approbation. We also have to remember that men are not judged by single 
instances but by the overall impression of their character. Nicole goes so far 
as  to  claim that  ‘an  extreme indulgence  for  other  mens  faults’,  hiding  and 
excusing them as much as possible, ‘never’ condemning anyone, explicating 
‘all  to  the  best’,  being  ‘easily  satisfied’  and  rather  being  ‘deceived’  than  
giving ‘way to suspicions which are hurtful’ to others are all part of civility. 
For  Nicole,  ‘all  this  tends  directly’  in  the  end  ‘to  amour-propre’.258 Perhaps 
Nicole is right that this is the only way that amour-propre actually ‘hinders 
us from passing for proud and presumptuous’.259 At  least,  if  we  take  
Nicole’s word for it, it seems that in order to even uphold our self-liking it 
takes much more than an empty shell  to actually ‘prosper in the design of 
making our selves beloved’, to ‘acquire friends’, ‘pacifie our enemies’ and to 
‘keep a good correspondence with all the world’.260  
 Nicole  does  not  think  that  an  individual  ever  succeeds  in  his  forlorn  
battle of loving himself as he ought to love God. Our high ‘opinions’ about 
ourselves ‘are grounded only upon a voluntary error’. For Nicole, it really 
does  not  matter  what  we  have  achieved  in  the  world.  The  opinions  about  
ourselves  ‘are  never  firm  and  sure’,  but  ‘always  mixed  with  mistrust,  and  
consequently with melancholy, trouble and molestation’. Instead of ‘pure 
joy’ and ‘full and entire satisfaction which amour-propre aimeth  at,  all  it  can  
do’  is  ‘to  suspend  for  some  time  the  sentiments  of  sadness,  which  are  
nourished at the bottom of the heart’.261 A Nicolean man is pathetic, but it 
is difficult to imagine a civil society more progressive than the one inhabited 
by these men. 
 The  idea  of  God’s  justice  and  order  imprinted  in  mankind  is  a  basic  
Christian doctrine, uninteresting as such. However, Nicole is effectively 
using it also as part of his naturalistic description of civil society. I think that 
because of this paradoxical contrast between the love of God and the love 
of self, Nicole’s explanation of human progress seems almost unmatched in 
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dynamism. It is the agonising conflict within every individual that leads a 
secular life that keeps the world in motion. People are always in a genuine 
search after what they can consider true and good. According to Nicole, 
every  human  being  has  to  believe,  at  least  in  some  very  confused  and  
obscure manner, that what he does and what he is, ultimately is worthwhile. 
Nicole is very precise when he says that ‘we can love nothing which we do 
not think good’ and ‘true’.262 We ‘cannot’ even ‘enjoy’ anything, if we think 
that it is ‘false’.263 Thus, even when stirred by base motives and false 
judgement, ‘people’ have to ‘justifie in themselves and flatter themselves, 
that their stubbornness, and their inflexibility in their sentiments, proceed 
only from the love they have for truth’.264 They ‘are so fashion’d by nature, 
that they lay hold on nothing but what is by the understanding presented to 
them under the appearance of some good’.265 
 What, of course, happens is that this seemingly noble quality turns 
upside down. ‘The love of truth’ is hailed as the first principle by everybody, 
but it usually unveils as an ill-servant because ‘the chief and principal use we 
make’ of it ‘is to persuade us that what we love is true’. As it often unfolds, 
we  do not  ‘love’  things  ‘because  they  are  true’,  but  ‘we  believe  them true,  
because we love them’. Thus, we manage ‘to add’ the ‘idea of truth’ into our 
‘inclinations’, which only fixes us ‘more firmly’ in our meaningless ways.266 
It might seem that in this manner Nicole drains the meaning out of our love 
of truth, but he does not do so entirely. It becomes apparent that ‘men 
would not be men, did they not run after some true, or false light’.267  
 If  men  always  have  to  justify  to  themselves  that  they  are  looking  for  
something  that  is  good  and  true,  it  is  equally  natural  that  they  think  that  
they are ultimately in search of harmony. The ‘life of a true Christian’, 
Nicole writes, would be ‘a life of peace’, but the life of a man driven by his 
concupiscence is a constant motion searching for peace that he cannot find. 
God’s will is ‘immoveable’ and ‘the bent and inclination of a virtuous man 
is  towards  silence  as  much  as  possible  he  can’.268 The inclination of the 
common sinner is ‘to fly from himself’ believing that ‘his happiness consists 
in being forgetful of himself, and running headlong into this 
forgetfulness’.269  
 As  mistaken  as  they  might  be,  men are  genuinely  and naturally  aiming  
for  the  satisfaction  that  is  not  to  be  found.  The  scenario  is  further  
complicated by the fact that even when men are constantly turning their 
eyes away from themselves, they have a natural desire to think that they are 
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doing the very opposite. A Nicolean man is truly a paradox. We have ‘two 
inclinations’,  one  which  ‘makes  us  to  fly’  from  ourselves,  and  ‘the  other’,  
which makes us ‘seek the knowledge of our selves’. They are both ‘natural’ 
and ‘spring’ from ‘the same fountain’.270 Knowing and not knowing 
ourselves  is  difficult.  A  ‘vain’  man,  sooner  or  later,  ‘will’  always  ‘see’  his  
meaningless and worthless self.271 ‘Truth  always  makes  it  self  a  little  light  
through all those clouds wherewith men strive to obscure it’. Once amour-
propre is  at  the  brink  of  acquiring  satisfaction,  there  are  ‘always  some rays’  
that  come  and  ‘incommode  pride’  and  ‘trouble’  the  ‘false  quiet  which  it  
endeavours to procure it self’.272 Naturally, a man ‘avoids seeing’ his actual 
state, ‘because being vain he is not able to suffer the sight of his faults and 
miseries’. ‘To accord these two contrary desires’ a man has to be extremely 
astute to find ‘means’ that are ‘worth his vanity’ and ‘satisfy’ both of these 
inclinations  ‘at  the  same  time’.  It  truly  takes  ‘craft  or  subtility’  from  the  
Nicolean  man to  be  able  to  ‘cover  all  his  faults’  and  ‘only  to  include’  this  
‘image which he’ forms ‘of himself’, those ‘qualities which may raise him in 
his own thoughts’.273 It is interesting that Pierre Nicole puts so much effort 
in  proving  that  a  man  has  to  genuinely  succeed  in  deceiving  himself  (not  
just other people) and believe that he is as worthy as he would like to think. 
 Meanwhile, what happens is that these Nicolean men are constantly 
forced to ‘renew the idea of their me’. It is ‘this idea’ of self that causes ‘their 
pleasure during their fortune’ and ‘their displeasure during their disgrace’.274 
Once  the  former  ground  where  men  had  placed  the  idea  of  their  own  
excellence (or virtue) crumbles down – as it always does – they have to find 
some new ground where they can build it anew or at least support the old 
foundation. They are in constant motion and renewing the idea of self. 
There is ‘no other end’ than ‘amour-propre’ for their ‘actions’, but ultimately 
what  is  directing  these  actions  is  the  need  to  ‘joyn  always  to  the  idea that 
they have of themselves, new ornaments and new titles’.275 Nicole’s 
explanation for the cause of human progress is admirable.  The idea is that 
‘our  vanity  remains’  only  ‘half  satisfied’  –  at  best.276 Thus, our whole 
personal identity becomes dependent upon movement. We are, at least in 
some sense, continuously refining and progressing, but only because there is 
no end to it. There is no goal and no true satisfaction that we can achieve. If 
the motion ceases we simply cannot bear ourselves.  The only way that the 
love for ourselves is supported is by ‘leaning to a number of petty supports’, 
and  we  need  an  innumerable  amount  of  these  ‘little  props  and  helps’  to  
‘keep it in repose’.277 But  once  we  come  to  realise  (as  we  sooner  or  later  
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always do) that the old supports were not enough to fully satisfy our vanity, 
we have to start looking for some new ones and the circle continues. Only 
‘by  continual  changes  the  soul  maintains  it  self  in  a  condition  it  can  away  
with,  and  that  it  hinders  it  self  from  being  overwhelmed  with  grief  and  
melancholy’. Nicole’s dramatic summary is that ‘the soul subsists only by 
art’.278 Thus,  we  manage  to  create  a  vicious  circle  that  is  not  completely  
tilted  off  track,  because  we  have  to  genuinely  believe  that  what  we  are  
looking for is true and good and we are also fully dependent on the opinion 
and approval of others. Life is simply a postponement of melancholy and 
sadness. Yet, men keep on searching and refining their petty little ways. 
Meanwhile,  bridges are built,  fashions change, etc.  In short,  at least all  the 
necessities of life are supplied for, and conversations are more or less 
agreeable. 
 Without  the  idea  that  the  truth  and God are  implanted  in  us,  Nicole’s  
scheme (of course, if one wanted, one could give these divine attributes a 
secular explanation) would go astray. Even when we are constantly fooling 
ourselves and desperately renewing the image we have of ourselves, we 
need to be able to believe that the things we love are actually good and real 
– that we are true and good. A man would not be a man if he did not think 
that he is searching for the truth. But if one is not looking in the right place, 
Nicole in his normative doctrine lectures, one will never find it. One’s 
vanity  will  always  remain,  at  best,  half-satisfied.  However,  the  choice  that  
Nicole has to offer does not look too appealing for the common sinner. In 
fact,  a  fallen  man  is  not  too  willing  to  look  for  inner  peace,  because  the  
price to pay is too high. It would take too much to accept his worthlessness. 
Even  the  idea  of  facing  the  fact  that  he  is  not  as  great  or  virtuous  as  he  
would  like  to  be  shuns  him.  Thus,  instead  of  giving  it  even  a  passing  
thought,  he keeps trying to satisfy his self-liking, time and again, using his 
able imagination to think of different ways of achieving the impossible.  
Justice, politeness and civil society 
Pierre Nicole has received the attention of modern scholars because he is 
one of the first early modern authors to outline the idea of how a secular 
society can be rendered peaceful based on enlightened self-interest.279 ‘One 
may say truly’, Nicole writes, ‘that absolutely to reform the world, that’s to 
say  to  banish  all  the  vices’,  all  you  need  to  do  is  ‘give  every  one  an  
enlightened amour-propre’  [amour-propre éclairé].  Such  a  ‘society’  might  be  
‘corrupt’ inside, but ‘there would be nothing better ordered, more civil, 
more just, more peaceable, more honest, more generous’ and, significantly, 
more ‘admirable’ than this. The reason why this society is admirable, 
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according to Nicole, is that even when nothing but amour-propre moves  it,  
amour-propre ‘would not appear there’ at all.280  
 This  idea  of  ‘amour-propre éclairé’ has usually been understood in the 
narrow Hobbist sense as ‘enlightened self-interest’.281 If anything, we have 
to take into consideration both sides of Nicole’s conception of amour-propre 
and  put  a  strong  emphasis  on  self-liking,  instead  of  self-love,  since  this  is  
Nicole’s own invention. Even when ‘true interests’ are certainly involved in 
this society, curiously the self-liking side, which is the crux of Nicole’s line 
of reasoning, has somehow escaped modern scholars. To put my argument 
in short, it is both justice and politeness that have to be accounted for if we 
want to talk about Nicole’s idea of enlightened amour-propre. And for Nicole, 
it is the idea of the self-liking side of amour-propre that plays the foundational 
role in rendering a secular society tolerable. 
 The  idea  that  two  moral  institutions,  justice  and  politeness,  (both  
derived from amour-propre) are needed to render a society enlightened 
follows consistently throughout Nicole’s essays. As he clearly points out, 
‘we owe some things to our neighbour by certain laws of justice; which are 
properly  call’d  laws’.  Analogously,  we  owe him some other  things  ‘by  the  
bare  laws  of  civility’.  Even when these  laws  of  civility  are  not  laws  in  the  
strict sense of the word, ‘the obligation’ to follow them ‘springs from a 
consent amongst men’ who have agreed ‘to blame such as shall be defective 
in  them’.  Ultimately,  it  is  ‘men’  who  ‘have  established  all  these  laws’.282 
Based on ‘justice’ and the ‘motion of interest’ men can ‘expect’ certain 
‘duties  from  us’.  It  is  exactly  ‘the  same’  that  ‘happens  in  the  duties  of  
civility’. Just like in our debts, if we ‘are wanting’ in civility, ‘others are 
effectively offended’.283  
 By and large, it  is  the rules of ‘civility’  (not honesty,  as the anonymous 
English translator repeatedly suggests) and ‘justice’ that are needed in civil 
society.284 As Nicole describes, ‘men are link’d together by an infinite 
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number of wants’. Thus, they are obliged ‘out of necessity to live in society’ 
since ‘each particular’ is not ‘able to subsist without others’. Now, it is 
obvious that this implies different kinds of interests and commerce. 
However,  what  Nicole  particularly  wants  to  stress  is  that  ‘for  keeping  up  
society amongst men’, it is of ‘absolute necessity’ that ‘they should respect 
and love one another’. As always, Nicole wants to specifically point out that 
in this moral institution there are no interests or money involved. ‘There are 
a number’, he writes, ‘of small matters’ which are ‘highly necessary for life’. 
People should realise that they ‘are bestowed gratis’  and  never  ‘to  be  sold’  
because they ‘can only be had for love’. It is precisely the fact that ‘society’ 
is  ‘compos’d  of  men  full  of  love  and  esteem  for  themselves’  that  special  
‘care’  has  to  be  taken  ‘reciprocally  to  please  and  humour  one  another’.  If  
not,  ‘it  would prove a loose company’,  ‘ill  pleas’d and dissatisfied amongst 
themselves’ and, in the end, not able to ‘continue united’. Logically, ‘since 
this  mutual  love  and  esteem  appears  not  outwardly,  they  have  thought  
convenient to establish amongst themselves certain devoirs, which should 
be so many tokens of respect and affection’. Thus, it is the institution of 
politeness that is of importance in the concept of ‘enlightened amour-
propre’.285  
 Only  when  we  take  into  account  Nicole’s  broad  definition  of  amour-
propre that has two different sides, we may understand why he thinks that a 
secular civil  society is able to function. My argument is that this forms the 
foundation for Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, who follow Nicole in 
this overall distinction. They both take their cue for their moral and political 
philosophy  from  the  idea  that  we  may  derive  justice  and  politeness  from  
human nature, namely from the two different sides of amour-propre. Of 
course, both Mandeville and Hume seriously modify the description of civil 
society by paying close attention to natural and artificial moral qualities and 
the  evolutionary  nature  of  moral  institutions  in  the  conjectural  history  of  
civil society. However, it was Pierre Nicole who first outlined the overall 
blueprint for this project.  
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3. Later Mandeville  
and the history of civil society 
The starting point of Mandeville’s history of civil society in his later works 
is a ‘wild couple’ in a ‘state of simplicity’. Before embarking into his 
conjectures, he alerts his readers that this austere state is a ‘condition’ hard 
to  grasp  for  men  ‘born  in  society’.  Mandeville  was  well  aware  of  the  
theoretical puzzles of the concept of state of nature and the argument under 
construction was a direct reference towards jurisprudential authors, who in 
their descriptions of the concept were not concerned with the evolutionary 
aspect of civil society. Mandeville’s predecessors had not deprived the 
savage man of the qualities and institutions that are not original, but 
products  of  society.  We  are  so  used  to  our  various  wants  and  needs,  
Mandeville carries on manifesting his novel point of view, that without 
training in ‘abstract thinking’ it  is  difficult to even imagine a man with ‘so 
few desires, and no appetites roving beyond the immediate call of his 
untaught nature’.1 
 Mandeville’s later theory of civil society is particularly focussed on 
amending the intellectual efforts of Thomas Hobbes and to counter, what 
one scholar has come to describe as, the idea ‘that liberty itself engendered 
conflict  and  that  the  pursuit  of  natural  rights  produced  a  state  of  war’.2 
There are no natural rights among untaught animals and neither is there a 
state of war in nature. All the moral distinctions arise from social relations 
as new wants and appetites are generated. The first savage pair was not 
aware  of  the  social  needs.  Who  would  think,  Mandeville  points  out,  that  
‘such a couple’, for example, ‘would not only be destitute of language, but 
likewise never find out or imagine, that they stood in need of any; or that 
the  want  of  it  was  any  real  inconvenience  to  them’?  We  acquire  all  our  
knowledge from experience and ‘it is impossible, that any creature should 
know the want of what it can have no idea of’.3 
 It is equally important, Mandeville lectures, to realise that a savage man 
would not have any use for spoken language, because while ‘he has nothing 
to  obey,  but  the  simple  dictates  of  nature,  the  want  of  speech  is  easily  
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supply’d by dumb signs’4 and ‘our wild couple would at their first meeting 
intelligibly say more to one another without guile, than any civiliz’d pair 
would dare to name without blushing’.5 There is a significant lesson in this 
tongue in cheek comparison. As I mentioned, Mandeville’s fundamental 
criticism towards earlier natural law theorists is that they furnish the savage 
man  with  artificial  qualities  that  are  the  products  of  society.  An  essential  
point derived from this insight is that a savage man does not need society 
for the sake of his self-preservation. He is, to a large extent, self-reliant. It is 
the ‘civiliz’d people’, who ‘stand most in need of society’. There are ‘none’ 
who need society ‘less than savages’.6 Mandeville carefully points out that 
he  is  not  making  the  same  mistake  that  natural  jurists  make  when  talking  
about the weak or aggressive condition of men in the state of nature, which 
are  not  natural,  but  are  social  traits.  To  make  this  as  explicit  as  possible,  
Mandeville makes Horatio ask his spokesman: ‘Don’t you fall into the same 
error, which you say Hobbes has  been  guilty  of,  when  you  talk  of  man’s  
necessitous and helpless condition?’ Cleomenes’s answer is a quip 
remarking  the  progressive  nature  of  society  and  spelling  out  that  more  
advanced men are in civility, ‘the more necessitous and helpless they are in 
their nature’.7 Nowhere  does  he  claim that  wild  men were  unable  to  help  
themselves or that timidity was an original human quality.  
 Another important part of Mandeville’s criticism of the modern school 
of natural law concerns the role of reason, will and self-preservation in the 
history  of  civil  society.  It  is  true  that  ‘all  passions  and instincts  in  general  
were  given  to  all  animals  for  some  wise  end’  and  they  all  tend  to  ‘the  
preservation and happiness’ of the animal herself or her ‘species’.8 
However,  Mandeville  holds  a  view  that  this  does  not  happen  by  rational  
calculation or by a direct act of free will. This may, he articulates, already be 
inferred from the first savage, who does not choose to reproduce, but 
‘propagates, before he knows the consequence of it’.9 Mandeville diligently 
brings  home  the  point  that  naturally  the  actions  of  an  individual  are  not  
dictated  by  his  ability  to  reason,  but  by  his  passions.  ‘A  savage  man  
multiplies his kind by instinct, as other animals do, without more thought or 
design of preserving his species, than a new-born infant has of keeping 
itself alive, in the action of sucking’.10 If this is true, how can we describe 
that the step from the state of nature into the civil society is guided by the 
right use of reason and free will in the act of self-preservation? We certainly 
cannot.  Our  ‘every  action’  cannot  be  ‘determin’d  by  the  will’,  if  ‘we  are  
violently urg’d from within, and, in a manner, compell’d, not only to assist 
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in,  but  likewise  to  long  for’,  and  even  ‘be  highly  pleased  with,  a  
performance, that infinitely surpasses our understanding’.11 Mandeville’s 
theory stating that passions control human actions instead of reason is 
designed  to  argue  that  the  question  of  free  will  is  indifferent  where  the  
development of civil society is concerned. Even if a man would have been 
given a superior capacity of understanding compared to other animals, it 
makes little difference in the grand scheme of civil society. In nature there 
are  no  duties  or  conflicts  of  rights.  A man in  his  uncultivated  state  is  like  
any  other  animal.  His  wants  are  few,  he  has  no  use,  desire  or  ability  for  
artificial conventions and the first principle that makes him associate with 
others is lust.  
 With the description of the wild couple Mandeville is not addressing a 
hypothetical  state  of  nature  in  order  to  explain  how  the  natural  laws  are  
derived  by  the  right  use  of  reason,  but  he  is  setting  up  the  basis  for  an  
anthropological analysis of society that will help us grasp the nature of civil 
society. If the preceding theories about natural law were erroneous while 
dressing savage men up in artificial clothing, in a similar manner the 
benevolent school (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson) is mistaken for taking artificial 
qualities as natural. Mandeville stocks the wild and civilised man with the 
same natural human propensities. He insists that there is ‘no difference 
between the  original  nature  of  a  savage,  and  that  of  a  civiliz’d  man’12 and 
‘what  belong  to  our  nature,  all  men may  justly  be  said  to  have  actually  or  
virtually in them at their birth’, and ‘whatever is not born with us, either the 
thing it self, or that which afterwards produces it, cannot be said to belong 
to our nature’.13 According to Mandeville, the predominant natural human 
quality ‘obliges us continually to assume every thing to ourselves’.14 If a man 
had remained in the state of simplicity, he could never have learned to be 
other-regarding. ‘Whilst’ men are ‘uninstructed’ and ‘let alone’, they ‘will 
follow the impulse of their nature, without regard to others’.15 Only  art,  
education and communication with other people may change this. But what 
is this ‘impulse of nature’ that men naturally follow? In The Fable we have 
seen  an  attempt  to  draw  all  the  passions  from  the  concept  of  self-love,  
which  turned  out  to  be  an  inconsistent  theoretical  solution.  In  order  to  
avoid the problems of his first theory of civil society, in Part II, the ‘natural 
impulse’ is coined as ‘the instinct of sovereignty’. This is a peculiarly 
Nicolean definition of a ‘tyrannical disposition’ that centres everything in us 
and is irresistibly ‘stamped in the bottom of’ our ‘hearts’16, which is not, as 
we have learned, a necessarily Hobbist concept. The wild couple’s actions 
were  also  bound  to  be  motivated  by  this  instinct  that  naturally  has  some  
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13 Mandeville, Part II, p. 121. 
14 Mandeville, Part II, p. 273. 
15 Mandeville, Part II, p. 269. 
16 See the previous chapter on Nicole. 
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resonance  in  Hobbes’s  idea  that  ‘nature had given all to all’.17 Like Hobbes, 
Mandeville concedes that this principle of selfishness, when acting at liberty, 
is the grand obstacle of society, but unlike Hobbes and much like Nicole, he 
wants to remind his audience that simultaneously this instinct, for various 
reasons, is necessary for the development of civil society. Mandeville seeks 
to  define  this  instinctive  principle,  how  it  operates  in  human  beings  and  
what is the precise role that it has in the conjectural history of civil society. 
Naturally (that is to say without education and experience of society) ‘man 
would have every thing he likes, without considering, whether he has any 
right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to do, without 
regard  to  the  consequences  it  would  be  of  to  others’.18 Another way that 
Mandeville describes this instinct is that paradoxically ‘all men are born with 
a strong desire, and no capacity at all to govern’.19  
 The  process  of  a  man  becoming  sociable  starts  immediately  after  the  
wild couple propagates. Hypothetically speaking, their children are born 
sociable. The plot of Mandeville’s Part II is a perpetual clash between 
natural and artificial principles within every sociable being as well as a 
conflict  between men,  which  can  only  be  meliorated  by  living  in  a  society  
and  by  inventing  and  mending  conventions  that  are  designed  to  cure  the  
frailties of human nature. The problem is that we naturally have ‘a desire of 
superiority’  and  if  we  only  followed  the  natural  dictates  of  our  nature  we  
would grasp ‘every thing’ for ourselves, whereas ‘the notions of right and 
wrong’, are ‘acquired’ and arise artificially through social relations.20 
Furthermore,  since  ‘the  desire  as  well  as  aptness  of  man  to  associate’,  do  
not proceed from ‘his love to others’21, the only way ‘we’ can ‘be cured of’ 
this  instinct  of  sovereignty  is  ‘by  our  commerce  with  others,  and  the  
experience of facts, by which we are convinc’d, that we have no such right’ 
that our selfishness bids us to claim.22  
Natural stage of the conjectural development of society 
The  idea  of  a  contract  plays  a  marginal  role  in  Mandeville’s  historical  
understanding  of  the  origin  of  civil  society.  Any  idea  of  an  agreement  as  
such  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  civil  society,  because  it  would  not  hold  
among ‘ill-bred and uncultivated’ people, of whom ‘no man would keep a 
contract  longer  than  interest  lasted,  which  made  him  submit  to  it’.23 It  is  
important to notice that Mandeville makes a distinction between a man that 
                                                        
17 Hobbes, De Cive, I.X. 
18 Mandeville, Part II, p. 271. 
19 Mandeville, Part II, p. 320. 
20 Mandeville, Part II, p. 223. 
21 Mandeville, Part II, p. 178. 
22 Mandeville, Part II, p. 223. 
23 Mandeville, Part II, pp. 267–7. 
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is made ‘merely sociable’ and a man that is ‘civilised’.24 In the description of 
the  origin  of  society,  we  cannot  leap  from  a  wild  couple  in  a  state  of  
simplicity into civil society that has a government and is regulated by laws. 
By doing this, Mandeville is significantly turning against the view he himself 
set forward in the original Fable. In other words, Mandeville is arguing that 
contract theories, even when the natural jurists are indisputably on the right 
path with their intellectual efforts, are an insufficient and bewildered 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  civil  society.  The  story  has  to  be  told  as  an  
evolutionary  history  and  more  attention  has  to  be  paid  at  a  preliminary  
social stage, family society, which is formed following the natural qualities 
of  human  nature,  before  we  start  examining  the  entry  to  later  stages  of  
civilisation. Again, this functions against the theory Mandeville had earlier 
set forward. When the question about the origin of civil society is examined 
within the boundaries of a conjectural history, the confused argument about 
contract and sovereignty dissolves. In Mandeville’s new theory the emphasis 
is on the process and conventions that make men sociable and, which in 
turn are the basis for civil society. Intriguingly, for Mandeville there is no 
difference  between social  and  moral  progress.  In  this  sense,  all  morality  is  
artificial in its nature, but it does not mean that the distinction between 
right  and wrong is  an  arbitrary  invention  of  a  politician  to  trick  men into  
self-denial, as Mandeville had earlier argued. In order to be social, men have 
to  follow  a  coherent  system  of  artificial  moral  principles  that  function  in  
accordance with the propensities of human nature.  
 In the course of Part II, Horatio insists on every solution he can think of 
while trying to guess the origin of civil society, but Cleomenes turns all his 
suggestions  down.  If  a  contract  could  not  explain  the  foundation,  neither  
can the right use of reason. In fact, ‘superiority of understanding in the state 
of nature’ would ‘serve to render man incurably averse to society, and more 
obstinately tenacious of his savage liberty, than any other creature’.25 
Another  clarifying  example  of  the  role  of  reason in  Mandeville’s  theory  is  
the  speculation  of  whether  a  man  in  ‘his  savage  consort’  is  miraculously  
given  a  perfect  ‘capacity  in  the  art  of  reasoning’,  he  would  not  come  to  
entertain  the  ‘same notions  of  right  and wrong’  that  any  man of  middling  
capacity, without an effort, holds in a civil society. Mandeville’s argument is 
that ‘no man can reason but à posteriori, from something that he knows, or 
supposes to be true’. Thus, since we cannot deduce an intelligible idea of 
justice from natural relations, only the ‘persons’ who remember ‘their 
education’  and  live  ‘in  society’  with  ‘others  of  their  own  species’  that  are  
independent ‘of them, and either their equals or superiours’ may know the 
‘differences between right and wrong’.26 Attention should be paid to how 
clearly Mandeville underlines that the idea of justice can only be learned 
through transactions between equals.  
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 Mandeville also amplifies his arguments about the impossibility of 
knowing anything a priori and the artificial nature of justice on several 
occasions. He spells out with clarity that ‘from nature’ we do not have any 
‘thoughts of justice and injustice’ and without a proper education and social 
relations  a  man  ‘would  naturally,  without  much  thinking  in  the  case,  take  
every  thing  to  be  his  own,  that  he  could  lay  his  hands  on’.27 And since 
Cleomenes, despite his interlocutor’s objections, remains categorical about 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  ‘love  of  man for  his  species’  implanted  in  human 
breast28,  Horatio  eventually  raises  his  hands  and sighs:  ‘How came society  
into the world?’29 
 Before we dwell into Cleomenes’s multifaceted answer that society came 
into the world ‘from private families; but not without great difficulty, and 
the concurrence of many favourable accidents’30, we have to first stress that 
what Mandeville is eventually after is the civil society that is ‘entirely built 
upon  the  variety  of  our  wants’31 and governed by written laws, which in 
turn  are  modified  and  executed  by  magistracy.  Thus,  in  one  sense,  what  
Mandeville is aiming at is in line with the modern school of natural law. The 
problem with natural jurists is that they oversimplify and confuse the course 
of the development of society by paying no or only little attention to the 
differences between the natural and artificial stages of this process. 
Mandeville persistently insists that ‘the undoubted basis of all societies is 
government’.32 It is clear that on most occasions when he is discussing the 
‘origin of society’ he has a political society in mind. But he also points out 
that  the  authority  the  ‘parents’  hold  ‘over  their  children’  is  one  form  ‘of  
government’.33 In order to understand the origin of civil society, we have to 
realise that the first private family is already a form of society, even when 
the first wild couple are not themselves sociable creatures or even able to 
teach and govern their children.  
 The  first  savage  couple  had  been drawn together  by  lust,  which  is  the  
first principle that makes humans associate. Mandeville stresses that these 
first parents were entirely moved by their instinct of sovereignty and unable 
to  govern  their  children.  It  is  significant  to  realise  that  by  the  ability  to  
govern  Mandeville  does  not  mean  a  power  to  hold  authority,  but  the  
capacity to ‘built upon the knowledge of human nature’, which enables one 
‘to promote’ and ‘reward all good and useful actions on the one hand; and 
on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every thing that is destructive 
or hurtful to society’.34 It is equally important to understand that in Part II 
                                                        
27 Mandeville, Part II, p. 200. 
28 Mandeville, Part II, p. 259. 
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31 Mandeville, Part II, p. 349. 
32 Mandeville, Part II, pp. 183–4. 
33 Mandeville, Part II, p. 241. 
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this ‘art of governing’ is not ‘the work of one man, or of one generation’,  
but the ‘greatest part’ of it is ‘the product, the joynt labour of several ages’.35 
Since the first parents do not have the experience of society, the knowledge 
of different patterns of governing or any idea what would promote or be 
destructive  to  the  common good,  for  that  matter  they  simply  follow their  
natural instinct, consider their children as their property and make them 
labour for their few needs.  
 However, this does not render the children helpless or without care. We 
need to notice a difference between an artificial and a natural quality, 
namely  the  art  of  governing  and  ‘natural  affection’,  which  ‘prompts  all  
mothers to take care of the offspring’.36 According  to  Mandeville,  ‘all  
creatures naturally love their offspring, whilst they are helpless, and so does 
man’.37 This ‘natural affection’ is such a powerful principle that it would, 
without any concern for his own interest,  render ‘a wild man to love, and 
cherish his child’.38 It is noteworthy that in stark contrast with the original 
Fable,  Mandeville  now  characterises  this  natural  affection  as  a  pure  and  
durable passion. Even without the intermixture of self-love or self-liking, 
‘natural affection’ can ‘make wild men’ and women ‘sacrifice their lives, and 
die for their children’39. From Mandeville’s treatment of this original 
passion it becomes apparent that it is difficult, or in fact ineffective, to claim 
that Mandeville is now arguing that a man by his nature is wholly incapable 
of other-regarding affection. Thus, we cannot simply deduce Mandeville’s 
second thesis of sociability from an Augustinian/Epicurean line of thought, 
where self-interest is seen as the only motivating principle.40 In the light of 
this evidence it  is clear that Mandeville no longer supports such reasoning 
and self-interest pledging arguments that insist that parents would take care 
of their children hoping that when they are old their children will return the 
favour.41 What  this  also  indicates,  is  that  we  cannot  simply  ignore  
Mandeville by labelling his moral system utterly selfish (any more than we 
can do this with David Hume and his confined generosity), which has often 
served as a justification for paying little or no attention to what Mandeville 
is actually saying, when Hume and the history of philosophy has been under 
investigation. 
                                                        
35 Mandeville, Part II, pp. 321–2. 
36 Mandeville, Part II, p. 189. 
37 Mandeville, Part II, p. 199. 
38 Mandeville, Part II, p. 201. 
39 Mandeville, Part II, p. 240. 
40 Generally argued by Pierre Force. Also Shelley Burtt writes that Mandeville 
‘brushes aside’ also in Part II ‘any suggestion that an inborn affection’ might ‘account for 
moral or sociable behavior.’ Burtt, Virtue transformed, 1992, p. 139. About the relevance of 
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73 and Sheridan, ‘Parental affection and self-interest: Mandeville, Hutcheson, and the 
question of natural benevolence’, 2007, pp. 377–392. 
41 An impression given by Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith, 2003, pp. 62–3. 
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 What is remarkable about Mandeville’s understanding of ‘natural 
affection’ in human beings is that it does not end when children are old and 
experienced enough to take care of themselves. Unlike ‘the young ones of 
other  animals’,  who,  ‘as  soon  as  they  can  help  themselves,  are  free’,  ‘the  
authority, which parents pretend to have over their children, never ceases’. 
The  reason  is  that  in  human  beings  the  natural  tenderness  towards  the  
offspring ultimately mixes with ‘the desire of dominion’, which is ‘a never-
failing consequence of the pride, that is common to all men’. As a 
consequence, ‘our savage pair would’ not only consider their own children 
as their ‘undoubted property’, but they would naturally extend their ‘title’ 
also over the ‘grandchildren’.42 Hypothetically speaking, ‘without 
intermixture of foreign blood, they would look upon the whole race to be 
their natural vassals’.43 Mandeville’s spokesman, Cleomenes, asserts that he 
is ‘persuaded, that the more knowledge and capacity of reasoning this first 
couple acquired, the more just and unquestionable their sovereignty over all 
their descendants would appear to them’.44  
 By making this intellectual move of integrating ‘instinct of sovereignty’ 
with ‘natural affection’, Mandeville is able to explain how the first wild pair 
turned into a small clan following the natural principles universally 
implanted in men. This development is also supported by the fact that ‘in 
the  wild  state  of  nature,  man multiplies  his  kind  much faster,  than  can  be  
allow’d of in any regular society: No male at fourteen would be long 
without  a  female,  if  he  could  get  one;  and  no  female  of  twelve  would  be  
refractory, if applied to; or remain long uncourted, if there were men’.45 On 
the one hand, Mandeville stresses that this kind of natural family is the very 
counterpart of civil society, where the idea is to ‘preserve peace and 
tranquillity among multitudes of different views’ and not just within a group 
that  is  related  through  blood  or  belong  to  the  same  race.46 On the other 
hand,  the  strong  affection  that  human beings  naturally  have  towards  their  
children has a crucial role in Mandeville’s system. It plays an important part 
also in later stages of civil society, because it not only ‘renders’ men 
‘solicitous about’ the ‘education’ of their children, it also ‘makes’ them ‘take 
pains to leave their children rich’.47 To understand Mandeville’s later idea of 
social development, it is important to realise that he thought it natural for 
men to take care of the education of their children. Nevertheless, despite all 
the sociable effects, ‘this eternal claim’ over their children that men 
‘naturally’  have  in  their  hearts  is  so  ‘general  and  unreasonable’  that  ‘every  
civil  society’,  Mandeville  in  his  peculiar  manner  points  out,  ‘is  forced  to  
make’ particular ‘laws’ that limit the ‘paternal authority to a certain term of 
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years’ in order ‘to prevent the usurpation of parents, and rescue children 
from their dominion’.48 This,  of  course,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  
otherwise children are subjected to physical labour, servitude or material 
inconvenience of any kind. In a more advanced civil society this may better 
be illustrated by saying that some children might feel the smothering 
affection of their parents, which is indeed natural, for the whole course of 
their lives while the parents want to stick their noses in all of their children’s 
business.49 Nevertheless, what becomes evident in Mandeville’s treatment 
of  natural  affection  is  that  we  have  to  allow that  he  endorses  a  view that  
men have naturally confined generosity towards their family that might even 
outdo their care for themselves. 
 The first wild couple was destined to live without the social abilities that 
would enable them to restrict their instinct of sovereignty, but this does not 
hold true with their children. According to Mandeville, it was ‘very 
unworthy of a philosopher to say, as Hobbes did, that man is born unfit  to 
society’.50 It  is noteworthy that here Mandeville is not only writing against 
Hobbes, but against his own principal idea of The Fable.51 In  the  table  of  
contents that was dropped after 1714, for example, it clearly states that ‘Man 
without government is of all creatures the most unfit for society’.52 After considering 
this foundational question anew, Mandeville accepts that every child is born 
into a society of some sort, where he can perfectly well learn to be sociable 
simply by living in this society. There are also certain human propensities 
that support and guide this course of action. First of all, every ‘savage child 
would learn to love and fear his father’. According to Mandeville, ‘these two 
passions, together with the esteem, which we naturally have for every thing 
that far excels us,  will  seldom fail  of producing that compound, which we 
call reverence’.53 As we see, in Part II, Mandeville is no longer obsessed with 
                                                        
48 Mandeville, Part II, p. 204. 
49 In my opinion, this is an ingenious theoretical insight from Mandeville into the 
artificial moral principles, bringing clearly to the surface the difficulty of distinguishing 
between naturally amorous passions and instinct of sovereignty; a mixture, which makes 
one, at times, completely unable to see the possible misjudgements of one’s own actions, 
which one himself cannot consider but as perfectly virtuous and justified. 
50 Mandeville, Part II, p. 177. For Goldsmith’s understanding of the relationship 
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51 Lamprecht points out that regarding the origin of civil society Mandeville differs 
from Hobbes. Lamprecht, ‘The Fable of the bees’, 1926, pp. 567–8. 
52 Index can be found in Kaye’s commentary, Mandeville, Part II, p. 388. 
53 Mandeville, Part II, p. 202. 
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the idea that all passions are directly derived from self-love. This is already a 
leap away from Hobbism. ‘Reverence to authority’ is ‘necessary, to make 
human creatures governable’, Mandeville declares.54 When  Horatio  
complains to Cleomenes that they have not made any ‘progress’ towards the 
origin of civil society in their conversation, his interlocutor answers that ‘the 
introduction of the reverence, which the wildest son must feel more or less 
for  the  most  savage  father,  if  he  stays  with  him,  had  been  a  considerable  
step’.55 If we look at reverence from a theoretical perspective and consider 
its position in this overall system of sociability, we come to realise that what 
Mandeville was aiming at was an ambitious attempt to give an alternative 
account of the idea of voluntary servitude presented in the preceding 
contract theories, which is consequently a vital component in his challenge 
to revise the works of Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes.56 
 Mandeville rejects the idea that men enter the society by an explicit or 
tacit  agreement  that  transfers  the  authority  to  a  sovereign,  for  the  simple  
reason  that  this  is  the  wrong  way  of  examining  the  question.  Mandeville  
stresses  this  point  by  illustrating  that  the  idea  of  ‘two  or  three  hundred  
single savages, men and women, that never had been under any subjection, 
and were above twenty years of age, could ever establish a society, and be 
united into one body’ is futile, for the plain reason that ‘societies never were 
made that way’.57 Without an agreement of any kind every child is born into 
the subjection of his parents, which is already one form ‘of government’.58 
Mandeville defines that a creature is governable ‘when, reconciled to 
submission,  it  has  learned  to  construe  his  servitude  to  his  own advantage;  
and rests satisfied with the account it finds for itself, in the labour it 
performs for others’.59 Evidently, Mandeville’s idea of a governable creature 
includes the idea of voluntary servitude. However, instead of jumping into 
the conclusion of how men agree to this voluntary servitude in civil society, 
Mandeville invokes the same concept to explain how the first generation 
was naturally rendered governable (in other words, born to servitude, able 
to  accept  their  condition  and  to  make  the  best  of  it).  In  a  later  stage  of  
development, this same principle dissolves the question about original 
contract by explaining the foundation of civil government in historical 
terms.  
 In order to augment his point regarding the respect towards authority, 
Mandeville  also  mentions  that  in  the  Decalogue  the  ‘best  method is  made  
use of’ in order to ‘inspire men with a deep sense of’ fear, love and esteem, 
which  are  ‘the  three  ingredients,  that  make  up  the  compound  of  
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reverence’.60 The law, or fear of punishment for breaking it, does not create 
the original compound of reverence. It simply supports and strengthens the 
reverence that children naturally have for their parents. Thus, we have 
advanced a long way towards a civil  society even when we have only gone 
one generation down from the first wild couple. ‘The reverence of children 
to parents’ is ‘of the highest moment to all government, and sociableness 
itself’. However, ‘experience teaches us, that this reverence may be 
overruled by stronger passions’. Mandeville also remarks that ‘God thought 
fit  to fortify and strengthen it  in us,  by a particular command of his own; 
and moreover to encourage it,  by the promise of a reward for the keeping 
of it’.61 Civil society cannot exist without laws. This does not mean that the 
moral distinctions could be considered an invention of lawmakers or clever 
politicians. Laws fix the artificial conventions, but the conventions do not 
originate from these laws or the makers of them. 
 Unambiguously, ‘the very first generation of the most brutish savages, 
was sufficient to produce sociable creatures’. Natural respect towards 
authority plays a part in this scheme, but more importantly, ‘children, who’ 
simply ‘conversed with their own species, though they were brought up by 
savages, would be governable’ and when they come ‘to maturity, would be 
fit for society, how ignorant and unskillful soever their parents might have 
been’.62 One of Mandeville’s claims is that ‘society’ is ‘entirely built upon 
the  variety  of  our  wants’.63 Mandeville also pays attention to the relation 
between the size of the society and the variety of wants and desires. In the 
state of nature the wild couple only has to satisfy the immediate needs. 
Evidently, ‘the smaller’ the ‘society’, ‘the more strictly the members of it’ 
would  ‘confine  themselves’  to  the  ‘wants’  that  are  ‘necessary  for  their  
subsistence’ and consequently ‘the larger the numbers are in a society, the 
more extensive they have rendered the variety of their desires’.64 The 
process of creating artificial wants and desires is necessary for the 
advancement  of  a  family  society  towards  state  formation,  but  how  is  this  
development triggered? Why is it that men in general, and particularly the 
savage  men,  who  originally  had  no  superfluous  wants  to  satisfy,  are  first  
drawn towards society, if they do not have ‘a desire, out of a fondness’ 
towards  their  ‘species’,  superior  ‘to  what  other  animals  have  for  theirs’,  as  
Mandeville maintains?65  
 ‘Sufficient motives’ to be ‘fond of society’, Mandeville claims, are a 
man’s ‘love’ for ‘ease and security’  and his ‘perpetual desire of meliorating 
his condition’.66 According to Mandeville, the first savages were self-reliant 
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and since the ‘condition’ of human nature only becomes increasingly 
‘necessitous and helpless’ as he advances in civility, the foundational motive 
to  make  a  man  desirous  of  society  is  his  infinite  desire  to  advance  his  
circumstances. In other words, a conventional definition of self-
preservation cannot explain the origin of society. But the claim that no-one 
in  reality  needs  society  ‘less  than  savages’  does  not  mean  that  the  first  
generation would not desire it in hopes of bettering their condition.67 
Mandeville  places  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  argument  that  ‘the  first  
generation of the most brutish savages’ produces ‘sociable creatures’68 and 
the ‘desire of meliorating our condition’ is ‘so general’ that ‘not one that can 
be call’d a sociable creature’ is ‘without it’.69 In other words, the first 
generation that had been sprung out of the wild couple was sensible that it 
is within their interest to ‘enter into society’. 
 Mandeville augments this important point on different occasions. ‘I am 
willing to allow’, he confirms, ‘that among the motives, that prompt man to 
enter into society, there is a desire which he has naturally after company’.70 
As  I  have  already  highlighted,  we  should  pay  close  attention  to  what  
Mandeville  calls  natural  and  artificial.  The  cause  of  this  desire  is  not  the  
fondness of our species, but the desire of society is nevertheless so strong 
that  it  is  hard  to  tell  whether  it  is  natural  or  not.  Instead  of  austerely  
dismissing the possibility that this desire is in a strict sense natural, 
Mandeville  leaves  the  question  open and remarks  that  if  a  man was  more  
‘desirous’  of  ‘society’  by  nature  ‘than  any  other  animal’  this  would  not  be  
anything ‘to brag of’.71 This  argument  is,  of  course,  directed  against  the  
writers  emphasising  the  noble  generosity  of  human  nature.  Instead  of  
natural  benevolence,  Mandeville  thinks  that  a  man  has  this  desire  ‘for  his  
own  sake,  in  hopes  of  being  better  for  it;  and  he  would  never  wish  for,  
either company or any thing else, but for some advantage or other he 
proposes to himself from it’.72 Thus, certain authors are right when claiming 
that the men who are born in a sociable condition desire society, but only in 
hopes of advancing their own interest. 
 Already the first children were slowly gaining the knowledge of how to 
turn their submission to their own advantage, curbing their natural instinct 
of sovereignty and starting to be contented with their situation. Mandeville’s 
point  about  civil  society  arising  ‘from  private  families’  within  a  course  of  
‘many generations’, ‘great difficulty’ and ‘concurrence of many favourable 
accidents’ simply means that even when the first children are sociable, 
‘much more’ is ‘required’ to ‘produce a man fit to govern others’.73 This has 
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nothing to do with the emergence of a clever politician who would trick 
ignorant men into self-denial. The particular question concerns the state 
formation and moral progress: How are different family societies united 
into a civil society? While forming his second theory of society, Mandeville 
takes painstaking care to point out that the role of a single individual is 
minimal  in  his  outlook.  What  is  required,  and  what  renders  a  man  fit  to  
govern others, are several artificial conventions and social institutions that 
enable the mutual and peaceful existence of contrasting views and interests. 
These moral conventions can only be developed through an extensive 
period of time and surmounted experience. When these institutions have 
been established, any man of middling capacity is fit  to govern others.  To 
some it might seem ‘inconceivable to what prodigious height, from next to 
nothing,  some  arts  may  be  and  have  been  raised  by  human  industry  and  
application, by the uninterrupted labour, and joint experience of many ages, 
tho’ none but men of ordinary capacity should ever be employ’d in them’.74  
 One  man  does  not  make  a  difference  in  mankind’s  march  toward  a  
peaceful and amiable existence, which is the implicit purpose of civil 
society. The reason why Mandeville draws a striking contrast between a 
family and civil  society is that these conventions have to be established by 
written laws and executed by government, in order to gain a permanent 
status among a large society that consists of people who are not necessarily 
related or even acquainted with each other. Until some rigid rules have been 
formed, men ‘without doubt would encrease in knowledge and cunning’ 
and ‘in the particular things, to which they apply’d themselves,  they would 
become  as  expert  and  ingenious  as  the  most  civiliz’d  nations:  but  their  
unruly passions, and the discords occasioned by them, would never suffer 
them to be happy; their mutual contentions would be continually spoiling 
their improvements, destroying their inventions, and frustrating their 
designs’.75 Nevertheless, the first children did, by trial and error, start 
building different artificial conventions designed to help them to live in 
social relations, which eventually would form the framework of civil society, 
even when their efforts, due to the lack of experience, were doomed to 
crumble down to pieces for generations to come. 
Artificial stage of the conjectural development of society 
In Part II, Bernard Mandeville explains how a wild couple expanded into a 
relatively large family society following the natural inclinations of human 
nature without the help of the moral or artificial institutions. What is 
noteworthy in the natural stage of his conjectural history is the change that 
occurred in the first children compared to their wild parents. By explaining 
how the first children were already born into society, Mandeville gives them 
the most important attribute of human sociability, the ‘desire of meliorating 
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our  condition’,  which  is  a  sufficient  motive  for  a  human  being  to  desire  
society.  
 If  the  progress  until  this  point  had  been  advanced  mainly  relying  on  
natural human propensities, the moral development that is launched in 
connection with the oblique search after society has to depend on artificial 
conventions. As a manifest slogan for his conjectural development of 
society, Mandeville maintains that ‘the restless industry of man to supply his 
wants, and his constant endeavours to meliorate his condition upon earth, 
have  produced  and  brought  to  perfection  many  useful  arts  and  sciences’.  
When mentioning these arts and sciences, Mandeville refers to a wide 
variety of different artificial abilities and customs such as language, 
politeness, justice, lawmaking, art of governing, distribution of land, 
division of labour, monetary exchange, construction navale, viticulture etc. 
None of them are ‘invented by reasoning a priori’.76 Mandeville  points  out  
that  there  is  a  flaw  in  our  thinking  to  ‘often  ascribe  to  the  excellency  of  
man’s genius,  and the depth of his penetration, what is in reality owing to 
length of time, and the experience of many generations’.77 All  of  the  
important conventions have originally been founded on an ‘uncertain era’, 
and if we start pondering upon the reason behind them, ‘we can assign no 
other causes’ to them, but ‘human sagacity in general, and the joynt labour 
of many ages, in which men have always employ’d themselves in studying 
and contriving ways and means to sooth their various appetites, and make 
the best of their infirmities’.78 This is the heart of the ‘Mandevillean’ idea of 
civil  society,  which  is  a  pivotal  contribution  to  modern  social  thought.  It  
initiated  a  plethora  of  positive  analysis  by  Hume,  Rousseau,  Smith  and  
several others.  
 In Mandeville’s understanding, the arts of building boats and making 
soap, as well as the inventions of iron and money, also took a long time to 
instigate and were co-products of many generations instead of single strokes 
of  a  solitary  genius.  Technical  innovations  have  contributed  to  the  
development of civil society by soothing some of man’s appetites, by 
meliorating his condition and, simultaneously, by creating several new 
appetites and needs. Nevertheless, emphasis has to be placed on those 
artificial conventions that enable the moral development of mankind in its 
everlasting battle against the instinct of sovereignty. As Mandeville 
unambiguously states, naturally, a ‘man would have every thing he likes, 
without considering, whether he has any right to it or not; and he would do 
every thing he has a mind to do, without regard to the consequences it 
would be to others’.79 Whether it is possible to overcome this infirmity is 
the most important question for human happiness, since otherwise ‘mutual 
contentions would be continually spoiling their improvements, destroying 
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their inventions, and frustrating their designs’.80 This cannot happen by the 
sudden appearance of a clever politician who tricks others into self-denial 
or by an original contract to advance sociability.  
 So far I have only briefly discussed the instinct of sovereignty without 
connecting it to Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and self-liking. 
This  becomes  relevant  only  now  when  we  are  considering  the  artificial  
conventions that enable men to control and redirect their passions at the 
artificial stage of the conjectural history of society. Mandeville introduces 
for the first time the concept of self-liking in the third dialogue of Part II. 
He argues that it consists of two components. Cleomenes instructs Horatio 
that ‘nature has given’ men ‘an instinct, by which every individual values 
itself above its real worth’. This natural instinct is aligned with ‘an 
apprehension’ for the fact that we ‘over-value ourselves’, which ‘makes us 
so fond of the approbation, liking and assent of others; because they 
strengthen and confirm us in the good opinion we have of ourselves’.81 
These definitions ought to be seen in the light of Pierre Nicole’s writings.  
Mandeville did not invent himself the distinction between self-love and self-
liking nor the idea that other people’s opinions are the crux of the opinion 
that we entertain of our selves. The main part of Mandeville’s originality lies 
on his emphasis of how the inclination to over-value one’s own worth has 
remained constant throughout history, while an individual’s relationship to 
the opinion of others takes different patterns, which in turn plays a crucial 
role shaping the commonly shared values in different cultures. 
 When Horatio tries to suggest that ‘self-liking is evidently pride’ 
Cleomenes cannot accept this.82 Self-liking  is  the  cause  of  pride,  but  only  
when  ‘excessive,  and  so  openly  shewn  as  to  give  offence  to  others’  it  is  
called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men 
act ‘from that and from no other principle’.83 When Horatio proposes that 
the passion should be called ‘a desire of the applause of others’, Cleomenes 
disagrees  yet  again.  The  effects  of  self-love  should  not  be  classified  as  a  
passion and neither should self-liking be confined to its consequences.84 
Mandeville  has  a  good reason for  this  intellectual  move.  The  fundamental  
part of his thought is the separation of the two different origins of the so-
called selfish passions. Also in his Origin of honour, Mandeville reminds his 
audience that self-liking is ‘plainly distinct from self-love’.85 
 The  importance  of  the  concept  of  self-liking  for  Mandeville  is  by  no  
means a new discovery. Already Paul Sakmann emphasised its 
significance86,  F.  B.  Kaye  singled  it  out  as  an  important  concept  for  
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Mandeville and Maurice Goldsmith perceptively noticed how it functions as 
part of the conjectural history of civil society.87 Lately, increasing attention 
has been directed towards self-liking.88 The primacy of self-liking over self-
love is slowly being established in scholarship.89 Perhaps the best specimen 
of  this  development  is  Bert  Kerhof’s  article  in  the  History of Political 
Thought.90 He makes an explicit division between self-love and self-liking. 
He describes self-liking as our propensity to ‘overestimate ourselves’ in 
‘comparison with others’.91 Because of this quality man can be described ‘as 
an animal living in constant anxiety about the opinion of others’. One result 
is that at times self-liking ‘conquers the ‘fear of death’ (self-love)’, which can 
be  used  to  explain  such  phenomena  as  bravery  in  battle,  dueling  and  
suicide.92 Markku  Peltonen  has  since  made  a  crucial  contribution  to  
Mandeville studies by taking this discussion further with his analysis of how 
self-liking functions in the context of the early modern ideas of dueling and 
politeness. The present study attempts to expand the scope of the 
discussion by showing that the reason why amour-propre is important in 
moral and political philosophy is that it is the key concept behind the moral 
institutions of justice and politeness. 
 What  is  often  ignored  is  the  important  overriding  presence  of  the  
instinct  of  sovereignty  in  the  midst  of  both,  self-love  and self-liking.  This  
instinct is prevailing in all animals. ‘The desire of uncontroul’d liberty, and 
impatience of restraint’ are similar in a wild horse and a savage man. What 
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distances  a  civilised  man  from  a  brute  is  that  a  brute  ‘wildly  follows  the  
unbridled appetites of his untaught or ill-managed nature’.93 In Cleomenes’s 
vocabulary this instinct is also called ‘a domineering spirit, and a principle of 
selfishness’. 94 It is said to make its mark upon all the passions. Not only on 
self-love or self-liking, but in the operation of both. It affects self-liking 
because ‘all men are partial in their judgements, when they compare 
themselves to others’. It directs self-love because a ‘man in his anger 
behaves  himself  in  the  same  manner  as  other  animals;  disturbing,  in  the  
pursuit  of  self-preservation,  those  they  are  angry  with;  and  all  of  them  
endeavour, according as the degree of their passion is, either to destroy, or 
cause  pain  and  displeasure  to  their  adversaries’.  As  we  can  see,  with  this  
instinct, Mandeville seeks to outline the very source of all the frailty in 
human nature and what stood at odds with civil society. Mandeville’s 
definition  of  a  savage  is  a  man  ‘who  is  naturally  for  making  every  thing  
centre  in  himself’  and  ‘very  prone  to  look  upon every  thing,  he  enjoys,  as  
his  due;  and  every  thing  he  meddles  with,  as  his  own  performance’.95 In 
other  words,  he  is  a  person  who  could  not,  for  one  reason  or  another,  
check his instinct of sovereignty. 
 Why is this instinct so important? Isn’t this just another way of saying 
that men are naturally selfish? Yes, but there are two main reasons why this 
strategic  move  is  an  integral  part  of  Mandeville’s  idea  of  civility.  First,  we  
should remark that in his description, Mandeville is carefully holding on to 
his distinction between self-liking and self-love. The instinct of sovereignty 
affects both, but the effects are different. Second, when describing 
selfishness as an instinct that has an effect on all  the passions, Mandeville 
does  not  have  to  say  that  all  men  are  always  concerned  about  their  self-
interest,  but  they  are  instead  naturally  inclined  to  be  selfish.  The  key  is  to  
understand that in this way Mandeville detaches himself from the traditional 
definition of self-preservation that he had himself endorsed in the original 
Fable –  a  step  that  was  meant  to  unshackle  his  scheme of  civility  from its  
Hobbist chains.  
 In The Fable of the Bees, necessary appetites and anger aroused in their 
pursuit were presented as the motivating passions. It was of first 
importance for the government to suppress the anger caused in men while 
they  were  trying  to  gratify  the  passions  arising  from  self-love.  In  Part II 
these  passions  are  only  perceived  to  be  of  secondary  importance  in  the  
making of a man. Instead, pride is now indicated as the ‘hidden spring, that 
gives life and motion to all’ man’s ‘actions’.96 A  different  approach is  also  
adopted when contemplating how this motivating passion should be 
treated. Not a single step towards civil society could have been taken before 
it  was  realised  that  ‘pride  was  not  to  be  destroyed  by  force’,  but  ‘to  be  
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governed by stratagem’, which was of course ‘by playing the passion against 
itself’.97  
 This  should  be  seen  as  a  decisive  turn  away  from  Hobbism  and  
Mandeville’s first analysis of civil society. For Mandeville’s purposes it 
proved  inadequate  to  try  and  modify  a  Hobbist  idea  in  which  the  civil  
society  starts  to  function  when  the  fear  of  death  taught  men  to  use  their  
rational capabilities and to seek peace. Mandeville had first attempted to add 
pride at a later stage of society’s historical development to support the 
Hobbist scheme, but it  proved unsatisfactory. The root of the system was 
still the strict idea of self-preservation.  
 Mandeville consumes a considerable amount of time and space 
redefining the concept of self-preservation in Part II. In their third dialogue 
Cleomenes and Horatio deliberate over the matter at length. Cleomenes 
carefully brings the familiar characterization of this concept into their 
discussion.  ‘In  the  affair  of  self-preservation’  even  in  the  behaviour  of  a  
savage we commonly note that ‘self-love would first make it scrape together 
every thing it wanted for sustenance, provide against the injuries of air, and 
do  every  thing  to  make  itself  and  young  ones  secure’.98 Horatio readily 
agrees  that  ‘self-love’  induces  a  man  ‘to  labour  for  his  maintenance  and  
safety and makes him fond of every thing which he imagines to tend to his 
preservation’99, but Cleomenes is not just pointing at a well-established fact. 
He is redefining the concept. Cleomenes argues that not only self-love, but 
also ‘self-liking’ is a passion ‘given to man for self-preservation’.100 In order 
to stress the novelty and importance of this redefinition Horatio is made to 
express his doubts several times. It is plain to see that self-love plays a role 
in  man’s  self-preservation,  but  ‘what  good  does  the  self-liking  to  him?’  
Horatio  cannot  see  what  ‘benefit’  men  ‘could  receive  from  it,  either  in  a  
savage or a civilized state’. He thinks that ‘self-liking’ would rather be 
‘hurtful to men, because it must make them odious to one another’.101 After 
all, Cleomenes had defined that ‘self-liking’ forces a savage to ‘seek for 
opportunities, by gestures, looks, and sounds, to display the value it has for 
itself, superiour to what it has for others’.102  
 Cleomenes  answers  with  a  determined  tackle  on  the  Hobbist  idea  of  
civil society. ‘Self-liking’ may easily be defined as a passion working for our 
self-preservation.  ‘It  is  so  necessary  to  the  well-being  of  those  that  have  
been used to indulge it; that they can taste no pleasure without it’. ‘It 
doubles our happiness in prosperity, and buoys us up against the frowns of 
adverse fortune’. Mandeville calls self-liking ‘the mother of hopes, and the 
end  as  well  as  the  foundation  of  our  best  wishes’.  He  considers  it  ‘the  
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strongest  armour  against  despair,  and  as  long  as  we  can  like  any  ways  our  
situation, either in regard to present circumstances, or the prospect before 
us, we take care of ourselves; and no man can resolve upon suicide, whilst 
self-liking lasts’.103 Nothing  could  be  said  to  contribute  more  to  our  self-
preservation than the passion that gives us the will to live. 
 The  importance  of  these  passages  is  that  by  linking  self-liking  to  the  
concept of self-preservation, Mandeville is refuting the core of 
straightforward Hobbism. Self-preservation no longer means what it used 
to. Simultaneously, Mandeville may point out that he was not altogether 
wrong in what he claimed in The Fable of the Bees. Yet, after changing the 
entire  concept,  he  is  holding  a  view  that  is  contrary  to  what  he  originally  
argued. Mandeville became bitterly conscious in The Fable that if  one takes 
up self-love as the starting point of the analysis of civil society, it leads to a 
dead end. Instead, there has to be a wholehearted shift from the emphasis 
placed  on  self-love  to  self-liking.  With  the  ‘instinct  of  sovereignty’  
Mandeville  is  also  able  to  emphasize  that  the  ‘principle  of  selfishness’  is  
extremely  ‘difficult’  to  ‘destroy’  and  ‘pull  out  of  the  heart  of  man’.  When  
any man, regardless of how learned or civilised he might be, ‘heartily covets 
a thing, this instinct, this principle, will overrule and persuade him to leave 
no stone unturned, to compass his desires’. Mandeville tries to make sense 
of an important fact that ‘this innate principle, that bids us gratify every 
appetite’  might easily force us do things that we normally would not agree 
upon.104 It  might  just  as  easily  occur  that  we  do  not  even  realise  the  
consequences of our actions.  
 What becomes evident in Mandeville’s treatment of the key passions is 
that  self-love  and self-liking  as  such  cannot  be  described  to  be  vicious  or  
virtuous. According to Mandeville’s stoic sounding insight, ‘all passions and 
instincts  in  general  were  given  to  all  animals  for  some wise  end’.  They  all  
tend  to  ‘the  preservation  and  happiness’  of  the  animal  herself  or  her  
‘species’. Mandeville prescribes it as ‘our duty to hinder’ these passions and 
instincts ‘from being detrimental or offensive to any part of the society’, but 
there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  ‘be  ashamed  of  having  them’.105 
Mandeville  defends  the  view  that  both  self-love  and  self-liking,  which  are  
the principal passions that explain our actions, should be considered 
morally neutral. In order to make his science of human nature stem with his 
scheme of civil society, Mandeville invokes the instinct of sovereignty as the 
sole detrimental cause of manmade misery. Most of the laws, for example, 
are directed in one way or another against it. Mandeville points out that the 
‘regulations and prohibitions, that have been contrived for the temporal 
happiness of mankind’ are designed for one reason: ‘to cure and disappoint 
that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every 
thing  as  centring  in  himself,  and  prompts  him  to  put  in  a  claim  to  every  
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thing, he can lay his hands on’.106 This holds true with both, self-love and 
self-liking when they are guided by the unrestrained movement of this 
instinct. What follows is very logical: the two redeeming principles, that 
‘hinder’ this instinct in connection with self-love or self-liking ‘from being 
detrimental  or  offensive  to  any  part’  of  the  civil  society,  are  justice  and  
politeness. The laws defining and securing justice protect the self-love of 
every individual and politeness in turn guarantees that everyone may 
cultivate his self-liking. These are the imperative moral conventions 
designed  to  make  the  best  of  our  infirmities,  developed  by  several  
generations and ultimately fixed by rigid rules.  
Forming a moral institution 
Mandeville’s conception of a moral institution needs to be analysed in 
detail,  and  the  best  way  to  do  this  is  to  carefully  consider  self-liking  and  
politeness,  which  he  discusses  at  length  on  several  occasions,  but  
particularly in the first half of Part II. Good manners, politeness, courtesy, 
civility and good-breeding are terms which all describe an artificial moral 
institution that in Mandeville’s understanding is meant for one specific 
purpose, ‘concealing’ our ‘pride’.107 Politeness is an excellent illustration of 
Mandeville’s  comprehension  of  a  moral  convention.  First,  it  is  the  prime  
example of playing a passion ‘against itself’.108 Only when men learn to hide 
their pride they start to boast in their self-liking.109 Second, all the aspects of 
the formation of a moral convention in Mandeville’s conjectural history are 
precisely sketched in his treatment of self-liking. Politeness serves as an 
explicit example of the formation of a moral institution in the historical 
development of civil society.  
 The bedrock of a moral institution is that it has to become accepted and 
adopted by most part of the society, which can only happen when it proves 
to  be  in  practice  advantageous  to  people.  Politeness  passes  this  test  by  
improving the sociability between men. Mandeville pronounces that ‘once 
the generality begin to conceal the high value they have for themselves, men 
must become more tolerable to one another’.110 But  how  is  this  
accomplished?  How  do  we  advance  from  the  savage  state  to  a  situation  
where the majority start concealing their pride? Mandeville invokes, once 
again, conjectural history to unfold his argument. Cleomenes asks Horatio 
to  consider  only  ‘two  things’  to  understand  that  all  civil  societies  are  
compelled to form a principle such as politeness, where the aim is to teach 
men  to  hide  their  true  sentiments  from  the  high  value  they  hold  for  
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themselves. ‘First’, Mandeville emphasises, ‘from the nature of that passion’ 
called ‘self-liking’, ‘it must follow, that all untaught men will ever be hateful 
to one another in conversation’, ‘if their thoughts were known to each 
other’.  Mandeville points out that it  is solely the passion of self-liking that 
needs to be redirected in order to render a conversation agreeable. It is 
significant that Mandeville in his treatment of politeness explicitly 
articulates that the moral institution is not meant to serve our self-love. 
Where self-interest is concerned, also uncivilised men might be able to 
conceal their pride, but this cannot be considered politeness qua moral 
institution.  Such  pattern  of  behaviour,  where  the  mask  falls  once  the  
interest  ceases,  does  not  count  as  civility.  Mandeville  points  out  that  by  a  
conversation he means a casual situation between ‘equals’, ‘where neither 
interest  nor  superiority  are  consider’d’.  What  happens  is  that  in  a  
conversation ‘among un-civilized men’ outward ‘declaration of their 
sentiments’ often happens and ‘render them both insufferable to each 
other’.  It  is  plain  to  see  that  ‘without  a  mixture  of  art  and  trouble,  the  
outward symptoms’ of self-liking ‘are not to be stifled’.111 Men instinctively 
value themselves above their real worth. Thus, it automatically happens that 
the conversation between two equal, uncivilised men, who have not learned 
to change the course of self-liking and hide their sentiments, is doomed to 
be unsatisfactory for both of them.  
 Cleomenes’s second point of concern is that a man is a creature ‘endued 
with a great share of understanding’, fond of his ‘ease to the last degree, and 
as industrious to produce it’. Thus, ‘in all human probability’, the ‘effect’ 
this ‘inconveniency arising from self-liking’ has upon men is that they start 
searching for ways to meliorate this frailty in their social relationships and 
eventually  redirect  their  passion.  What  this  means  in  relation  to  the  
conjectural development of a moral institution is spelled out in plain words. 
‘The disturbance and uneasiness, that must be caused by self-liking’, ‘must’ 
in  turn  ‘necessarily  produce  at  long  run,  what  we  call  good  manners  and  
politeness’.112 Mandeville staunchly underlines that the cause of this 
development is evident, but the historical progress is not straightforward. A 
moral institution is not established in a single stroke, but many ‘strugglings 
and unsuccessful trials to remedy’ the uneasiness of pride will ‘precede’ this 
point of perfection.113  
 The ingenious design of Mandeville’s conjectural development of moral 
institutions explains how an invaluable moral practise is developed without 
the actors being conscious of what is happening, nor is their intention to 
contribute to the moral progress. If the evolution of the fundamental moral 
institutions is logical and compelled to follow a certain course, the actual 
moral agents can be fully unaware of the process that they are participating 
in. This is a point that is difficult for us to overemphasise when considering 
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what is original in Mandeville’s thinking. After Cleomenes has illustrated the 
two  points  that  explain  how  politeness  is  a  natural  product  of  the  
development of civil society, Horatio recaps what he understands as the 
main part of the conjectural development of politeness:  
Everybody, in this undisciplin’d state, being affected with the high value he has for 
himself, and displaying the most natural symptoms, which you have describ’d, they 
would all be offended at the barefac’d pride of their neighbours: and it is impossible, 
that this should continue long among rational creatures, but the repeated experience 
of the uneasiness they received from such behaviour, would make some of them 
reflect  on  the  cause  of  it;  which,  in  tract  of  time,  would  make  them find  out,  that  
their  own  barefaced  pride  must  be  as  offensive  to  others,  as  that  of  others  is  to  
themselves.114  
Horatio’s summary is presented as informative, but he unfortunately 
misunderstands the role of reason and intention in this process. One meta-
text stratagem that Mandeville employs is to flag a mistake his character 
makes. An example of this is Cleomenes pointing to Horatio that ‘what you 
say is certainly the philosophical reason of the alterations, that are made in 
the behaviour of men, by their being civiliz’d: but all this is done without 
reflection’. Mandeville systematically insists, by giving different examples, 
that even when the conjectural development of moral institutions is deemed 
to  follow  a  certain  course,  this  is  not  a  conscious  process.  Men  do  not  
intentionally aim to establish any moral conventions. Eventually, at some 
point in time, they will establish them, because of the inconvenience caused 
by  the  passion  in  question,  but  they  are  unable  to  directly  strive  for  these  
institutions since they are controlled by the very same passions that have to 
be redirected. Cleomenes argues that ‘by degrees, and great length of time’ 
they ‘fall as it were into these things spontaneously’.115  
 One might think that once politeness has become an established moral 
institution people would realise its worth and follow its principles because 
they  understand that  it  is  the  reasonable  thing  to  do.  Mandeville  does  not  
think  that  a  later  stage  of  civilization  makes  a  difference  in  this  respect.  
‘Even now’, Cleomenes lectures, when the art of good manners is ‘brought 
to great perfection, the greatest part of those that are most expert, and daily 
making improvements’ in it, ‘know as little of the Rationale’  of  it,  as  the  
‘predecessors did at first’.116 This is an intriguing point, because not only the 
role of reason, but also the question about proper motives and intentions 
vanish in conjectural history. It does not make a difference why people are 
polite  or  just.  ‘In  the  choice  of  things  we  are  more  often  directed  by  the  
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caprice of fashions, and the custom of the age, than we are by solid reason, 
or our own understanding’.117 What  makes  a  difference  is  that  there  is  
politeness and justice; and people follow these general rules, whether they 
do  it  out  of  habit,  because  of  self-liking,  self-love  or  whatever  wavering  
motive they might have at that fleeting moment in time. 
 Mandeville also gives his readers a step by step sketch of how a moral 
institution comes into the world from a meagre, savage society. This is not 
presented as an actual historical development, for example, in Britain, 
France or Greece. As Mandeville expresses through the words of 
Cleomenes: ‘I  don’t speak of our nation in particular,  but of all  states and 
kingdoms in general’.118 The conjectural progress of politeness is set out in 
common terms in order to stress the fact that the development in all  civil  
societies is bound to follow these very same lines. The first incentive in 
most primitive actions is self-interest. According to Mandeville, it is ‘the 
most  crafty  and  designing’  that  will  ‘be  the  first’  to  ‘learn  to  conceal’  the  
‘passion of pride’ for ‘interest-sake’. Imitation is a powerful social tool. 
Once  an  example  is  set  forward  ‘in  little  time  no  body’  in  this  abstracted  
savage society ‘will shew the least symptom of’ self-liking ‘whilst he is 
asking favours, or stands in need of help’.119 Thus, the rudimentary progress 
of politeness starts in search for self-interest, but this is just the beginning 
of the process, where the significance of the moral institution is placed on 
self-liking instead of self-love. 
 Mandeville emphasises that moral institutions are constantly developing 
and changing. Ineptly uncivilised men first learn that when asking for 
favours  it  is  within  their  interest  not  to  show  their  pride.  This  is  a  mean  
beginning, but more is soon to follow. Mandeville highlights that ‘once the 
generality begin to conceal’ their self-liking, ‘new improvements must be 
made  every  day’.  It  will  not  be  long,  ‘till  some  of  them  grow  impudent  
enough, not only to deny the high value they have for themselves, but 
likewise to pretend that they have greater value for others, than they have 
for themselves’.120 In turn, ‘this will bring in complaisance, and now flattery 
will rush in upon them like a torrent’. This marks the turning point when 
the  most  influential  part  of  society  slowly  starts  to  shift  their  behaviour  
from securing self-love towards the cultivation of self-liking. The natural 
affection  that  parents  feel  towards  their  children  also  has  a  role  to  play  in  
this  scheme  and  ‘as  soon  as’  men  ‘are  arrived  at  this  pitch  of  insincerity,  
they will find the benefit of it, and teach it their children’.121 In other words, 
that is plainly teaching children what we call manners. 
                                                        
117 Mandeville, Part II, p. 247. 
118 Mandeville, Part II, p. 323. 
119 Mandeville, Part II, p. 141. 
120 Mandeville, Part II, p. 145, see also p. 150. 
121 Mandeville, Part II, p. 145. 
LATER MANDEVILLE AND THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
173 
 Mandeville underlines the importance of education in his social 
theory.122 According  to  the  him,  the  only  ‘reality’  of  ‘the  compliment  we  
make to our species,  of its being endued with speech and sociableness’,  is  
‘that by care and industry men may be taught to speak, and be made 
sociable, if the discipline begins when they are very young’.123 He  also  
emphasises that it takes various generations before a decent level of civility 
is reached. He does not think that this development is brought to a closure 
when a civil state is established. Self-liking is far more difficult to redirect 
than self-love. Human nature is tremulous and the first private ‘family 
descending from such a stock, would be crumbled to pieces, re-united, and 
dispers’d  again  several  times,  before  the  whole  or  any  part  of  it  could  be  
advanced to any degree of politeness’.124 However, what happens in the 
conjectural development is that ‘the knowledge of parents’, regardless of the 
fact  of  how useless  it  might  be  in  practise,  ‘is  communicated  to  their  off-
spring’, because they have a natural affection concerning their well-being.125 
Only  ‘few parents  are  so  bad  as  not  to  wish  their  offspring  might  be  well  
accomplish’d’126,  and  thus  ‘every  one’s  experience  in  life,  being  added  to  
what he learn’d in his youth, every generation after this must be better 
taught than the preceding; by which means, in two or three centuries, good 
manners must be brought to great perfection’.127 And, even after reaching a 
high level of politeness, Mandeville insists, most people who follow these 
guidelines  do  not  reflect  upon  their  actions.  He  skilfully  separates  the  
question of proper motivation from the idea of a beneficial moral 
institution. Who could deny that the ‘doctrine of good manners’  is ‘taught 
and practised by millions, who never thought on the origin of politeness, or 
so much as knew the real benefit it is of to society’?128  
 So, here we have Mandeville’s understanding of the conjectural 
development of a moral institution in a nutshell. He goes out of his way to 
explain that the development of the pivotal artificial moral conventions 
follows  a  somewhat  natural  course  in  all  human  societies  because  the  
common propensities of human nature are the same for a savage as well as 
for a civilised man. ‘All the precepts of good manners throughout the world 
have  the  same  tendency,  and  are  no  more  than  the  various  methods  of  
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making ourselves acceptable to others, with as little prejudice to ourselves 
as is possible’.129 This, of course, does not mean that men in their manners 
and  morals  are  predestined  for  a  certain  mould.  The  methods  of  making  
‘ourselves acceptable to others’ might, and do change, even if the semantic 
value of manners is fixed. In the sense that the inconvenience caused by 
self-liking sets men to seek customs of concealing their pride and the 
disturbance  caused  by  self-love  makes  them  look  for  ways  to  restrict  the  
unbound movement of their selfishness, the development of civil society is 
natural. ‘The art of good manners’, according to the Dutchman, is ‘a science 
that  is  ever  built  on  the  same steady  principle  in  our  nature,  whatever  the  
age  or  the  climate  may  be,  in  which  it  is  practis’d’.130 The convention is 
always established for the same reason and following same basic principles. 
The inconvenience caused by self-liking forces all the civil societies to look 
for a custom such as politeness where the idea is to redirect the course of 
self-liking so that it  is not converted into outward manifestations of pride. 
There is,  of course, a great variance in how this is,  at different places and 
times, laid out in practise. For example, modern honour, according to 
Mandeville, is the most important contribution to eighteenth-century 
European politeness, but not a part of his general explanation of the 
development of civil society, because it is strictly attached to the 
development  of  this  particular  society  instead  of  being  a  universal  
practise.131 
 
Mandeville and justice 
It is time to turn from politeness to the other pivotal moral institution, 
justice. The principal idea of justice and politeness as remedies against the 
instinct of sovereignty is consistently applied in Mandeville’s scheme of civil 
society.  It  is  vital  to  realise  that  the  idea  behind  these  institutions  is  
symmetric. The passion in question is turned against itself. This is the only 
way that these violent passions that are guided by the instinct of sovereignty 
can be controlled. How the institution of justice is established is a parallel 
story with the art of good-breeding. The difference is, of course, that 
politeness is a necessity for every civil society because of the nature of the 
passion called self-liking and justice is needed because of self-love. Precisely 
in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  self-liking  and  politeness,  the  
inconvenience caused by self-love must produce the moral convention of 
justice  in  a  long  run.  This  conjectural  development  is  not  a  process  
advanced by conscious agents, but an indirect path requiring experience and 
time.  
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 Mandeville  makes  good  use  of  the  neo-Augustinian  idea  of  
countervailing passions for his own purposes. The security of private 
property, after it has first been invented, serves everyone’s self-interest.132 
Men learn through experience that they can better advance their selfish 
needs by simultaneously letting everyone enjoy what is their own. This is a 
straightforward conclusion derived from experience: otherwise there could 
not be any commerce between men or advancement of society; a fact that 
the children of the first wild couple were already sensible of. The theoretical 
principle is to ‘play the passion against itself’.133 Experience eventually 
teaches men that it is within their self-interest to restrict the unbound 
movement of their self-love. General behaviour starts to be rule-guided 
once  some  people  set  an  example  that  others  willingly  imitate.  In  time,  it  
becomes obvious that this convention is advantageous to everyone’s 
interest and thus parents, because of their natural affection, start to educate 
their children to act according to it. Meantime, the convention is daily 
improved and shaped. Taken into consideration the volatility of human 
nature  and  the  primacy  of  the  instinct  of  sovereignty,  it  is  clear  that  this  
convention can only become fully effectual when operated through laws. 
This is why a strict rule of law is necessary, which cannot be executed 
without a government. Nevertheless, the convention precedes the law and 
thus the conjectural development of this moral institution is the only way to 
grasp the nature of justice.  
 Mandeville calls attention to his insight that there cannot be any natural 
or a priori way of finding out the difference between right and wrong. We 
do not have any natural ‘thoughts of justice and injustice’134 and ‘raw, 
ignorant,  and  untaught  men,  fix  their  eyes  on  what  is  immediately  before,  
and seldom look further than, as it is vulgarly express’d, the length of their 
noses’.135 However, simply by living in society,  men in due course become 
sociable and acquire these notions when experience enables them to 
understand human nature and to form moral conventions. Eventually, the 
inconvenience  caused  by  self-love  will  make  men  aware  that  the  
‘endeavours’ of a man ‘to advance his fortune’ are ‘always restless, and have 
no bounds; but where he is oblig’d to act openly, and has reason to fear the 
censure of the world’.136 What  is  important  is  that  a  civil  society  can  
function perfectly well without everyone being conscious of its foundational 
principles or knowing why certain conventions are necessary. There is a 
difference between understanding the abstract nature of justice and being 
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sensible of the operation and requirements of this principle in practice. 
Mandeville carefully points out that a basic understanding of the rudiments 
of justice does not only concern ‘men of great accomplishments’ or that an 
ability ‘to think abstractly’ would be necessary for one to be sensible of the 
principles of justice. Instead, ‘all men of middling capacities’, ‘in all 
countries,  and  in  all  ages’,  ‘that  have  been  brought  up  in  societies’  will  
‘always  find  out  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  in  things  
diametrically opposite’.137  
 This  means  that  ‘there  are  certain  facts’,  which  a  man  ‘will  always  
condemn, and others which he will always approve of’. For example, ‘to kill 
a member of the same society, that has not offended us’ or ‘to rob him, will 
always  be  bad’.  In  a  similar  manner,  everyone  will  ‘always’  agree  that  ‘to  
cure  the  sick,  and  be  beneficent  to  publick’  is  ‘a  good  rule  in  life’.138 But 
how is  the  knowledge  of  these  facts  acquired,  if  we  do not  know them a 
priori, they are not derived from any natural principles of human nature and 
we  do  not  understand  the  abstract  nature  of  justice?  The  uniformity  of  
human passions compels all human societies to form certain guidelines. 
When something becomes commonly accepted it is within a man’s nature 
to  follow  the  general  example.  A  man  ‘naturally  loves  to  imitate  what  he  
sees others do’.139 These  rules  cannot  be  called  natural  in  a  sense  that  we  
find them by rational calculation or that to follow them would be natural 
for human nature. However, the process of forming these artificial 
guidelines always follows a similar path. All men brought up in civil 
societies will agree upon the same basic facts (which of course does not 
mean that they would always act according to the rules themselves), because 
the fundamental moral institutions established in the course of many 
centuries are similar in their function and once these conventions are 
established imitation and education do the rest in order to furnish men with 
the sentiments of approval and disapproval. Most importantly, ‘experience 
and  imitation’  teach  men  ‘to  act  as  they  do’.140 According to Mandeville, 
‘the foundation of all accomplishments must be laid in our youth, before we 
are  able  or  allow’d  to  chuse  for  ourselves,  or  to  judge,  which  is  the  most  
profitable way of employing our time’141 and ‘children have no opportunity 
of  learning  their  duty,  but  from their  parents,  and  those  who act  by  their  
authority or in their stead’.142  
 An important part of Mandeville’s understanding of moral institutions is 
that  conventions  precede  laws.  This  is  also  crucial  with  a  reference  to  the  
modern  theory  of  natural  law.  In  his  interpretation  of  the  process  of  civil  
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society he leaves little room for God.143 A higher power does not prescribe 
natural  law to  men.  Instead,  with  his  examples,  Mandeville  secularises  the  
role of religion and explains how God’s laws function as any other 
manmade legislation. The Decalogue itself was established upon certain 
preceding moral conventions. If we examine the hypothetical moment 
when God gave his commands to men, we realise that even these laws had 
to be based on human experience. Mandeville reminds his audience that 
‘The Israelites, whilst they were slaves in Egypt, were’ already ‘govern’d by the 
laws of their master’.  Cleomenes speculates that the ‘Israelites’  had already 
come a long way in the moral development and ‘were many degrees 
remov’d from the lowest savages’, but ‘yet far from being a civiliz’d nation’. 
They were already advancing and developing moral institutions, which had 
not been yet confirmed by prohibitions and punishments regulated by a 
government. Cleomenes notes that ‘it is reasonable to think, that, before 
they receiv’d the law of God, they had regulations and agreements already 
establish’d, which the ten commandments did not abolish’. In other words, 
what Mandeville wants to foremost emphasise is that all laws, even the once 
said  to  be  handed  down  by  God,  have  to  be  based  on  preceding  human  
conventions. In his historical example Mandeville maintains that already 
prior to Moses it ‘is demonstrable’ that the Israelites ‘must have had notions 
of right and wrong, and contracts among them against open violence, and 
the invasion of property’.144  
 Thus, Mandeville turns the theological argument, maintained also by 
many modern natural law theorists, that God gave men the ability to reason 
in order to discover His natural law of advancing sociability on its head. We 
do not need to refer to God nor reason in order to explain the origin of the 
natural law. Instead, we can perfectly well give a secular explanation also to 
the role of religion in the conjectural development of civil society.145 
Mandeville is also able to dissolve the question of original contract as the 
foundation of civil society by explaining the origin of society in historical 
terms. Men do not agree to be governed, they become governable, which is 
in turn part of the explanation why they can be called sociable. Once men 
are plainly born into a social condition, they start obliquely seeking after 
such conventions that will  advance their own interest by enabling them to 
live peacefully in society and which in turn will  form the structure of civil  
society. This structure cannot become fully effectual without a government 
executing laws. Thus, the remaining question, after the historical process of 
establishing necessarily artificial conventions has been accounted for, is how 
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these moral institutions are rendered effective and permanent. This, 
however, is a question concerning state formation and not the conjectural 
development of conventions that precede the establishment of a civil state. 
Establishing a civil state 
All  the  main  components  of  the  ‘Mandevillean’  scheme  of  society  are  
constructed in accordance with the conjectural development of moral 
institutions that we have studied in detail. Without this process, underlying 
the established conventions of politeness and justice, civil society could 
never  have  emerged.  However,  in  so  far  as  the  origin  of  civil  society  is  
concerned, we also have to pay close attention to the monumental point in 
history when these conventions are rendered effectual. When different 
multitudes are thought to come to be governed by written laws is a defining 
moment in Mandeville’s social philosophy. 
 The moral development of mankind was naturally launched when the 
children of the first wild couple were born into a pre-social condition. The 
oblique search after society made these savages indirectly form different 
conventions that would enable them to meliorate their condition. 
Mandeville explains how the first savages, following the natural principles 
of human nature, might have expanded into a relatively large clan and while 
the  first  generation  was  making  moral  progress  within  this  natural  family  
society. Cleomenes’s suggestion, that society came into the world ‘from 
private  families;  but  not  without  great  difficulty,  and  the  concurrence  of  
many favourable accidents; and many generations may pass, before there is 
any likelihood of their being form’d into a society’146,  is  given  with  an  
apparent  reference  to  the  formation  of  a  state,  where  various  family  
societies come to live together eventually forming a civil society. Thus, 
Mandeville’s three renowned ‘step[s] into society’, instead of telling the 
whole story of the origin of society, which started much earlier, principally 
explain how these different families are eventually united in a civil state.147 
To  explain  my  interpretation  in  short,  the  steps  to  society,  without  the  
pivotal connection to the conjectural development of moral institutions, 
mean very little. In what follows, these three steps will be examined from 
this perspective. 
 According  to  Mandeville,  the  first  step  towards  state  formation  is  a  
‘common danger, which unites’ even ‘the greatest enemies’.148 This has 
nothing to do with individuals who would strive for society for the sake of 
self-preservation. Instead, ‘it is possible’, Cleomenes speculates, ‘that several 
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families  of  savages  might  unite,  and  the  heads  of  them  agree  upon  some  
sort of government or other, for their common good’.149 It  is  very  likely  
that an external threat of wild beasts might have endeavoured ‘different 
families’ temporarily ‘to live together’, but they would have had ‘little use to 
one another, when there’ no longer was a ‘common enemy to oppose’.150 
Simultaneously, these families started to quarrel. Cleomenes calls this 
‘danger’  that  ‘men  are  in  from  one  another’  as  ‘the  second  step  to  
society’.151 This step includes an important correction to Mandeville’s 
previous scheme of civil society.  
 One of the shortcomings of The Fable regards the civilising method. 
Previously Mandeville had only been using one explanatory device: the 
Hobbist idea of self-preservation countering the odious passions of self-
love.  This  added  up  to  a  major  flaw.  The  theory  could  not  answer  this  
foundational question: how and why would anyone become a lawgiver or 
politician, if all the original appetites concerned necessities or reproduction 
and men wanted to peacefully cultivate their primal passions?  
 As soon as Cleomenes introduces self-liking to Horatio, he immediately 
hurries to give a hypothetical example of how this passion effects the 
formation  of  a  state.  For  ‘a  hundred’  savage  ‘males’,  all  ‘equally  free’,  
coming together for the first time, having ‘their bellies full’ and no external 
reason for a dispute, it would take ‘less than half an hour’ for ‘this liking in 
question’ to ‘appear in the desire of superiority’.152 In The Fable there had 
not  been  any  indications  of  an  original  drive  towards  government.  Like  
mushrooms lawgivers  simply  popped up at  a  certain  point  in  history  with  
their inflexible laws curbing men’s anger caused by self-love. In Part II, 
Cleomenes argues that the instinct of sovereignty and self-liking play a dual 
role in the formation of a civil  society,  since ‘multitudes could never have 
been formed into societies, if some of them had not been possessed of this 
thirst of dominion’. Horatio agrees that underlying a governed society there 
has  to  be  some  ‘peculiar  instincts,  that  belong  to  a  whole  species’,  which  
could not be ‘acquired by art or discipline’.153 The  second  step  to  society  
means  that  ‘many  families  could  not  live  long  together’  until  ‘actuated  by  
the principle’ of self-liking some ‘would strive for superiority’.154 The 
apparent  dilemma is  how could  these  families  desiring  to  dominate  others  
eventually maintain their superiority?  
 For once Cleomenes accepts his interlocutor’s suggestion. Horatio is 
right that the ‘same ambition that made a man aspire to be a leader, would 
make  him  likewise  desirous  of  being  obeyed  in  civil  matters’.  After  an  
unspecified, but considerably long period of time, leaders would eventually 
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look into ‘human nature’ and realise that ‘the more strife and discord there 
was amongst the people they headed, the less use they could make of 
them’.155 Underlying this self-interested action is the artificial moral 
progress  that  already  started  with  the  first  generation  of  wild  savages.  A  
chieftain looking into human nature simply means that the maturity of the 
moral institutions and the historical circumstances are at a sufficient level to 
establish a civil state. Leaders create ‘prohibitions and penalties’ confirming 
the conjectural development of justice, which could be rendered effectual 
only now when the laws were written down.156 Thus, ‘the third and last step 
to society’ is ‘the invention of letters’.157  
 We may see that this third step towards society is a crux where the main 
storylines come together. The moral institution of justice, that is a product 
of the conjoined experience of several generations, only becomes effectual 
when  regulated  through  prohibitions  and  penalties  that  are  executed  by  
magistracy.  At  this  point  in  time  politeness  is  much  further  away  from  
perfection than justice. This idealised moment of conjectural history marks 
the actual origin of government. Mandeville’s strong belief is that ‘the 
undoubted basis of all societies is government’.158 According  to  him,  ‘it  is  
inconsistent with the nature of human creatures,  that any number of them 
should ever live together in tolerable concord, without laws or 
government’.159 As plain as it is: ‘No multitudes can live peaceably without 
government; no government can subsist without laws; and no laws can be 
effectual long, unless they are wrote down’.160 One cannot sufficiently stress 
the  importance  of  the  plural  form  in  the  word  ‘multitudes’  in  the  former  
quote. Mandeville’s focus is on the idea that in the formation of a civil state 
different family societies are united into a body politic.  
 An important feature of the connection between the theory of state 
formation and conjectural development of moral institutions is that the 
penalties and prohibitions that are created are not arbitrary, but in line with 
the moral progress made by previous generations. ‘All sound politicks, and 
the whole art of governing’, according to Mandeville, ‘are entirely built 
upon  the  knowledge  of  human  nature’,  which  is  the  sole  product  of  the  
conjectural development of moral institutions. ‘The great business’ of ‘a 
politician is to promote, and, if  he can, reward all  good and useful actions 
on the one hand; and on the other, to punish, or at least discourage, every 
thing  that  is  destructive  or  hurtful  to  society’.161 The  politician  does  not  
define what is right and wrong. His role is to think of different methods of 
how to promote sociability. Nevertheless, even this cannot be considered to 
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be ‘the work of one man, or of one generation’, but like all the other human 
conventions  the  art  of  governing  is  ‘the  joynt  labour  of  several  ages’.162 
Laws cannot be arbitrary, if they are based on the preceding convention 
that is formed following universal principles of redirecting the passions.  
 What  this  in  its  simplicity  means,  is  that  even  when  a  perfect  legal  
system might never be found and the ‘best forms of government are subject 
to revolutions’163,  ‘the  principal  laws  of  all  countries  have  the  same  
tendency’.164 Every one of them is ‘plainly design’d’ to ‘cure and disappoint 
that natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches man to look upon every 
thing  as  centring  in  himself,  and  prompts  him  to  put  in  a  claim  to  every  
thing,  he  can  lay  his  hands  on’.  The  ‘obstacles  to  society’  should  not  be  
called  as  ‘faults’,  but  ‘rather’  as  ‘properties  of  our  nature’  and  all  ‘the  
principal  laws’  point  at  ‘some  frailty,  defect,  or  unfitness  for  society,  that  
men  are  naturally  subject  to’.165 Mandeville repeats on different occasions 
that the function of ‘the principal laws of all  countries’  is that they all  ‘are 
remedies against human frailties’. Pledging his physician background, 
Mandeville elaborates that these laws ‘are design’d as antidotes, to prevent 
the ill consequences of some properties, inseparable from our nature; which 
yet in themselves, without management or restraint, are obstructive and 
pernicious to society’.166  
 Mandeville scrupulously emphasises the centrality of the role of an 
established civil society in the conjectural history of society. The slow and 
painstaking  moral  progress  starts  to  make  rapid  advancement.  His  
interpretation is that ‘once men come to be govern’d by written laws, all the 
rest comes on a-pace’.167 This change in tempo is noteworthy for different 
reasons.  The  formation  of  a  civil  society,  controlled  by  written  laws  and  
executed by a government, has a serious effect on men. People ‘discover a 
restless endeavour to make themselves easy, which insensibly teaches them 
to avoid mischief on all emergencies’. What this means in accordance with 
the formation of civil society is that ‘when human creatures once submit to 
government, and are used to live under the restraint of laws, it is incredible, 
how many useful cautions, shifts, and stratagems, they will learn to practise 
by experience and imitation, from conversing together’. This remark is 
connected to a reminder that this happens ‘without’ the particular people 
‘being  aware  of  the  natural  causes,  that  oblige  them to  act  as  they  do,  viz. 
The  passions  within,  that,  unknown  to  themselves,  govern  their  will  and  
direct their behaviour’.168  
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 The immediate outcome of the written laws is that a system of justice is 
rendered effective and ‘now property, and safety of life and limb, may be 
secured’.  The primary purpose of civil  state is thus to provide security for 
every individual’s self-love. In consequence, breakthroughs will occur upon 
other fronts as well. The general security of individual self-interest ‘naturally 
will  forward  the  love  of  peace,  and  make  it  spread’.  This  mutual  trust  in  
turn considerably advances the commerce between reliable individuals and 
‘no number of men, when once they enjoy quiet, and no man needs to fear 
his  neighbour,  will  be  long  without  learning  to  divide  and  subdivide  their  
labour’.169 With regulations on self-love a government is able to stabilize 
society  and  its  numbers  start  to  grow.  This  is  also  the  first  time  that  the  
faculty of reason is adopted in Mandeville’s scheme. ‘When laws begin to be 
well known, and the execution of them is facilitated by general approbation, 
multitudes may be kept in tolerable concord among themselves’. ‘It is then 
that  it  appears,  and  not  before,  how  much  the  superiority  of  man’s  
understanding beyond other animals, contributes to his sociableness, which 
is  only  retarded  by  it  in  his  savage  state’.170 As  we  may  plausibly  infer,  
Mandeville  places  much  weight  on  the  formation  of  a  civil  state  that  
eventually teaches men, as he called it, ‘a method of thinking justly’.171 But 
no matter how crucial  this artificial  convention of justice might be, it  only 
confirms one side of the bilateral moral progress. After reaching the 
culmination of establishing laws and a government, we still have to explore 
how the overall shift from self-love to self-liking takes place. The formation 
of  a  civil  state  is  a  crucial  moment  in  history,  but  we  are  still  far  from  
stepping into a civilised state. 
Politicians, politeness and gallantry 
The moral progress does not end when the civil society has first been 
established. An ever-developing legislative system that provides security for 
every individual’s self-love is a landmark in the history of moral institutions, 
but we are still far from the emergence of a truly civilised person, who has 
been ‘educated in a society, a civil establishment, of several hundred years 
standing’.172 I  will  concentrate  on  this  idea  of  change  by  examining  the  
modern development towards politeness presented in Part II and  its  
connection to voluntary servitude. I will also pay attention to the new role 
of politicians and to the link between the modern customs of honour and 
adultery, which, in their highly polemical nature, are the best examples of 
the social shift from self-love to self-liking. 
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 When describing the civilising process, Mandeville was fully aware of 
the social theories that emphasised self-preservation, in fact, he was earlier 
in the process of developing such a theory himself. What Mandeville offers 
in his later works is an alternative to these accounts. The problem with such 
theories was that they understood self-preservation solely in terms of 
preserving life.  Reason was usually stressed in one way or the other as the 
element triggering the progress towards civility. Mandeville critically 
emphasises  that  self-preservation,  or  self-love  in  this  sense,  is  not  the  
passion that men follow when they have the least dint of civility. Civilised 
men are not governed by reason or by primitive appetites. Their motivating 
passion is self-liking. Mandeville describes politeness as a social change that 
highlights the turn from a savage state based on self-love to a civil  society 
founded on self-liking. 
 Being governable in Mandeville’s terms means that a man is, in spite of 
everything, yielded to servitude. People are ‘reconciled to submission’. 
Regardless of this submissive state, Mandeville maintains that men are able 
to take advantage of their condition and are satisfied in their servitude. How 
is this possible? When we remember the new concepts that Mandeville 
coins  –  self-liking  and  the  instinct  of  sovereignty  –  we  can  recognise  the  
difference between being submissive and being governable that Mandeville 
is  after.  When  a  man  is  rendered  governable  he  has  to  compromise  his  
‘domineering spirit’. He cannot roam free and indulge his natural liberty at 
will. He has to curb the natural inclinations that arise from self-love. But a 
man still has his self-liking to indulge and it does not mean that the instinct 
of sovereignty is pulled out of a man’s heart. The cornerstone of civility is 
that  men  start  to  cultivate  their  self-liking.  It  is  ‘the  management  of  self-
liking’ that ‘set forth the excellency of our species beyond all other 
animals’.173 
 A crucial factor confirming Mandeville’s idea of the shift from self-love 
to self-liking is the new role he bestows on politicians in Part II. In the 
version of the history of civil society given in the original Fable, politicians 
were  described  as  ruthless  men,  who  suffocated  men’s  primal  passions  at  
will. Mandeville emphasized that it was ‘the first care’ of all governments to 
inflict  ‘severe  punishments’  in  order  to  ‘curb’  a  man’s  hurtful  anger.174 He 
later enhances this argument considerably. In Origin of honour, Cleomenes 
emphasises that ‘the first business of all  governments’  and the actual ‘task 
which  all  rulers  must  begin  with’  is  ‘to  make  men tractable  and obedient’.  
There  is  only  one  way  to  do  this  effectively.  ‘Human  nature  ought  to  be  
humoured  as  well  as  studied.’  Whoever  ‘takes  upon  him  to  govern  a  
multitude’  has  to  ‘inform  himself  of  those  sentiments  that  are  the  natural  
result  of  the  passions  and  frailties  which  every  human  creature  is  born  
with’.175 A politician has to be skilful enough to make use of the ‘fear of the 
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invisible cause’ inherent to all men.176 He has to come up with the different 
measures  of  how  to  discourage  men’s  instinct  of  sovereignty  and  make  
them  labour  for  the  common  interest.  The  lesson  that  a  politician  has  to  
learn is that ‘all human creatures are swayed by their passions’. It does not 
matter  how  ‘fine  notions  we  may  flatter  our  selves  with’.  Even  the  ones  
‘who act suitably to their knowledge, and strictly follow the dictates of their 
reason, are not less compelled so to do by some passion or other, that sets 
them to work, than others, who bid defiance and act contrary to both, and 
whom  we  call  slaves  to  their  passions’.177 The difference is that civilised 
people know the principles that they have to follow in order to be able to 
manage  self-liking.  Whereas  the  ones  who  are  slaves  to  their  passions  do  
not. Already in the first dialogues Cleomenes fully endorses this new role of 
the  politicians.  He reminds  us  that  ‘all  lawgivers  have  two main  points  to  
consider’. Firstly, ‘what things will procure happiness to the society under 
their  care’  and  ‘secondly,  what  passions  and properties  there  are  in  man’s  
nature, that may either promote or obstruct this happiness’.178 Cleomenes 
attempts to teach his friend an important lesson about governing. It is his 
firm contention that a multitude cannot be forced to ‘believe contrary to 
what they feel, or what contradicts a passion inherent in their nature’. But, 
by the same token, ‘if you humour that passion, and allow it to be just, you 
may regulate it as you please’.179 This, of course, means the management of 
self-liking. 
 As I have tried to show, in the original Fable politeness was outlined as a 
significant aid for an individual to promote his self-interest. Most 
importantly it was represented as a technique that would permit a person to 
hypocritically benefit from social relations. In Part II, politeness is still 
perceived  as  artificial  but  even  if  politeness  could  at  times  directly  
contribute to one’s self-interest this is not prescribed as its main function. 
The  significance  of  the  revisions  that  Mandeville  makes  to  his  theory  of  
civility  is  that  now  he  is  able  to  give  a  plausible  explanation  for  why  
politeness is the central moral institution that renders people governable 
and upholds modern society. Politeness is a practise that benefits society as 
a whole. It is the only way to successfully control the instinct of sovereignty 
and without  it  a  multitude  cannot  possibly  be  governed as  a  body  politic.  
Politeness  is  an  integral  part  of  the  process  towards  refinement  and  the  
reason why we may talk about civilised society in the first place.  
 In Part II, Mandeville is still preoccupied with the concept of anger, but 
this time only when describing the break between barbarity and civility. 
‘Man in his anger behaves himself in the same manner as other animals’. In 
his ‘pursuit of self-preservation’ he will disturb those who he is angry with. 
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Thus,  he  will  try  to  either  ‘destroy,  or  cause  pain  and  displeasure  to’  his  
‘adversaries’.180 This  is  natural  for  a  man.  Mandeville  never  changes  his  
definition of anger, which is said to arise from self-love (mainly, hunger or 
lust). According to Cleomenes, we may ‘observe’ also ‘in infants of two or 
three months old’ the presence of an ‘instinct, something implanted in the 
frame’  that  ‘raises  their  anger,  which  is  easily  and  at  most  times  
unaccountably provoked; often by hunger, pain, and other inward 
ailments’.181 Mandeville is not trying to argue that men in a civil society are 
sincerely peaceful. People are still affected by their instinct of sovereignty 
and they are continuously crossed in the business of self-preservation, but 
now their passions are described to be operating in a different way.  
 The use of ‘ill language’ or insults is a prime example of how some ‘half-
civilized’ individuals give ‘vent to their anger’  that is too ‘troublesome’ for 
them ‘to stifle and conceal’.  The ‘obvious, ready and unstudied manner of 
venting and expressing anger, which nature teaches’ is to come to blows. If 
someone ‘called another rogue and rascal’, this would have been 
accompanied  in  an  uncivilised  state  with  knocking  the  adversary  down.  
Thus  in  a  society  where  ‘people  call  names,  without  doing  further  injury’  
this is not only ‘a sign’ that they have laws ‘against open force and violence’, 
but  it  is  also  an  indication  that  there  has  been  a  significant  change  
concerning men, since they are obeying these laws in the first place. 
Cleomenes emphasises that men in a functioning society do not necessarily 
submit to laws because of ‘self-denial’.182 Neither do they exclusively 
restrain from the use of violence because they have realised that it is within 
their self-interest. They are still governed by their passions, no matter how 
capable they were in using their understanding. Hence, there has been a 
change concerning the operation of their passions. The reason why men do 
not fight is that they are moved by another passion that is able to overcome 
the instinct of sovereignty directing their self-love.  
 The people using foul language are called ‘half-civilised’ because they are 
expressing their antagonism even if this is solely done through words. A 
fully civilised man never vents his anger because he feels that his self-liking 
is superior to his self-love. If he emits his natural passion (anger), this would 
lessen his self-liking since his audience would find this unpleasant. In this 
light, it is comprehensible that Cleomenes maintains that politeness ‘in its 
original’  was  ‘a  plain  shift  to  avoid  fighting,  and  the  ill  consequences  of  
it’.183  
 All  men  born  in  a  society  start  to  cultivate  self-liking.  As  we  recall,  
Mandeville describes that this passion had two vital components. Men 
involuntarily value themselves above their real worth. Nevertheless, they 
have some sort of a notion of the fact that they do actually misjudge their 
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value and this makes them very fond of the audience’s approval.184 The best 
way  to  seek  the  good  opinion  of  others  is  by  mutual  discretions.  Since  
everyone thinks, in a way or another,  too highly of themselves,  we are not 
to  reveal  this  passion  in  public.  Only  then  there  is  enough  room  for  
everyone  to  look  for  different  ways  to  cultivate  the  notions  of  their  own  
worth. In short, Mandeville fully endorses the long established tradition of 
renaissance court civility.185 In  his  second  attempt  to  theorise  about  civil  
society, the advancement of politeness is presented to be equivalent to the 
development of civil society.  
 Mandeville  portrays  politeness  as  a  refining  circle.  According  to  
Cleomenes, ‘life is one continued scene of hypocrisy!’186 There  is  nothing  
inappropriate in this. ‘The true object of pride or vain-glory’ is ‘the opinion 
of others’.187 This is highly beneficial to society, since the ‘more pride’ men 
‘have and the greater value they set on the esteem of others, the more they’ll 
make it their study, to render themselves acceptable to all they converse 
with’.188 If  a  man  stops  adorning  himself,  the  effects  are  drastic  to  the  
person itself and to society. The more dependent men become on their self-
liking and the opinion of others, the further they drift away from the need 
to vent their anger.  At the same time, self-liking and politeness are rooted 
even deeper in the society. ‘The doctrine of good manners’ is described to 
teach ‘a thousand lessons against the various appearances and outward 
symptoms  of  pride’,  but  it  has  nothing  against  passion  itself.189 True 
gentlemen go to the lengths of taking ‘uncommon pains to conceal and 
stifle in their bosoms every thing, which their good sense tells them ought 
not to be seen or understood’.190 Thus, they try to give the impression that 
their artificial way of behaving is actually natural. The manners have to 
seem genuine. Simultaneously, ‘when men are well-accomplished, they are’ 
in  fact  ‘ashamed  of  the  lowest  steps,  from  which  they  rose  to  that  
perfection’. Hence, ‘the more civilized they are, the more they think it 
injurious, to have their nature seen, without the improvements that have 
been made upon it’.191 Some of the courtiers were even able to deceive 
themselves and to believe that their mannerly tricks epitomise their 
sincerely refined nature.  
 Mandeville emphasises that a man ‘naturally loves to imitate what he 
sees others do’.192 Human understanding has little to do with the civilizing 
process. Most importantly, ‘experience and imitation’ teach men ‘to act as 
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they do’.193 ‘Beau monde’ functions ‘in all countries’ as ‘the undoubted 
refiners of language’ and most parts of society try to imitate their example 
the best they can.194 The emphasis should lie on ‘most parts of the society’ 
because self-liking could easily operate in other ways as well. ‘Some men’ 
might ‘indulge their pride in being shameless’.195 According to Cleomenes, it 
is  self-evident  that  the  ‘man  of  honour  and  one  that  has  none,’  both  act  
‘from  the  same  principle’.  At  the  same  time,  the  role  of  education  and  
government turns out to be highly crucial in civil society. ‘There is nothing 
that some men may not be taught to be ashamed of. The same passion, that 
makes the well-bred man and prudent officer value and secretly admire 
themselves for the honour and fidelity they display, may make the rake and 
scoundrel brag of their vices and boast of their impudence’.196  
 Living in a society simply renders men depended upon it. When even 
the  rogues  are  motivated  through pride,  it  is  fundamental  for  a  society  to  
diminish its outward expressions. Politeness is an important custom that 
teaches men to ‘play’ pride ‘against itself’. As Cleomenes proposes, men 
have  to  be  ‘allowed to  change  the  natural  home-bred  symptoms’  of  pride,  
‘for artificial foreign ones’.197 When  all  the  possible  efforts  are  taken  
regarding dress and appearance, the gentlefolk are also distanced from the 
natural expressions of self-love. This does not mean that men are not 
affected by hunger or lust. They continuously use their understanding and 
look  for  different  ways  how  to  please  themselves  and  make  their  lives  
easy.198 But when people try to artificially appear pleasing in commerce to 
others, society is able to function. The question Mandeville tries to answer 
is how a society may realistically operate and not what an imaginary society 
founded on something else than human nature might look like. 
 It  is an undeniable truth, according to Cleomenes, ‘that the valour and 
steadiness  of  men  of  honour  are  the  grand  support  of  all  states  and  
kingdoms’.  It  is  just  ‘as  unquestionable’  that  ‘not  only  the  peace  and  
tranquillity, and all the blessings we enjoy, but likewise the king’s crown and 
safety would be precarious without’ men of honour.199 Thus, ‘all wise 
princes,  magistrates  and  governours’  will  ‘take  all  the  imaginable  care’  to  
‘cultivate  and  encourage  the  most  noble  principle  of  honour’  and  ‘to  
encrease the numbers of the worthy professors of it, by favouring and on all 
occasions  shewing  them  the  most  tender  affection,  as  well  as  highest  
esteem’.200 Honour  is  the  key  principle  that  underlies  courtly  society,  as  
Markku Peltonen has recently shown.201 The instinct of sovereignty would 
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never vanish from the civil society, but it could be redirected and managed 
by artful government and principles, which might not be virtuous, but are in 
reality beneficial to the society. 
 Alongside duelling, the custom of gallantry was often criticised as 
immoral in early-modern Britain. In fact, sometimes gallantry and adultery 
are taken as synonyms.202 The anonymous author of Essay upon modern 
gallantry starts the tract by stating that there cannot ‘be a stronger proof of 
the degeneracy of this age, than the state of modern gallantry’, which 
according to the writer is ‘a total dissolution of manners, attended with the 
basest and most dishonourable practises’.203 The  given  definition  of  
gallantry remarks that ‘the modern sense of that word, is to be understood, 
a constant application to the good works of adultery and fornication’.204 
This  new  custom  is  not  exclusively  to  be  blamed.  The  ‘modern  authors’  
have  furnished  the  fops  ‘with  excellent  arguments’,  which  ‘certain  late  
assemblies’ have given ‘proper opportunities to inforce’. As the author 
rather bluntly puts it, ‘the sole business of all our late diversions, the whole 
tune of most modern books, and the subject of polite conversation seems 
calculated for this end’.205 In short, the essay is directed to tackle the 
arguments  that  justify  adultery  by  promoting  modern  gallantry,  ‘the  
introduction  of  foreign  customs,  and  the  influence  of  too  general  an  
example’.206 
 In  contrast,  gallantry  is  praised  by  some  authors  for  providing  a  
considerable refinement on manners, since gentlemen have to go to the 
extremes in their courtesies to please the ladies. Some think that gallantry, 
along with honour, is a constituent of politeness.  As I have tried to show, 
when considering the natural appetite of lust in The Fable of the Bees, 
Mandeville’s remarks were contradictory. He attempted to justify a notion 
derived from the tradition of court civility claiming that lust has to be 
concealed in modern society. But because the foundation of his project was 
the hobbist idea of self-preservation, he came to insist that women have to 
keep their natural passions at awe and try to curb lust by all means. It had 
not  yet  occured  to  him  that  women  might  be  proud  not  to  indulge  their  
natural appetites. In Part II, Cleomenes solves these problems by construing 
an original theory about civility. Mandeville is finally able to fully endorse 
the arguments set forth by the renaissance tradition of courtesy. 
 In his ‘Preface’ to Part II,  Mandeville alludes that the arguments about 
to take place are in agreement with the principles of civility described by the 
                                                        
202 For a recent study of this topic, see Davidson, Hypocrisy and the politics of politeness, 
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‘court-philosophers’. Mandeville had corrected his account and was able to 
accentuate  that  ‘a  civil  behaviour  among  the  fair  in  publick,  and  a  
deportment, inoffensive both in words and actions, is all the chastity, the 
polite world requires in men’.207 In  the  first  part  of  The Fable, Mandeville 
had  tried  to  justify  the  point  he  was  about  to  make.  A  gentleman’s  
‘reputation’ would never suffer, regardless of what ‘liberties’ he granted 
‘himself in private’, as long as ‘nothing criminal can ever be proved upon 
him’.208 Nevertheless, he had previously failed to connect these notions 
with the theory of civility that he was promoting.  
 The  theoretical  issue  at  hand,  the  ‘too  general  an  example’,  is  how  to  
behave in the presence of women in general. The translator of François 
Bruys’ The  art  of  knowing  women notes  that  ‘the  French’  have  ‘made  the  
knowledge of women an art’.209 ‘Vanity’ is the ‘distinguishing characteristic’ 
of women210, causing the distressing fact that all the real ‘principles are in a 
state of corruption’.211 According to Bruys, ‘flattery’, incompatible with 
truth, ‘nourishes the vanity of women’.212 In consequence, ‘the best of 
people are dupes and slaves to their pride and vanity’.213 But when reflecting 
on infidelity in a section entitled ‘Dissertation concerning adultery’ Bruys’ 
surprisingly drops his moral criticism and notes that ‘since custom will have 
it  so, should I pretend to moralise upon it,  I  might only be laughed at for 
my pains’.214 Whether pejoratively or not, Bruys concludes that ‘there is no 
quality  more  necessary  in  a  husband,  than  an  entire  indifference  as  to  his  
wife’s behaviour’.215 
 According to Mandeville, adultery is a common and somewhat harmless 
practise  if  it  is  kept  a  secret.  When  Horatio  tries  to  pursue  the  rationalist  
point that the ‘end of love, between the different sexes, in all animals, is the 
preservation of their species’, Cleomenes retorts with a grim remark. If one 
takes a glimpse at a savage, one would realise that ‘he propagates, before he 
knows  the  consequences  of  it’.  Not  even  the  ‘most  civilised  pair,  in  the  
most chaste of their embraces, ever act from the care of their species, as a 
real principle’.216 Nevertheless, a civilised person is not forlornly besieged 
with his natural appetites. His vanity dictates his actions. Natural appetites 
are of course present and difficult to overcome. Lust has to be concealed. 
‘Pride’ produces ‘the honour in women’, which has ‘no other object than 
their chastity’. Hence, the gallantry shown to the ladies has to be as discrete 
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and  refined  as  possible.  Women  always  have  to  look  like  they  have  kept  
their ‘jewel entire’.  In this manner they will  ‘apprehend no shame’.  If they 
have  ‘sinned in  private’  they  will  do  whatever  it  takes  ‘to  hide’  this  frailty  
‘from the world’.217 The actual practise of adultery never sees daylight. 
Simultaneously, the manners are refined. 
 When adultery is considered a part of the institution of politeness and 
under social control, it is viewed in a different light than what the Christian 
perspective provided. In Mandeville’s conjectural history a pivotal role is 
given to the idea that the instinct of sovereignty may be redirected in ways 
that eventually benefit society. In any case, the custom of gallantry, at least 
in theory, seldom results in actual adultery, since the proudest women are as 
cautious as possible regarding their chastity. Thus, truly civilised women are 
too vain to indulge their natural appetites even if they have an opportunity 
for getting away with their crime. 
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PART II: 
DAVID HUME 
AND GREATNESS OF MIND 
‘As the mutual shocks, in society, and the oppositions of interest and self-
love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice; in order to 
preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like 
manner, the eternal contrarieties, in company, of men’s pride and self-
conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD MANNERS or 
POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an 
undisturbed commerce and conversation.’ 
 
– David Hume, Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, 1751 
 
  
4. Portrait of a gentleman 
The purpose of the second half of this dissertation is to explain how 
Hume’s conception of greatness of mind is linked to the idea of self-liking, 
which Hume introduced in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals as  ‘the  
sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review 
of  man’s  own  conduct  and  character’  which  is  ‘the  most  common  of  all  
others’, yet it ‘has no proper name in our language’. 1 As we recall, in his 
Origin of honour, Mandeville discussed ‘Means which Men by Conversing 
together have found out to please and gratify one another on Account of a 
palpable Passion in our Nature, that has no Name, and which therefore I 
call self-liking’.2 Also on another occasion Mandeville emphasised that 
when this passion is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men act 
‘from that and from no other principle’.3 When Hume’s own definition of 
this  passion  that  has  no  name  is  compared  to  Mandeville’s,  it  is  beyond  
doubt that Hume had Mandeville’s later works in mind when structuring 
the social theory of his Treatise. 
 Allan Ramsay jr. painted his first portrait of David Hume in 1754. This 
portrait  is  not  as  famous  as  Ramsay’s  later  twin  study  of  Hume  and  
Rousseau that carries an obvious load of political and intellectual weight.4 
Although  Ramsay’s  friendship  with  Hume  and  his  later  portrait  have  
gathered justifiable attention, little has been written on the earlier portrait 
aside from the fairly straightforward discussion on it by Alastair Smart in 
                                                        
1 EPM Appendix 4.3; SBN 314. In the footnote Hume added: ‘the term, pride, is 
commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either 
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circumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by the term, amour 
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2 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 14. 
3 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 3. 
4 For a recent, compelling account of the “twin-study” (and for a critical discussion 
of previous scholarship on it), see Douglas Fordham, ‘Allan Ramsay's enlightenment: or, 
Hume and the patronizing portrait’, Art Bulletin, 88, 2006, pp. 508–524. For a clear and 
on the point account of the conflict between Hume and Rousseau, see Dena Goodman, 
‘The Hume-Rousseau affair: from private querelle to public process’, Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 25, 1991-2, pp. 171–201. 
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his monographs and catalogue relating to Allan Ramsay.5 However,  this  
early portrait is a document revealing something of Hume’s philosophical 
position. 
 The  painting  features  a  healthy  looking  Hume,  who  had  just  finished  
publishing his Political Discourses and the first part of History, gazing past the 
spectator.  The  portrait  was  painted  right  after  Hume  had,  for  the  second  
and last time in 1751-2, tried and ‘failed to get professorships at Scotland’s 
leading universities’.6 When Hume sat for Ramsay, it was clear that he was 
never to advance an academic career. The few remarks in secondary 
literature on the painting assume a scholarly nature of the setting, which in 
fact is not apparent. Any reference to the cap that Hume is wearing being a 
“scholar’s cap” or that the image of Hume would somehow represent his 
scholarly character are simply false. On the surface, there is nothing in the 
painting that distinguishes Hume from any other fashionable person of the 
time (regardless whether it was a man of learning or not). 
 Hume’s clothing is however significantly symbolic. The turban-like cap 
is  an  important  part  of  Hume’s  outfit.  The  clothing  is  an  example  of  the  
East Indian fashion, increasingly popular among the up-to-date Europeans 
and peaking in the 1770s. The portrait surfaces Hume’s lifelong desire to be 
looked  upon  as  a  fashionable  man.  Hume  was  dressed  à la mode already 
when he came back from France. Miss Elizabeth Mure in her ‘Remarks on 
the  change  of  manners  in  Scotland  during  the  18th century’ recalls Hume 
returning to Britain in the late 1730s with his French cut jackets.7 
Elizabeth’s father, Hume’s dear friend Baron Mure,8 was himself very much 
in  favour  of  the  French  style  of  education  and  later  Hume  himself  took  
much care of the education of his own nephew, as well as the Baron Mure’s 
children.9  
 As  such,  the  1754  painting  could  be  taken  to  have  no hidden agenda.  
From a perspective of an innocent eighteenth-century Parisian spectator, 
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correspondence. Smart is Ramsay’s biographer. For a summary of Smart’s works on 
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7 Elizabeth Mure, ‘Some remarks on the change of manners in my own time. 1700–
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friends.’ Mure, Caldewell papers, Glasgow, 1854, I, part II, p. 28. 
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for example, the turban-like cap simply replaces a wig protecting Hume’s 
shaved head.  But  the  painting  features  a  man who often  masked his  own 
opinions even in his philosophical works and the painter of the portrait was 
his cheeky friend.10 There is something concealed behind Hume’s muted 
smile and his Oriental style clothing did also function at different levels. 
What was innocuous in Paris carried a different meaning in the Highlands. 
Hume’s outfit was first of all, a message to all the authors who condemned 
luxury and its eastern origins. In Hume’s case, wrapping oneself (literally) in 
Ottoman clothing when the East Indian fashion had only started to become 
popular in Europe in the 1750s was not a religiously neutral message either.  
 Even when Hume’s position in the luxury debate is obvious and his 
general attitude towards the clergy outright provocative, there is a more 
nuanced and perhaps more interesting message that the painting set 
forward. Ramsay cropped Hume’s lower body and the bulk of his arms 
from the painting so that the focus is on Hume’s chest. Hume’s head is 
slightly turned and he is looking past the viewer, which is common in 
Ramsay’s  portraits.  But  what  is  unconventional  in  this  type  of  setting  in  a  
male portrait is that Hume’s shoulders are geometrically lined in front of the 
viewer so that the viewer’s eyes are immediately clasped to his chest.11 The 
main effect of the painting is the dualism that the resonance between 
Hume’s caftan-like, plain coat and the underlying lavishly decorated silk 
shirt implies. Symbolically this presentation of Hume’s chest is the dualism 
between a man’s outer and inner parts and the painting can be seen to mark 
a redefinition of the concept of greatness of mind (from a more cynical 
perspective one might also add that these artistic choices make Hume look 
less plump). 
 On the  surface,  this  part  of  the  outfit,  of  course,  also  functions  as  an  
epitome of a very distinctive feature of Ottoman dress: the idea of layering. 
                                                        
10 About Ramsay’s “cheekiness” one can read his letters. For example, notice the 
excessive irony in a letter from Allan Ramsay to David Hume on 13 March 1756, NLS, 
MS. 23156. Ramsay’s stand on luxury was blunt: ‘Can a Man, a Philosopher, be both 
sorry and glad at the same time? If the thing is possible, I am in those circumstances. For 
I  am glad  to  hear  that  there  is  any  society  of  men  amongst  you  who  have  a  particular  
attention to the improvement of the arts of Luxury, so conducive to the riches, the 
strength and liberty of our dear Country; but am afraid at the same time that this Scheme, 
by bringing in a new set of Members of another Species, will destroy that which we had 
set on foot’. Also, Ramsay commends Hume’s extremely negative description of 
Shakespeare – especially, when Ramsay himself had advised Hume regarding it: ‘The 
Character of Shakespeare, which, as it stood in the Manuscript was subject to much 
exception, has now become one of the shining parts of the work, by the means of the 
two paragraphs which you have since inserted for its introduction; and looking upon 
them as the consequence of my advice, I felt as much vanity in reading them as if I had 
been their Writer.’ 
11 Out of the 87 portraits associated with Ramsay and viewable in the National 
Gallery’s website, most male portraits follow a similar pattern in which, if the head is 
turned and the eyes are not directed at the viewer, the position of the body is similarly 
aligned. 
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Ramsay did not paint Hume’s sleeves, but the neck and the open front of 
the  coat  give  us  a  glimpse  of  the  sumptuous  underlying  garment.  At  the  
same  time,  the  portrait  also  paints  a  picture  with  a  more  subtle  meaning  
about greatness of mind. It is the outer garment, the plain-buttoned caftan, 
which barely covers, but yet smooths out the lavish silk decorations 
underneath, that dominates the portrait. The caftan is like politeness 
topping and covering man’s pride, which is one principle of a broader 
concept of greatness of mind that Hume studied in all of his published and 
unpublished works from pre-Treatise times onwards, as we will soon learn.  
 The color of the caftan is equally important. The thick and heavy 
garment of the coat is red. An eighteenth-century dictionary defined 
‘Gules’, derived from Persian origin, as ‘Red, or Vermilion Colour, which 
signifies greatness of Mind, Courage, Generosity, &c.’.12 When  we  
understand that the concept of greatness of mind is the lynchpin of Hume’s 
moral and political philosophy, we start to pay more attention to these 
details. In short, one way to look at it is that Allan Ramsay jr. painted David 
Hume in 1754 to embody greatness of mind, which was a key concept for 
David Hume the philosopher.  
Greatness of mind, David Hume and previous scholarship 
Greatness of mind has gathered some attention in Hume scholarship.13 
Amongst the more recent works, Katie Abramson’s idea is that greatness of 
mind is the ‘all-important link between Hume’s view about moral evaluation 
and the questions about moral motivation’.14 She perceptively identifies 
some of the problems of the standard interpretations of greatness of mind, 
but then attempts to change greatness of mind into strength of mind 
missing the point about self-liking, self-conceit and pride in accordance to 
Hume’s redefinition of greatness of mind and its context. As Abramson 
points  out,  the  section  entitled  ‘Of  greatness  of  mind’  of  the  Treatise is 
‘commonly read as a mere illustration of the principles of Humean moral 
                                                        
12 Edward Phillips, New world of words: or, universal English dictionary,  6th ed, London, 
1706, entry for “Gules”. 
13 Some recent work on Hume concentrating on greatness of mind include: Marie A. 
Martin, ‘Hume on human excellence’, Hume Studies, 18, 1992, pp. 383–400, whose 
interpretation of Hume as a virtue ethicist stands in contrast with what I will be putting 
forward in this thesis. Graham Solomon offers a rather plain and conventional reading of 
the subject  in his  ‘Hume on “Greatness of  soul”’,  Hume Studies, 26, 2000, pp. 129–142. 
Also Donald Livingston in Philosophical melancholy and delirium: Hume’s pathology of philosophy, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998 gives central position to greatness of mind. About 
Greatness of mind, see also Donald T. Siebert, The moral animus of David Hume, University 
of Delaware Press, 1990, Chapter “In search of the hero of feeling”. Another recent 
article on greatness of mind is Andrew Sabl, ‘Noble infirmity. love of fame in Hume’, 
Political Theory, 34, 2006, pp. 542–568.  
14 Katie Abramson, ‘Two portraits of the Humean moral agent’, Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 83, 2002, p. 305. Abramson does not discuss actual portraits in her article. 
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evaluation’. 15 As  I  will  try  to  demonstrate,  much  more  was  at  stake.  My  
purpose  is  to  make  a  comprehensive  and detailed  analysis  of  greatness  of  
mind as a general concept that offers us a more thorough understanding of 
David Hume’s moral and political philosophy. 
 Greatness of mind in scholarship is generally a vague concept – often 
used, but seldom defined. A general image of it is the idea of magnanimity 
or greatness of soul along Aristotelian lines. Even when Aristotle has much 
to  say  about  human  excellence,  I  think  we  are  better  off  reading  Hume  
without tying him too closely to the relevant passages of the Nichomachean 
Ethics.  My  reading  of  greatness  of  mind  and  other  aspects  of  Hume’s  
thinking stands in contrast, for example, with a common view expressed by 
one commentator, who emphatically writes that ‘Hume is a virtue ethicist, 
albeit one in modern dress, who, poised between the ancients and moderns, 
self-consciously chose to align himself with the ancient tradition, asserting 
its superiority over the modern’.16 What I will be arguing is that Hume did 
in fact the exact opposite and self-consciously presented a view that stood 
in contrast with what we understand as the ancient tradition.  
 Abramson  reads  Hume’s  account  of  greatness  of  mind  in  accordance  
with Aristotle’s conception of megalopsuchia and Cicero’s vision of magnitudo 
animi.17 What I will be arguing is that we should make a distinction between 
the Aristotelian understanding of magnanimity and the Ciceronian 
understanding  of  greatness  of  mind.  My  emphasis  will  be  on  the  role  of  
Cicero for early modern conception of greatness of mind. I will argue that 
particularly the Ciceronian line functions as a counterpart for David 
Hume’s redefinition of the concept, which he intentionally formed to 
counter  this  tradition  along  the  example  set  by  Bernard  Mandeville.  I  also  
believe that at the level of personal history, we should link Hume’s crisis at 
the end of the 1720s directly to this struggle over the idea of greatness of 
mind. Hume did indeed realise the importance of greatness of mind while 
reading the classical sources and modern spins of the Ciceronian greatness 
of mind. However, the intellectual and physical crisis changed Hume’s 
perception of the world and led (in accordance with other sceptical 
leanings) to the redefinition of greatness of mind – literally embodied in the 
Dialogue and symbolically in the 1754 portrait of David Hume himself.  
 The general tendency of modelling Hume into a virtue ethicist in line 
with the ancient tradition leads to further misconception. Modern scholars 
are ‘increasingly convinced that Hume’s Treatise was,  in  part,  a  normative  
project’.18 Katie Abramson also reads Book 3 of the Treatise as a normative 
                                                        
15 Abramson, ‘Two portraits’, 2002, p. 305. e.g. Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, pp. 
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dominate the rest of Book III’, Abramson, ‘Two portraits’, 2002, p. 305. 
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undertaking. What I will try to show is that in order to understand the ‘Of 
Morals’ –part of the Treatise,  we should not read it  as a normative project.  
On  the  contrary,  we  need  to  read  it  as  a  descriptive  account  of  human  
nature and conjectural development of moral principles and civil society. 
This  misconstruction  also  leads  Abramson to  make  a  case  of  greatness  of  
mind as a general disposition with a strong link to strength of mind and a 
vague idea of goodness, which I believe is wrong.19 By and large, the recent 
fixation upon Hume’s supposed normative project ends in an attempt to 
turn greatness of mind into an all-encompassing meta-virtue, incorporating 
all the possible attributes and sub-virtues into strength of mind.  
 Another common feature of Hume scholarship is to somehow reject the 
warlike connotations of greatness of mind and pride. This can be 
accomplished, for example, by putting a strong emphasis on the point that 
Hume ‘would  never  agree  that  greatness  of  soul  arises  only  from pride  in  
one’s military courage and heroism’.20 It seems that to underline any warlike 
features  of  greatness  of  mind  would  somehow  be  unworthy  of  a  
philosopher of Hume’s stratum. Perhaps, this is also the reason why the 
fact that Hume had a military career (he was a secretary to General St Clair, 
wore  the  uniform  of  an  officer,  and  accompanied  the  general  on  an  
expedition in 1745) is often ignored in the history of philosophy. Andrew 
Sabl, for example, underestimates the serious implication that military 
heroism actually plays in Hume’s works. Sabl, instead, emphasises the 
Ciceronian motivation for public service.21 Even when there are certain 
ironic tendencies in Hume’s treatment of greatness of mind with regard to 
the stock example of Alexander the Great, it was in fact crucial for Hume’s 
moral and political philosophy that the concept of greatness of mind 
retained its warlike connotations. This does not exclude the fact that the 
role of humanity becomes increasingly important in Enquiry concerning the 
principles of morals,  as  I  will  try  to  show  towards  the  end  of  my  study,  but  
humanity cannot be realised without enabling courage to flourish in some 
artificial manner. This is why pride and its link to military courage and 
heroism is something that Hume would embellish and not ignore. Pride and 
warlike courage formed one of the main arguments in Hume’s case against 
the Christian and republican authors who used Cicero’s conception of 
greatness of mind as the basis of their moral and political philosophy. 
Cicero and the disposition to be great 
What is greatness of mind? A general preliminary remark that we can make 
before studying the different uses of this difficult concept, is that greatness 
of mind generally implies a disposition. Greatness of mind is not a duty. It 
is  not  a  virtue  as  such.  And  as  a  concept  it  is  much  broader  than  for  
                                                        
19 Abramson, ‘Two portraits’, 2002, p. 310–313. 
20 Solomon, ‘Hume on “Greatness of soul”’, 2000, p. 130. 
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example courage (being courageous is usually seen as part of having 
greatness of mind).  In short,  greatness of mind is a disposition to act in a 
certain manner, which naturally makes it difficult to pin down. For the 
history of early modern political thought, the most important classical 
source using it as a disposition was Cicero’s De Officiis.22 Especially  in  the  
third  book of  the  Offices,  Cicero  gives  us  a  definition  that  set  the  standard  
for magnanimity and greatness of soul for centuries to come. I will consider 
Cicero’s the Offices in more detail shortly. Regarding the early modern 
examples implying that greatness of mind is a disposition, I would like to 
only mention Pierre Charron at this point, who in his important early 
sixteenth-century book Of wisdom defined ‘Greatness of Mind’ as a ‘universal 
Temper’.23 A somewhat virtue-oriented compiler of the Gentleman’s library 
on  his  behalf  reminded  his  readers  that  it  is  the  ‘Honesty of Disposition, 
which always argues true Greatness of Mind’.24 This use of greatness of mind 
as a disposition has been noticed in Hume scholarship. One commentator 
has eloquently stated that ‘Greatness of mind is not a particular virtue, but a 
category of what Hume refers to as the “heroic” virtues’.25  
 Greatness of mind was also a disposition that the authors of contested 
perspectives  would  praise.  Rochefoucauld  had  a  maxim  claiming  that  
‘Greatness  of  Mind  sets  off  Merit, as good dressing does handsome 
Persons’.26 Spectator wrote that greatness of mind ‘attracts the Admiration 
and Esteem of all who behold it’.27 Nevertheless, we will shortly learn that 
while its amiability and dispositional quality were commonly acknowledged 
attributes,  the  actual  implication  of  greatness  of  mind  turned  out  to  be  a  
contested issue. My purpose is not to make a definitive analysis of Cicero’s 
use of magnanimity or greatness of mind as such (especially when I will be 
attempting  to  show  that  Hume’s  use  of  greatness  of  mind  implies  a  view  
strongly emphasising that this disposition of mind did not exist in Cicero’s 
time). Nevertheless it is useful for us to start our discussion with the Offices. 
Cicero, and particularly his Offices, has  proved  to  be  a  fertile  source  of  
                                                        
22 It goes without saying that magnanimity was a concept discussed by all the classical 
authors from Aristotle onwards. However, for the points that I am about to make 
regarding Hume, we ought to concentrate on Cicero. One could of course make a 
different choice as well. For example, Solomon, ‘Hume on “Greatness of soul”’, 2000, p. 
129 takes Aristotle’s views on “great-souled man” as the starting point of his treatment of 
greatness of mind in Hume. I obviously disagree and claim that in order to understand 
Hume’s redefinition of greatness of mind we need to see how it stands in contrast with 
the Ciceronian tradition of greatness of mind, instead of the Aristotelian use of the 
concept. These “traditions” and different uses naturally coincide, but I still think that 
there is a crucial point in reading them in this contextual sense. 
23 Pierre Charron, Of wisdom, 2nd ed, 2 vols., London, 1707, II, p. 185 (first published 
in French in 1601). 
24 Gentleman, Gentleman’s library, London, 1715, p. 205. 
25 Martin, ‘Hume on human excellence’, 1992, p. 385. 
26 François duc de La Rochefoucauld, Moral maxims and reflections,  2nd ed, London, 
1706, p. 72 maxim CCCC (first published in French in 1665). 
27 The Spectator. Vol. 8, 2nd ed., London, 1717, p. 190. 
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different interpretations of human nature. The variety of reading the 
influence  of  Cicero  ranges  from  the  typical  Stoic  perspective  to  a  more  
sceptical  way  of  looking  at  Cicero’s  influence  that  might  even  befit  David  
Hume.28  
 In the Offices, the basic framework of a man is relatively simple.29 There 
are certain qualities that are common to all living creatures and others that 
set  a  man apart  from the  rest  of  the  animals.  In  the  Offices Cicero stresses 
that ‘All Living Creatures’, including men, ‘are Originally mov’d by a 
Natural Instinct, toward the means of Self-preservation’. This instinct, not only 
of self-preservation – but also the instinct of what man interprets as means 
of  self-preservation,  leaving  room  for  miss-attributions  of  what  self-
preservation actually implies – extends from ‘the Defence of their Lives, and 
Bodies; the Avoidance of things hurtful to them; the search, and provision of all  
Necessaries for Life’ to ‘The Appetite to Propagating and Continuing their 
Kind’ in accordance with ‘a certain Care, and Tenderness for their Issue’.30 
While this broad understanding of self-preservation is presented as the first 
clause for a living creature, what sets a man apart from animals for Cicero is 
the human bid for glory. In fact,  this quest for glory is the cornerstone of 
Cicero’s  thinking.  ‘Where  is  the  Man’,  Cicero  ponders,  ‘who  after  all  his  
hazards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect Glory,  as a reward of his 
Adventures?’31 Cicero not only emphasises that all men desire glory, but he 
also uses greatness of mind in a sense that there really is true glory and all  
the  hazards  and  travels  could  not  have  been  undertaken  in  vain.  The  
contrast, for example, with Hobbes’s later definition of glory as joy of being 
foremost in comparison to others (or, plainly put, power) is palpable.32 This 
in turn gives Cicero a foundation to base his psychological principles on the 
high-minded idea of human dignity.  
                                                        
28 For Hume and Cicero, see James Moore, ‘Utility and humanity: the quest for the 
Honestum in Cicero, Hutcheson, and Hume’, Utilitas, 14, 2002, pp. 365–387 and Peter 
Jones, Hume’s sentiments: their Ciceronian and French context, Edinburgh University Press, 
1982. 
29 For this brief recap of the Ciceronian principles I have used the L’Estrange 
translation (Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tully’s offices, in three books. Translated into English, By 
Sir R. L’Estrange. The sixth edition, revised throughout, and carefully corrected 
according to the Latin original, London, 1720) instead of the Cockman edition (Cicero, 
Marcus Tullius, Tully’s offices, in English. The third edition, revised and corrected. By Mr. 
Tho. Cockman, London, 1714) because of the familiar booksellers involved in the 
L’Estrange edition (Tonson, Knaplock, Strahan, Ballard, Mears). The assumption being, 
that this connection to Mandeville (and Hume) might take us indirectly closer to these 
philosophers. 
30 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, pp. 7–8. 
31 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, p. 39. 
32 For Hobbes’s notion of glory, see Gabriella Slomp, ‘Hobbes on glory and civil 
strife’, in The Cambridge companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, Patricia Springborg, ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, pp. 181–199 and especially Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the political 
philosophy of glory, London: Macmillan/New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000. 
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 The centre of Cicero’s understanding of dignity,  which in short means 
the  extent  of  the  range  of  actions  that  are  worthwhile  for  a  man  to  
undertake, is indeed this ‘Noble, and Exalted Mind’.33 This implies ‘a Mind 
advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things’.  The image of 
an elevated hero looking down on fortune is the cornerstone of Ciceronian 
dignity.  The  idea  of  movement  (or  progress  that  the  mind  makes)  is  also  
important. For Cicero greatness of mind is a disposition founded on the 
idea  that  true  ‘Virtue’  is  ‘to  be  reputed  the  most  Glorious’.  Greatness  of  
mind is this exalted disposition ‘from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow’.34 
In  other  words,  Cicero  gives  a  man  a  natural  sense  of  autonomy  and  the  
ability  of  self-rule  due  to  our  greatness  of  mind.  It  facilitates  our  reading  
that Cicero underlines that in the end there are in effect two central qualities 
that  characterise  greatness  as  ‘a  Disposition  of  Mind’.  The  first  one  is  a  
peculiar  ‘despise’  for  ‘outward things’  and,  the  second  quality  is  that  a  man  
only ‘attempts things Great, and mighty Profitable;  but  withal,  very  difficult, 
laborious, and dangerous’.35 These two aspects will naturally produce glory.  
 Now, all of these three attributes (contempt of unimportant things, 
attempt of great things and glory that naturally follows) imply that there 
really is something identical to true virtue and real glory. Achieving true 
greatness will naturally render us powerful also in comparison to others 
who are less fortunate in their actions. However, it is the glory and virtue per 
se that we seek when setting off to our journeys. Hence, power does not 
seem to motivate a Ciceronian man. For Cicero, magnanimity is the 
disposition to act according to the dictates of an elevated mind. This, 
however, leaves many doors open and as we will see, each door could serve 
a different purpose for later commentators. From a more sceptical 
perspective, for example, we may point out that this idea of dignity is fully 
based on the openly vindicated pride – and this, indeed, is what David 
Hume with his redefinition of greatness of mind sought to overcome.36  
                                                        
33 Cicero’s thinking can be described as actor-oriented. 
34 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, p. 36. 
35 Cicero, Offices, (Sir R. L’Estrange), 1720, p. 39. The Cockman translation is perhaps 
even more expressive in this passage than the L’Estrange translation on the point of 
Ciceronian “true magnanimity”: true Greatness of Soul’  is  ‘an Enemy to Covetousness, to the 
Desire of Applause, and of Power’.  It  ‘produces a calm and unpassionate Mind’. Significantly, ‘all 
true Courage and Greatness of Mind’ is first of all ‘a generous Contempt or Disregard of 
all outward Goods, proceeding from an Opinion, That ’tis unworthy of a Man to admire, 
or wish for, or endeavour after any thing, unless it be that which is Honest and 
Becoming’. Cicero, Offices, (Thomas Cockman), 1714, p. 47. 
36 I take it that this Ciceronian point of view that Hume is set out to counter differs 
from the Aristotelian account of dignity as human flourishing. One could see that one 
line of the Aristotelian account of magnanimity comes quite close to Mandeville and 
Hume regarding the centrality of pride. Nevertheless, it is different in other crucial 
respects and I will not engage in this issue here any further. 
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Christian greatness 
Two Ciceronian qualities, the neglect of everything below and the elevation 
towards  the  truly  honourable,  remained  as  the  defining  attributes  of  the  
disposition of greatness of mind throughout centuries. Magnanimity was of 
course one of the scholastic debates and renaissance authors wrote many 
books upon the subject. What we are interested about here however is how 
the discussion had been shaped towards the turn of the eighteenth century. 
While the Ciceronian emphasis on these two different qualities prevailed, it 
gave an incentive Christian authors in particular to bolster their case. 
 What is important in the Ciceronian understanding of dignity and 
excellence is the upward movement, elevation. When we study early 
modern examples of magnanimity, we realise that a familiar feature of them 
is this same emphasis. It was common to link attributes such as ‘Height’ to 
‘Greatness of Mind’.37 A schoolbook entitled An epitome of ethics expounded, 
for example, that it is ‘the praise of Magnanimity, that it does not disquiet the 
Mind with minute or numerous Cares; but rather lifts it up to the Ambition 
of doing great and excellent things, whereof the number can be but small’.38 
The Anglican Edward Stillingfleet in his sermons emphasised another 
aspect  of  this  same  disposition  when  he  wrote  that  ‘Greatness  of  Mind  
raises a man above the need of using little tricks and devices’.39 Meanwhile, 
the Ciceronian aspect of overlooking fortune was retained. 
 A conspicuous contempt for everything beneath us was also directly 
stressed. Another Anglican minister, Richard Fiddes, in his Theologia 
speculativa praised the ‘greatness of mind, which will not suffer a man’ under 
any circumstances ‘to do any thing below the dignity of human nature’. The 
idea of elevation of the mind as dignity is important to Fiddes. ‘To be of a 
degenerate mind’ is described ‘as if gradually converting into some creature 
of another species’.40 To  lose  the  elevation  of  the  mind,  to  seek  things  
below us, not only corrupts, but turns a man into a non-human being. 
Another commentator reminded his readers that he who has ‘greatness of 
mind will think it below him so much as to take notice of every little injury’ 
and it is ‘the property of small and mean wretches to be always retaliating’.41 
Stillingfleet rather eloquently described how ‘Greatness of Mind’ carries ‘a 
Man  on  in  doing  what  becomes  him,  without  being  discouraged  by  the  
Fears  of  what  may  befall  him  in  it’.42 And the grammarian William 
                                                        
37 John Gauden, Several letters between two ladies, London, 1701, p. 10 (first published in 
1656). 
38 Anon., An epitome of ethics or a short account of the moral virtues for the use of schools, 
London, 1723, p. 229. 
39 Edward Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, London, 1707, p. 258 (Stillingfleet died in 1699, 
so the sermons on several occasions were all composed in seventeenth century). 
40 Richard Fiddes, Theologia speculative, 2 vols., London, 1718–20, II, p. 490. 
41 William Willymott, Peculiar use and signification of words in Latin, London, 1704, p. 
463. 
42 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons. 1707, p. 442. 
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Willymott in his Peculiar  use  and  signification  of  words  in  Latin quoted directly 
from the Offices: ‘True Courage and Greatness of Mind is seen in two things: 
the one of which lies in a Contempt of outward Things: the other in performing 
such Actions, as are glorious, and profitable, but withal very full of Labour 
and Difficulty’.43 In the light of the strong emphasis that Cicero himself had 
put on these two attributes of greatness of mind, this might seem an 
obvious path for the early modern commentators to follow. However, what 
is  particularly  important  is  that  it  is  not  only  the  character  of  Cicero  that  
lurks behind the early modern conception of greatness of mind, but that the 
emphasis  on  these  two  particular  points  turned  greatness  of  mind  into  a  
particularly Christian concept. 
 There  is  only  a  short  step  from  the  Ciceronian  idea  of  dignity  to  the  
Christian  idea  of  elevation  of  mind,  which  is  a  concrete  image  of  a  man  
resembling God. At times, even such strong terms as the ‘Spirit of Christian 
Magnanimity’ were applied and this Christian magnanimity was couched 
directly to ‘Cicero’.44 As  it  turns  out,  this  was  a  common  early  modern  
definition of greatness of mind, which also explains why Hume was so 
eager to redefine it with such vigour. Pierre Charron argued that a man who 
has ‘Greatness of Mind’ is ‘a Character so beautiful, that it in some measure 
resembles God himself’.45 According to Richard Fiddes, ‘there is something 
great and noble, and God-like in  Greatness  of  Mind’.  It  is  a  moral  
perfection ‘of the Divine Nature’.46 God had created man in his own image 
and when a man in his earthly struggles manages to keep his dignity, that is 
greatness  of  mind,  there  is  naturally  something  ‘God-like’  in  this.  A  later  
commentator crystallized the idea by claiming that ‘the only true Honour of a 
Christian, is to resemble his Father which is in Heaven. This is the only true 
Greatness of Mind, which ought to distinguish a true Christian’.47 Following 
this same line of thought, another author wrote, it is ‘a Heavenly Institution, 
which teaches such true Greatness of Mind as this’.48 Hence, Richard Steele 
in his aptly entitled The Christian Hero had appropriate justification within 
this tradition when he put it rather bluntly that ‘True greatness of mind is to 
be maintain’d only by Christian Principles’.49 Meanwhile, this obvious 
argument of elevation of mind approaching God also created different 
types of moral images in the early eighteenth-century texts. An anonymous 
author of Christian’s duty, for example, described that ‘it shews greatness of 
mind to be unmoved, and to disdain affronts, and to keep it self serene, and 
clear, like the pure Heavens, when free from Clouds. And become like God 
                                                        
43 Willymott, Peculiar use and signification of words in Latin, 1704, p. 270. 
44 Stillingfleet, Fifty sermons, 1707, p. 443. 
45 Charron, Of wisdom, 1707, II, p. 185. 
46 Richard Fiddes, Practical discourses on several subjects, London, 1712, p. 22. 
47 John Hildrop, Essay on honour, London, 1741, p. 97. 
48 Francis Bragge, Practical discourses upon the parables of our blessed saviour, 2 vols., 
London 1704, II, p. 306 (first published in 1694). 
49 Richard Steele, The Christian Hero, 2nd ed., London, 1701, p. 78. 
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himself’.50 In a somewhat peculiar manner, Christian’s duty combined aspects 
of  Ciceronian  idea  of  greatness  of  mind,  Stoic  clarity  and  basic  Christian  
principles. In his serene moments a man was thought to become (and not 
remain) God-like, which was the same as being clear and free from the 
clouds, as the Stoic ideal dictated. 
 If this link between magnanimity and Christianity seems obvious, the 
other move that had occurred in this tradition that christened the 
Ciceronian  greatness  of  mind  was  of  a  somewhat  more  peculiar  nature,  
namely, it put together benevolence and greatness of mind. It made the 
connection between amiable generosity and greatness of mind seem natural 
when  the  connection  might  not  be  apparent.  To  some  extent,  of  course,  
Cicero’s Offices emphasised the role of generosity in relation to greatness of 
mind. Since part of a man’s dignity was established by overlooking worldly 
things, it was psychologically convenient to be willing to share some of the 
means of self-preservation with the people in need. However, in the 
Christian tradition the idea of generosity was given a new and stricter 
meaning.51 
 Greatness  of  mind  in  the  Christian  context  implies  a  way  in  which  a  
man resembles God. As we have learned, the link was made through the 
elevation of the mind towards God, being like God or becoming God-like. 
This idea of elevation could also be couched directly to Cicero. What was 
the most commonly used attribute of God? His goodness. Therefore, God’s 
goodness was consequently in the Christian tradition linked to greatness of 
mind. What followed for example from Charron’s argument that a man 
‘resembles God’ is that because of greatness of mind a man is also ‘a Copy 
of his Communicative Goodness’.52 This  was  also  the  move  that  Richard  
Fiddes  made  after  defining  greatness  of  mind  as  something  ‘God-like’. 
According  to  Fiddes,  it  was  because  of  this  godliness  that  in  fact  
‘Generosity, or a Disposition to do good, is properly termed Greatness of 
Mind’.53 Naturally, there is no logical or necessary connection between the 
original Ciceronian idea of greatness of mind as elevation of the mind and 
the attribute ‘communicative goodness’ as it was put in Christian terms. But 
once the image of greatness of mind as a man resembling God was added 
to this discussion, it was also easy to make a strong link between the 
Christian ideal of generosity, goodness and clemency to greatness of mind. 
It  is  worthwhile  noting  that  even  Samuel  Pufendorf  linked  the  ‘Vertue  of  
                                                        
50 Anon., Christian’s duty, or divine meditations and essays. London, 1703, p. 303. 
51 About a concept often linked to generosity, gratitude, being a distinctively modern 
concept difficult for Rousseau, which as such did not feature in Cicero or Seneca because 
of their different kind of interest in magnanimity, see Patrick Coleman, ‘Rousseau’s 
quarrel with gratitude’, in Politics and the passions, 1500–1850, Victoria Kahn, Neil 
Saccamano, and Daniela Coli, eds., Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 151. 
52 Charron, Of wisdom, 2nd ed, 1707, II, p. 185. 
53 Fiddes, Practical discourses, 1712, p. 22. 
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Generosity and true Greatness of Mind’ together.54 David  Hume’s  
redefinition of greatness of mind removed all these Christian connotations 
and deliberately burned this straw-like bridge from greatness of mind 
towards  man’s  God-like  goodness.  It  is  of  little  wonder  that  he  was  not  
much appreciated in the Kirk. 
 Following this Christian tradition, Baltasar Gracian in his Compleat 
gentleman claimed that ‘Generosity is inseparable from a Greatness of Soul’ 
and  ‘Christianity  is  the  true  Foundation  of  that  unlimited  Greatness  of  
Mind, which extends it self universally to all Things, and to all Persons’.55 
As  we  see  in  this  example,  the  attribute  of  universality  was  rather  easy  to  
add  to  greatness  of  mind,  since  omnipotent  God  does  not  deal  with  
particulars. When applying a Christian concept of greatness of mind, an 
author had no need to justify a man’s natural benevolence because this was 
granted due to the link between God’s goodness and greatness of mind. It 
was  easy  to  argue  that  we  express  ‘the  greatness  of  our  mind  by  being  
merciful to pardon injuries, by clemency, and slowness to anger’.56 Hence it 
was  only  natural  to  claim  that  in  men  of  real  greatness  ‘the  Greatness  of  
their Mind exempts them from Fear, and makes them least concerned for 
any Accident of their own, yet none condole and sympathise more heartily 
than  they’.  To  put  it  in  short,  ‘the  most  generous  Dispositions’  were  
thought as ‘the most Compassionate’.57  
 In this light we may notice that the definition of civility set forward in 
Antoine de Courtin’s famous Rules of civility, fits well in this Christian 
context. ‘Civility being’, Courtin defines, ‘the effect of Modesty, Modesty of 
Humility,  and  Humility  being  a  true  mark  of  Greatness  of  the Mind, and 
indeed  the  true  Greatness,  it  is  that  which  obliges,  which  gains  upon  the  
Affection, and makes a Man belov’d wherever he comes’.58 What followed 
was  that  attributes  such  as  clemency  started  to  be  linked  to  this  newly  
defined greatness of mind. In his essays, Anstruther wrote that ‘there is 
more Real Courage, Boldness, Magnanimity, Honour, and Greatness of 
Mind, requisite to forgive our Enemies, and be religious in this dissolute 
and Atheistical Age, than to take a fortifyed city, or beat an army’.59 After all 
these steps it  seemed as if  ‘greatness of mind’ would have always been the 
natural companion of ‘constancy’, ‘humanity’ and ‘meekness’. Almost as if a 
                                                        
54 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, Oxford, 1703, p. 178 (De jure 
naturae et gentium was first published in 1672). 
55 Baltasar Gracian, The compleat gentleman: or a description of the several qualifications, both 
Natural and Acquired, that are necessary to form a great man, 2nd ed, London, 1730, p. 30. 
56 Anon., Christian’s duty, 1703, p. 303. 
57 Jeremy Collier, Essays upon several moral subjects,  5th ed., London, 1702–3, p. 154 
(originally published in 1694-5 with titles “Miscellanies” and “Miscellanies upon moral 
subjects. The second part”). 
58 Antoine de Courtin, Rules of civility; or, the maxims of genteel behaviour, London, 1703, 
p. 185 (Nouveau traité de la civilité was first published in French in 1671). 
59 William Anstruther, Essays, moral and divine; in five discourses, Edinburgh, 1701, p. 
179. 
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man of true greatness of mind would be Jesus Christ himself and the ideal 
that  modern  Europeans  could  follow,  would  be  something  close  to  ‘St.  
Stephen, and the rest of the Disciples’.60 
 The  clever  part  about  the  Christian  greatness  of  mind  is  that  while  
adding emphasis to the traditional Christian attributes such as clemency, it 
sought  to  also  retain  the  more  warlike  features  of  the  secular  use  of  
greatness  of  mind.  If  the  Christian  link  between  greatness  of  mind  and  
clemency is rather artificial, the link between greatness of mind and courage 
originates in Cicero.  
 This  original  link  was  also  retained  in  most  early  modern  works  
discussing greatness of mind. Baldassare Castiglione in his Courtier made it  
explicit  that  ‘to  prefer  Honour  and  Duty  before  all  the  Dangers  in  the  
World’ is ‘true Magnanimity’.61 Jean de La Bruyère mentions physical force 
and greatness of mind in a same passage.62 In a similar manner, ‘undaunted 
Courage’  and  ‘Greatness  of  Mind’  were  often  discussed  as  natural,  
connected attributes of the noble, who were ‘born for Great 
Performances’.63 In accordance with the usual historical reference to 
Alexander the Great, Charles the Fifth started to become a stock example 
of natural ‘Martial Spirit’, ‘Generosity and Greatness of Mind’.64 In a similar 
manner,  some historical  works  broadened the  use  of  ‘natural  greatness  of  
mind or usual bravery’ to natural characteristics of certain people.65 By and 
large, the anonymous author of the Gentleman’s library spoke for many when 
he wrote that ‘true Greatness of Mind’ is ‘usually accompanied with undaunted 
Courage and Resolution’.66 
 While  stressing  the  role  of  clemency  in  true  greatness  of  mind,  the  
Christian authors had a need to explain how the Christian hero would be a 
true  hero  in  a  sense  that  he  is  able  to  fight  and defend his  country  when 
necessary. Now, some of the distinctly Christian authors seemed to have no 
                                                        
60 Robert Jenkin, Reasonableness and certainty of the Christian religion, 2 vols., London, 
1715, I, p. 302 (first published in 1698). 
61 Baldassare Castiglione, Il cortegiano, or the courtier,  London,  1727,  p.  270 (Il libro del 
Cortegiano was first published in 1528). 
62 Jean de La Bruyère, Works, 2 vols., London, 1723, II, p. 201 (La Bruyère’s Caractères 
was first published in 1688 in French). ‘Courage and Greatness of Mind’ were also linked 
in more classical sources, such as Lucian, of Samosata, Works, 4 vols., London, 1715, I, p. 
105. 
63 Thomas Goodwin, History of the reign of Henry the Fifth, London, 1704, p. 2. 
64 Prudencio de Sandoval, History of Charles the Fifth, London, 1703, p. [A3] (the 
Spanish historian died in 1620). For Charles the Fifth and greatness of mind, see also for 
example, Goodwin, History  of  the  reign  of  Henry  the  Fifth, 1704 and Marius D’Assigny, 
History of Earls and earldom of Flanders, London, 1701, p. 173. The link between Alexander 
and greatness of mind was a stock example, for a variety of different genres using it see 
for example, The Guardian, 2 vols., London, 1714, I, p. 184, William Howell, The elements of 
history  from the  creation  of  the  earth,  to  the  reign  of  Constantine  the  Great, London, 1704, p. 216 
(the work first appeared in 1661) and Hume’s discussion of Alexander in the Treatise. 
65 Thomas Craig, The right of succession to the kingdom of England, London, 1703, p. 430. 
66 Gentleman’s library, 1715, p. 205. 
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problems using ancient examples when describing the warlike attributes of 
greatness  of  mind.  The  English  critic  John  Dennis  explained  that  it  was  
particularly ‘Greatness of Mind’ that excited ‘the Greek to Battel’.67 One 
early eighteenth-century sermon emphasised a man’s innate patriotism by 
explaining that ‘Heathens died for their Country out of natural Gallantry 
and greatness of Mind’68. By and large, there was usually a short step from 
the  Greeks  going  to  battle  to  the  greatness  of  mind  of  Richard  Steele’s  
Christian Hero, who would maintain his courage ‘by Christian Principles’.69 
This feature was well summoned by the anonymous author of the Paraphrase 
and comment upon the Epistles and Gospels when he explained that ‘Honour, 
truly understood’ is ‘greatness of mind, which scorns to descend to an ill 
and  base  thing’.  The  crux  of  the  Christian  argument  about  greatness  of  
mind  was  that  as  long  as  ‘our  Virtue  continues  unblemished’  our  
‘Conscience cannot reproach us’, which consequently means that ‘we are 
always superiour in the Combat’.70 Richard Fiddes presented ‘fortitude’ and 
‘preserving a man’s virtue’ identical, which according to him explained ‘why 
cowardice is thought so great and insupportable a reproach’ – even ‘by men 
who shew very little regard to any other moral consideration of good or 
evil’.71 In psychological terms, the argument about true Christian greatness 
of mind used the same attribute of self-esteem and confidence based on 
one’s unblemished excellence that Cicero had also put forward. 
Stoic calmness, conquering passions and neo-Platonist use of reason 
As  the  point  got  across  that  there  was  no  apparent  conflict  between  the  
Ciceronian magnanimity and the Christian principles, a number of authors 
started linking greatness of mind also to another vastly popular argument of 
the late seventeenth-century philosophy: the prevalence of reason in human 
actions.  The  argument  states  that  it  ought  to  be  reason  and  not  passions  
that governed men. Richard Bulstrode, educated at Pembroke College, 
Cambridge, quite fabulously explained that ‘true Greatness of Mind rather 
consists in conquering one’s self, than the World’.72 The problem, however, 
that most commentators were struggling with was that passions, and 
particularly  pride,  might  be  spoiling  the  idea  of  true  greatness  of  mind  
regardless of the fantastic slogans claiming otherwise. Especially in the 
Christian version of magnanimity there was categorically no room for sinful 
pride and the authors faced remarkable difficulties when making the shift 
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that  explained  why  pride  held  no  role  in  their  conception  of  greatness  of  
mind.  
 Even  Stillingfleet,  who  argued  for  the  ‘Spirit  of  Christian Magnanimity’, 
observed  that  it  was  usually  the  ‘ambitious  Man’,  who  at  least  seemingly  
‘hath the greatness of mind’.73 But  a  lesson  that  one  could  read  even  in  
popular sources such as Plutarch’s Lives was that ‘Ambition’ often takes 
‘measures’  that  are  ‘unsociable  and  brutal’,  as  the  example  of  Pyrrhus  
‘returning gloriously home’ from battle and entertaining ‘himself with the 
sense of his own Honour and Greatness of Mind’ reveals.74 Other popular 
sources like Fables of Aesop also declared that it was a balancing act to remain 
pure from ‘an extreme Ambition’ and find ‘true Greatness of Mind’.75 
Richard Fiddes as a particularly Christian author tackled these conceptual 
problems by emphasising the need for ‘Prudence’. ‘Pride’ simply cannot 
assume the name of ‘Greatness of Mind’, he pointed out.76 Passions, for 
Fiddes, were not a problem that the exercise of prudence could not handle. 
Pufendorf also recognised the problem of pride and argued that ‘honest 
humility’ instead of ‘empty pride’ was needed for ‘true Greatness of mind’. 
Pufendorf acknowledged that the difficulty with ambition was that the ‘Rule 
of Equality’  is  often  ‘transgress’d  by  Pride,  when a  Man for  no  Reason,  or  
without sufficient Reason, prefers himself to others, bearing a lofty carriage 
towards them, as base Underlings, unworthy of his Consideration or 
Regard’.77 Conceptually, it was not all that clear that this dilemma between 
ambition and pride was easily resolved (and pride was not part of ‘greatness 
of mind’), although Pufendorf claimed that Descartes’s ‘Treatise of the 
Passions’ proved otherwise.78 There  are  also  authors  who  explicitly  
contrasted magnanimity and pride claiming that it is possible and necessary 
for  a  person  to  show  ‘Greatness  of  Mind,  and  no  Pride’.79 One later 
commentator of the topic created a clever medical simile arguing that 
‘whatever Similitude there may seem to be betwixt Pride and Honour, 
Ambition and true Greatness of Mind, they are as far asunder as the Swelling of 
a  Dropsy,  from  a  full  and  robust  Habit  of  Body’.  Without  pausing,  the  
commentator carried on writing ‘that the Root of Pride is Folly, that 
Ignorance is the Mother of Vanity, I shall endeavour to prove, and whether 
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Ignorance and Folly be consistent with true Honour and Greatness of Mind, Let 
the silliest Reader judge’.80 
 Now, in accordance with the catchy slogans and rhetoric, theoretical 
support (other than Descartes) also started to appear for the argument that 
‘true Greatness of Mind rather consists in conquering one’s self, than the 
World’.81 It was the neo-Platonist use of reason combined with a tempered 
Stoic idea of harnessing the passions that supplemented the argument about 
Christian magnanimity. At least one author saw no difficulty uniting 
‘Greatness of Mind’ and ‘Impartiality of Judgement’.82 Nevertheless, most authors 
were more careful when trying to establish the objective foundation of 
greatness of mind. The seasoned Stillingfleet, for example, emphasised that 
‘Greatness of mind’ is an attribute of a ‘Wise Man’, which implies that it is 
difficult to acquire. It is the right use of reason and ‘calm and sedate 
Courage’  that  reveal  true  Greatness  of  Mind  instead  of  ‘any  sudden  and  
violent Heats, which rather shew the greatness of the Passions than of the 
Mind’.83 Another clergyman also pointed out that ‘a fierce ungovernable 
Temper does only shew the Greatness of a Man’s Passion, not that of his 
Mind’.84 John Cockburn in his History and examination of duels used historical 
examples  to  embody  real  greatness  of  mind  as  a  man  who  has  ‘a  fix’d  
Resolution to resist a popular Current’. Cockburn rested his argument on 
the  words  of  Cicero  stressing  that  ‘to  do  another  Prejudice  for  the  sake  of  ones  
Pleasure and Profit, is more against nature than Death or Grief or the like’.85  
 What  is  important  in  all  of  these  eighteenth-century  examples  of  
greatness of mind is that we may notice how the focus is explicitly on the 
control that man needs to exercise over his passions. George Royse made it 
particularly  clear  in  his  sermon  that  ‘the  Greatness  of  a  Man’s  Mind’  
consists ‘in the Command over its Passions’.86 Once again, the idea of the 
juxtaposition of conquering the world and oneself was introduced. ‘Office 
of Ruling and Managing our Tempers’, Royse wrote, ‘does shew more true 
Bravery and Greatness of Mind, than the advancing the greatest Conquest 
and Dominion over others’. Indeed, it is ‘the true Fortitude and Bravery of 
the  mind to  quell  those  Passions,  that  are  Enemies  to  our  Reason’,  Royse  
preached in full accordance with the neo-Platonic argument about a man’s 
rational capabilities.87 This  sermon is  important  because  it  aired  a  popular  
view about greatness of mind in a direct form. 
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 This broad, rationalist context could be shaped to serve many ends. A 
Scotsman, Archibald Campbell in his extremely interesting Enquiry into the 
original of moral virtue for example linked greatness of mind to our desire of 
esteem and used it to prove our rational nature and the prevalence of God. 
Campbell claimed that there are different ways in which ‘Desire of Esteem’ 
can ‘spread and diffuse itself’.  In this sense it  is a ‘social  Appetite’  that can 
spread ‘all over the Face of the Earth’ and stretch ‘up particularly towards 
the great Father of Mankind’. In fact, according to Campbell, this is ‘natural 
to  the  highest  Degree,  and  shews  the  great  Head of  the  rational  Creation,  
and all our Fellow-men; which distinctly speaks an Openness and Greatness 
of Mind, divinely noble and glorious, and which, with good Reason, may be 
deem’d the Desire of true Glory’. Hence, in one sense a circle was closing in 
Campbell’s Enquiry. Rhetorically, the concept of greatness of mind had 
witnessed many shifts, but Campbell put it back to its original Ciceronian 
use. He only emphasised that the true use of reason, our desire of esteem 
and  Christianity  are  in  accordance  with  it.  It  is  only  ‘if  in  this  Desire  of  
Esteem  we  leave  out  God,  and  confine ourselves  to  Mankind,  it  is  then  
manifestly  less  natural;  the  social  Appetite  begins  to  be  vitiated,  and  the  
Mind to grow narrow and contracted’.88 But  if  a  man would  just  keep  on 
elevating  his  mind towards  God,  reaching  for  true  glory,  true  greatness  of  
mind would prevail. This was an argument that probably both, Charron and 
Fiddes, would have approved. 
 At  the  same  time,  the  argument  of  Christian  greatness  of  mind  faced  
conceptual difficulties. A common strategy to defend it (and a sign that the 
momentum of the Ciceronian greatness started to wear off) was a practical 
attack on pride and luxury; and particularly on any authors that might even 
hint  that  these  attributes  would  have  something  to  do  with  greatness  of  
mind.  Abbé  de  Bellegarde’s  letters  to  a  lady  of  the  Court  of  France  
discussed  a  true  example  of  ‘Greatness  of  Mind’  that  consisted  of  a  
noblewoman ‘renouncing her Kingdom, from a Contempt of the World’.89 
The seed of this argument was planted in the Offices. As we remember, one 
crucial Ciceronian attribute of greatness of mind was a hearty contempt of 
everything beneath oneself. Yet, it is interesting that the current of the time 
had  changed so  that  even  Bellegarde  spoke  with  a  moralising  tone  against  
the luxurious age of the late seventeenth century. Before, a noblemen had 
functioned  as  the  epitome  of  greatness  of  mind.  At  the  turn  of  the  
eighteenth-century the argument had changed so that ‘none but great Souls 
are capable of great Designs, and few Courtiers have had Greatness of 
Mind enough to procure the Promotion of Science, which is the Exaltation 
of Human Nature, and the Enlargement of the Empire of Reason’.90 This 
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tells something about the structural changes in European societies. But 
what it shows more explicitly is that the widely popular Ciceronian idea of 
greatness of mind did not fit well into the modern world. 
 Some of the British authors took this trend of renouncing the 
fashionable world even further. At the same time, the argument about the 
Ciceronian greatness started to crumble. For example, it is not all that clear 
that  the  main  features  of  greatness  of  mind could  still  be  distinguished  in  
some of the arguments advanced in An epitome of ethics published in 1723. A 
move claiming that the ‘perfection of Generosity’ is that ‘a Man is not’ ruled 
by ‘popular Applause’ might still be fitted within the Ciceronian framework. 
However, to attack ‘the Itch of common Glory’ with a claim that ‘Mind is 
satisfi’d and corroborated’ in certain acts themselves without any regard for 
glory, is to turn away from the Ciceronian principles.91 Without some 
notion of glory, there is no Ciceronian greatness of mind. An earlier author, 
still remaining in the Ciceronian framework when discussing greatness of 
mind, but yet attacking the luxurious age with an alarming vigour, was the 
English clergyman John Wilkins. In his sermons, Wilkins levelled his 
criticism particularly strongly against the people who seeked material goods. 
His example of greatness of mind consisted of a person who ‘look’d down 
upon Wealth, as much as others admire it’.92 There was a short step from 
this  kind  of  expressions  of  the  Christian  greatness  of  mind  to  the  early  
modern republicanism that struggled with concepts such as luxury.93  
 Typical moralism poured more water into the well. Mary Astell, who has 
sometimes been called the first English feminist, serves perhaps as the best 
example of an author embodying the trend that unites the aspects that we 
have previously discussed with outright republican principles. First of all, 
she  strongly  argued  that  ‘he  who  is  a  Slave  to  his  Appetites,  must  never  
pretend to  stand up for  his  own and his  Fellow Citizens  Liberties’.  Astell  
defined freedom in the traditional terms of non-interference, which 
included internal restrain caused by a man’s own passions. She continued 
her attack against luxury and sensibility by underlining the need for ‘a 
Vertuous Poverty’ exemplified by the ‘High-Spirited Romans’.  It  was  the  
Romans, Astell explained, who had ‘true Greatness of Mind’. These 
remarks suit none better than the acknowledged republican authors of the 
early modern period. The Roman link in their thinking has been well 
established in scholarship. Regarding greatness of mind, the prototype-
republican Charles Davenant referred to the example of ‘Roman People’ 
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when discussing ‘Modesty and Greatness of Mind’.94 ‘True Roman Courage, 
and Greatness of Mind’ were also used with a strong emphasis in Echard’s 
Roman History.95 And Francis Bacon also looked back to ‘Augustus Caesar’  
when searching for a historical example of a ‘Mortal Man’  with ‘greatness of 
Mind’.96 Astell saw that the problem was the modern authors arguing against 
this  ‘Vertuous  Poverty’  and  claiming  that  ‘Pride’  had  a  role  to  play  in  the  
actions of the ancient people. What these modern authors were doing only 
attempted  to  ‘depress  the  Generous  Mind’.  As  for  Wilkins  and  Astell,  a  
person of true greatness of mind was embodied in a person ‘who Dispises 
Money as much as they Adore it’.97  
 The  moral  and  political  stance  expressed  by  Astell  started  to  be  an  
increasingly untenable position to hold in the eighteenth-century world. It 
had its foundation in Cicero’s greatness of mind and it implied a common 
early eighteenth-century view that combined Christian and republican 
aspects. David Hume devoted his life to the redefinition of the concept of 
greatness of mind. In 1754, he presented himself as the embodiment of it.  
Hume  thought  that  one  of  his  achievements  was  to  bring  down  the  
Ciceronian greatness of mind together with its Republican and Christian 
spin-offs that had proved futile for the modern world which Hume himself 
inhabited. The positive part of this was that he had worked extremely hard 
replacing this outdated concept with a fully different analysis of greatness of 
mind and pride, that we will shortly turn to. 
Robert Boyle and noble designs 
We unfortunately know very little of the young David Hume, therefore 
even minor details from the pre-Treatise times attract considerable attention. 
One such detail, which has not yet perhaps been fully exhausted, is that 
Hume read Robert Boyle as a student. Michael Barfoot in his seminal article 
about Hume’s scientific upbringing emphasises that Boyle, not Newton, 
was the centre of the scientific courses that Hume followed in Edinburgh.98 
What  is  equally  significant  is  that  Boyle  was  well  represented  in  the  
physiological library that Hume used as a student.99 Barfoot makes a point 
                                                        
94 Charles Davenant, Essays upon peace at home, and war abroad, 2nd ed, London, 1704, p. 
56. 
95 Laurence Echard, The roman history, from the total failure of the Western empire in 
Augustulus, to the restitution of the same by Charles the Great. Containing the Space of 324 Years. 
Vol. IV. London, 1704, p. 250. 
96 Francis Bacon, The essays, or councils, civil and moral, London, 1701, p. 166 (first 
published in 1597). 
97 Mary Astell, Moderation truly stated: or, a review of a late pamphlet, entitul’d, Moderation a 
vertue, London, 1704, p. 108. 
98 Michael Barfoot, ‘Hume and the culture of science in the early eighteenth century’, 
in Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish enlightenment, 1990, pp. 151–190. 
99 For Norton’s emphasis on this point: David Fate Norton, ‘Historical account of A 
Treatise of Human Nature from  its  beginnings  to  the  time  of  Hume’s  death’,  in  David  
DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND 
 
212 
that theology was a section that was emphasised in this particular library. 
The third chapter in the second volume of Boyle’s Theological works 
published in 1715, is entitled ‘Of the Greatness of Mind promoted by 
Christianity’. This chapter is an extensive and elaborated discussion along 
the  general  lines  of  the  Christian  greatness  of  mind that  we  have  studied.  
The obvious conclusion is that Boyle’s account of Greatness of mind would 
have  easily  been  within  Hume’s  reach  and  Hume  might  well  have  been  
directly  acquainted  with  it  as  a  young man given  the  importance  that  was  
placed on Boyle in the classroom. And even if Hume had not been reading 
Boyle’s outline of greatness of mind as a student, Boyle’s views were in no 
manner unusual, only remarkably explicit, hence Boyle’s case of Christian 
greatness serves as the perfect counterpart to launch Hume’s redefinition of 
greatness of mind. 
 The  emphasis  of  Boyle’s  analysis  of  greatness  of  mind  is  on  an  
implication of ‘an Heroick Temper of Mind’.100 Boyle’s  use  of  this  
dispositional concept is clearly Ciceronian in this sense. The foundational 
idea  behind  it,  according  to  Boyle,  is  that  we  must  ‘elevate  the  Mind  and  
make it Heroick’.101 In  a  distinguishably  Ciceronian  vein,  Boyle  carries  on  
stating that ‘to aim at high and Noble Designs, is both a Genuin Mark and 
Effect of greatness of Mind’. In short, ‘to have a Noble design is the chief 
sign’ of greatness of mind.102  
 After establishing the Ciceronian origin of greatness of mind, as 
Christian  authors  in  general  did,  Boyle  struggles  to  separate  greatness  of  
mind  and  pride.  Boyle  states  that  his  argument  is  directed  against  the  
‘Atheistical and Sensual Persons’ who claim that greatness of mind should 
not be linked to Christianity.103 Boyle’s purpose is to account for the factors 
that ‘make up Magnanimity or Greatness of Mind, which is composed of a 
great  many  elevated  and  radiant  Qualities’  which  ‘Christian  Religion  is  at  
least consistent with each of them, if it does not promote it’. Again, what is 
looming behind the argument is the problem of ambition and pride. On the 
one  hand,  Boyle  leans  towards  this  direction,  by  claiming  that  there  is  no  
conceptual problem when uniting greatness of mind and Christianity. On 
the other hand, he has the need to categorically separate greatness of mind 
and pride.  
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 Boyle attempts to do this by making several distinctions. For example, 
he points towards the difference between ‘real Greatness inherent in a Man’ 
and ‘that Pompous One annexed by Fortune’.104 Boyle  also  stresses  the  
Christianity of greatness of mind by putting his faith on a commonplace 
that  ‘True  Greatness  of  Mind  resides  in  the  Soul’  while  ‘Extrinsick  
Greatness’ and ‘great Bustle and Noise in the World’ adds nothing to it.105  
 The real intellectual effort that Boyle undertakes is that instead of pride, 
he attempts to introduce humility to accompany greatness of mind. From a 
Christian perspective, pride is a very visible vice. In contrast, Boyle 
acknowledges  that  ‘Humility  is  a  Virtue’,  but  ‘at  the  first  sight’  it  ‘seems  
different  from  greatness  of  Mind’.  What  Boyle  tries  to  argue  is  that  ‘in  
Conjunction with other Qualities, which make up greatness of Mind’, 
humility ‘adds to their Number, and though not so bright as some of them, 
yet  it  adds  Loveliness  to  the  rest’.  The  problem  is  that  humility  is  in  fact  
very different from any other possible quality of greatness of mind and it is 
not  all  that  clear  whether  Boyle  is  convinced  of  the  argument  linking  
humility to greatness of mind. He even acknowledges that ‘though other 
Virtues assist one another, they all conspire to overthrow Humility’. The 
problem lies with pride, since being virtuous makes us easily proud. Boyle 
writes that ‘Pride is so strange an Adversary, that sometimes by being 
foyled, it overcomes; for when we use the best Arguments against it, the 
success tempts the Master of them to be Proud’.106 But Boyle’s real problem 
is  not  with  the  deceiving  nature  of  pride.  The  problem is  that  he  has  not  
really  been  able  to  establish  how greatness  of  mind could  be  conceptually  
separated  from  pride,  no  matter  how  he  tries  to  push  his  Christian  
principles. The best he can do is to argue that ‘Noble Attempts though they 
fail of Success, yet they gain Esteem’.107 This might be a good argument 
establishing that virtue in rags is still a virtue, but this kind of arguments 
surely did not convince David Hume of the Christian greatness of mind – 
despite his own acknowledged early religious aspirations. What happened is 
that while greatness of mind became the cornerstone of Hume’s moral and 
political philosophy, all the hints about its Christianity were fully swept 
aside. 
* * * * 
After studying the context of different uses of greatness of mind, the 
significance of the 1754 portrait  and the task that Hume set for himself in 
his philosophical works relating to greatness of mind, seems obvious. 
Greatness of mind had to be shown as a concept of significance, but 
without any metaphysical implications. Hume’s task was to weld greatness 
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of mind into the naturalistic account of the progress of civil societies. 
Hence, he launched a full-fledged program relating to the concept of 
greatness of mind. Hume had the need to show that without any reference 
to a man’s God-like nature greatness of mind could even have more 
significance  than  what  it  had  been  given  in  the  republican  or  Christian  
traditions.  But  Hume’s  greatness  of  mind  was  part  of  his  science  of  man  
project that not only countered the Christian and republican authors, but 
also the neo-Platonist writers that extolled the role of reason. Therefore, it 
is  not  surprising  that  theoretically,  one  of  the  most  important  section  of  
Book 3 of the Treatise is entitled ‘Of greatness of mind’. 
Sympathy, moral sense and artificial virtues 
An entry in the Oxford English Dictionary defines pride as ‘having a high 
or exalted opinion of one’s own worth or importance. Usually in the 
negative sense: disposed to feeling superior; having inordinate self-esteem; 
haughty, arrogant’. In contrast, David Hume made the surprisingly strong 
case  that  pride  is  a  positive  passion,  indeed  necessarily  boastful  in  human 
beings. One of the main points of this study is to show how haughty pride 
can maintain its positive role in Hume’s account even when exposed pride 
causes harm to others. In other words, pride plays a crucial role in greatness 
of mind. 
 While some aspects of pride have been covered in Hume scholarship, 
one main line remains unexplored, namely, what is the relationship between 
self-love and pride. In moral and political philosophy this is one of the most 
important paths for us to take. What Hume is concerned with is to establish 
how politeness functions precisely in the same way as the well-known story 
about justice in relation to self-love. This point about the analogy between 
the spheres of self-love and pride (and justice and politeness) and the 
implications that they bear are the main focus of the remaining part of this 
study.  
 While pride, self-love and justice have played roles in Hume scholarship, 
politeness has been left with much less attention.108 The link between pride 
                                                        
108 A typical discussion of a certain “neglected” part of Hume’s intellectual activities 
opens by pointing out that ‘Hume the aesthetic theorist has always been overshadowed 
by Hume the epistemologist, the metaphysician, and the moral theorist’. Steven Sverdlik, 
‘Hume’s key and aesthetic rationality’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 45, 1986, p. 69. 
The aesthetics is in fact not at all a neglected aspect of Hume scholarship. The actual 
problem is that the modern focus is on such fragmented fields of study as aesthetic 
theory instead of the Hume’s science of man as a whole. For example, the Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism does not lack discussion on Hume’s standard of taste. In that 
particular journal in addition to Sverdlik’s article, we may find also Noel Carroll, ‘Hume’s 
standard of taste’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 43, 1984, pp. 181–194 and James 
Shelley, ‘Hume’s double standard of taste’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52, 1994, 
pp. 437–45. On standard of taste, see also Jeffrey Wieand, ‘Hume’s two standards of 
taste’, The Philosophical Quarterly,  34,  1984,  pp.  129–142 and works cited there.  For more 
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and politeness has gone more or less unnoticed. There are plenty of general 
discussions on pride in Hume scholarship, but only a few links to 
politeness. Simultaneously, we have no understanding of the role of pride in 
Hume’s moral and political philosophy and only a few studies stressing the 
importance of civility in his philosophy.109  
 One reason why politeness, which is the artificial virtue that concerns 
pride (as this study seeks to establish) has received very little notice is that 
artificial virtues in general were neglected for long time. While Hume’s 
philosophy has been the object of extensive scholarship since Kemp 
Smith’s grand postulation of it in the 1940s, it was still possible to open an 
article published as recently as 1979 stating that ‘a generally accepted view 
holds that the distinction’ between ‘natural and artificial virtue’ is ‘of little 
importance’.110 Although  this  is  not  entirely  true,  for  example,  Knud  
Haakonssen had just published a very original article arguing that since 
there is no natural obligation for artificial virtues as there is for natural 
virtues, and since we lack the motive to be “artificially virtuous”, we come 
to  dislike  ourselves  for  lacking  the  original  motive  and  this  self-hate  
functions as a motive for artificial virtues.111 Yet, there is still much work to 
be done with artificial virtues and I join Ted A. Ponko’s words: ‘In essence, 
                                                                                                                 
recent discussions of this essay, see for example, Christopher Williams, ‘Hume on the 
tedium of reading Spenser’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 46, 2006, pp. 1–16. However, 
discussions linking this to science of man as a whole are few. In a sense, what I am trying 
to do with politeness is different from this approach, because I am not claiming that 
politeness is an important, neglected field of Hume scholarship. What I am claiming is 
much more than this. I claim that we do not understand Hume’s science of man without 
understanding the role of politeness in it. About the standard of taste, see also 
Christopher MacLachlan, ‘Hume and the standard of taste’, Hume Studies, 7, 1986, pp. 18–
38 and (the classic) Peter Kivy, ‘Hume’s standard of taste: breaking the circle’, British 
Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, 7, 1967, pp. 57–66. 
109 Peter Johnson, ‘Hume on manners and the civil condition’, British  Journal  for  the  
History of Philosophy, 6, 1998, pp. 209–222. Another account where politeness gets central 
stage is M. A. Box, The suasive art of David Hume. Princeton University Press, 1990. 
Regarding politeness, one needs to consult also James Moore, ‘The social background of 
Hume’s science of human nature’, in McGill Hume Studies. Studies in Hume and Scottish 
Philosophy, David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi and Wade L. Robinson, eds., Austin Hill 
Press, San Diego, 1979, pp. 23–42. 
110 Charles E. Cottle, ‘Justice as artificial virtue in Hume's Treatise’, Journal  of  the  
History of Ideas, 40, 1979, p. 457. 
111 Knud Haakonssen, ‘Hume’s obligations’, Hume Studies, 4, 1978, pp. 7–17. 
However important the question of obligation is from some other perspective, I do not 
feel that I need to try and address this within my framework. In fact, leaving the question 
of obligation (and, for example, the distribution of justice etc.) aside will lead to a more 
broad picture of what Hume himself was trying to do in Treatise. I hope that this becomes 
evident while reading this work. 
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I  shall  urge  that  a  sharper  distinction  is  needed  between  the  artificial  and  
natural virtues’.112 
 Virtues in general have of course always gathered vast attention. There 
is, for example, a great deal of modern philosophers discussing Hume from 
the perspective of virtue ethics.113 Some commentators are excited that 
‘Hume discusses about 70 different virtues in his moral theory’.114 My point 
is  that  this  is  a  direction  that  misses  the  rather  simple,  but  all  the  more  
important  point  that  Hume  is  trying  to  establish  with  the  discussion  on  
artificial virtues in the Treatise. Of the first class philosophers, only John 
Mackie has consistently underlined the significance of artificial virtues. He 
writes  that  regarding  ‘artificial  virtue’,  those  ‘who  came  closest  to  
anticipating this insight were other sceptically inclined writers like 
Mandeville and Hobbes. But in some ways Hume’s thought is subtler than 
that of either of these predecessors’115 – which is certainly true. Mackie’s 
problem, as I will  show later more precisely,  is that he underestimates the 
importance of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues. Mackie 
states that ‘Hume’s treatment of the natural virtues is both less interesting 
and less defensible than his treatment of the artificial ones’.116 While Mackie 
is certainly correct that our emphasis should be on the artificial virtues, yet 
the only way to grasp the significance of the artificial virtues is by realising 
the significance of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues, 
which is the reason why we should not dismiss the natural virtues either. 
 Lately artificial virtues have also gathered increasing attention in the 
history of philosophy, but the emphasis has almost solely been on the 
importance of justice.117 To make a long story short, it will be the purpose 
                                                        
112 Ted A. Ponko, ‘Artificial virtue, self-interest, and acquired social concern’, Hume 
Studies, 9, 1983, p. 46. About the distinction between natural and artificial in Mandeville, 
see pp. 162–165 above. 
113 e.g. Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue ethics and human nature’, Hume Studies, 25, 
1999, pp. 67–82. 
114 James Fieser, ‘Hume’s wide view of the virtues: an analysis of his early critics’, 
Hume Studies, 24, 1998, pp. 295–312. 
115 Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 82. 
116 Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 129. 
117 There are many useful general discussions of justice as an artificial virtue, 
regarding the more philosophical ones, see for example, Marcia Baron, ‘Hume’s noble lie: 
an account of his artificial virtues’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12, 1982, pp. 539–555; 
Sharon  R.  Krause,  ‘Hume  and  the  (false)  luster  of  justice’,  Political Theory, 32, 2004, pp. 
628–655 and especially the work of Rachel Cohon. Her concern has been particularly the 
question of non-moral motive. E.g. Rachel Cohon, ‘Hume’s difficulty with the virtue of 
honesty’, Hume Studies, 23, 1997, pp. 91–112. Cohon’s interpretation is that Hume’s 
requirement of the virtue of honesty is that person’s approval of honesty is strengthened 
so that it becomes a motivating sentiment to be honest. It also needs to function in all 
the cases ‘required by the rules of property’. Hence, ‘mere rule-following is not enough 
for this virtue; one needs morally-motivated rule following’. Cohon, ‘Hume’s difficulty 
with the virtue of honesty’, 1997, p. 102. Of the other artificial virtues, chastity has 
received attention with the rise of interest in women in philosophy. E.g. Ann Levey, 
‘Under constraint: chastity and modesty in Hume’, Hume Studies, 23, 1997, pp. 213–226. 
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of the remainder of this study to account for the link between greatness of 
mind, pride and politeness and present a more coherent view of Hume’s 
moral and political philosophy. 
Norton and Moore debate 
From  a  broader  perspective,  one  of  the  most  important  developments  in  
scholarship regarding Hume’s moral philosophy concerns the difference 
between the Hutchesonian and more sceptical aspects of Hume. This 
development has been personified in a struggle between two leading 
international scholars, David Fate Norton and James Moore. A significant 
moment in Hume scholarship took place at the 32nd Hume Conference in 
2005  in  Toronto.  Perhaps  the  peak  of  this  struggle  was  reached  in  that  
particular occasion; Canada being the home soil of both of these scholars. 
Before David Fate Norton started reading his paper, the chair promised 
James  Moore  that  he  would  get  to  utter  the  first  words  during  the  
discussion  part  of  the  session.  The  topic  was  the  author  of  the  successive  
critical reviews of Books 1 and 3 of A treatise of human nature which appeared 
anonymously in the Amsterdam journal, Bibliothèque Raisonnée,  in  1740  and 
1741.  James  Moore  had  suggested  in  a  previous  article  that  these  might  
have been written by Francis Hutcheson, who David Fate Norton, together 
with Dario Perinetti, was now set to oppose.  
 On that  occasion  the  topic  was  bibliographical,  but  at  the  core  of  the  
debate was the interpretation of the nature of Hume’s moral philosophy. To 
put it in simple terms, Norton has consistently placed a strong emphasis on 
the concept of sympathy and Hume’s link to Francis Hutcheson.118 Moore, 
on the other hand, is inclined towards reading Hume as an Epicurean moral 
philosopher  with  sceptical  undertones.  This  study  will  side  with  James  
Moore’s  interpretation.  In  fact,  it  is  my  attempt  to  show  how  Moore’s  
intuitive  stance  since  his  first  profound  article  on  the  topic  in  1976  is  a  
correct one. However, it needs to be significantly supplemented with 
additional  evidence  and  worked  into  a  plausible  argument  about  Hume’s  
moral and political philosophy that grasps the Mandevillean division 
between self-love and self-liking. 
 The  major  issue  at  stake  in  the  Norton-Moore  debate  is  the  origin  of  
morals. Norton has stressed the role of sympathy and its connection to 
Hutcheson’s conception of moral sense.119 For  quite  some  time  the  
                                                        
118 This is a traditional reading of Hume and Hutcheson, regarding modern scholars 
should be mentioned that for example E. J. Hundert writes that Hume was ‘Hutcheson’s 
pupil and friend’. Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 1994, p. 82. 
119 The diminishing role of sympathy in the transition from Treatise to the second 
Enquiry is a standard question in Hume scholarship. For recent contribution to this topic, 
see Remy Debes, ‘Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’, 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15, 2007, pp. 27–57. Debes makes the case for 
humanity instead of sympathy. 
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question of sympathy and moral sense has been treated as the decisive 
question of eighteenth-century moral philosophy.120 While these certainly 
are important concepts and some of the discussions on them are very 
sophisticated, one general point of this study is that their significance for 
Hume’s system has been overstated.121 It is natural to give a central position 
to the concept of sympathy/moral sense, if we assume that Hutcheson was 
the most significant positive influence on Hume’s moral theory. 
 This has indeed been assumed. Hutcheson being a “gateway” for Hume 
to morals is a common line of argument established by Norman Kemp 
Smith in his The  philosophy  of  David  Hume.  This  was  also  J.  Y.  T.  Greig’s  
understanding. In an explicit letter to J. M. Keynes, Greig emphatically 
stresses the significant role that Hutcheson played in Hume’s life: 
There is no doubt whatever that Hume met Francis Hutcheson, at least once, and 
probably several times. In one of his letters to Hutcheson he says: ‘Since I saw you, I 
have...’ And between 1740 and 1745 he paid more than one visit to his friends the 
Mures of Caldwell,  who lived just  outside Glasgow and who were rather particular  
friends of Hutcheson’s. It was Hutcheson, too, who first made Hume and Adam 
Smith acquainted, though the latter was only a seventeen-year-old student at the 
time. Hume was rather hurt when Hutcheson, cautious man, declined to support his 
candidature for the Chair of Ethics and Pneumatic Philosophy in Edinburgh.122  
A  common  view  in  the  1960s  was  that  ‘there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  
Hume’s moral theory had roots in the writings of Francis Hutcheson’.123 In 
1976 Duncan Forbes wrote that ‘that the philosopher who was intellectually 
closest  to  Hume,  especially  in  what  concerned  morals,  at  the  time  of  the  
publication of the Treatise was probably Francis Hutcheson, the most 
forward-looking thinker of his day in Scotland, and no doubt a hero to 
many young men at the Scottish universities’.124 A  few  years  later,  T.  D.  
Campbell  emphatically  stated  that  ‘it  is  now  generally  acknowledged  that  
Hutcheson is the ‘father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume’s ethics are 
largely Hutchesonian’.125 Hutcheson’s role as the father of the so-called 
                                                        
120 About this topic, see especially the work of Luigi Turgo: e.g. Turgo, ‘Sympathy 
and moral sense: 1725–1740’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 7, 1999, pp. 79–101. 
Turgo particularly discusses Hutcheson’s theory of moral sense and how it relates to 
Mandeville. About Hume and sympathy, see also Tony Pitson, ‘Sympathy and other 
selves’, Hume Studies, 22, 1996, pp. 255–272. 
121 For a monograph regarding these premises that originally extends perhaps the 
furthest (covering almost all aspects of Hume’s works with sympathy), see Jennifer A. 
Herdt, Religion and faction in Hume’s moral philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
122 J. Y. T. Greig to J. M. Keynes, 25 June, 1928, JMK/PP/87/24/11, Cambridge 
University, King's College Archive Centre: The Papers of John Maynard Keynes. 
123 Kivy, ‘Hume’s standard of taste: breaking the circle’, 1967, p. 57. Norman Kemp 
Smith, The philosophy of David Hume. A critical study of its origins and central doctrines, 
MacMillan, 1941. 
124 Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics, 1975, p. 32. 
125 T. D. Campbell, ‘Francis Hutcheson: ‘Father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in 
The origins and nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, 
eds. ,John Donald Publishers, Edinburgh, 1982, p. 167. 
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Scottish Enlightenment had of course been set forward already in the 1940s 
(along Kemp Smith’s postulations) by Gladys Bryson’s Man and Society.126 
 The influence of Hutcheson in modern scholarship has been most 
closely felt through the presence of David Fate Norton, who has integrated 
his interpretation to this long line of scholarship when stressing the 
relevance of the concept of sympathy for Hume.127 The core of Norton’s 
philosophical interpretation of Hume’s common-sense moral philosophy 
was established in his book in 1982.128 The book is an important one due to 
its sound epistemological and metaphysical understanding. Regarding moral 
philosophy, perhaps the clearest expression of Norton’s understanding of 
Hume  in  the  eighteenth-century  context  has  been  put  forward  in  his  
‘Foundations of morality debate’, published in the Cambridge history of 
eighteenth-century philosophy.129 
 Although Norton describes Hume’s account of what he calls the “two-
foundation theory” as complex, it still quite neatly lines up as a variation of 
Hutcheson’s account of sentiment. Norton’s understanding of sympathy for 
Hume is also extensive – bridging the gap between Hume and Hutcheson. 
According to Norton, sympathy is for Hume the source of the moral 
distinctions, it makes vicarious and disinterested pleasure possible and also 
artificial virtues depend on it. Norton emphasises that after general rules 
have been first formed, it is the principle of sympathy that enables the 
development of civil society and the principle of justice.  
 The point that I want to make is that on the one hand the question is 
much more complicated from the outset than what Norton implies. 
Mandeville,  who  is  one  of  the  main  influences  on  Hume,  is  not  a  simple  
egoist whose moral theory has no foundation on the nature of things. Also, 
Hume’s conception of sympathy does not crack open the social theory of 
the Treatise even when there most certainly is something for us to crack (and 
this  is  the  reason why I  think  it  is  best  for  us  to  discuss  the  social  theory  
instead  of  the  moral  theory  of  Treatise).130 On  the  other  hand,  the  overall  
plot  is  simple.  Once  we  get  a  good  grip  of  the  change  in  Mandeville’s  
thinking expressed in a separate, published work in 1729 – and come to see 
that  he  was  pushing  towards  an  actual  theory  of  human  nature  and  civil  
                                                        
126 Bryson, Man and society, 1945, p. 8. 
127 Norton has carefully pointed out that Kemp-Smith and others overlook the 
religious differences between Hutcheson and Hume. However, I do not think that this 
was the major issue at stake as I will try to prove in this thesis. Hence, I see no problem 
reading Norton himself in this way in the same line of scholarship as Kemp-Smith and 
others. 
128 Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982. 
129 David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn, ‘The foundations of morality’, in The 
Cambridge history of eighteenth-century philosophy, 2006, pp. 939–986. I am grateful to Professor 
Norton for sending me this article prior to its publication upon request. 
130 For a recent account leaning towards the same direction, see Christopher Berry, 
‘Hume’s universalism: The science of man and the anthropological point of view’, British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15, 2007, pp. 535–550. 
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society in which the possibility of natural virtues is clearly established – we 
also understand the Treatise much more precisely. 
 In contrast, James Moore has stood his ground against the 
overwhelming majority of commentators since Kemp-Smith linking Hume 
to Hutcheson.131 In  his  ‘Hume’s  theory  of  justice  and  property’  (1976),  
‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’ (1977) and 
‘The  Social  Background  of  Hume’s  Science  of  Human  Nature’  (1979)  
Moore established a strong backbone for reading David Hume as an 
Epicurean moral philosopher including the proper context for this anti-
Hutchesonian interpretation of Hume.132 Particularly in ‘Science of human 
nature’,  Moore  makes  an  introduction  to  the  idea  of  society  in  Hume’s  
science of human nature unmatched in the history of philosophy. Even 
when he does not develop the issue very far, Moore indicates the question 
of politeness as an artificial virtue with a relation to Mandeville’s works as a 
crucial issue133 and  points  towards  all  the  relevant  evidence  available  
(including the “politeness letter” to Ramsay and Hume’s early essay on 
modern  honour).  The  point  that  I  want  to  make  is  that  Moore’s  articles  
constitute perhaps the most unappreciated coherent stance in Hume 
scholarship. Although Moore is renowned among a small circle of sensible 
intellectual historians and certainly not neglected, in larger circles the fruits 
of his work have not yet been fully collected.134 The differences between 
Norton and Moore have always been concrete, but the conflict escalated 
                                                        
131 The most explicit expression of Moore’s reading of the relationship between 
Hume and Hutcheson can be found in Moore, ‘Hume and Hutcheson’, 1995, pp. 23–57. 
132 Moore, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’, 1976, pp. 103–119; Moore, 
‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, 1977, pp. 809–839 and 
Moore, ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’, 1979, pp. 23–42. 
The core of Moore’s interpretation, ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’ is a product 
of its time. Moore’s is very close to Duncan Forbes’s understanding of Hume’s place in 
the history of philosophy with regard to the natural law tradition. (About Moore’s 
understanding of natural law tradition, see also James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, 
‘Gershom Carmichael and the natural jurisprudence tradition in eighteenth-century 
Scotland’, in Wealth and Virtue, 1983, pp. 73–87.) ‘Hume’s theory of justice and property’ 
–article is particularly important, because it brings out the crucial difference between 
small, family-society and large, civil society and the primary nature of law. The main point 
of criticism is the typically overwhelming role of justice over the other artificial virtues. In 
‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, Moore was first of all set 
out to make the clear interpretation that ‘Hume’s political science can best be understood 
as an elaborate response to the political science of the classical republicans.’ Moore, 
‘Hume’s political science and the classical republican tradition’, 1977, p. 810. It is 
interesting to notice that even when this article was published just a year after the 
Machiavellian moment,  it  was  not  used  as  clear  evidence  of  how  Hume  should  not  be  
considered as a neo-republican political thinker. The most visionary, yet tentative article 
by Moore has been ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’. 
133 Moore, ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’, 1979, p. 28. 
134 Particularly John Robertson has realised the importance and originality of James 
Moore’s ideas. Robertson, ‘The Scottish contribution to the enlightenment’, 2000, p. 47. 
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only recently after the publication of Moore’s explicit interpretation of 
Hutcheson and Hume in 1995.135 
 Even when it is still common to assume a close relationship between 
Hume  and  Hutcheson,  some  general  doubts  have  been  cast.136 What has 
particularly  struck  people  is  the  fact  that  (in  the  words  of  James  Moore)  
‘Hutcheson adamantly opposed Hume's candidacy for the professorship of 
pneumatics and ethical philosophy at the University of Edinburgh’.137 
Scholars agree that this is one reason to rethink their relationship, but there 
is disagreement on whether this tells us anything about the nature of their 
moral philosophy. Moore’s explanation for the incident is a fundamental 
difference  in  the  nature  of  their  moral  philosophy.  He  writes  that  
‘Hutcheson’s principal complaint against Hume as a moral philosopher’, as 
he expressed it in a letter to Hume (known to us only from Hume’s reply), 
was that Hume’s moral philosophy lacked ‘a certain Warmth in the Cause of 
Virtue’.138 Hume responded that  this  was  not  an  accident:  ‘his  philosophy  
was not designed to recommend virtue but to explain the operations of the 
understanding,  the  passions,  and  morals’.  In  the  end  Hume  was  not  
appointed to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh; 
the appointment went to William Cleghorn, one of several candidates 
recommended by Hutcheson.139  
 Norton in contrast thinks that the relationship between Hume and 
Hutcheson turned sour later in the 1740s and Hutcheson opposed Hume’s 
candidacy because of theological issues. Norton maintains that the 
awareness of these theological differences is what sets Norton’s 
interpretation apart from Kemp-Smith and his followers. According to 
Norton’s understanding, since this is a question that concerns Hume’s later 
career,  this  is  not  necessarily  any  proof  that  Hume  would  not  have  been  
close to Hutcheson’s understanding of sympathy at the time of writing the 
Treatise.  
 John Robertson acknowledges both of these possibilities. ‘Hume's 
letters to Hutcheson in December 1739 and March 1740 may be read as an 
ingenuous attempt to persuade the senior philosopher that the arguments 
of the Treatise were  a  legitimate  development  of  his  own.  But  it  is  also  
possible,’ Robertson writes, ‘that Hume was aware of important differences 
between them, and that his deference belied a determination to advance 
                                                        
135 Moore, ‘Hume and Hutcheson’, 1995, pp. 23–57. 
136 See the concise account of Hutcheson in Robertson, The case for the Enlightenment, 
2005, pp. 283–289. 
137 About the case of Hume’s professorship, see Emerson, ‘The “affair” at 
Edinburgh and the “project” at Glasgow’, 1994, pp. 1–22. 
138 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 Sept 1739; Hume, Letters, I, pp. 32–5. 
139 Moore, James, ‘Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/ 
14273, accessed 29 Aug 2007] 
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arguments of his own.’140 It  seems  that  Robertson  himself  is  inclined  
towards Moore on this issue.  
 Some  experienced  Hume  scholars  have  steered  clear  of  the  Norton-
Moore debate. For example, M. A. Stewart seems quite careful not to cast 
his vote before all the facts are in. On the one hand, Stewart has underlined 
the Baylean side of Hume, but on the other, concerning the differences 
between Hutcheson and Hume in ‘Hume’s intellectual development’, 
Stewart mentions that Hume met ‘the challenge of Hutcheson’s opposition 
to his psychologically founded natural jurisprudence’, but much of this 
challenge ‘was theologically motivated’.141 Hutcheson’s concern about 
theology in the light of Hume’s outright anti-clerical opinions is of course a 
sensible point to make in the light of current evidence. But it simultaneously 
leaves some of the foundational issues unresolved. 
 The issue hence has much to do with the now lost letter that Hutcheson 
sent to Hume and which we know through Hume’s reply. But the clash 
over  the  professorship  does  not  resolve  the  conflict.  We  only  know  that  
Hutcheson opposed Hume. The reason behind this without introducing any 
other evidence could equally well be a theological matter or the sceptical 
and epicurean nature of Hume’s system. Hence, some other supporting 
facts such as Hume owning a copy of Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks in the 
late 1720s, have become highly relevant in this debate about the nature of 
Hume’s moral philosophy.142 Moore or his associates have not been able to 
show how the line from Kemp Smith to Norton stressing the influence of 
Hutcheson would necessarily be incorrect. It is one purpose of this study to 
prove that already at the time before the Treatise we have good reasons to 
doubt Hume’s sincerity towards Hutcheson and whether some passages are 
actually leaning towards Hutcheson at all. 
 Regardless of the question of the differences between Hutcheson and 
Hume,  caution,  indeed,  must  be  used  when  considering  the  question  of  
professorship as evidence. It might well be that Hume’s public image as an 
‘antichristian apostle’, as Elizabeth Montagu referred to him, was the reason 
why he would not be appointed to a University post.143 For example, Adam 
Smith wrote to William Cullen in 1751 that ‘I should prefer David Hume to 
any  man  for  the  college,  but  I  am  afraid  the  public  would  not  be  of  my  
opinion, and the interest of society will oblige us to have some regard to the 
                                                        
140 John Robertson, ‘Hume, David (1711–1776)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ 
article/14141, accessed 29 Aug 2007] 
141 Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005, p. 45. 
142 Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005, pp. 38–39. 
143 Elizabeth Montagu to the Duchess of Portland, July 29 [1772?], Historical 
manuscripts commission, Calendar of the manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath, preserved at 
Longleat, Wiltshire. 3 vols., 1904, I, pp. 334–335. 
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opinion of the public’.144 By  that  time,  Smith,  of  course,  had  secured  his  
own professorship in Glasgow. 
 While Hutcheson’s relationship to Hume is a standard topic in Hume 
scholarship, what has not been covered is Mandeville’s influence on the 
young Hume. It has, nevertheless, become increasingly common to assert 
that  Mandeville  had  some effect  on  Hume’s  thinking  and to  even discuss  
‘the Mandevillian side of Hume’.145 However, these comments are usually 
supplemented with remarks such as: ‘Hume’s discussion of the natural 
character of our moral sentiments’, as this particular article notes, ‘can be 
seen as an attempt to partially rebut well-known views of Hobbes and 
Mandeville,  in  which  self-love  or  self-preservation  are  seen  as  the  primary  
motive for engagement in social and political relations’.146 Even James 
Moore, after identifying relevant similarities between Mandeville and Hume, 
points out that ‘Hume’s artificial rules were not artifices or tricks played by 
politicians and men of fashion, as Mandeville had claimed’.147 By 1729 
Mandeville  had  modified  his  position.  By  and  large,  even  when  there  are  
scholars that notice the link between Mandeville and Hume148, it is much 
more common to claim that Hume is very different from Mandeville.149 
Also  E.  J.  Hundert,  who  is  one  of  the  few  people  who  have  studied  
Mandeville  in  depth,  never  put  the  same  kind  of  effort  on  Hume,  while  
                                                        
144 Sraffa mss, H1/13, Trinity College, Cambridge. Photocopies of correspondence 
between Adam Smith, John Home, William Strahan, Joseph Black and Pat Clason with a 
"scrapbook" of printed and typescript copies of Smith's letters (15 docs), Adam Smith to 
Dr William Cullen, Edin., Tuesday, November 1751 [transcript of the letter in John 
Thomson, An account of the Life, Lectures and Writings of William Cullen. 3 vols., Edinburgh, 
1859, I, 606.] 
145 A. B. Stilz, ‘Hume, modern patriotism, and commercial society’, History of European 
Ideas, 29, 2003, p. 22. 
146 Stilz, ‘Hume, modern patriotism, and commercial society’, 2003, pp. 17–18. 
147 Moore, ‘The social background of Hume’s science of human nature’, 1979, p. 40. 
148 For example, Jerrold Seigel, ‘Self-centeredness and sociability: Mandeville and 
Hume’, in his The idea of self: thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventeenth century, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 111–139; Goldsmith, ‘Liberty, virtue, and the rule 
of law, 1689–1770’, 1994, pp. 218–219: ‘His [Hume’s] account of English history 
combined a ”modern Whig” conception of the development of the English constitution 
with a Mandevillean account of the development of civilization’; and Castiglione, 
‘Considering Things Minutely’, 1986, pp. 463–488. 
149 For works which take Mandeville’s role seriously in Hume’s philosophy, see 
especially Reindhard Brandt, ‘The beginnings of Hume´s philosophy’, in David Hume. 
Bicentenary papers, G. P. Morice, ed., Edinburgh University Press, 1977, pp. 117–125 and 
the articles of Michael Gill: Gill, ‘Shaftesbury’s two accounts of the reason to be 
virtuous’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 38, 2000, pp. 529–548; Gill, ‘Hume’s 
progressive view of human nature’, 2000, pp. 87–108; Gill, ‘A philosopher in the closet: 
reflexivity and justification in Hume’s moral theory’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, 
1996, pp. 231–256. See also Hans Lottenbach, ‘Monkish virtues, artificial lives: on 
Hume’s genealogy of morals’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1996, pp. 367–388. 
Particularly Michael Gill’s articles have gathered due attention, e.g. Alix Cohen, ‘The 
notion of moral progress in Hume’s philosophy: does Hume have a theory of moral 
progress?`’, Hume Studies, 26, 2000, pp. 109–128. 
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Maurice Goldsmith has studied Hobbes and Mandeville sagaciously, but 
leaving Hume’s science of human nature quite untouched. Hence, the role 
of  Mandeville  in  Hume  scholarship  has  been  limited  for  these  reasons  as  
well. 
 Among Hume scholars in particular it has been common to see 
Mandeville as a representative of ‘out-and-out scepticism’ that thinks that 
‘moral rules’ are ‘invented by moralists and politicians’.150 Since this has 
been the perception of Mandeville, Hume scholars naturally claim that there 
is  a  wide  gap  between  Mandeville  and  Hume.  There  are,  of  course,  
exceptions. Antony Flew points out that ‘Hume’s approach to the origin of 
social institutions’ is ‘evolutionary as opposed to creationist’ and it is ‘not 
without reason’ that Hume ‘lists Dr Mandeville among his predecessors’.151 
But  a  common  view,  as  M.  A.  Box  expresses  it,  is  that  Hume,  ‘not  only  
refutes, but disparages’ Mandevillean egoism. Regarding the question of 
why  Hume in  his  refutation  of  Mandeville  ‘never  mentions  Mandeville  by  
name’, Box conjectures that he preferred to ‘attack a movement rather than 
an  individual’  and  ‘it  was  Mandeville’s  egoism  that  would  have  come  to  
readers’ minds when Hume speaks of those ‘who have denied the reality of 
moral distinctions’.152 I  believe  that  this  is  true  in  the  sense  that  Hume  
definitely  wants  to  appear  as  if  he  was  refuting  Mandeville.  However,  the  
question is much more complicated as this study seeks to establish. It 
should also be pointed out that Hume had no problem mentioning 
Shaftesbury by name when Hume criticises those who have misunderstood 
the idea of modern civility and railed against gallantry.153 
 The question of Mandeville’s influence on Hume relates directly to the 
Norton-Moore debate. In the end, it is this question that tips the balance 
towards James Moore’s side. There are experienced Hume scholars 
balancing between Norton and Moore regarding the influence of 
Mandeville.  For  example,  John  P.  Wright  has  been  captivated  by  
Mandeville’s thinking throughout his career.154 Wright  has  for  example  
carried out a detailed comparison between Hume’s first known essay on 
“Modern honour” and Mandeville’s works pointing out that there is a clear 
                                                        
150 David Miller, Philosophy and ideology in Hume’s political thought, Oxford University 
Press,  1981,  pp.  41 and 116.  For a  recent,  perceptive reading of Hume’s relationship to 
scepticism, see Dario Castiglione, ‘Hume’s two views of modern scepticism’, History of 
European Ideas, 32, 2006, pp. 1–16. 
151 Antony Flew, David Hume. Philosopher of moral science, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 159. 
152 Box, The suasive art of David Hume, 1990, p. 243. About Mandevillean egoism, see 
also ibid. p. 245 and 253. 
153 Box has offered us an interpretation of Hume’s account of politeness that 
mistakenly links it to Addison and Steele and claims that in his letter of politeness from 
Paris in 1734 Hume prefers ‘English manners’ to ‘French’, see Box, The suasive art of David 
Hume, 1990, pp. 142–8. 
154 Already in John P. Wright, The sceptical realism of David Hume, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983, pp. 190–1 and 236–7 Wright paid close attention to the role of 
Mandeville and hypochondria in Hume’s famous letter to a doctor of 1734.  
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influence of Mandeville in young Hume.155 However, the contrasting 
conclusion that Wright makes is that Hume’s ‘moral philosophy had 
probably been largely influenced by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and it is 
their assumptions that form the philosophical conception of virtue in the 
background of’ Wright’s interpretation. I am inclined to put much more 
emphasis on the positive influence of Mandeville. 
 With regard to the younger generation of Hume scholars, Michael B. 
Gill’s  articles are invaluable.  The core of Gill’s  works has concentrated on 
the principle of the association of ideas. In an article entitled ‘Fundamental 
difference between Hutcheson and Hume’ Gill shows in detail how 
‘Hume’s associationism’ is ‘particularly revealing of his distance from 
Hutcheson’.156 In  short,  Hutcheson’s  negative  use  of  “fantastick”  
association  of  ideas  gets  a  positive  role  in  Hume’s  system  in  which  an  
original passion is not given a privileged role over an associative one as in 
Hutcheson. At the same time, Gill has convincingly argued against the idea 
of Hume’s test of morality through reflexivity.157 In other words, the system 
offered in the Treatise is non-reflective in a way that Hume’s moral system 
does not attempt any justification beyond that of explaining human action. 
This is a point that goes directly against the mainstream reading of Hume. 
 Gill has also studied the evolutionary aspect of Mandeville’s account of 
civil society in detail and agrees that, regarding the artificiality of justice, 
Hume is Mandevillean.158 What  Gill  sees  as  a  foundational  difference  
between Hume and Mandeville is that for Mandeville all morality is 
hypocritical while for Hume ‘people really do exhibit the non-self-interested 
virtue of justice’.159 I do not see this as a profound difference, as I will later 
attempt  to  establish  in  my treatment  of  justice  for  Hume.  Although Gill’s  
point about the differences between ‘static or originalist view of human 
nature’ and ‘dynamic or progressive view’ is useful, I think it is somewhat too 
categorical  a  distinction  to  be  applied  for  the  case  of  Mandeville  and  
Hume.160 Mandeville’s view is simply not as static as it might seem. 
 But it needs to be pointed out that also for Gill the aspect of theology 
and Hume’s secularism is a founding feature. Gill’s recently published book 
                                                        
155 John P. Wright, ‘Hume on the origin of modern honour: a study in Hume’s 
intellectual development’, a paper presented at the 32nd International Hume Conference, 
University of Toronto, July 19–23, 2005. I am grateful to professor Wright for allowing 
me to quote this unpublished paper and for discussions on different occasions. 
156 Michael Gill, ‘Fantastick associations and addictive general rules: a fundamental 
difference between Hutcheson and Hume’, Hume Studies, 22, 1996, pp. 23–48. Gill’s 
extremely useful work on association and Hutcheson’s relationship to Locke’s 
conception of the association of ideas is continued in Michael Gill, ‘Nature and 
association in the moral theory of Francis Hutcheson’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12, 
1995, pp. 281–301. 
157 Gill, ‘A philosopher in the closet’, 1996, pp. 231–256. 
158 Gill, ‘Hume’s progressive view of human nature’, 2000, p. 90. 
159 Gill, ‘Hume’s progressive view of human nature’, 2000, p. 98. 
160 Gill, ‘Hume’s progressive view of human nature’, 2000, pp. 99–100. 
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is about the ‘birth of secular ethics’.161 The theological conflict and context 
is implied. Also in his ‘Fundamental difference between Hutcheson and 
Hume’ Gill commences by pointing out that Hume attacks the ‘theological 
conception of human nature on all fronts’ and it is ‘out of these attacks that 
Hume develops his own “science of man”.162 Besides being anti-
Hutchesonian, this study is founded on the assumption that Hume was also 
anti-Shaftesburyan in many a sense.  
 Hume attacked theological conceptions of man, but it is the theory of 
civil society that Hume is relying on that is the decisive issue, and this ought 
to be carefully linked to an understanding of Hume’s associationism as this 
study  attempts  to  establish.  Although  Gill’s  analyses  of  Hume  are  very  
precise  and useful,  he  does  not  quite  go  far  enough.  Gill  does  not  in  fact  
establish what Hume’s theory of civil society is about, although in ‘Hume’s 
progressive  view  of  human  nature’  he  goes  a  long  way  towards  this  
direction. Gill never discusses pride or politeness. The fountainhead of 
Hume’s social theory is the analogy between self-love and pride. My point is 
that there is something substantial underneath Hume’s secularism and it is 
Hume’s reliance on the later part of Mandeville’s works.163  
 This  study  is  not  motivated  by  the  question  of  the  nature  of  Hume’s  
naturalism.164 With regard to the question of naturalism, Hume is close to 
Shaftesbury  and  might  well  have  used  him  as  his  model.  But  when  we  
advance  to  the  question  of  morals,  Hume and Shaftesbury  are  wide  apart.  
This has gone missing probably because the question of naturalism would 
make us assume that Hume is close to Shaftesbury in other respects as well. 
Hence, we may remark that Shaftesbury, Mandeville and Hume are all 
naturalist with regard to the juxtapositions between religion and the secular 
aspects of morals (unlike Hutcheson), but this has to be kept separate from 
the question of nature of morality.165 In the basic principles of morals, 
Hutcheson  and  Shaftesbury  are  much  alike  and  Mandeville  and  Hume  
belong to a different school. Then again, when considering the question of 
                                                        
161 Michael Gill, The  British  moralists  on  human  nature  and  the  birth  of  secular  ethics, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
162 Gill, ‘Fantastick associations and addictive general rules’, 1996, p. 23. 
163 Also Hume’s current biographer, James Harris (much like Gill) is inclined towards 
Moore’s side and the sceptical and “Baylean” features of Hume. James Harris, ‘Hume’s 
use of the rhetoric of Calvinism’, in Impressions of Hume, Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. 
Kail, eds., Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 141–159. However, it should also be noted 
that  it  is  quite  common to see Hume and Mandeville  as  “Baylean” writers,  what ever it  
might mean. What I find as a significant point to make is that Bayle might be an 
important background figure in many respects (and particularly regarding the 
theologically motivated debates), but I have wanted to establish the originality of later 
Mandeville and that it is him that Hume consciously follows. Hence, I dissociate my own 
position from the “Baylean” accounts. 
164 The starting point of this line of interpretation is, of course, Norman Kemp 
Smith, ‘The Naturalism of Hume’, Mind, 14, 1905, pp. 149–173. 
165 The best discussion and narrative of this development is Gill, The British moralists 
on human nature, 2006. 
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the associative principles, Hume may in some sense be seen to follow 
Locke and Hutcheson, but also Mandeville in the sense that he turns it into 
a  positive  view.  By  and large,  the  real  argument  is  that  Hume turns  all  of  
these  questions  and  different  aspects  of  early  modern  philosophy  to  fit  a  
Mandevillean system where the emergence of civil society is explained 
through the  two spheres  of  self-love  and self-liking  and how they  operate  
within the science of man. I refer to this as greatness of mind. 
Bibliography matters 
Norton has remained faithful throughout his career to his interpretation 
about  Hume’s  moral  philosophy.  But  one  change  that  we  may  note  is  an  
increasing interest towards bibliographical and historical questions in the 
later  stages  of  his  career.  While  the  interpretations  of  the  nature  of  moral  
philosophy are partly matters of opinion, the bibliographical questions are 
usually sorted our based on more concrete evidence. The best case is of 
course, if the bibliographical details support the philosophical 
interpretation. Norton’s influence as a historian and editor has been closely 
felt, and the matter of the author of the reviews of the Treatise in Bibliothèque 
Raisonnée is  just  one  example.  For  instance,  a  catalogue  that  records  some 
books of Hume’s likely reading in Norton’s The David Hume Library has 
been regarded as a significant undertaking166, and Norton has played his 
part  as  a  major  authority  on  other  bibliographical  issues  as  well,  for  
example,  he  had  the  last  word  in  recent  polemics  of  the  authorship  of  
Abstract to the Treatise in Hume Studies.167 But  the  most  important  way  in  
which  Norton  has  exercised  his  power  in  Hume  scholarship  is  by  editing  
the Treatise for the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume.168  
                                                        
166 David Fate Norton and Mary Norton, The David Hume Library, Edinburgh 
Bibliographical Society, 1996. The catalogue of the Hume library is given central 
attention for example in the chronological analysis of it in Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual 
development, 1711–1752’, 2005, pp. 37–41. 
167 David Fate Norton, ‘More evidence that Hume wrote the Abstract’, Hume Studies, 
19, 1993, pp. 271–272. Besides the polemics carried out in the 1990s in Hume Studies 
regarding the authorship of the Abstract, see the often neglected J. M. Keynes and P. 
Straffa, ‘Introduction’ in David Hume, An abstract of a Treatise of human nature, 1740, a 
pamphlet hitherto unknown, Cambridge University Press, 1938, pp. v–xxxii. It is also a very 
good history of Hume’s Treatise and, after all, it was Sraffa who found out that the author 
was Hume himself. 
168 We should also remark that much like Norton, also Moore’s own scholarly 
enterprises have since turned to the more practical side of the question of Hutcheson’s 
influence on Hume. These include editing Hutcheson, writing significant biographical 
entries of him and pondering such questions as the authorship of the reviews of the 
Treatise in Bibliothèque Raisonnée. It is interesting to notice that while the battleground is 
now largely bibliography, the core of the debate is yet the same. Norton claims that 
Hume is a Hutchesonian moral philosopher, Moore says that he is epicurean. For 
example, in a recent article on Cicero, Hutcheson and Hume, Moore explicitly states that 
he ‘proposes further that Hume’s reworking of Cicero’s De Officiis represents an 
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 Norton has emphasised the possibility that one of Hume’s concerns was 
to  publish  the  second  edition  of  the  Treatise,  towards  which  Hume  had  
made some pen-and-ink corrections to some copies of the book. Norton, 
together with his wife, who is the co-editor, has sought to establish this 
hybrid “second edition” of the Treatise. The edition is of first-rate 
scholarship. But one problem, relevant to this study, is that it incorporates 
Hume’s supposed corrections for the second edition silently without 
indicating them in the actual text. The corrections replace the originally 
published text of the Treatise as  if  there  had  been  a  second  edition.  The  
original  text  of  the  first  and  only  edition  that  was  actually  published  has  
now to be tediously sought from a supplementary volume. 
 The previous editor of the Treatise also pondered about the possibility of 
the  second  edition.  P.  H.  Nidditch  writes,  ‘I  assume  that  Hume  had  the  
intention of getting all the manuscript amendments incorporated in their 
appropriate places in a corrected new edition of the Treatise that would be 
published in the early 1740’s’.169 Yet,  Nidditch’s choice was to publish the 
manuscript amendments as an appendix incorporated into the Treatise 
instead of silently altering the original text. Nidditch also gives his learned 
opinion about the amendments:  
although the majority of Hume’s new alterations in the Hume copy are minor ones 
by way of corrections of incidental misprints or of solecisms, intended stylistic 
improvements, or rewording for the sake of somewhat greater precision or clearness, 
some others appear to represent changes of substance in his doctrines, especially in regard to his 
views of public interest and of self-interest.170 
This is no small concern, especially when considering the influence of 
Hutcheson and Mandeville. 
 Some of the alterations and additions in fact indicate an apparent 
leaning towards Hutcheson’s side. For example, regarding chastity, 
originally Hume simply wrote that ‘those, who have an interest in the 
fidelity  of  women,  naturally  disapprove  of  their  infidelity’  and  ‘those,  who 
have  no  interest,  are  carried  along  with  the  stream’.  In  a  pen-and-ink  
addition, Hume supplemented the thought with a note that reads: ‘and are 
also apt to be affected with sympathy for the general interests of society’ – a 
                                                                                                                 
expression of a long standing disagreement with his senior contemporary, Francis 
Hutcheson’. Moore, ‘Utility and humanity’, 2002, p. 366. There has also been other 
interest about the structural similarities between Hume’s and Cicero’s works. About 
Hume’s Dialogues and Cicero’s De natura deorum, see John Valdimir Price, ‘Sceptics in 
Cicero and Hume’, Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas,  25,  1964,  pp.  97–106.  About  the  terms  
used in De Officiis and Hume, see Gregory DesJardins, ‘Terms of De Officiis in Hume 
and Kant’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 28, 1967, pp. 237–242. Even when the article is 
based on Hume’s admiration of De Officiis and bibliographical details, in fact it is another 
way of exploring how Hume’s moral philosophy is not Hutchesonian at heart. 
169 Nidditch,  ‘An  apparatus  of  variant  readings  for  Hume’s  Treatise.  Including  a  
catalogue of Hume’s manuscript amendments’, 1976 [unpublished manuscript, BL], p. 
15. 
170 Emphases added. 
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sentence that is not in any particular way connected to the point that Hume 
was making.171 By and large, the word “sympathy” features four more times 
in the recently published critical edition than in the originally published 
Treatise. Public interest and general interest of society are terms that were 
also added to the text after the Treatise had been published in 1739–40. 
 Now, these added “Hutchesonian leanings” do not mean that Hume 
was in any particular way close to Hutcheson in his actual moral theory. It 
might equally well mean that Hume is (after having gone through a series of 
arguments with a senior Scottish philosopher) making some changes and 
additions that contribute to the image that his views are not that far from 
Hutcheson  after  all  –  when  in  reality  they  are.  To  put  it  in  short,  the  
influence of Hutcheson was more like pressure towards a young man to be 
politically correct while the real intellectual debt goes to Bernard 
Mandeville, a man that Hutcheson would not acknowledge as an authority. 
 I attempt to show in this study that Hume himself had a clear pattern in 
editing his works that reveals that this kind of practice was rather common 
for Hume.172 Of course, as it becomes evident from Nidditch’s remarks, 
like all editing also Hume’s was mainly stylistic. Hume’s editing rarely lead 
to express that he had actually changed his mind. But what happened often 
in  Hume’s  editing  was  that  he  took the  edge  off  some of  his  expressions  
making it more difficult to grasp the nature of some of his thoughts. Hence, 
it  is  quite  crucial  for  us  to  know  the  text  originally  published,  because  at  
times it is the clearest indication of what he actually wanted to say regarding 
certain matters. This is best shown in the subsequent editions of his Essays. 
On several different occasions, what was first published in a rather radical 
choice of words was later changed into a much “milder” form. This point 
has  gone  almost  fully  missing  because  of  the  poor  rate  of  the  modern  
editions of Essays. 
 In fact, in the case of Essays, the text of the first editions has not been 
available to the reader of the modern editions of Essays. The copy-text that 
was used in Greig and Liberty Fund edition  is  based  on  a  later  edition  
altogether.  This  has  contributed  to  the  fact  that  we  have  not  been  able  to  
clearly grasp the radical nature of the young Hume’s texts. Now, the danger 
with the new Clarendon edition of the Treatise is  that  the  same  thing  
happens with the published text and we end up with a partly toned down 
version.  When  put  together  with  all  the  other  evidence  provided  in  this  
study,  it  functions  as  an  indication  of  the  Epicurean  nature  of  David  
Hume’s system.  
 It should still be noted about the Treatise that the Clarendon edition is of 
first-rate.  The  point  that  I  want  to  make  is  that  some  caution  must  be  
exercised before getting carried away with the idea that the second edition 
                                                        
171 T 3.2.12.7; SBN 572. 
172 For brilliant examples revealing how Hume edits his History of England from an 
edition to another, see John Hill Burton, Life and correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols., 
Edinburgh, 1846, II, p. 79. 
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would immediately take us closer to what Hume in fact wanted to say for 
the reasons that I have indicated above. Also, I am not claiming, of course, 
that Norton, who is a remarkable scholar, would intentionally have left out 
some  parts  of  the  published  book.  He  just  made  a  choice  regarding  the  
readability of the published text that, in my opinion, lead to an unfortunate 
result. What this mostly concerns is the influence of Bernard Mandeville on 
the young Hume. The supposed second edition of the Treatise and the later 
editions of Essays were not the first times when Hume was taking a radical 
edge off his wordings. Perhaps the most often used evidence of the nature 
of  Hume’s  moral  philosophy  is  a  letter  to  Hutcheson  on  17  September,  
1739  in  which  Hume  makes  for  the  first  time  the  famous  comparison  
between  the  anatomist  and  the  painter  of  morals.  The  original  letter  is  
preserved  in  the  National  Library  of  Scotland  and  it  includes  important  
wordings that Hume decided to strike out.  
 Of the anatomist-painter letter we should first remark that the letter is a 
proper letter, not a polished fair-copy (like the famous “letter to the doctor” 
of  1734).  What  this  indicates  is  that  Hume  might  not  have  been  overtly  
worried about Hutcheson as an authority at this point. But as the text of the 
letter  indicates,  there  is  an  acknowledged,  major  dispute  of  moral  
philosophy at stake. In the letter Hume already outright and clearly opposes 
Hutcheson. Since Hume is writing to Hutcheson about their dispute, it 
would be natural for him to be a little cautious in order not to align himself 
too  squarely  with  the  authors  that  Hutcheson  had  made  his  career  
opposing. Hume had originally written that ‘Where you pull off the Skin, & 
display all  the minute Parts,  there appears something trivial  if  not hideous, 
even in the noblest Attitudes…’ Hume deleted the words “if not hideous” 
from the letter (but did not make them illegible). 173 These deleted words are 
not mentioned in Greig’s edition of the letters.174 
 When Hume was first saying that there is ‘something trivial if not 
hideous, even in the noblest attitudes’ this puts his original sentencing more 
towards Hobbes and Mandeville than what we might assume by reading the 
modern edition of the letters. Hence, it seems at the same time revealing 
and understandable that Hume deleted “if not hideous” from the text, even 
when he did not go to lengths to make this illegible. In the letter he already 
outright and clearly opposes Hutcheson’s way of doing things (and perhaps 
even the purpose of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy). However, he is 
thoughtful enough to moderate his opinions by deleting the words that he 
thinks would unnecessarily widen the already large gap between their points 
of  view.  This  need  not  be  the  deliberate  disguising  of  an  opinion,  but  
                                                        
173 I would like to thank Professor M. A. Stewart for confirming in private 
correspondence that my transcription of the deleted words in the manuscript is correct. I 
am also grateful to Professor Stewart for the astute point that Hume was not deliberately 
covering his views when deleting these words, otherwise, he would surely have made 
them illegible. 
174 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, NLS, MS.23151 f. 55. 
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putting  things  into  perspective,  it  seems that  Hume would  have  not  been  
too eager to put his Mandevillean ideas too bluntly to Hutcheson either. 
 But perhaps the most important deletion revealing something relevant 
about Hume’s thinking regards the manuscript of the conclusion of Book 3 
of the Treatise (T 3.3.6) that is supposed to have been sent to Hutcheson.175 
The draft also includes words that have been struck out, only this time with 
such relevance that perhaps Norton could have mentioned them in the 
Clarendon edition. Again, I am not claiming that Hume was necessarily 
trying to hide his opinions, although when examining the manuscript of 
Book 3, we may even consider this possibility. 
 In  the  draft  of  T  3.3.6.  Hume originally  wrote:  ‘The  same system may  
help us to form a just notion of the happiness,  as  well  as  of  the  dignity of 
virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature, both our selfishness 
and pride, in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality’. Previously in 
a letter to Hutcheson Hume had deleted his words that there is something 
‘hideous’  in  the  ‘noblest  attitudes’.  In  the  conclusion  of  Book  3  (also  
supposedly sent to Hutcheson) he deleted ‘both our Selfishness & Pride’ 
from the sentence indicating the principles of our nature (and hence not 
revealing what he means by the principles of our nature).  
 The observation that Hume deleted ‘both our Selfishness & Pride’ (and 
not just selfishness or pride) is important. Selfishness and pride include an 
analogy and it is vital that they are analysed together. The deletion of ‘both 
our  Selfishness  &  Pride’  was  made  after  the  manuscript  was  finished  
(judging  by  the  looks  of  it).  But  the  problem  is  that  the  wording  of  the  
sentence seems a little curious.176 Selfishness  and  pride  are  surely  not  the  
only principles of our nature that appear in Hume’s system. But perhaps we 
should  read  Hume’s  use  of  the  “every  Principle  of  our  Nature”  in  a  
different manner, so that he is not referring to all the possible principles in 
the widest meaning of the expression, but only to the most important ones. 
In  any  case,  the  sentence  should  be  read  in  such  a  way  that  Hume would  
have wanted to mention only selfishness and pride (because this is what he 
does).  In  other  words,  he  is  not  saying  that  selfishness  and  pride  are  the  
only  principles  of  our  nature,  but  he  points  them  out  specifically  because  
together they play a crucial role in Hume’s moral and political philosophy. 
Also,  the  word  “both”  in  adjunction  to  ‘our  Selfishness  &  Pride’  gives  
additional weight to the case of Hume making a point about linking these 
two  principles  of  human  nature  together.  When  we  keep  in  mind  that  
Hume made even more similar deletions later (regarding Hutcheson) in the 
Treatise, in Essays, and in the anatomist-painter letter to Hutcheson, we may 
conclude that this points clearly towards Mandeville. 
 Now, disregarding whether these are the only principles of our nature, 
these are the only ones that are indicated in the text, which also supports 
                                                        
175 In reading the manuscript I need to rely on Norton’s reproduction in the editorial 
appendix of his edition of the Treatise. 
176 Professor M. A. Stewart alerted me to this fact. 
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the case made in this study. The main argument is that Hume is following 
Mandeville in his distinction between self-love and self-liking (or selfishness 
and pride), which is only introduced in Mandeville’s later works published 
in  1729  and  1732.  It  is  crucial  hence  that  Hume  at  relevant  points  in  his  
works discusses selfishness and pride (and the derivative moral institutions 
of justice and politeness) together, which aligns him with Mandeville (the 
pre-Treatise indications of this are evident not only in the essay on modern 
honour, but also in the explicitly Mandevillean analysis of politeness in 
Hume’s  letter  to  Ramsay  in  1734).  It  is  the  link  of  self-love  to  pride  
followed  by  the  link  between  justice  and  politeness  that  is  of  central  
importance and which is only crystallized in Book 3 of the Treatise.  If only 
pride was important, this could equally put Hume together for example 
with Malebranche (or a number of French authors), but it is the distinction 
between interest and pride that makes this Mandevillean.  
 In short, selfishness and pride (together) are the main principles of our 
nature for Hume’s moral and political philosophy and they are the only 
principles of human nature that Hume mentions that explain how moral 
institutions can be drawn directly from human nature (justice in the case of 
self-love and politeness in the case of pride). Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily explain the deletion of ‘both our selfishness and pride’ in T 
3.3.6,  but  I  think  the  deletion  at  least  indirectly  supports  this  study,  even  
when  we  might  not  want  to  say  that  selfishness  and  pride  are  the  only  
principles  of  human  nature  and  that  Hume  did  not  want  to  deliberately  
disguise his opinions from Hutcheson. 
 The idea is not to deny the role of Hutcheson and to simply replace it  
with Mandeville’s name. Hume was certainly concerned about Hutcheson’s 
opinion  and  the  influence  it  might  have  for  the  reception  of  the  Treatise. 
Hume’s strategy seems to have been sending the Treatise (or its manuscript) 
to  many  influential  scholars  that  might  affect  its  reception  (Butler,  Des  
Maizeaux…) It does make sense that even when Hume’s moral theory has 
its  roots  elsewhere  than  in  the  Hutcheson’s  writings,  Hume still  would  be  
pointing out the similarities in their philosophy in his personal 
correspondence. Norton is correct in many of his points about Hume’s idea 
about  the  origin  of  morality.  I  just  don’t  know  if  this  actually  supports  
Norton’s overall interpretation to draw the link between Hutcheson and 
Hume and the dissimilarities between Mandeville and Hume. The more 
subtle point that I want to make is to show that the change in Mandeville 
affects the interpretation of Hume.  
 In the words of M. A. Stewart,  ‘although’ Hume ‘was seeking his own 
independence of mind, there is no evidence that Hume had yet abandoned 
the ancients’ conception [mainly Cicero and the Stoics] of the philosophical 
enterprise when, around his eighteenth birthday (April 1729), he was 
confronted with ‘a new Scene of Thought’.177 Reinhard Brandt made a 
                                                        
177 Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005, p. 29. 
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similar observation.178 What  Brandt  was  indicating  was  the  influence  of  
Mandeville in Hume. But what has not been considered is that this is also 
the very time when Part II was published. There is a strong likelihood that 
reading  the  later  works  of  Mandeville  might  have  been  one  reason  for  
Hume to adopt a more sceptical perspective around the time when Part II 
was published (the title is just the publishers way to cash in, the work and 
the theory is separate from the provocative 2nd edition of The Fable of the 
Bees of 1723. This is something that I think a man with a sharp mind like 
Hume’s  would  have  noticed,  if  he  got  his  hands  on  the  book.  
Chronologically, this is also quite plausible.). We have to keep in mind that 
the relevance of Part II (independent of the original Fable) remained as a 
well-established fact in eighteenth-century Scottish thought. Adam Smith 
wrote a famous letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review in 1755. Smith 
quite fittingly points out that ‘the second volume of the Fable of the Bees 
has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau’. Now, what I find fitting 
is not only that Smith has his finger on the right book, but the fact that he 
wrote this in 1755, which was the first time that there was such a thing as a 
printed ‘second volume of the Fable’. The first Edinburgh edition came out 
that year and it was the first time in England that the two parts of The Fable 
were issued together. The young Hume’s intellectual development took 
place in a world where The Fable of the Bees and Part II were two different 
works. 
Introduction to A treatise of human nature 
Hume’s ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise has  been  called  his  ‘earliest  work’.179 
The momentous point of the introduction is Hume’s claim that he is about 
to ‘march up directly to the capital or center’ of all the branches of science, 
‘to  human  nature  itself’.  Hume  exclaims  that  he  is  going  to  ‘explain  the  
principles of human nature’ and it  is this ‘science of man’ that ‘is  the only 
solid foundation for the other sciences’.180 According to Hume, there is ‘no 
question of importance’ in ‘logic, morals, criticism, and politics’ that could 
not  be  ‘compriz’d  in  the  science  of  man’  and  human  nature  itself.181 
Additionally, Hume points out five modern authors ‘who have begun to put 
the science of man on new footing’.182 The list includes Locke, Shaftesbury, 
                                                        
178 Brandt, ‘The beginnings of Hume´s Philosophy’, 1977, pp. 117–127. Also Stewart 
acknowledges that the relevance of ‘new Scene of Thought’ is ‘well made in’ Brandt’s 
article, which is (in the words of Stewart) ‘one of the best analyses so far of the letter to 
the physician’. Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005, p. 29, 
footnote 56. 
179 Frederick Whelan, Order and artifice in Hume’s political philosophy, Princeton 
University Press, 1985, p. 83. 
180 T Introduction 6–7; SBN xvi. 
181 T Introduction 5–6; SBN xvi. 
182 T Introduction 7; SBN xvii. 
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Hutcheson, Mandeville and Butler.183 It was quite provocative from Hume 
to include Mandeville in these ranks, especially when we know his personal 
relationship with Mandeville’s nemesis Francis Hutcheson.184 In 1737, 
Hume wrote a letter to Henry Home explaining that he is ‘at present 
castrating’ his Treatise and ‘cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it 
shall give as little Offence as possible’.185 Despite this self-censorship, 
Mandeville’s name remains next to Hutcheson’s in the published work. 
There had to be a significant reason for Hume to indicate Mandeville as the 
predecessor for his ‘science of man’-project when he knew that this might 
damage his relationship with Francis Hutcheson and be contrary to his own 
interest.  
 I  find  it  as  a  sign  of  intellectual  integrity,  that  Hume  did  in  fact  
acknowledge his debt to Mandeville. Of the above mentioned authors, it is 
only Mandeville who makes a similar sketch about ‘science of man’. When 
discussing politics in Part II,  Mandeville  wrote  a  line  for  his  spokesman  
Cleomenes that encapsulates the essence of his later works: ‘When I have a 
mind  to  dive  into  the  origin  of  any  maxim’  established  ‘for  the  use  of  
society in general, I don’t trouble my head with enquiring after the time or 
country, in which it was first heard of, nor what others have wrote or said 
about  it;  but  I  go  directly  to  the  fountain  head,  human nature  itself’.186 In 
other words, Mandeville’s idea is that if we understand human nature, we 
understand the political principles in any given society. Thus, studying 
human  nature  is  the  first  science  for  Mandeville,  and  it  is  also  the  
foundation of politics.  
 Of  course,  this  is  not  to  say  that  Hume  would  be  Mandeville  in  
disguise.187 Hume’s scope of the ‘science of man’ is much more ambitious, 
ingenious and complex.188 Most  importantly,  the  science  of  man  in  the  
Treatise is a vast project of the philosophy of mind covering aspects ranging 
from causal inference, aesthetic thought to social theory and politics. 
Nothing that Mandeville ever wrote can be compared to this. However, it is 
not  my intention  to  explain  the  science  of  man in  its  entire  magnitude  or  
make claims about the essence of the science of man. I am concentrating on 
                                                        
183 The same list of philosophers also features in the T Abstract.2; SBN 646. 
184 I also find it crucial that Thomas Hobbes is not on the list, and Bernard 
Mandeville is. If Hume had thought, like plethora of the modern commentators, that 
Mandeville is merely Hobbes’s shadow, most likely he would have done homage to 
Hobbes, not Mandeville. 
185 David Hume to Henry Home, 2.XII 1737, Hume, New letters, p. 2. 
186 Mandeville, Part II, p. 128. 
187 David  Fate  Norton  has  reminded  the  ‘readers  of  Hume’  to  ‘be  wary  of  those  
commentators who engage in the kind of historical reductivism that claims to unlock the 
secrets of Hume’s thought by reference to one or two authors or one intellectual 
tradition’. David Fate Norton, ‘An introduction to Hume’s thought’, in The Cambridge 
companion to Hume, David Fate Norton, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 13. 
188 Although, it also changed after Hume had written his introduction, which means 
that we cannot possibly indicate what extensions of science of man Hume had in mind 
before applying it to different directions. 
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its social, moral and political dimensions. When we focus our attention on 
the conjectural history of civil society and social theory, I contend that we 
find  significant  points  in  common  with  Mandeville’s  later  works  and  the  
Treatise,  which makes it  evident that perhaps they should be interpreted in 
the same tradition. 
  
  
5. Social theory of A treatise of human nature 
Modern scholars are often quick to downplay Mandeville’s influence on 
Hume, although the only serious criticism that Hume directs towards the 
Dutchman in the Treatise is that all the moral distinctions cannot be the 
inventions of clever politicians. As we have learned, Mandeville’s position 
considerably changed as he advanced to theorise about civil society in the 
dialogues between Cleomenes and Horatio. I have been arguing that we 
may plausibly maintain that Mandeville revised his opinion of the arbitrary 
role of the politicians in Part II and developed a hypothesis where justice 
and politeness are explained as decisive, artificial moral institutions based 
on previous human conventions. In the end the question about moral 
distinctions turns out to be of minor significance compared to the nature of 
artificial virtues, which in Hume’s words plainly ‘arise from interest and 
education’.1 
 Before  engaging  the  features  that  are  peculiar  to  David  Hume’s  
thinking, we first need to establish his relation to Bernard Mandeville more 
particularly. A good point to commence is the argument that supposedly 
separates the Scotchman from Mandeville. Hume is careful to let his 
audience  know  that  he  censures  the  idea  that  all  moral  distinctions  are  
artificial inventions putting distance between himself and the controversial 
reputation of The Fable of the Bees. Towards the end of the Treatise, in a part 
entitled ‘Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices’, Hume indicates that 
there have been ‘some philosophers’ who think that ‘moral distinctions’ 
only arise ‘when skilful politicians endeavour’d to restrain the turbulent 
passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions 
of honour and shame’.2 As Hume publicly announces, he does not endorse 
the view where ‘all moral distinctions’ are represented ‘as the effect of 
artifice and education’. He explicitly dismisses such ‘system’, because it is 
not ‘consistent with experience’.3 Modern scholars have taken careful notice 
of  this  and  it  is  commonplace  that  ‘Hume  forcefully  rejects  “the  selfish  
philosophy” then associated with Hobbes and Mandeville’.4 The 
anamorphosis in the prevailing interpretations derived from the remarks of 
                                                        
1 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483. 
2 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578. 
3 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578. 
4 Krause, ‘Hume and the (false) luster of justice’, 2004, p. 641. 
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Hume’s relationship towards Mandeville is that Mandeville had arrived to 
the same conclusion ten years earlier. 
 Hume introduces  two observations  to  counter  the  claim that  all  moral  
distinctions have been invented by skilful politicians. According to his 
interpretation, in the selfish system all the ‘virtues and vices’ are thought to 
have  a  ‘tendency  to  the  public  advantage  or  loss’.5 Since Hume maintains 
that there are other virtues as well, some, for example, that are agreeable or 
useful to the person itself and not in anyway to the public, he claims that in 
this  respect  the  selfish  system  is  not  plausible.  Hume’s  second  point,  and  
what modern scholars have taken as the factor that rigorously distinguishes 
Hume from Mandeville, is the existence of moral vocabulary. Hume 
indicates that if men did not have any ‘natural sentiment of approbation and 
blame, it cou’d never be excited by politicians; nor wou’d the words laudable 
and praise-worthy, blameable and odious,  be  any  more  intelligible,  than  if  they  
were  a  language  perfectly  unknown  to  us’.6 It  seems  to  be  that  Hume’s  
explicit intention is to make the case that anyone claiming that all moral 
distinctions are artificial is wrong, because we have a comprehensive moral 
vocabulary  and thus  there  has  to  be  at  least  some natural  sentiments  that  
approve and disapprove certain qualities without any external, socially 
binding force.7 Hume argues this point on three different occasions, twice 
in the Treatise and once in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.  
 I do not want to claim that the argument about moral vocabulary would 
not be an important point in the Treatise. It certainly puts distance between 
Hume and the reception of The Fable. However, I cannot see how this point 
alone would separate Hume’s interpretation of civil society and social 
theory in Mandeville’s revised vision. In his later works, Bernard Mandeville 
was  happy  to  admit  that  there  is  at  least  one  thoroughly  natural  virtue  in  
human nature,  natural  affection.  And when we see  this  in  the  light  of  the  
1720s  criticism,  we  notice  that  Hume’s  position  actually  differs  very  little  
from the stance taken in Part II.8 
 Hume’s criticism leads us directly to the heart of the matter, natural and 
artificial virtues.9 Why are certain virtues called natural? Hume makes it 
plain to see that the foundation of a natural virtue is human nature. When 
there is an original motive implanted in our nature to act in a virtuous 
manner, this particular virtue is natural. When we detect a sign of what we 
take  to  be  a  virtuous  motive  in  others,  we  instinctively  approve  it.  This  
approving  sentiment  is  natural  and  arises  without  the  aid  of  education  or  
social experience. Since there are certain inclinations to act in a virtuous 
                                                        
5 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 578–9. 
6 T 3.3.1.11; SBN 579. 
7 About Butler and the argument of moral vocabulary, see p. 126 above. About 
Hutcheson on the same topic, see p. 121. 
8 About natural affection and earlier and later Mandeville and 1720s ciriticism, see 
pp. 79, 105–107, 117–122, 126, 129–131, 156–158, 172–173 and 175 above. 
9 About Mandeville and natural and artificial in Part II, see pp. 162–164 above. 
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manner regardless of artificial conventions and public instruction, we 
cannot  claim  that  all  moral  distinctions  are  the  effect  of  artifice  and  
education. He explains that, for example, humanity is a natural virtue and 
‘when I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive’10 and 
even  if  there  ‘was  no  obligation  to  relieve  the  miserable,  our  humanity  
wou’d  lead  us  to  it;  and  when  we  omit  that  duty,  the  immorality  of  the  
omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments 
of humanity’.11 Hume  makes  the  case  for  natural  virtues  much  more  
forcefully when discussing a father, who takes ‘care of his children’.12 
Taking  care  of  his  children  is  the  man’s  ‘duty’,  but  he  also  has  ‘a  natural  
inclination to it’.13 Natural virtues in Hume’s system are exactly what 
Hutcheson and other virtue theorists understood by virtue in general. I can 
see no interpretative difficulties regarding the nature of natural virtues. 
When stressing that parental affection is a natural quality, Hume conforms 
to  the  standard  case  of  the  natural  affection  pinpointed  by  Butler,  
Hutcheson and Balguy among others.14  
 In his influential interpretation of Hume’s moral theory, John Mackie 
has argued that ‘natural virtues’ are ‘after all’ only ‘a further set of artificial 
virtues’.15 I think that this interpretation is somewhat problematic, because 
it seems to miss the meaning of the distinction between these two classes of 
virtues and, in a sense, takes an inequitable shortcut regarding the question 
of moral motivation.16 Natural affection is the only active natural virtue that 
operates  at  the  beginning  of  the  civilising  process  or  in  a  barbarous  age.  
Most of the other natural virtues are latent features of human nature, which 
can easily be accounted as a reason not to pay particular attention to them 
when  focusing  on  the  origin  of  human  society.  The  latent  quality  of  the  
majority of the natural virtues is also apparent. For example, Hume’s 
favourite example of humanity may only become effectual in a civil society, 
due  to  outward  circumstances.  This  does  not  mean  that  men  would  not  
originally  have  the  seeds  of  these  inclinations,  only  that  it  takes  time  and  
social development before men are placed in a situation where they become 
effective.  This  also  explains  why  he  claims  that  through  the  circle  of  
                                                        
10 T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579. 
11 T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518. 
12 The great ‘Force of natural Affection’ also features in Hume’s Early Memoranda. 
Hume, David, ‘Early Memoranda, 1729–1740: The Complete Text’, Ernest Campbell 
Mossner, ed., Journal of the History of Ideas, 9, 1948, p. 503. 
13 T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518–9. 
14 About Mandeville and natural affection in Part II, see pp. 156–157 above. 
15 Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 123. 
16 How can natural virtues ‘counteract’ the ‘effects’ of ‘confined generosity’, if 
confined generosity is crucially caused by natural virtues i.e. natural affection? To me it 
seems that Mackie’s account of natural virtues overemphasises psychological role of 
pleasure for Hume. Natural virtue is a natural virtue because we are naturally motivated 
to act accordingly and we naturally approve this type of behaviour in others. This is clear 
enough and I do not think that there is anything to be added to this in order to 
understand what natural virtues are. 
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refinement only the contemporary Europe has become effectively humane, 
whereas  for  example  the  ancient  Greece  had  remained  barbarous  in  this  
respect.17 But it would be futile to debate whether humanity or brutality are 
original features of human nature because either one of these traits can be 
seen to actualise in a given society depending on the circumstances. It is the 
question of controlling these overall circumstances that is the heart of the 
matter.  In  other  words,  the  advancement  of  artificial  moral  institutions  
provides the means for securing self-love and balancing economic 
development, which in turn gives the foundation for cultivating natural 
virtues  in  a  proper  manner.  Without  the  circle  of  refinement  and  the  
foundational role of artificial moral institutions this would remain 
impossible. 
 Hume gives us a clarifying example in his Essays where he outlines that 
there are two kinds of moral duties. There are, on the one hand, ‘those, to 
which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, 
which  operates  on  them,  independent  of  all  ideas  of  obligation,  and of  all  
views, either to public or private utility’. Such duties are ‘love of children, 
gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate’.18 This conforms precisely 
to  the  principal  arguments  of  the  1720s  criticism towards  Hobbism.19 On 
the other hand, there are also other ‘moral duties’ that ‘are not supported by 
any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of 
obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the 
impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected’.20 To  put  it  
simply, natural virtues are those beneficial acts that men are naturally 
inclined to perform and we consequently have natural sentiments that 
approve such motives that set men to perform these actions. 
 But perhaps the most influential recent reading of Hume’s distinction 
between natural and artificial virtues has been given by Schneewind in his 
Invention of autonomy.21 Schneewind inteprets this distinction as a direct 
continuation of Grotius’s distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. 
Even when this distinction might be indirectly influenced by the natural law 
tradition,  we  need  to  realise  that  it  was  widely  used  by  the  1720s  moral  
philosophers, who were not necessarily participating in any discussion on 
rights and the natural law. To discuss natural and artificial virtues was 
simply a common feature of the ongoing debate.  
 Another common contemporary way to interpret the distinction 
between natural and artificial virtues is to take Hume’s words at face value 
and point out that the actual difference is that natural virtues ‘produce good 
on each occasion of their practise’ and are approved ‘on every occasion’, 
                                                        
17 I will treat this central aspect of Hume’s historical thought in detail below in 
‘Ancient v. modern’. 
18 Hume, ‘Of the original contract’, in Essays, p. 479. 
19 About 1720s criticism of Hobbism, see pp. 116–131 above. 
20 Hume, ‘Of the original contract’, in Essays, p. 480. 
21 Schneewind, The invention of autonomy, 1998, p. 365. 
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whereas some instances of artificial virtue might “be ‘contrary to the public 
good’ and be approved only as it is entailed by ‘a general scheme or system 
of  action,  which  is  advantageous’  in  so  far  as  it  conforms  to  one  of  the  
general rules we have been disposed to form.”22 This is indeed what Hume 
tells his audience after he had laid out the conjectural development of civil 
society, where he vehemently questions the relevance of our natural moral 
principles. When describing the civilising process, Hume is not highlighting 
the similarities between natural and artificial virtues, he is stressing the 
apparent conflict between our natural ideas of morality (that include natural 
virtues) and artificial moral institutions.  
 When  we  understand  that  Hume  is  adopting  a  familiar  form  of  
argument when discussing natural virtues, we also realise that the actual 
concessions that he makes towards Hutcheson are very slight. The question 
at hand is not whether there are some virtues that we may call natural. The 
heart  of  the  matter  is  whether  the  foundational  virtues  of  justice  and  
politeness are natural. Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, claims that a 
natural sentiment of universal benevolence is the foundation of justice, thus 
justice is a natural virtue. David Hume categorically maintains that ‘there is 
no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind’.23 He argues that 
‘public benevolence’, ‘regard to the interests of mankind’ or ‘private 
benevolence’ cannot be the ‘original motive of justice’24 and therefore ‘we must 
allow’  that  this  virtue  is  ‘not  deriv’d  from  nature’.  Instead,  it  arises  
‘artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human conventions’.25 I 
cannot  see  how  this  would  be  in  anyway  decidedly  different  from  what  
Mandeville was advancing in Part II. 
 The link to Mandeville’s later theory becomes apparent when one 
realises the role natural virtues actually play in the Treatise. The premises that 
Hume places in the first savage state are altogether familiar in Mandeville’s 
discussion on the same subject. The first crucial point that distinguishes 
Mandeville’s and Hume’s account from the modern natural law theory 
concerns the concept of state of nature. Mandeville pointed out that we 
should not overemphasise the contrast between the state of nature and civil 
society because the children of the first wild couple are already born into a 
social state.26 Thus, we can use the idea of state of nature as a hypothetical 
device.  David  Hume  also  emphasises  that  the  ‘state of nature’ should ‘be 
regarded  as  a  mere  fiction’  and  if  we  want  to  utilise  this  concept  in  our  
reasoning we have to write about ‘suppos’d state of nature’ instead of an 
                                                        
22 Norton, David Hume. Common-sense moralist, 1982, p. 16. T 3.3.1.12; SBN 579. 
23 T 3.2.1.12; SBN 481. 
24 T 3.2.1.13; SBN 482. 
25 T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483. 
26 About the contrast between family and civil society in Mandeville, see p. 161–162 
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actual condition.27 Like Mandeville, when discussing the first savages, Hume 
uses the concept of ‘wild uncultivated state’ instead of state of nature.28  
 In his discussion on the first family society (a wild couple and their 
children) Mandeville singled out three original principles: lust between 
sexes, instinct of sovereignty and natural affection. It is a significant part of 
his theory of the civilising process that the first family was formed relying 
completely  on  the  natural  principles  of  human  nature.  Lust  is  the  first  
principle that naturally draws the wild couple together. The instinct of 
sovereignty, that governs all their actions, makes them send their children to 
labour for their few needs. And, finally,  natural affection, which is defined 
as a lasting and other-regarding passion that restricts our behaviour and can 
even  make  a  savage  man  sacrifice  his  life  for  his  children’s  sake,  plays  an  
important  role  in  various  ways,  not  only  in  the  development  of  a  family  
society, but also at later stages of the civil society.29 Hume’s  remarks  are  
remarkably similar. ‘Natural appetite betwixt the sexes’ is underlined as the 
primary ‘necessity’ of the association between human beings. The first wild 
family has a natural bond, because the parents are always guided by ‘natural 
affection’, which for example restrains ‘the exercise’ of ‘the authority’ that 
‘they bear their children’30 and it is precisely the ‘passions of lust and natural 
affection’  that  seems  to  render  the  ‘union’  within  the  savage  family  
‘unavoidable’.31 He also stresses that this ‘requisite conjunction’ is partly 
disturbed by ‘other particulars’ of human nature and ‘outward circumstances’. It 
is,  of  course,  our  ‘selfishness’ that is maintained as ‘the most considerable’ 
aspect of ‘our natural temper’ and which is considered the greatest obstacle in 
an established society.32 This is remarkably close to Mandeville’s description 
of the first private family.33 Our  selfish  principles  are  perceived  as  the  
governing feature of human nature, but because of other natural passions, 
namely lust between the sexes and natural affection towards kin – without 
any assistance from the artificial institutions – the first private family is able 
to function as a coherent unit. 
 After pinning down that selfishness is the dominating feature in human 
nature, Hume is quick to seemingly balance the accounts by declaring that 
he does not think ‘that men have no affection for any thing beyond 
themselves’.34 According to the testimony given by Hume, even though ‘it  
be  rare  to  meet  with’  a  person  ‘who  loves  any  single  person  better  than  
himself;  yet  ‘tis  as  rare  to  meet  with  one,  in  whom all  the  kind  affections,  
taken  together,  do  not  over-balance  all  the  selfish’.  Hume  carries  the  
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thought further and begs his audience to ‘consult common experience’: 
Isn’t it evident that even when ‘the whole expense of the family be generally 
under the direction of the master of it’,  most of these masters ‘bestow the 
largest  part’  of  their  fortune  ‘on  the  pleasures  of  their  wives,  and  the  
education of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own 
proper use and entertainment’?35 Now,  instead  of  jumping  to  the  
conclusion that Hume detaches himself from Mandeville’s egoistic system, 
we  should  stop  to  think  what  he  is  actually  saying.  As  we  recall,  Hume  
strictly denies that there would be such a ‘passion in human minds, as the 
love of mankind’.36 Instead, he exhausts the point that ‘we are naturally very 
limited in our kindness and affection’.37 Even when the  role  of  the  other-
regarding affection is buttressed with overwhelming eloquence, in Hume’s 
system the affections that the savages have do not reach strangers. When 
we remember that a similar answer had been given by Mandeville in Part II 
to the 1720s criticism, the radical content of Hume’s argument turns out to 
be all the more striking. According to Hume, naturally generous feelings are 
confined  within  the  family.  And  what  this  means  is  that  Hume  does  not  
make any more compromises towards Hutcheson than Mandeville does. 
They  are  both  emphasising  the  significance  of  ‘natural  affection’  and  the  
unifying passion between the sexes. This point can also be confirmed in 
Hume’s treatment of passions in Book 2 of the Treatise, where ‘love’ 
between ‘sexes’ is described as natural38 and  ‘the  affection  of  parents  to  
their  young’  ones  to  proceed  ‘from a  peculiar  instinct’  in  all  ‘animals’,  not  
just men.39 Thus, it  hardly comes as a surprise that the only natural virtue 
that has significant relevance in this civilising scheme is encapsulated in the 
example  of  a  parent,  who  takes  ‘care  of  his  children’,  because  he  has  ‘a  
natural inclination to it’.40 Hume indeed makes a bustle of the fact that in 
his system there is a place for natural virtues. Nevertheless, when discussing 
the  common  propensities  for  human  mind  in  a  civilised  and  an  
‘uncultivated state’, the only original principles that he singles out are 
‘selfishness and limited generosity’.41 Against  this  background,  it  is  
understandable that other natural virtues are a simple catalogue in the 
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Treatise. Perhaps we should draw an even sharper conclusion and state that 
the  role  of  the  original,  other-regarding  passions  of  human  nature  are  
analogous in Part II and the Treatise.  
 But  instead  of  just  noting  that  Hume  should  be  read  in  Mandeville’s  
context,  we  need  to  analyse  his  position  further.  What  he  is  doing  is  far  
more outspoken, analytic and radical than what Mandeville proposed. 
Hume  turns  the  two  passions  that  are  ‘evidently  implanted  in  human  
nature’, ‘affection betwixt the sexes’42 and ‘natural affection’ towards 
children, into ‘confined generosity’ and explains how it vaguely touches all 
our loved ones in general.43 After he has uttered that ‘this generosity must 
be acknowledg’d to the honour of human nature’, he comes up with a twist 
that  turns  the  argument  on  its  head.  Hume  argues  that  ‘so  noble  an  
affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to 
them,  as  the  most  narrow selfishness’.  The  sole  intention  of  the  civilising  
process, and a considerable part of Book 3 of the Treatise, is to explain how 
men  are  integrated  into  civil  society.  Instead  of  eulogising  the  natural  
virtues, Hume is claiming that all the generosity that we naturally have 
stands in stark contrast with large societies, since ‘each person loves himself 
better  than  any  other  single  person,  and  in  his  love  to  others  bears  the  
greatest  affection  to  his  relations  and  acquaintance,  this  must  necessarily  
produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of 
actions’.44 Thus,  what  he  manages  to  do  is  to  tie  our  selfishness  and  
confined generosity together and, significantly, coin them as our ‘natural 
uncultivated ideas of morality’45 that  are  fundamentally  opposed  to  civil  
society. These natural ideas of morality are often conflicting with civil 
society for the plain reason that in their partiality they stand in contrast with 
the artificial moral institutions that are not based on any natural inclination 
of human nature.46 After analysing these uncultivated principles for three 
pages or so, he reaches the unambiguous conclusion that our natural ideas 
of  morality  ‘instead  of  providing  a  remedy  for  the  partiality  of  our  
affections,  do  rather  conform  themselves  to  that  partiality,  and  give  it  an  
additional force and influence’.47 
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 Mandeville and Hume made two interrelated conceptual distinctions: 
the first between a small and large society, and the second between natural 
morality and artificial moral institutions. The purpose of stressing these 
divisions is to explain an understanding of morality based on a pluralist 
system, where our selfishness and natural partiality are kept under control. 
This is also the reason why Hume vehemently stresses that ‘the generosity 
of  men  is  very  limited’  and  ‘it  seldom  extends  beyond  their  friends  and  
family, or, at most, beyond their native country’.48 We cannot suppose that 
our  system  of  justice  could  be  based  on  our  natural  benevolence,  which  
would  only  mean  that  it  excludes  most  of  humanity  from  its  scope.  It  is  
remarkable that both Mandeville and Hume forcefully attack the pre-
eminent position of natural generosity in the prevailing ethical systems, 
which, in their opinion, would interfere with a more equal way of deciding 
what is right and wrong. Their idea is to explain how men began their moral 
development, in a wild and uncultivated state, from natural morality fully 
based on natural motives, and how, during the long course of the civilising 
process,  they  are  forced  to  face  the  fact  that  their  natural  judgement  is  
always  partial  and  tied  to  the  circumstances  (no  matter  how right  it  might  
feel). Hence, men eventually come to fix particular artificial rules restricting 
the movement of their natural passions. The immediate consequence of this 
paradigmatic  change  in  morals  is  that  men  are  able  to  advance  their  own  
interests, which in turn creates a new sense of a moral need for upholding 
the  system  that  does  not  depend  on  their  partial  judgement,  but  that  it  
nevertheless serves their self-interest. This is what conjectural history of 
civil society is all about and this is what I want to study in detail, now when 
we have realised that this development, in the strict sense of the term, is 
fully dependant upon the artificial principles. 
No non-moral motive for artificial virtues 
According to David Hume, justice is an artificial virtue that is founded on a 
previous human convention. Bernard Mandeville made a similar 
hypothesis.49 Before  we  start  examining  what  Hume  says  about  artificial  
virtues and the conjectural development of moral institutions, we need to 
make one specific clarification that will considerably help our task. Not only 
do we have to look for a foundation other than human nature for moral 
institutions that enable the civilising process, we also have to realise that we 
simply cannot find a natural (or non-moral) motive for these artificial 
virtues because Hume states that it does not exist.  
 What is still creating unrest among the philosophically oriented 
commentators is the supposed tension between Hume’s overall definition 
of morality and artificial virtues. In what way is an artificial virtue to be 
considered a virtue? Before introducing the possibility of a virtue that does 
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not  have  its  origin  in  human  nature,  Hume  writes  that  ‘no action can be 
virtuous,  or  morally  good,  unless  there  be  in  human  nature  some  motive  to  produce  it,  
distinct from the sense of its morality’.50 What  causes  a  problem  is  that  a  few  
pages later he seems to refute his own system of morals by stating that ‘we 
have naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, 
but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be 
equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, 
there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle’.51 Some 
philosophers, interested in ‘humean’ morality, have taken the requirement 
of a non-moral motive behind a virtuous action highly seriously and 
painstaking efforts have been put on different explanations of how Hume’s 
system of ethics meets this criteria or how it fails to do so.52 This  is  
problematic because Hume unambiguously closes his analysis by stating 
that instead of looking for some separate motive ‘we must allow, that the 
sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature’.53  
 In my reading this condition simply does not apply to artificial  virtues.  
Or  to  put  it  more  explicitly,  according  to  Hume,  it  is  dangerous  to  think  
that it would. The intensely examined part where he seems to be applying 
the requirement of a non-moral motive to artificial virtues is an illustration 
of what requirements justice would have to meet, if it were a natural 
virtue.54 To  make  such  a  claim  is  not  a  strategy  to  work  my  way  around  
Hume’s circle argument, instead I am contending that in his system it is 
relevant that we do not suppose that artificial virtues have to meet this 
criteria.  What  Hume  is  doing,  is  to  point  out  that  there  is  a  significant  
difference between natural and artificial virtues. If we do not realise this and 
think  that  artificial  virtues  have  to  have  their  motivating  basis  on  human  
nature in the same manner as natural virtues, this will lead us to confusion 
and, as Hume points out,  the scheme of justice,  and other artificial  virtues 
that are regulated by general rules, are jeopardized. Hence, the idea of 
natural (or non-moral) motives behind an artificial virtue is not only 
confusing, it is also harmful.  
 Hume argues this in his third point of the section entitled ‘Some farther 
reflexions concerning justice and injustice’. He examines what happens if 
we make the mistake of thinking that an artificial  virtue is founded on the 
common principles of human nature i.e. on some natural motive. He claims 
first that in ‘the ordinary course of human actions’ the mind is never 
restrained  ‘by  any  general  and  universal  rules’  and  acts  according  to  ‘its  
present motives and inclination’.55 The circumstances always define our 
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naturally motivated judgement and, as a consequence, ‘if on some 
occasions’ we try to ‘form’ strictly from our own experience ‘something like 
general rules for our conduct’ what always happens is that ‘these rules are not 
perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions’.56 Any rules that we are 
able to form from particular experience in ‘the ordinary course of human 
actions’ are only ‘something like general rules’ and not general rules per se. In 
contrast,  as  Hume  underlines,  ‘the  laws  of  justice’  are  ‘universal  and  
perfectly inflexible’, thus, they ‘can never be deriv’d from nature’ nor could 
they ‘be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination’.57 
Hume  is  very  clear  about  our  incapacity  to  form  a  coherent  system  of  
justice based on our natural passions. 
 As  I  pointed  out,  the  reason  why  this  section  is  significant  is  not  the  
commonplace that justice, according to Hume, is an artificial virtue, but the 
explicit proof that he is trying to convince his audience why we should not 
try to look for non-moral motives behind artificial virtues. After making the 
above-mentioned analysis, he turns to consider an example of a ‘dispute for 
an estate’, where one of the quarrellers is ‘rich, a fool’, ‘a batchelor’ and ‘my 
enemy’; ‘the other poor, a man of sense’, who ‘has a numerous family’ and 
is ‘my friend’.58 The  whole  point  of  this  example  is  that  it  is  staged  as  an  
examination of what happens to civil society if we were to base our rules of 
justice on our natural sentiments of morality, which are the only non-moral 
motives that we have. The consequences would be disastrous. For 
argument’s sake, and not because it is his own premise, Hume takes up the 
position that ‘no action can be either morally good or evil, unless there be 
some natural passion or motive to impel us to it, or deter us from it’, which 
is the same requirement of a non-moral motive that he suggests in section 
3.2.1.59 The  conclusion  that  he  draws  from  this  premise  is  evident.  If  we  
were  to  solve  the  dispute  based  on  our  ‘natural  motives’,  we  ‘must’  do  
whatever we can ‘to procure the estate to’ the poor family man.60 This is of 
course contrary to Hume’s idea of justice. In real life we have to be able to 
also  consider  ‘the  right  and  property  of  the  persons’  that  restrains  our  
judgement,  instead  of  trusting  our  natural  motives.  We  need  an  inflexible  
general  rule  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  way  we  would  naturally  feel  
about right and wrong, which is not a constant principle, as he points out, 
but varies according to the circumstances. If ‘all property depends on 
morality’  and ‘all  morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions 
and  actions’,  and  these,  in  turn,  ‘are  only  directed  by  particular  motives’,  
Hume  concludes  that  it  is  ‘evident’  that  ‘such  a  partial  conduct  must  be  
suitable  to  the  strictest  morality,  and  cou’d  never  be  a  violation  of  
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property’.61 Thus,  if  we  were  taking  the  suggested  premise  as  a  real  one,  
without exception in this particular example our judgement would transfer 
the  estate  to  the  poor  man,  regardless  of  the  question  of  ‘rightful’  
ownership. Justice based on any natural motives would always be partial. As 
one  would  expect,  this  is  an  absurd  claim  and,  as  he  in  his  conclusion  
indicates, this is not his position, but a demonstration of what would 
happen if someone, no matter how earnestly, tries to construct a system of 
justice trusting his natural understanding. In short, this person would always 
end up building his system of justice on natural motives, which are ‘a very 
improper foundation for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature’.62  
 Thus,  the  point  is  that  if  men  were  able  to  brush  aside  all  the  
impressions of the artificial moral rules derived from education, they turn to 
consult their original principles and act according to the way they naturally 
feel  about  what  is  right  and  wrong,  which  would  mean  that  all  they  are  
doing is to ‘conduct themselves’ by ‘particular judgements’ that ‘wou’d 
produce an infinite confusion in human society’ and ‘the avidity and 
partiality  of  men wou’d  quickly  bring  disorder  into  the  world’.  This  is  the  
reason  why  justice  is  not  based  on  natural  motives  and  men  need  to  be  
‘restrain’d by some general and inflexible principles’. Since justice cannot be 
partial and our natural motives always lead us to a partial judgement, there 
is no primary non-moral motive that artificial virtues are based on. Instead, 
‘men have establish’d’ certain ‘principles’ in order ‘to restrain themselves by 
general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular 
views of private or public interest’.63 Hume carries on and states that ‘these 
rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to 
the common principles of human nature, which accommodate themselves 
to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of operation’.64 The 
‘laws  of  nature’  are  not  founded  on  natural  motives.  They  ‘can  only  be  
deriv’d from human conventions, when men perceiv’d the disorders that 
result from following their natural and variable principles’.65  
 The opening section of part II of Book 3 of the Treatise, where Hume 
first picks the topic of justice, has understandably gathered vast attention 
from  scholars  and  it  might  certainly  seem  as  if  he  was  imposing  the  
requirement of a non-moral motive for any ethical theory, including his 
own description of artificial virtues. Even though the section is admittedly 
very curiously written, it only demonstrates what conditions an artificial 
virtue would have to meet if it was a natural virtue. Nevertheless, what does 
quite effectively prove that he is only putting forward a hypothetical 
premise is the reductio ad absurdum argument that I have just analysed, which 
demolishes the idea that our sense of justice could be based on any ‘natural 
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motive’. Here Hume specifically attacks the idea of justice based on a 
‘natural  motive’.  If  we  carefully  read  what  Hume  writes  about  the  
requirement of a non-moral motive, in the section 3.2.1, we recognise that it 
only ‘appears’ that ‘all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous 
motives’ and this ‘first virtuous motive’, as he emphasises ‘must be some 
other natural motive or principle’.66 If this was also a requirement for 
artificial virtues, Hume’s system would not make any sense whatsoever. But, 
as  he  goes  on  to  explain,  the  requirement  only  concerns  natural  virtues,  
such as ‘natural affection’67, and it cannot hold true for the artificial virtues 
that are ‘not deriv’d from nature’, but arise ‘artificially, tho’ necessarily from 
education, and human conventions’.68 And what is more, since he even 
emphasises that we should not look for natural motives for artificial virtues, 
because it would be confusing and harmful to our established system, I 
think that we may conclude that the requirement for a non-moral motive 
does not apply to artificial virtues. 
Conjectural development of artificial moral institutions 
In order to understand Hume’s Treatise, more importance has to be placed 
on the different transitional phases introduced in Hume’s account of the 
conjectural history of civil society. Hume was not a Hobbist contractian or 
an advocate of the four stage theory. Yet, the distinctions between different 
kinds  of  societies  make  all  the  difference  for  Hume’s  understanding  of  
natural and artificial virtues alike.69  
 Hume  agrees  with  Mandeville  that  in  a  sense  the  ‘very  first  state  and  
situation’  of  a  savage  ‘may  justly  be  esteem’d  social’.70 Without any 
hesitation he emphasises that ‘the state of society without government is 
one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction 
of many families’.71 Hobbes claims that we only find a social condition in a 
civil  society  that  is  based  on the  infallible  role  of  the  sovereign.  Thus,  we  
should take notice of how far from the Hobbist world Hume’s social 
thought evolves. Mandeville explains already that relying on the natural 
principles implanted in human nature the first wild family expands into a 
clan that would coexist without any fixed government. Like Mandeville, 
Hume  emphasises  that  ‘all  societies  on  their  first  formation’  are  ‘so  
barbarous and uninstructed’ that ‘many years must elapse before these 
cou’d encrease to such a degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of 
peace and concord’. Hume’s attention is focused on making the distinction 
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between small, clan-based societies and large civil societies. Only ‘an 
encrease of riches and possessions’ would eventually force men to stop 
relying on their natural bonds.72  
 It is against this divisional background that we have to analyse the well-
known fact that, according to Hume, it is ‘by society alone’ that a ‘man’ may 
overcome his ‘unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity’ and 
‘raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a 
superiority above them’.73 The first state of society is extremely barbarous, 
yet the artificial moral development starts already then. Since Hume 
practically annuls the role of any generosity that we naturally have by 
equating it  to our most narrow selfishness,  the problem is of course, how 
do  men  acquire  such  a  foundation  of  morality  that  functions  in  a  large  
society. One detail that Hume explicates much more comprehensively than 
Mandeville (which is of course understandable since Hume’s medium was a 
treatise and Mandeville’s a dialogue) is how radical the idea of artificial basis 
for  morality  actually  is.  The  idea  of  artificial  virtues  is  to  get  men  to  act  
contrary to their original principles, natural sentiments and at times against 
their natural understanding of morality implanted in human nature. People 
might not grasp how uncompromising a suggestion this actually is, because 
they  are  used  to  living  in  a  society  where  laws,  custom  and  honour  have  
replaced natural conscience and men are inclined to prefer invented rules to 
the natural turn of mind. However, in the eighteenth century this idea was 
more  sweeping  than  stating  that  all  moral  distinctions  are  artificial.  When  
we recognise the effective contrast between natural and artificial virtues, it 
becomes apparent that at times we need to put aside the inclinations that 
are  original  in  our  nature  and  choose  a  system  that  has  been  artificially  
invented by men. The dichotomy between natural and artificial virtues is 
more devastating to the ‘Hutchesonian’ system of benevolence than a 
Hobbist outright moral scepticism that claims that all moral principles are 
artificial inventions.  
 Another common feature of Mandeville and Hume’s descriptions of the 
conjectural history of civil society is that they both firmly circumscribe the 
role of reason in the civilising process. Hume writes that in the ‘wild 
uncultivated  state’  it  is  ‘impossible’  that  savages  ‘by  study  and  reflexion  
alone’  would  ‘be  able  to  attain’  the  knowledge  of  the  ‘advantages’  of  
‘society’.74 The point is not that the savages are unable to use the faculty of 
reason. The point is rather that men can only learn from experience, thus, 
the role of reason cannot be on the central  stage when the history of civil  
society  is  played  out.  In  both  of  these  naturalistic  accounts  the  role  of  
reason in the civilising process is severely limited and replaced by social 
experience. 
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 The  question  about  civil  society  and sociability  concerns  our  passions.  
Precisely like Mandeville, Hume points out that a critical change occurs in 
the first children compared to their wild parents. ‘Custom and habit’ start to 
operate ‘on the tender minds of the children’ and ‘in a little time’ they make 
‘them sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from society’.75 As 
we recall, one defining quality of a sociable creature for Mandeville is an 
insatiable desire to meliorate his condition. In the Treatise, Hume brings 
forward  the  very  same  feature.  This  desire  is  such  a  dominating  
characteristic of human nature that Hume goes on to declare that men 
would  ‘never  be  so  foolish’  as  to  agree  upon  anything  but  in  hopes  of  
‘bettering their own condition’.76 Relying on this theoretical backdrop 
Hume states that by the generous aid of ‘custom and habit’ the children are 
‘by  degrees’  fashioned for  society  and slowly  start  to  rub  ‘off  those  rough 
corners and untoward affections’ that prevent ‘their coalition’.77 Hume 
instructs his audience that ‘insensibly and by degrees’, within the course of 
many generations men eventually become ‘sensible of the misery’ of ‘their 
savage and solitary condition’. Instead of guarding their natural liberty, 
people recognise ‘the advantages that wou’d result from society’, seek ‘each 
other’s company’ and make ‘an offer of mutual protection and assistance’.78 
Thus, the motive to seek society is that men have ‘become sensible of the 
infinite advantages that result from it’, and simultaneously, ‘from their early 
education in society’ they acquire ‘a new affection to company and 
conversation’ that will slowly start moulding the self-image of men to be 
tenaciously dependent upon the opinion of others.79  
 The description of the process and the focus of the conjectural history 
of civil society are similar (or partly identical) in Part II and the Treatise, but 
so is the intellectual scenario that explains how this historical development 
of artificial  moral institutions takes place. In both of them, the role of the 
countervailing passions is set forward as the primary civilising devise. The 
idea  is  to  play  the  passions  against  themselves.  What  is  more,  the  passion  
that  has  to  be  redirected  is  not  only  our  self-love  or  self-interest,  but  also  
self-liking or pride. A remarkable feature of the Treatise is  that  it  
meticulously follows Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and self-
applause. Hume, like his Dutch predecessor,  adopts the idea that there are 
two original selfish passions in human nature that need to be regulated by 
strict rules in order to be cultivated, the direct ‘passion of self-interest’80 and 
the indirect passion of pride.81 Civil  society,  according  to  this  outline,  
derived perhaps from Pierre Nicole and (what some scholars have come to 
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call) the neo-Augustinian tradition, is built by nurturing these passions. The 
point  is  that  these  two  distinct  passions  are  the  cause  of  the  two  
corresponding moral institutions. Every civil society is forced to form these 
two  general  outlines  of  artificial  morality,  because  of  the  passion  in  
question. Previously, justice and politeness have both been singled out as 
important virtues for Hume.82 Nevertheless, justice and politeness have not 
been interrelated or connected. So far no one has pointed out the apparent 
symmetry between the passions and the equivalent artificial virtues, nor that 
for Hume they are two sides of the same coin.  
 When  making  the  distinction  between  self-love  and  self-liking  we  are  
referring to two different passions. Most of the other artificial  virtues that 
Hume studies in detail, such as promise-keeping, allegiance and the laws of 
nations are part of justice or directly derived from it. They all belong to self-
love. In addition, Hume’s system allows other artificial virtues such as 
chastity. However, the intellectual framework underlying chastity is 
different from justice and politeness. The idea in chastity is to solely curb 
the  passion  of  lust,  whereas  in  both  justice  and  politeness  the  idea  is  to  
cultivate the passion in question.83 Hume tells his audience that even when 
‘the  fundamental  laws  of  nature’  (i.e.  justice)  ‘impose’  a  ‘restraint’  on  ‘the  
passions of men’, in fact they ‘are only a more artful and more refin’d way 
of satisfying them’.84 The same holds true for politeness,  where the idea is 
that  ‘good-breeding’  requires  ‘that  we  shou’d  avoid  all  signs  and  
expressions, which tend directly to show’ the passion of ‘pride’.  However, 
‘pride,  or  self-applause’  is  ‘always  agreeable  to  ourselves’  and  ‘thus  self-
satisfaction  and  vanity  may  not  only  be  allowable,  but  requisite  in  a  
character’.85 In the case of justice and politeness, Hume introduces an idea 
of  a  circle  of  refinement,  where  the  moral  institution  strengthens  as  the  
passion of self-love or self-liking is encouraged. This redirected spiral is 
altogether familiar in Mandeville and can be seen as a naturalistic 
development of Pierre Nicole’s neo-Augustinian outline. According to 
Hume,  in  order  for  everyone  to  be  able  to  cultivate  their  pride,  ‘we  must  
carry  a  fair  outside,  and  have  the  appearance  of  modesty  and  mutual  
deference in all our conduct and behaviour’, while the actual feeling that we 
nurture is diametrically opposite to this theatrical mask.86 There  is  little  
doubt that concerning the pivotal artificial virtues, Hume was setting 
forward  the  idea  of  cultivating  the  passions  in  question  by  redirecting  its  
course.  
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 The passions of self-interest (self-love) and pride (self-liking) are not to 
be  confined  but  advanced,  and  the  idea  is  to  ‘prevent  the  opposition’  of  
these  passions  and not  to  curb  them.  In  a  large  society,  without  giving  ‘a  
new direction’ to these ‘natural passions’87 through the laws of nature and 
rules of good-breeding, society would disperse. Only at this point the idea 
of morality, which is essentially an inclination to follow these rules, comes 
to play.  When ‘justice’  is ‘esteem’d an artificial  and not a natural virtue’,  as 
Hume famously maintains, ‘honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the 
place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same 
effects’.88 In other words, what Hume is doing in his Treatise is countering 
the common eighteenth-century understanding of justice and politeness as 
natural virtues and aiming for a Mandevillean goal, the circle of refinement, 
where the end is that men can give a boost to their pride and spring it into 
new spheres with the generous aid of material wealth, which consequently 
leads society to a situation where manners and customs are reciprocally 
refined. 
 The distinction between the two self-regarding passions has gone 
unnoticed for the simple reason that Hume mainly concentrates on justice 
in Book 3 of the Treatise. He had plausible reasons to do this. Hume might 
have adopted the distinction between self-interest and pride from 
Mandeville, but he develops this theory of civil society considerably. By 
explaining how our self-love is a direct passion and pride indirect, he makes 
it obvious that controlling the unbound movement of our self-love is the 
primary object in any large society. Since ‘interest’ is the ‘passion’ that is the 
hardest to restrain, ‘the convention for the distinction of property, and for 
the stability of possession’ is prescribed in ‘all circumstances the most 
necessary to the establishment of human society’. An indirect passion, on 
the other hand, does not set men immediately into action, and ‘vanity’ is not 
directly destructive to society and can be considered ‘a bond of union 
among men’.89 Thus,  justice,  according  to  Hume,  is  the  foundational  
artificial virtue and it is understandable that Hume mainly concentrates on 
explaining its position in civil society in Book 3 of the Treatise, even when it 
is only one of the ‘virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means 
of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and 
necessities of mankind’.90 This  is  also  understandable  when we remember  
the importance placed on the natural law tradition (and justice) in Scottish 
Universities at the time. 
 Nevertheless, Book 3 is not only about justice. Hume makes an explicit 
analogy  between the  two primary  moral  institutions  by  stating  that  ‘as  we  
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establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and 
prevent the opposition of self-interest’, in a similar manner, ‘we establish 
the rules of good-breeding,  in  order  to  prevent  the  opposition  of  men’s  pride,  
and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive’.91 He  does  this  in  a  
section crucially entitled ‘Greatness of mind’. I take this analogy (that Pierre 
Nicole had already been pointing at) to be one of the main components of 
our understanding of Hume’s moral and political thought. One could not 
express with more clarity that there are primarily two self-regarding 
passions that need to be redirected by general rules in order to enable men 
to cultivate the passions in question better. Furthermore, if instead of 
analysing  what  Hume  writes  in  Book  3  of  the  Treatise,  we  also  take  into  
account Book 2, ‘Of the passions’, we realise the relevance of pride.  
 Hume explains why it  is that we establish in the same way the rules of 
justice that we come to form the rules of good-breeding that essentially are 
meant  to  hide  the  sentiments  of  our  pride.  The  rules  of  politeness  that  
prohibit men showing their pride are originally formed for the same reason 
as laws of justice. It is ‘our own pride, which makes us so much displeas’d 
with the pride of other people’. The reason why we find the exposed 
‘vanity’ of other people ‘insupportable’ is ‘merely’ the fact that ‘we are vain’ 
also.92 This is the point that Mandeville was stressing just a few years prior 
to  this.  We have  to  be  able  to  cultivate  our  vanity,  in  a  similar  manner  as  
our avidity,  without disturbing the pride of others.  According to Hume, if  
had  to  depend  on  our  good-nature,  benevolence  or  simple  regard  for  the  
public, this would be utterly impossible. Instead, the rigid rules of good-
breeding ought to do the trick that natural virtues or our implanted ideas of 
morality  never  could.  The  artificial  virtue  in  this  case  also  creates  an  
inclination to follow the rules of politeness once they have been established 
for  some  time.  We  have  no  interest  to  follow  them  before  we  have  
developed an inclination to be polite towards people in general except for 
the fact that we are concerned about our reputation and aware that through 
sympathy other people will spontaneously counter an unpleasant feeling 
when they  meet  with  impolite  behaviour.  We are  proud and vain,  but  our  
need  to  use  artificial  means  to  disguise  these  inner  feelings  is  of  first  
importance.  
 The distinction between self-love and self-liking also explains why 
Hume’s idea of justice solely concentrates on property.93 He has also other 
methodical tools to explain our social existence. The entire burden of 
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sociability does not lie on justice and it is the centrality of pride that 
explains,  to  a  large  extent,  the  motivation  to  follow  the  rules  of  justice.  
Thus,  some of  the  significant  points  that  Hume is  making  are  exactly  the  
same ones that Mandeville was previously pressing. It is highly relevant that 
justice and politeness are recognised as interrelated concepts and seen as 
part of the same gradually advancing scheme of conjectural history. I will 
first treat the more familiar question of justice with some novel points and 
then  I  will  turn  to  politeness.  The  idea  is  to  show  how  politeness  was  a  
foundational theme for Hume already before the Treatise and how he 
developed this discussion in his works. 
Self-love and justice 
When  studying  Hume’s  idea  of  justice,  we  should  not  forget  that  he  is  
developing his analysis as a conjectural history. I find the interpretations 
that take Book 3 of the Treatise as a systematic ethical theory confusing. One 
persistent problem is the commonly and obscurely used idea of the 
prevalence of “enlightened self-interest” in his system.  
 A good reason why we have to be cautious when analysing the idea of 
self-interest in the Treatise is that we should not mistake it with another line 
of answers to Hobbism, based on a fully different view of human nature.94 
It was the likes of Ralph Cudworth that introduced the argument of (what 
we tend to call) enlightened self-interest as an immediate response to 
Thomas  Hobbes.  Cudworth  proclaimed  that  he  is  set  out  to  overrule  the  
idea  that  private  ‘self-interest  is  the  primary  measure  and  standard  of  our  
actions’.95 According  to  Cudworth,  our  true  self-interest  counters  this  
mistaken idea. Cudworth claims that when ‘self-interest’ is ‘rightly 
understood and taken in its due latitude’, it does ‘not only’ denote men ‘in 
private capacitys, but also as political and sociable creatures’. This, in turn, means 
that ‘what is term’d self-interest’  falls  ‘in  with  the  last  end  and  greatest  
happiness of nature’.96 Thus,  the  greatest  public  good  is  our  true  interest  
and, according to Cudworth, reasonable men are able to pursue this end.  
 What  stands  in  contrast  between  Cudworth  and  Hume’s  account  is  
evidently the role of reason, but most importantly, the actual gap between 
these different lines of thought is created by the contrasting conceptions of 
human nature.  Hume would  not  agree  with  Cudworth’s  analysis  of  men’s  
‘social’  and  ‘political’  capacity  and  how  they  are  ‘by  their  nature  and  
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condition sociable’, in other words, that men are ready to naturally prefer the 
greater good to their private self-interest.97 According to Hume, we do not 
have an implanted principle that points towards the greatest public good. 
 To use the concept of enlightened self-interest as a generalisation of 
Hume’s social thought is misleading, because it turns Hume into a quasi-
rationalist, who thinks that predominantly in large, civil societies men are 
able to reasonably pursue their long-term interests and control their self-
love (even if we would not be equating the long-term interest to public 
good). Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the Treatise. Something 
more dynamic and external than an individual understanding of long-term 
interests is needed in large societies in order to make men respect the 
property  of  complete  strangers.  The  whole  point  of  artificial  virtues  is  to  
explain how people act according to the established rules, even when it is 
hard to think of anything that would be ‘more fluctuating and inconsistent’ 
than ‘the will of man’98 and  ‘human  conduct’,  in  general,  ‘is  irregular  and  
uncertain’.99 Furthermore, since Hume emphasises that it is common in 
large societies that men ‘act knowingly against their interest’  and ‘the view 
of the greatest possible good does not always influence them’, we have to 
realise that the concept of enlightened self-interest is not the cornerstone of 
his system.100 The  key  is  to  understand  that  there  is  a  comprehensive  
difference between how a convention of justice is first established in a small 
society and how it will eventually function in a large society. Self-interest is 
the first motive to act in a judicious way in simple and rude societies, but its 
role changes when people enter into societies, which have to be managed by 
government and controlled by inflexible laws.  
 ‘Society’, Hume writes, is ‘absolutely necessary for the well-being of 
men’101 and its ‘chief advantage’ is ‘the improvement’ of ‘such possessions 
as we have acquir’d by our industry and good fortune’. In other words, 
society  is  first  meant  to  serve  (in  the  strict  definition  of  the  concept)  our  
self-interest.  If the main benefit  of civil  society concerns self-love, it  is  the 
very same source that is also seen as the ‘chief impediment’ for society, 
because this passion creates the ‘instability’ of the ‘possession’ of goods that 
are scarce.102 According to Hume, it is ‘certain, that self-love, when it acts at 
its  liberty,  instead  of  engaging  us  with  honest  actions,  is  the  source  of  all  
injustice and violence’.103 This  problem  of  ‘instability’  is  inherent  to  any  
human society because of human nature. No set of ‘moralists or politicians’ 
could ever overcome the fact that a man is a selfish creature.104 We  are  
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‘naturally  selfish’,  unable  to  change  our  nature  and  never  ‘induc’d  to  
perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some 
reciprocal  advantage,  which  they  had  no hope  of  obtaining  but  by  such  a  
performance’.105 We  cannot  undo  our  selfishness  and  the  only  thing  that  
can  be  done,  and  has  to  be  done,  is  to  correct  and  restrain  ‘the  natural 
movements’ of this passion.106 Thus, David Hume invokes the conjectural 
development of justice to explain how the movement of the interested 
passion  was  redirected  by  establishing  the  ‘fundamental  laws  of  nature’107 
that  ‘are  as  necessary  to  the  support  of  society’  as  society  is  to  our  self-
interest;  and  how  these,  in  turn,  provide  the  basis  for  the  laws  of  society  
that conclude the conjectural development of the artificial virtue of 
justice.108  
 An informative question of Hume’s idea of the evolution of justice, is 
how  men  come  to  realise  that  ‘we  make  much  greater  advances  in  the  
acquiring possessions’ when we are simultaneously ‘preserving society’, 
instead of ‘running into the solitary and forlorn condition’ that leads to 
‘violence’ and ‘universal license’?109 The  answer  is  two-fold.  When  first  
establishing the convention that gives rise to the idea of justice men have to 
have an impression of some sort of concrete material advantage. But once 
justice  has  been  forged  into  a  universal  principle  guarded  by  the  laws  of  
society, men no longer necessarily need to (or at times could) be conscious 
of this interest.110 Provided that they have been educated in a civil society, 
they will have such sentiments that approve of acts performed by other 
people  that  are  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  justice  and  disapprove  of  
such  that  are  not.  Moral  sentiment  that  arises  from  education  is  not  a  
sufficient  motive  to  act  according  to  the  laws  of  justice.  It  only  approves  
and disapproves actions performed by other people. Granted, it does 
indirectly affect the actions that we perform ourselves, but without social, 
physical  and  fiscal  sanctions,  fear  of  reproach  towards  our  character  and  
loss of self-liking, this moral sentiment alone would never turn out to be a 
moral  obligation.  Thus,  we  may  detect  two  stages  of  justice  in  the  
conjectural history of civil society. These stages follow the fundamental 
division between small and large societies and concern the ‘natural’ and 
                                                        
105 T 3.2.5.8; SBN 519. The case is crucially different, of course, with our loved ones 
and friends, who are not ‘strangers’ or neither do we hope to reap advantage from them 
in order to show our kindness. They belong to the sphere of our confined generosity, 
which indeed is natural and unselfish by nature. 
106 T 3.2.1.10; SBN 480. 
107 i.e. justice as an extended definition covering the ‘stability of possession’, ‘its 
transference by consent’ and ‘the performance of promises’ 
108 T 3.2.6.1; SBN 526. 
109 T 3.2.2.13; SBN 492. 
110 About similar idea of “unconscious” actors in Mandeville, see pp. 170–171, 173 
and 186 above. For a similar idea in Butler (see p. 127 above) and in Nicole (pp. 142–145 
above). 
SOCIAL THEORY OF A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
 
257 
‘moral obligation’ of justice.111 I  will  now  turn  to  examine  this  question  
starting with the first convention that takes us from the impression of 
interest to the idea of justice.  
 According to Hume, there is no original ‘principle of human mind’ that 
could ‘make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances’. 
If men in wild condition somehow acquired an ‘idea of justice’ without the 
impression of the underlying interest,  this could ‘never’  inspire them ‘with 
an equitable conduct towards each other’.112 In  order  to  be  motivated  to  
establish  a  convention  that  stabilises  property,  men need  a  vivid  image  of  
the  fact  that  this  convention  of  justice  is  within  their  interest.  In  a  small  
society men arrive to this impression by concrete rewards instead of 
abstractly realising the advantages of society. Since ‘the principal 
disturbance  in  society  arises  from’  external  goods,  Hume  emphasises  that  
men ‘must seek for a remedy’ that ‘can be done after no other manner, than 
by a convention enter’d into by all the members of the society to bestow 
stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in 
the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and 
industry’.113 We  should  notice  how  accurately  Hume  follows  the  idea  of  
countervailing passions. His description of the first establishment of the 
convention of justice fully adheres to the idea that ‘there is no passion’ that 
would be ‘capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very 
affection itself, by an alteration of its direction’.114 Thus, Hume is also able 
to conclude that it is the same passion of ‘self-love’ (that first rendered ‘men 
so incommodious to each other’) that now takes ‘a new and more 
convenient direction’ and produces ‘the rules of justice’. Remarkably, it is 
also  the  same  passion  that  is  ‘the  first motive of their observance’.115 In 
other words, the ‘real origin’ of those ‘rules’, which determine ‘property, 
right, and obligation’ is ‘self-love’.116 And with a reference to a small society, 
Hume  concludes:  ‘every  one  knows  what  he  may  safely  possess;  and  the  
passions are restrain’d in their partial and contradictory motions’.117  
 There are few important points that we may notice in this basic account. 
First of all, this description concerns only small societies and the beginning 
of the conjectural development of justice.118 Hume  stresses  that  ‘all  the  
members  of  the  society’  have  to  enter  this  ‘convention’.  Hume  is  an  
outspoken and well-known critic of the contract theory and he definitely 
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did not make such claims concerning a large society.119 However, there is 
no  reason why we should  not  read  the  remark  about  ‘all  the  members  of  
society’ literally, when we remember what Hume is in fact doing. We have 
to realise that Hume is here dealing with small clan-based societies and not 
analysing civil society in general. When discussing ‘natural obligation to 
justice’ i.e. ‘interest’ in section 3.2.2 the discussion concentrates solely on 
the first instance of the convention of justice being established in a natural 
society, where all the connections between the members of the society are 
personal.120 In  this  family  based  society  (that  Hume  also  dubbed  ‘narrow  
and contracted society’) everyone is affiliated with each other and the 
members are still largely affected by their natural generosity.121 This  is  the  
reason  why  also  the  examples  that  Hume  invokes  are  particular  and  
concrete, such as the famous case of the ‘two men’ pulling ‘the oars of the 
boat’,  who  ‘do  it  by  an  agreement  or  convention’  even  when  ‘they  have  
never given promises to each other’.122 If  we  take  these  examples  out  of  
context and try to use them as an illustration of Hume’s system as a whole 
and  of  his  idea  of  justice  in  general,  we  have  managed  to  totally  
misunderstand  his  intentions.  Only  when  we  realise  that  Hume  is  talking  
about small, uncultivated societies we may without difficulty talk about 
enlightened self-interest, which means that these simpletons are consciously 
following their rules of justice,  because the small  number and plainness of 
their social relations makes it hard for them to lose sight of what is within 
their interest. Thus, it is understandable that Hume describes the first rise of 
justice as a relatively easy, although gradual, process. Hume outlines that 
‘every  member’  of  this  primitive  ‘society  is  sensible’  of  the  ‘interest’  of  
stabilising property. A person expresses this sentiment to his ‘fellows, along 
with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition 
that  others  will  do  the  same’.  Therefore,  nothing  else  is  a  ‘requisite  to  
induce  any  one  of  them  to  perform  an  act  of  justice,  who  has  the  first  
opportunity’.  This,  in  turn,  ‘becomes  an  example  to  others’.  It  is  in  this  
manner that ‘justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; 
that  is,  by  a  sense  of  interest,  suppos’d  to  be  common  to  all,  and  where  
every single act is perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the 
like’.123  
 Thus, we may notice how neatly Hume is able to close the circle of the 
first foundation of ‘justice’ that ‘takes its rise from human conventions’124 in 
small societies, by concluding that it is evident that ‘only from the selfishness and 
confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, 
                                                        
119 This is widely accepted, the dissenting voice is David Gauthier, ‘David Hume, 
contractarian’, The Philosophical review, 88, 1979, pp. 3–38. 
120 T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489. 
121 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499. 
122 T 3.2.2.10; SBN 490. 
123 T 3.2.2.24; SBN 498. 
124 T 3.2.2.16; SBN 494. 
SOCIAL THEORY OF A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
 
259 
that justice derives its origin’.125 Later,  when  emphasising  the  role  of  the  
government in the ‘execution and decision of justice’, Hume points out that 
enlightened self-interest might enable ‘two neighbours’  to ‘agree to drain a 
meadow’, but it is ‘very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand 
persons shou’d agree in any such action’.126 He  invokes  such  examples  to  
prove his point about the idea of enlightened self-interest that operates 
smoothly in small  society can no longer be regarded as the basis of justice 
when the society has grown out of its wretched and uncultivated beginning. 
By and large, we need to take a completely different approach when 
examining how justice functions in large societies.  
Moral sentiments in large societies 
If  Hume’s  idea  of  self-interest  and  large  societies  is  different  from  
Cudworth’s analysis of enlightened self-interest, another eighteenth-century 
Scottish philosopher that in an important way concurs with Cudworth’s 
view is Francis Hutcheson.127 As  we  know,  in  one  sense  Hutcheson  has  
rightly been interpreted as Hume’s predecessor, since he diminishes the role 
of reason in moral philosophy by emphasising the function of moral 
sentiments. Logically, Hutcheson’s overall account partly differs from 
Cudworth’s staunch vindication of reason. Nevertheless, and more 
importantly, it is the uniform understanding of human nature that brings 
these interpretations of moral propensities together and distinguishes them 
clearly from Mandeville and Hume. This contrast becomes obvious when 
we compare their ideas about how a large society is able to function.  
 Hutcheson’s solution for large societies, like Cudworth’s, is 
unproblematic. The idea of universal benevolence is an overriding concept 
in  Hutcheson’s  system.  He  is  quick  to  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  
‘mankind’, in simple terms, is ‘capable of large extensive ideas of great 
societies’.  In order to support this idea, Hutcheson proposes that it  ‘is’  duly 
‘expected’ from men that ‘general benevolence should continually direct and 
limit, not only their selfish affections, but even their nearer attachments to others’. 
In other words, according to Hutcheson, our confined generosity does not 
stand in contrast with the public interest and the ‘desire of publick good, and 
aversion to publick misery’  in  the  natural  course  of  human  actions,  it  
overcomes the ‘desire of positive private advantages’. Universal benevolence 
forces men to ‘abstain from any action which would be positively 
pernicious or hurtful to mankind, however beneficial it might be to themselves, 
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or their favourites’.128 Hutcheson bases the motive of virtuous action on the 
passion of universal benevolence. Nevertheless, we should notice that 
Hutcheson  comes,  in  a  crucial  way,  close  to  Cudworth’s  analysis.  
Hutcheson claims that because of the succinct taxonomy of human 
passions, men can trust their faculty of reason regarding the preference 
between right and wrong and they are able to choose actions that are within 
the best interest of the public. The role of passions plays a foundational part 
in Hutcheson’s outlook, but he is also turns back towards an analysis similar 
to Cudworth’s and equates the public good to enlightened self-interest. 
However, Hutcheson was not the only one applying this strategy. It seems 
that one way of solving the problem of confined generosity was simply to 
deny  that  ‘the  partiality  implanted  in  us  to  our  own interests  and welfare’  
would be ‘an inclination’ that interferes ‘with the publick good’.129 
 Curiously, according to Hutcheson, it is the ‘power of reason and 
reflection,  by which we may see what course of action will  naturally tend to 
procure us the most valuable gratifications of all our desires, and prevent any 
intolerable or unnecessary pains’.  The  ‘course  of  action’  that  ‘naturally’  
provides  us  with  ‘the  most  valuable  gratifications  of  all  our  desires’  is  the  
one that creates the largest amount of the public good. Since our happiness 
is dependent upon the public good that comes through our actions, and it is 
the faculty of reason that directs the course of actions, I cannot see how 
Hutcheson’s account, of a man in a large society would in this sense differ 
from  Cudworth’s  theory.  Instead,  this  line  of  thought  produces  a  
justification for Hutcheson to conclude that we naturally ‘have wisdom 
sufficient to form ideas of rights, laws, constitutions;  so  as  to  preserve  large  
societies in peace and prosperity, and promote a general good amidst all the 
private interests’.130 In  other  words,  Hutcheson’s  position  is  diametrically  
opposite to David Hume, who in his Treatise makes the case that it is the 
artificially established rules, originally formed to serve our private interest, 
that define our moral sentiments. In contrast, as Hutcheson put it, it is our 
natural, other-regarding sentiments that define the rules that guard civil 
society. 
 It seems that Hutcheson thought that large societies do not provide any 
considerable challenge to his moral philosophy. Men are wise and 
reasonable and if they follow their moral sense, the civil society will remain 
a peaceful and happy place. Even when Hutcheson finds the question about 
men in large societies unproblematic, this is one of the weakest points of his 
moral theory. As Hume implies, why would we have to place any emphasis 
on laws, if we had universal benevolence? If you ‘encrease’ the ‘benevolence 
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of men’ to ‘a sufficient degree’ the whole institution of ‘justice’ is rendered 
‘useless’.131 As  modern  day  interpreters,  we  have  to  bring  this  explicit  
difference out clearly, and if we do not make a rigid distinction between the 
line of answers to Hobbes that Hutcheson was pursuing, and the altogether 
different  position  that  Hume  and  Mandeville  held,  we  lose  sight  of  the  
highly  relevant  split  between  a  man  in  small  societies  and  a  man  in  large  
societies.  
 Hume makes explicit the division between small and large societies and 
what  effect  it  has  upon  moral  sentiments.  Self-love  and  the  sense  of  an  
immediate advantage, induce men in small societies to naturally ‘lay 
themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce 
more safe and commodious’. The first motive to form a convention of 
justice is self-interest that ‘on the first formation of society’  is ‘sufficiently 
strong  and  forcible’  to  guide  the  actions  of  these  uncivilised  men.  In  
contrast with this uncultivated society, Hume sees that problems 
concerning justice start to occur when ‘society’ becomes ‘more numerous’ 
and increases ‘to a tribe or nation’. The immediate ‘interest’ becomes ‘more 
remote’, and men no longer ‘perceive, that disorder and confusion’ that 
follow ‘upon every breach of these rules’ that they used to detect ‘in a more 
narrow and contracted society’. However, if men are brought up to respect 
an established convention of justice that generations of men have followed, 
they might ‘frequently lose sight of’ the ‘interest’ of ‘maintaining order’ of 
their ‘own actions’, but they would ‘never fail to observe the prejudice’ they 
‘receive’ from ‘the injustice’ done by others.132  
 This indeed is an interesting point.  What we disapprove of in others is 
what we might be more than tempted to do ourselves.  Or, putting it  even 
more succinctly, we might be unaware that we are breaking the rules 
ourselves, but we would still have a disapproving moral sentiment towards 
others  that  are  guilty  of  the  same  injustice.  When  analysing  this  idea,  we  
should remember that Hume is not in the business of colouring and 
recommending moral virtues. Instead, he is explaining the human 
understanding of morality.133 Thus, it is understandable that he places such 
an  emphasis  on  this  move  of  pointing  out  that  our  moral  outlook  might  
often be completely hypocritical. We should not think that Hume wants to 
highlight this contradiction in our common way of thinking in order to 
moralise or condemn it in the manner that Pierre Bayle for example did. In 
the end, this hypocritical stance is vital for strengthening moral institutions 
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and it explains how civil society functions, even when men are what they 
are. Even the ones who are motivated to act contrary to the established 
rules of justice disapprove of similar behaviour in others.  
 This internal logic of artificial virtues is not confined to justice, but 
concerns artificial virtues in general. The most explicit example concerns 
chastity.134 First, chastity for women becomes a general rule, when ‘those, 
who have an interest’ in their fidelity ‘naturally disapprove of their infidelity, 
and all the approaches to it’. According to Hume’s system of artificial 
virtues, this disapproving sentiment is common also among the ones, ‘who 
have  no  interest’  in  fidelity.  They  are  simply  ‘carried  along  with  the  
stream’.135 Finally, as a notable consequence, Hume concludes that even 
‘batchelors, however debauch’d, cannot but be shock’d with any instance of 
lewdness  or  impudence  in  women’,  which  is  a  clear  proof  of  the  
authoritative grip that the artificial moral institutions have upon our 
opinions.136 A man that seeks the company of a lewd woman cannot help 
having a disapproving sentiment towards the very same person.137  
 Hume  also  makes  a  similar  case  about  the  extension  of  the  artificial  
virtue of justice. He emphasises that even if ‘the injustice is so distant from 
us’ that it cannot in any way ‘affect our interest, it still displeases us’.138 This 
is  also  the  section  where  Hume  tells  that  ‘we  partake  of’  people’s  
‘uneasiness by sympathy’. Modern commentators have stressed the role of 
this mechanical faculty of receiving ‘by communication’ other people’s 
‘inclinations and sentiments’ that might be ‘even contrary to our own’.139 
What Hume also points out is that the only direct way in which sympathy 
affects  ‘our  own actions’  is  that  ‘we  naturally  sympathize with others in the 
sentiments they entertain of us’.140 In  other  words,  all  that  he  is  possibly  
saying about the connection between sympathy and moral motivation is 
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that we often respect the rules of justice, because we are dependent upon 
the  opinion  that  others  entertain  of  us.  If  we  break  the  rules,  others  will  
disapprove of our actions and logically also of our character. We can 
perfectly well make, and indeed we should make, an induction of these 
examples to concern artificial virtues in toto. Since men automatically 
disapprove of the breach of the established rules, the people who are led 
towards  these  actions  are  condemned,  but  because  the  opinion  of  
themselves is dependent upon the opinion of others, this is a vital 
restriction upon our actions. What this means for the civil society, is that in 
the normal course of action, there are only few people, educated in a 
particular society, that are willing to break the established rules, even when 
they have no natural motive, except for self-interest, to act according to the 
rules.  
 Since we have these approving and disapproving moral sentiments, why 
would they not automatically create in us a motive to act according to the 
rules? Well, they simply do not. In the previous case of chastity, Hume has 
not set out to indicate a particular motive for women to be chaste. Motives 
vary,  just  as  customs  vary.  The  only  thing  that  is  certain  is  that  through  
‘education’, the convention ‘takes possession of the ductile minds of the fair 
sex in their infancy’.141 Some of them might avoid ‘the strongest imaginable’ 
temptation of lust in order to avoid ‘shame’142, others, might be proud to be 
chaste  and  yet  some  others  simply  follow  the  rules  as  a  manner  of  habit.  
Can we say that some women are truly chaste, because they have a virtuous 
motive  and some are  not?  We cannot  make  this  distinction,  if  there  is  no  
sign of inclination to be unchaste. Without any discrimination, we approve 
of women’s character if we have no reason to doubt their fidelity. But what 
does this mean? Well,  it  means that we approve of women, who show no 
signs of infidelity, thus, the question about virtuous motivation never enters 
our  minds.  We  simply  approve  of  their  behaviour,  because  it  is  not  
mischievous.  
 By and large, the question about motives in Hume’s project is 
indifferent, because he sets out to explain our common ideas of morality 
and  how  the  established  customs  and  laws  affect  us.  In  the  end,  what  
matters is that civil society is able to function. This might be a difficult 
point for us to accept, if we do not understand the role that pride and the 
opinion of others play in Hume’s system.  
Self-liking and politeness 
John Mackie writes that ‘good manners are minor artificial virtues’.143 I 
think they are much more than that. Politeness in the Treatise relates directly 
and  solely  to  the  passion  of  pride.  This  is  a  simple  point,  but  extremely  
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significant for Hume’s overall social theory. ‘Good-breeding’, he dictates, is 
an  artificial  virtue  that  requires,  nothing  more  and  nothing  less,  ‘that  we  
shou’d  avoid  all  signs  and  expressions,  which  tend  directly  to  show’  our  
pride. Equally important for Hume’s study is that he does not mean that we 
should actually be humble. Instead, according to him, ‘self-satisfaction and 
vanity’ are not only ‘allowable, but requisite in a character’.144 All that needs 
to be remembered is that ‘if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry 
a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in 
all our conduct and behaviour’. Hume explicitly points out that ‘humility, 
which good-breeding and decency require’ us to express, does not go 
‘beyond the outside’ and it cannot be expected that ‘thorough sincerity in 
this particular’  would be ‘a real part of our duty’.145 In the Treatise, civility, 
good-breeding and politeness are interchangeably vindicated for one 
purpose only, to conceal the good opinion that we have of ourselves. This 
should not come as a surprise to those acquainted with the material written 
by Hume prior to the Treatise.  
 The  first  known  explicit  examination  of  the  theory  of  politeness  by  
Hume was included in a letter from Paris in 1734.146 At the beginning of the 
letter, he tells that he had been given ‘advice to observe carefully & imitate 
as much as possible, the manners of the French’.147 His interlocutor, 
Chevalier  Ramsay,  had,  according  to  Hume,  based  his  advice  on  an  
assumption that ‘the English’ might ‘have more of the real Politeness of the 
Heart’,  but  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  ‘the  French  certainly  have  a  
better way of expressing it’.148 Ramsay’s published works support a similar 
understanding of politeness. In his Plan of education for a prince, he tells his 
audience that men have an ‘inward principle of justice’, which will make us 
‘naturally’  do  ‘justice’  to  other  men  and  by  which  ‘we  will  know  how  to  
distinguish and honour true merit’. By the same token ‘we acquire not only 
an universal inward beneficence, generosity, and disinterested good-nature, 
but  also  that  outward  politeness  and delicacy  of  manners  which  expresses  
itself  by  a  noble  freedom  and  easiness  far  remov’d  from  the  everlasting  
ceremonies of an importunate, formal and never-ceasing civility’.149 To put 
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it briefly, according to Ramsay, true politeness springs from the soul. In his 
famous Travels of Cyrus, Ramsay also advances the same ‘Addisonian’ 
dichotomy between inward politeness and outward civility. To him, it seems 
clear that ‘internal politeness is very different’ from ‘superficial civility’.150 
Ramsay underlines that ‘true politeness is common to all delicate souls of all 
nations’ and ‘external civility is but the form establish’d in the different 
countries  for  expressing  that  politeness  of  the  soul’.151 Thus,  all  Hume  
could learn from the French are the expressions of civility, but not the 
essence of politeness. 
 In his letter, Hume tells his friend that Ramsay’s opinions had given him 
an ‘occasion to reflect upon the Matter, & in my humble Opinion, it is just 
the Contrary, viz. that the French have more real Politeness & the English 
the better Method of expressing it’.152 The letter is a significant evidence of 
Hume’s early intellectual development, which has been overlooked. In his 
letter, the young Hume makes a counterargument against each point that 
Ramsay had advanced.153 First, he strikes the popular idea that politeness is 
a  quality  of  the  heart.  Joseph  Addison  and  Richard  Steele,  among  others,  
argued  that  politeness  could  be  pinned  as  a  national  character  trait,  
emphasising that the English cultivate their moral qualities, whilst the 
French are corrupting themselves with mindless trifles. David Hume 
disagrees. He annuls the adjunct ‘of the heart’ from Ramsay’s sentence and 
states that between these nations it is actually ‘the French’, who ‘have more 
real Politeness’.154 Since  politeness  is  not  something  planted  in  the  soul,  it  
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can only be cultivated by constant application of theatrical gestures. It takes 
time for manners to refine, and kind expressions to become customary. 
Hume clarifies that ‘by real Politeness’, he refers to the ‘Softness of Temper’ 
and to the ‘Inclination to oblige & be serviceable’.155 The 23-year-old David 
Hume was convinced that good-breeding is, above all, a deeply rooted 
habit. 
 The  young  Hume’s  point  is  akin  to  the  view  put  forward  by  Bernard  
Mandeville.156 Mandeville’s  succinct  formulation  of  this  overall  idea  was  
printed just a few years before Hume made his first analysis on French 
manners. According to him, ‘men become sociable, by living together in 
Society’.157 Habitual expressions of politeness become a second nature for 
gentlemen, but only when the institution has been long established and men 
have become accustomed to being polite. The French experience confirms 
the opinion. According to Hume, ‘politeness’ has become ‘conspicuous’ in 
France, but ‘not only among the high but the low, insomuch that the 
Porters & Coachmen’ (which in the eighteenth century were considered the 
worst mannered brutes) ‘are civil’.158 And  what  is  more,  Hume  exclaims,  
these vulgar men are ‘not only’ polite towards ‘Gentlemen but likewise 
among themselves’. Hume testifies that he has ‘not yet seen one Quarrel in 
France, tho’ they are every where to be met with in England’.159 Hume’s 
empirical fact is an entirely ‘Mandevillean’ observation. The Dutchman 
defined that politeness ‘in its original is a plain Shift to avoid fighting, and 
the  ill  Consequences  of  it’.160 According  to  Hume,  the  reason  why  one  
could not witness quarrels in France is not that they have found a way to 
open  their  hearts  and  to  show  their  naturally  virtuous  nature.  On  the  
contrary, the explanation why there are such few quarrels in France is 
because the people are customarily conforming to the rules of good-
breeding. 
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158 Mandeville  wrote  that  ‘Porters  and  carmen  are  reckon’d  the  rudest  and  most  
uncivilis’d part of the nation’. Bernard Mandeville, Free thoughts on religion, the church and 
national happiness, London, 1720, p. 273. For the dichotomy: ‘Porters and hackney 
coachmen’ and ‘kings and princes’, see also The Fable of the Bees, p. 219. Regarding 
‘Hackney coachmen’, see also the interesting attitude in Erasmus Jones, The man of 
manners, 1737, pp. 43–44: ‘I believe, it will be neither thought uncharitable nor 
extravagant, to suppose that there are hardly half an hundred Hackney Coachmen within 
the Bills of Mortality, but what would with the utmost Pleasure and Satisfaction, drive 
over the most innocent Person whom they never knew, or receiv’d any Injury from, 
provided they could do it conveniently and safely, that is, within the Verge of the Law.’ 
159 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20. 
160 Mandeville, Part II, p. 295.  
SOCIAL THEORY OF A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
 
267 
 Ramsay’s second assumption, namely that ‘the French’ have ‘a better 
way of expressing’161 politeness than the English, is, according to Hume, as 
negligent a remark as his first postulation. If the French manners are to be 
criticised for anything, it is precisely for their inflated nature. Addison and 
Steele condemn the whole artificial nature of the French manners as moral 
corruption. Mandeville points out that outward civility might fail to create a 
pleasant feeling. According to him, the artificial nature of politeness should 
not become offensively visible. Hume agrees with the latter view. He 
maintains that the essence of the expressions of good-breeding is that they 
have to ‘please by their appearance’ and to ‘lead the mind’ into ‘an agreeable 
delusion’.162 
 In  relation  to  Ramsay’s  first  supposition,  Hume  argues  that  ‘real  
politeness’  simply  means  that  good-breeding  plays  such  a  habitual  part  in  
people’s lives that they have an actual inclination (which cannot be natural, 
in a strict sense) to show expressions of politeness to friends, strangers and 
even people they dislike. It does not matter how natural a courtesy seems or 
how willing people are to show these gestures, we are still talking about an 
artificial convention. When Hume discusses the ‘expressions of politeness’, 
he  emphasises  the  contrast  between  natural  kindness  and  the  artificial  
nature of politeness in general. This is the same disparity that exists between 
Hume’s  idea  of  ‘real  politeness’  and  Ramsay’s  suggestion  of  ‘politeness  of  
the  heart’.  Politeness  is  now  linked  with  ‘kindness’,  which  is  taken  to  be  
what Ramsay was alluding in his advice about the ‘politeness of the heart’.  
This is a ‘shaftesburyan’ way of addressing the topic. Shaftesbury supposed 
that politeness is a natural feature of human nature. If men just looked into 
their souls, instead of following pompous ceremonies, they would be able 
to be spontaneously kind towards each other. Shaftesbury’s principal 
argument  was  that  the  court  civility  disabled  men  from  being  naturally  
virtuous.  Hume  makes  the  point  that  this  assumption  is  false.  Even  the  
‘men of the Best Dispositions of the World’ cannot naturally feel this 
kindness ‘towards Strangers & indifferent Persons’. We need artificial 
expressions to compensate for this ‘defect’,  and ‘real politeness’  for Hume 
is an inclination to habitually show these expressions.163 
 Since Hume thinks that natural benevolence is very limited, 
consequently the ‘expressions of politeness’ form the core of Hume’s 
analysis  of  good-breeding.  ‘These  ceremonies’  have  to  be  set  apart  from  
natural expressions. They ‘ought to be so contriv’d, as that, tho they do not 
                                                        
161 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 19. 
162 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20. 
163 A  rarely  noticed  overall  definition  of  virtue  that  neatly  fits  Hume’s  concept  of  
politeness is found in his answer to the criticism (in the Newcastle Journal, 1742) regarding 
his essay on Walpole’s character in Gentleman’s Magazine, May 1742, XII, p. 265. Hume 
wrote, ‘virtue is properly, good-nature made steddy and extensive by good principles. A 
man may have many virtues without deserving so noble a character.’ Quoted from 
Elliott, ‘Hume’s “Character of Sir Robert Walpole”’, 1949, p. 368. It is striking how well 
this definition suits Hume’s understanding of the artificial nature of politeness. 
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deceive, nor pass for sincere, yet still they please by their Appearance’. In 
courtesies people may tumble into ‘two extremes’. A person might go astray 
by  making  his  ceremonies  ‘too  like  Truth  or  too  remote  from it’.  In  both  
cases,  unsuccessful  politeness  means  that  the  expressions  do  not  ‘lead  the  
mind’ to an ‘agreeable delusion’. The first ‘extreme’ is scarcely possible since 
‘whenever any Expression or Action becomes customary’ it cannot 
‘deceive’. Hume’s example is a Quaker addressing himself as ‘your friend’ 
instead  of  as  ‘your  humble  servant’.  ‘In  the  contrary  Extreme’  it  is  ‘the  
French’ that ‘err’ by ‘making their Civilities too remote from Truth’. Hume 
highlights his point by giving an analogy of an exaggerated courtesy and ‘a 
Dramatic Poet’ mixing ‘Improbabilities with his Fable’.164 Both of these 
instances, a ceremony and a tale,  ought to be credible,  otherwise the mind 
cannot proceed to an ‘agreeable delusion’.  
 This evidence links Hume’s early analysis of politeness to Mandeville. 
After making some idiosyncratic speculations about the English expressions 
of  good-breeding,  Hume  turns  back  to  consider  the  positive  aspects  of  
French politeness and expels possible misgivings about him having any 
sympathy for the “Spectatorian” understanding of politeness. Hume 
declares  that  ‘after  all  it  must  be  confest,  that  the  little  Niceties  of  the  
French Behaviour, tho’ troublesome & impertinent, yet serve to polish the 
ordinary Kind of People & prevent Rudeness & Brutality’.165 Hume 
inevitably had no intention to present himself as an eager advocate of the 
English ‘expressions of politeness’. All he had been aiming at was to 
counter Ramsay’s assumptions point by point and contrast them with his 
‘Mandevillean’ view. In Hume’s opinion, the artificiality of politeness 
should  not  become  too  visible,  but  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that  these  
artificial gestures are the essence of preventing brutality in the ‘ordinary 
kind of people’. To highlight the discrepancy with the ‘Shaftesburyan’ view, 
we  need  to  recall  that  it  was  exclusively  against  these  ‘troublesome’  and  
‘impertinent’ little ‘Niceties’, that Hume endorsed, that Shaftesbury, 
Addison and Steele directed the full force of their arguments.  
 Hume proceeds in his letter with an intriguing comparison. According 
to him, ‘Soldiers are found to become more courageous in learning to hold 
their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed’.  In a similar way, 
‘Devotees feel their Devotion encrease by the Observance of trivial 
Superstitions’, such as ‘Sprinkling, Kneeling, Crossing &c’. Precisely in the 
same manner, ‘men insensibly soften towards each other in the Practise of 
these Ceremonies’.166 Hume concludes his analysis by stating that ‘the Mind 
pleases  itself  by  the  Progress  it  makes  in  such  Trifles,  &  while  it  is  so  
supported  makes  an  easy  Transition  to  something  more  material:  And  I  
verily believe, that tis for this Reason you Scarce ever meet with a Clown, or 
                                                        
164 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20. 
165 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 21. 
166 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 21. 
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an ill bred man in France’.167 What is this ‘something more material’ that the 
‘mind’ is transferred to? I take that it  is not any sublime level of morality,  
but simply an example of how custom aids an idea to be transformed into 
an  impression,  and  men  acquire  an  ‘Inclination  to  oblige  &  be  
serviceable’.168 In other words, it is what Hume defined by ‘real politeness’. 
Hence, Hume has completed his circle and ended right back where he 
started. The French are more polite because they follow the theatrical 
expressions of politeness.  
 Towards  the  end of  his  letter,  Hume seems to  become aware  that  the  
addressee might want to raise some objections to his credulous enthusiasm 
for French politeness. ‘You may perhaps wonder’, Hume carefully 
approaches  his  friend,  ‘that  I  who  have  stay’d  so  short  time  in  France  &  
who have confest that I am not a Master of their Language, shou’d decide 
so  positively  of  their  manners’.  Hume  pleads  that  ‘with  Nations’  it  is  ‘as  
with particular Man, where one Trifle frequently serves more to discover 
the Character, than a whole Train of considerable Actions’. Hume reveals 
that  for  him  the  decisive  ‘trifle’  had  been  the  way  people  customarily  
address each other. ‘English Phraze of humble Servant’ is omitted ‘upon the 
least Intimacy’. The French ‘never forget’ to tell you that it is ‘the Honour 
of  being  your  most  humble  Servant’.  What  is  even  more  remarkable,  
according to Hume, is that this phrase ‘is us’d by People to those who are 
very much their Inferiours’.169 Hence,  English  manners  are  clearly  inferior  
to French politeness.170  
                                                        
167 On the same page of the Free thoughts where Mandeville discusses ‘porters and 
carmen’, he also uses this same dichotomy between ‘a well-bred man’ and ‘the greatest 
clown’. Mandeville’s emblematic point is that virtue or virtuous sociability has nothing to 
do  with  politeness.  In  fact,  ‘virtue  is  scarce,  every  where,  and  a  well-bred  man,  may  as  
much want real probity, as the greatest clown.’ 
168 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 20. 
169 David Hume to Michael Ramsay, 12. IX 1734, Letters, I, p. 21. 
170 It is a well-known fact that in his later life Hume was a great lover of Paris who 
snubbed London. For example, in a letter to Colonel Isaac Barré on the 16th of July, 
1764, Hume simply states: ‘Paris’ is ‘the center of arts, of politeness, of gallantry, and of 
good company’. Hume, New letters,  p.  85.  A  year  before,  Hume  had  called  Paris  the  
‘centre of the polite arts’, Hume to the Comtesse de Boufflers, 22.I 1763, Letters, I, p. 375. 
When comparing London to Paris, Hume wrote, ‘The method of living is not near so 
agreeable in London as in Paris. The best company are usually, and more so at present, in 
a flame of politics: the men of letters are few, and not very sociable: the women are not 
in general very conversible.’, Hume to the Comtesse de Boufflers, 12.I 1766, Letters, II, p. 
11. Thus, it is understandable, also for other than personal reasons, that Hume in a 
famous letter complains that ‘I have a Reluctance to think of living among the factious 
Barbarians of London,  who will  hate me because I  am a Scotsman & I am not a  Whig,  
and despise me because I am a man of Letters.’, Hume to Hugh Blair, 23.VIII 1765, 
Letters,  I,  p.  517.  This  was  not  the  first  time  Hume  called  Londoners  the  ‘factious  
Barbarians of London’. Two years earlier in a letter to William Robertson Hume had 
used the same term. Hume to William Robertson, 1.XII 1763, Letters, I, s. 417. It makes 
perfect sense, that after he had learned the importance of French politeness as a young 
man, Hume’s lifelong fear was that the British would be remembered as a nation, ‘which 
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 Hume’s first analysis on politeness is still incomplete compared to the 
theoretical speculation that constitutes an important part of his Treatise. In 
his letter Hume has not yet said a word about self-applause or pride, which 
is  the  heart  of  politeness  for  Bernard  Mandeville  and  David  Hume.  As  a  
result, Hume has not yet properly addressed the relation between human 
nature and politeness – a gap, which he bridges in his Treatise. 171 
                                                                                                                 
was at best but half civilised’. Hume to Horace Walpole, 20.XI 1766, Letters, II, p. 111. In 
this context, it is understandable that a poem ‘celebrating Hume’s return to Edinburgh’ in 
1769 published in The Caledonian Mercury ‘looks from the remote north, ignoring England, 
to the culture of Europe’. Donald Livingston, ‘A poem by Philocalos celebrating Hume’s 
return to Edinburgh’, Studies in Scottish Literature, 24, 1989, pp. 108–9. 
171 For a text, other than the letter on politeness, written by the young Hume in the 
early  1730s that  makes a  Mandevillean analysis  of  the history of civil  society,  see ‘Essay 
on chivalry and modern honour’. Mossner, Ernest Campbell, ‘David Hume´s ‘An 
historical essay on chivalry and modern honour’’, Modern philology, 45, 1947, pp. 57–60. 
The idea of ‘modern honour’ is as Mandevillean as any. Due to the known mistakes by 
Mossner, I have made my own transcript of the original manuscript in the National 
Library of Scotland: MS. 23159 f. 4 ‘An historical essay on chivalry and modern honour.’ 
I have made some amendments to Mossner, but cite it because it is the only edition of 
the essay. About Mossner’s mistakes dating the essay, see especially M. A. Stewart, ‘The 
dating of Hume’s manuscripts’, in The Scottish Enlightenment. Essays in Reinterpretation, Paul 
Wood, ed., University of Rochester Press, 2000, p. 267. See also Brandt, ‘The Beginnings 
of Hume´s Philosophy’, 1977, pp. 117–125. The essay also gets a central role in Donald 
T. Siebert, ‘Chivalry and romance in the age of Hume’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 21, 1997, 
pp. 62–79. For a recent attempt to harness the Humean honour, reading Treatise in 
accordance with Hume’s essay on modern honour, see Ted Westhusing, ‘A beguiling 
Military Virtue: Honour’, Journal of Military Ethics, 2, 2003, pp. 195–212. See also John P. 
Wright, ‘Hume on the origin of modern honour: a study in Hume’s intellectual 
development’, an unpublished paper presented for the 32nd International Hume Society 
Conference in Toronto, July 2005. About Mandeville and hypochondria in Hume’s 
famous letter to a doctor, also written in the early 1730s, see Wright, The sceptical realism of 
David Hume, 1983, pp. 190–1 and 236–7 and John P. Wright, ‘Dr. George Cheyne, 
Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume’s Letter to a Physician’, Hume Studies, 29, 2003, p. 139 note 
44. A somewhat wild possibility would be that Hume’s letter to the physician is partly 
satirically framed after the example of the character Misomedon (alluding of course to 
Hume’s actual condition) in Mandeville, Hypo, 3rd ed., 1730. In the dialogue Misomedon 
is described as ‘a Man of Learning, who whilst he has his Health was of a gay, even 
temper, and a friendly open Disposition; but having long labour’d under the 
Hypochondriack Passion is now much alter’d for the worse, and become peevish, fickle, 
censorious and mistrustful’, ibid. p. xii. Crucially, hypochondria is refered to as ‘the 
Disease of the Learned’,  ibid.  p.  106.  Misomedon tells  that  he studied law,  but hated it,  
ibid.  pp.  3–4.  Instead,  he  had  great  admiration  for  the  humanists,  ibid.  p.  7.  He  also  
sought advice from different doctors before consulting Philopiro, ibid. p. 20. These are 
all central points in Hume’s letter. I would not conclude from this evidence that this 
would be necessarily the case, however, I will remain sceptical regarding interpretations 
that  place  great  weight  on  the  testimony  given  in  this  particular  letter,  even  when  it  is  
evident in the light  of  Hume’s ‘Own life’,  that  some of the facts  are true.  In his  funeral  
oration of himself Hume repeats that he did not want law as his profession, that he had a 
passion for literature since he was a young boy and that his ‘health’ was ‘a little broken’ 
because of his ‘ardent application’ in study.  
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Defining pride in the Book 2 of the Treatise  
What  is  pride?  Pride  is  ‘simple  and  uniform’  and  because  of  this  ‘’tis  
impossible  we  can  ever’,  according  to  David  Hume,  ‘by  a  multitude  of  
words, give a just definition’ of it.172 A little later in the Treatise he however 
states: ‘But not to dispute about words, I observe that by pride I understand 
that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of 
our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves’.173 
Although the causes of pride are extended beyond these above mentioned 
qualities in other parts of the Treatise,  this  aspect  of  being  satisfied  with  
ourself  is  the  key  to  Hume’s  conception  of  pride.  With  human  nature  in  
mind, in Hume’s system, the distinction between pleasure and pain applies 
to everything. Pride is always on the side of pleasure. As Amalie Rorty has 
promptly put it, ‘pride is a particular unanalysable pleasurable quality’.174 
One  might  not  be  able  to  state  precisely  what  pride  is  or  segment  it  to  
particles, but the basic tenet is that pride is always pleasurable by aiding us 
to be satisfied with ourselves. 
 An  important  technical  definition  of  pride  is  that  it  has  the  self  as  an  
object. Another way to put this is that pride is an indirect passion or 
secondary impression.175 That  is  to  say,  in  a  sense,  pride  is  reflective.  The  
object is fixed to the self. There is a crucial, double relation between an 
impression and an idea. A certain something (usually a quality in us, but not 
necessarily) strikes a pleasurable impression in our mind. If this impression 
is related to the idea of the self, it naturally produces the secondary 
impression of pride. Gabriele Taylor writes, ‘the condition for a person 
feeling pride is not that the object in question be connected with him, but 
only that he believe this to be the case’.176 
 One  way  to  understand  the  indirectness  of  pride  is  with  a  contrast  to  
direct passions. Direct passions ‘arise from good and evil’ without ‘the least 
preparation’. What is involved is ‘an original instinct’  which  ‘tends  to  unite  
itself with the good [pleasure], and to avoid the evil [pain]’.177 Fear and hope 
are  examples  of  direct  passions.  They  arise  without  the  double  relation  of  
impressions and ideas. ‘When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to 
FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or 
                                                        
172 T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277. 
173 T 2.1.7.8; SBN 297. 
174 Amalie Rorty, ‘Pride produces the idea of self: Hume on moral agency’, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68, 1990, p. 258. 
175 The classic starting point for this discussion is Páll Árdal, Passion and value in 
Hume’s Treatise, Edinburgh University Press, 1966. See also Haruko Inoue, ‘The origin of 
the indirect passions in the Treatise: an analogy between Books 1 and 2’, Hume Studies, 29, 
2003, pp. 205–221. 
176 Gabriele Taylor, ‘Pride and humility’ in her Pride, shame, and guilt. Emotions of self-
assessment, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 27. 
177 T 2.3.9.2; SBN 438. 
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the other’.178 We do not need to relate the impression of likely pain to the 
idea of the self through the double relation of impression and ideas in order 
for the direct passions to arise.  
 Indirect passions, unlike direct passions, always need the adjustment 
between  the  primary  impression  and  the  idea  of  the  self  before  the  
secondary impression is produced. The relation between a pleasing quality 
and the self need not be rationally calculated (we cannot usually make a 
rational choice whether we are proud of something or not,  our judgement 
can  be  refined  or  corrupted,  of  course,  but  this  is  a  different  matter),  but  
what needs to be understood at this point is that the association of certain 
impression and the self has to be made in our mind in order to produce the 
secondary impression of pride. 
 Hume emphasises that almost anything causes pride: the ‘most obvious 
and  remarkable  property’  of  the  ‘causes  of  pride’  is  ‘the  vast  variety  of  
subjects,  on which they may be plac’d’.  First of all,  ‘whatever in ourselves is 
either useful, beautiful, or surprising, is an object of pride’.179 But the scope 
is  much  more  vast  and  in  the  end,  ‘every  valuable  quality  of  the  mind’,  
‘body’, other abilities and even external subjects such as ‘our country, 
family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths’ etc. 
‘may become a cause’ of pride.180 Perhaps the most explicit way that Hume 
puts  the  point  of  almost  unlimited  causes  of  pride,  is  by  stating  that  ‘any  
thing,  that  gives  a  pleasant  sensation,  and  is  related  to  self,  excites  the  
passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object’.181 He 
does not say that there would be a right and wrong kind of pride, there is 
just pride caused by almost anything. 
 To  say  that  almost  anything  can  cause  pride  is  not  to  say  that  the  
function  of  the  passion  is  arbitrary.  There  are  clear  guidelines  that  Hume  
gives when explaining the causes of pride. The regular operation of passions 
is something that Hume naturally finds extremely important. ‘Tho’ the 
effects be many’, he reminds us, ‘the principles, from which they arise, are 
commonly but few and simple, and that ’tis the sign of an unskilful 
naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every 
different operation’.182 The human mind is in one sense unaccountable and 
the causes of pride can be almost unlimited. However, the mechanism of 
how pride operates is uniform and simple. There is no simplicity in the self 
for Hume, but there is simplicity in the operation of passions.  
 The  basic  principle,  hence,  of  how pride  is  produced is  that  the  cause  
must be related to the self through the double relation of impressions and 
ideas.  The  cause  must  also  fulfil  other  conditions.  The  most  relevant  of  
these are that the relation between the cause and object must be a close one 
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(e.g.  closer  than  in  delight  or  joy);  the  cause  must  be  ‘peculiar  to  
ourselves’183 and the cause must usually be evident also for others to see.184 
The rareness, constancy and the durable connexion between the cause and 
the self influence whether something causes pride or not.185 General rules 
also  influence  the  operation  of  pride,  which  is  to  say  that  what  is  
customarily considered worthy, matters a great deal in our assessment of the 
worth of a particular object. 
 Much effort has been put in discussing these causes (and limitations) of 
pride. It  is striking that Hume uses so much time and space to emphasise 
that  more  or  less  anything  can  cause  pride.  Even  when  it  is  possible  to  
distinguish  certain  causes  of  pride,  we  may  do  this  only  with  certain  
probability. Therefore, all the discussion about the “proper” causes of pride 
seems rather futile compared to the question that interests Hume the most: 
there is only one pride caused by almost anything. The point is to establish 
our need to be satisfied with our own self. Naturally, our mind also craves 
for a certain cause in order to be satisfied, but this cause is not as relevant as 
the  existence  of  pride  and  being  satisfied  with  our  own  self  –  even  if  we  
were not morally or publicly worthy at all. Every man (good or bad, happy 
or  sad)  needs  to  sustain  his  self-satisfaction  based  on  pride  in  order  to  
prolong his will to exist as a social being. 
 The  nature  of  pride  as  an  indirect  passion  is  a  technical  topic  that  has  
been prudently discussed in scholarship.186 What needs to be stressed is the 
spherical and conditional sense in which Hume introduces this passion. The 
spherical sense of pride is based on the distinction between self-love and 
self-liking  and  can  only  be  understood  in  relation  to  self-love  (and  self-
preservation). The conditional role is also derived straight from 
Mandeville’s adaptation of the Augustinian argument of our self-doubt.  
 The most important way in which Annette Baier has shaped the 
discussion on pride is that she has been able to widen the scope of pride by 
emphasising that pride is a passion that must be sustained. Pauline Chazan 
is  also  on  the  right  track  when  she  makes  the  additional  point  that  ‘we  
sustain our pride, and so our self-consciousness of who and what we are, by 
means  of  a  continued  perception  of  qualities  and  attributes  related  to  the  
self, perceptions which are reflected back to us by means of the attentions, 
regard, and esteem of others’.187 It has not been sufficiently explained in the 
secondary literature why this is so. What is the purpose of sustaining aspect 
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186 E.g. Inoue, ‘The origin of the indirect passions in the Treatise’, 2003, pp. 205–221. 
187 Pauline Chazan, ‘Pride, virtue and selfhood: a reconstruction of Hume’, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 22, 1992, p. 48. The article makes a novel point about the interaction 
between  self  and  pride  claiming  that  ‘what  is  radical  about  Hume’s  thesis  is  that  pride  
comes into being as the self comes into being. One does not precede the other.’ (p. 51). I 
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correct or not. I simply find her reading of the idea of sustaining pride useful. 
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of pride? Pauline Chazan, for example, makes a valuable point that ‘pride’ 
itself ‘for Hume is to quite some degree self-sustaining’. Our mind does not 
need to be in an uninterrupted search for different causes of pride. We may 
at times operate out of simple curiosity. Yet, ‘without a continued 
perception of qualities and attributes’ that produces pride eventually ‘the 
idea  of  the  self,  together  with  the  passion  of  pride,  would  fade  away’.188 
These are both very good points to make, but the question of the self could 
be put also in a different light. The self for Hume is after all quite a mutable 
subject. It is a highly important concept, of course, but still a rather vague 
topic.  What would it  mean that the self fades away? If instead of plunging 
into  the  philosophical  depths  of  the  question  of  the  self,  we  use  Hume’s  
analogy between self-love and pride, the question becomes more concrete.  
 The generally unanalysable nature is one characteristic of pride. Another 
feature  of  it  is  that  ‘as  our  idea  of  ourself’  is  ‘advantageous’,  we  feel  a  
pleasurable affection and ‘are elated by pride’.189 The lifting and expanding 
quality  of  pride  is  important.  To make  these  two points,  the  unanalysable  
quality and the expanding nature of pride, is to draw a picture of pride in a 
spherical sense. There are several different aspects that fall under the sphere 
of  the  passion  of  pride,  but  it  is  the  qualities  of  this  uniform  sphere  in  
general that make a greater difference in understanding human nature than 
certain distinctions within the passion itself. Hume does not even bother to 
clearly separate pride and self-esteem.190 The reason for this is that Hume’s 
point is to analyse pride as a uniform passion – even the sides of pride that 
most people would consider separate passions altogether.  
 In order to understand why this is so, we should draw attention to the 
analogy between self-love and pride. For us to grasp the role that pride has 
as  a  spherical  passion,  we  need  to  make  an  analogy  of  self-love,  which  is  
also  spherical  in  nature.  What  is  self-love?  In  the  context  in  which  Hume 
uses it, it is first of all assuring that our body continues to exist, in a manner 
of  self-preservation.  The  concept  of  self-love  in  this  sense  can  also  be  
naturally extended to concern, for example, avarice or the love of gain. 
There are several different aspects and operations of self-love and self-
preservation to be achieved and satisfied, some of which can even be 
discussed as independent passions, affections or desires. This is a large 
sphere that as such includes many aspects, among others, the most natural 
ones such as eating and drinking. Hunger and thirst are the prime examples 
of bodily functions that can of course be discussed as independent desires 
or appetites. But if we look beyond these details, we come to see the larger 
sphere of self-love (or self-preservation), which is also an unanalysable 
passion in this sense. The point is that we may talk about self-love as one 
passion that leads to prolonging the life of our body.  
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 Hume makes this analogy between the spherical sense of pride and self-
love explicit by pointing out the most important difference that self-love 
and pride have towards the body. Hume writes,  ‘there is no disposition of 
body  peculiar  to  pride,  as  there  is  to  thirst  and  hunger’.  Now,  when  we  
understand  the  analogy  between  the  spheres,  we  also  realise  that  in  the  
Treatise, Hume particularly discusses the sustaining aspect of pride with the 
analogy of self-love in mind. ‘Daily experience convinces us’, Hume points 
out, ‘that pride requires certain causes to excite it, and languishes when 
unsupported by some excellency in the character, in bodily 
accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune’.191 What is involved is an 
implicit comparison to hunger in the case of self-love. The difference is that 
hunger is a direct passion (as well as all other desires linked to self-love) and 
pride is indirect.  Pride does not arise on its own. It is a social  passion and 
needs some foreign objects to accompany it. This is the sole point of 
indirect passions. Direct passions are nothing unusual. Hume’s emphasis is 
on the indirect nature of pride. This is also one reason why Book 2 of the 
Treatise commences  with  the  indirect  passion  of  pride  and  not  direct  
passions as one might perhaps have expected.  
 The sphere of self-love is different in nature from pride, mainly because 
it has the dispositions of the body. However, even when for example 
hunger can be satisfied, it also varies. For the sake of self-preservation a lot 
less  than  what  we  eat  might  be  enough,  but  as  animals,  we  have  natural  
restrictions as to how much food we can eat. Pride is tricky, because there 
really are no natural limits to it. The point of sustaining and expanding pride 
is  the  spherical  nature  of  pride.  As  our  pride  lifts  and  expands,  it  also  
reveals that there is no end to it, pride cannot be saturated. Once more, the 
contrast between indirect and direct passions proves useful. Direct passions 
in general are to be satisfied, indirect passions are not.  
 In  this  light,  it  makes  rather  good  sense  that  Hume  establishes  the  
central  division  between  direct  and  indirect  passions  that  neatly  fits  the  
distinction between the spheres of self-love and pride. This is then further 
tuned with the discussion of violent and calm passions. The point is that 
these are the main principles of human nature. Self-love aids us to exist (if 
we  do  not  eat  or  avoid  death  our  body  no  longer  exists).  The  self  is  
simultaneously dependent on our pride (and vice versa). As a consequence, 
“social death” can be seen as equally harmful to the self as natural death is 
to  the  body.  This  is  a  very  different  view of  the  distinction  between self-
love and self-liking compared to the Rousseauvian vision of natural self-
preservation and perverted attachment to the self. Mandeville and Hume 
emphasised that pride is just as important for the human being as her self-
preservation (in the common use of the word).  
 Once we understand the spherical nature of pride, it is also easy to grasp 
why Hume puts such an effort on emphasising that the causes of pride need 
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not be real. Our self-love is restricted and guided by our bodily dispositions 
to a certain extent.  It  is plausible to say that our hunger and thirst may be 
quenched. We concretely feel that we ate or drank enough. Pride does not 
have these natural limitations. There is no such thing as quenched pride. It 
may well languish, but it cannot be quenched.  
 Quite  unlike  our  hunger,  we  tend  to  overstate  and  mistake  our  pride.  
Perhaps we do not even have a clear conception of it. We might just in 
some vague sense feel the pleasing affection involved in self-approval 
through the mechanism of pride. This is an aspect of pride that has been 
occasionally surfaced in Hume scholarship without a satisfactory 
explanation. One commentator has pointed out that in pride ‘no real object 
of  any  sort  is  necessary.  All  that  is  needed  is  that  the  proud  person  has  
certain beliefs. He must believe that he is actually receiving, or at least that 
he deserves to receive, the admiration and envy of others’.192 Some  find  
puzzling Hume’s view that ‘someone sufficiently determined to shine can 
somehow build  his  pride  on a  relation  which  is  not  really  adequate’.193 In 
Hume’s system it seems ridiculously easy to justify one’s beliefs and pride. 
There is always the possibility that a person believes that ‘if only others 
were more intelligent or less trivially minded they, too, would come to value 
that thing [she is proud of], or at least come to see that it might be 
valued’.194 It  is  important  that  a  person  can  just  be  proud,  without  really  
being  proud  of  anything  (even  when  Hume  usually  describes  pride  as  an  
indirect passion that needs a particular cause). On general level Hume does 
not  make  a  distinction  between  these  two  cases.  Since  Hume  always  puts  
the basic question in terms of pleasure and pain, we should perhaps also 
make a note about this aspect. In the matter of pride, the pleasure of pride 
is not necessarily connected to the pleasure taken in what a person is proud 
of. What is important is that the pleasure, which is pride, is sustained. The 
causes vary, but the overall passion is yet the same.  
 Hume’s  theory  of  human nature  is  universal.  The  point  is  that  even  a  
poor beggar or wretched criminal can sustain his pride. People need to be 
proud  of  something  in  order  to  want  to  prolong  their  existence  as  social  
beings  –  a  matter  that  is  not  to  be  understood  to  concern  only  self-
preservation. If it was possible, most men would perhaps be like Alexander 
the Great, conquering half of the world and receiving hence supposed 
justification for their supposedly superior nature. We might choose other 
ways to operate than conquering and commanding, but yet the nature and 
principle of our own pride is just the same. Our way of life might be more 
modest (and even unrecognisable to someone with Alexander’s military 
frame of mind), but in due proportion our ambitions tend to be the same – 
without much grounding on due causes, just causes that vary and usually 
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involve a strong, social element in the form of the real or assumed approval 
of others. Perhaps the best way to characterise Hume’s theory of pride is to 
say that it assumes that a man is predisposed to feeling superior and having 
inordinate self-esteem by nature – which should not be viewed in a negative 
sense but as a natural fact.195 
 While  our  pride,  in  Hume’s  discussion  on it,  tends  to  be  boastful  and  
overstated,  he  takes  care  to  point  out  that  there  is  always  an  element  of  
doubt involved – even if we had factually conquered half the world or lived 
like sages for all  our lives.  This element of self-doubt seems to be missing 
from most of the philosophical accounts of pride. This is why this aspect is 
so important. Our undying need for other people’s approval does not 
become clear if we miss that pride is a conditional passion. 
 This  conditional  aspect  of  pride  is  one  cause  of  self-doubt,  but  at  the  
same time it is one reason for self-deception. Hume calls this the ‘quality of 
the mind’ by which ‘we are seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves’.  He 
unravels  this  further:  ‘the  great  propensity  men  have  to  pride’  is  partly  
explained in terms of taking delight in things close to us, ‘the mind finds a 
satisfaction and ease in the view of objects,  to which it  is accustom’d, and 
naturally prefers them to others, which, tho’, perhaps, in themselves more 
valuable,  are  less  known  to  it.  By  the  same  quality  of  the  mind  we  are  
seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves, and of all objects, that belong to 
us. They appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; and consequently 
fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other’.196 This  is  a  robust  
statement that makes it more or less impossible to even think that there 
could be an objective foundation of pride for Hume. The only thing that is 
clearly established is that there is always some uncertainty in the question 
whether our pride is well-founded, even when we can easily account for 
probable causes sustaining our pride at a given time and place. 
 Based  upon  Hume’s  system,  if  the  objective  foundation  of  our  self-
satisfaction is our prime concern, we have several good reasons to doubt if 
we should actually be proud of anything at all: no bodily disposition guides 
our pride, a strong social component of pride could mean that we are only 
looking to please others without any regard to how we acquire their 
approval, our mind tends to delight with things we are familiar with without 
real justification, somehow we crave for pride and tend to overstate it; and 
after all, the causes of pride need not be real at all – our self-satisfaction can 
be  based  upon views  that  we  might  not  even  approve  of.  But  we  are  not  
stupid. We are extremely rational in some aspects of life. Our pride is very 
precarious and we realise this. This creates self-doubt and this self-doubt is 
perhaps the most important element that makes pride a social passion. It is 
this  element  of  self-doubt  that  seems  to  be  missing  from  most  of  the  
philosophical analysis of pride. 
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Pride, good-breeding and the theory of passions 
An important part of David Hume’s intellectual development towards the 
Treatise was the study of how external expressions of kindness rendered civil 
society lenient. In the philosophical work he developed these notions into 
one of the cornerstones of his social theory along the same Mandevillean 
lines that he had adopted in his politeness-letter. As Annette Baier and 
some other philosophers have perceptively emphasised, pride is a ‘master 
passion’ for Hume.197 Nevertheless, in these philosophical analysis the 
crucial link between pride and politeness has not hitherto been 
established.198  
 Hume opens Book 2 of the Treatise, entitled ‘Of the passions’, by 
treating pride. A relevant connection between his philosophical theory of 
passions and his overall analysis of politeness is that he distinguishes ‘pride’ 
and ‘humility’ as passions that ‘are directly contrary in their effects’.199 One 
commentator has suggested that this dichotomy is a mistake on Hume’s 
part and he had been ‘confusing humility with shame’.200 I do not however 
think  so.  We  have  to  understand  that  even  when  Hume  is  making  a  
particular analysis of passions, he is also participating in a larger debate 
about pride, modesty and politeness. When we analyse his theory of 
passions from this point of view, the dichotomy between pride and humility 
(and  not  pride  and  shame)  turns  out  to  be  important.  Hume  manages  to  
exclude  all  the  popular  accounts  that  claim  that  true  modesty  is  the  real  
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source of politeness. For a theorist who confuses his ideas, Hume is quite 
rigorous  when  he  claims  that  it  is  ‘impossible’  that  ‘a  man  can  be  at  the  
same time’ both ‘proud and humble’.201 I  think  that  to  indicate  this  
conceptual blunder in some of the previous accounts of politeness is exactly 
what Hume had in mind. He maintains that ‘pride’ is always ‘a pleasant’ and 
‘agreeable’ sensation, whilst ‘humility’ is ‘uneasy’ and ‘painful’.202 In other 
words, even when pride and humility cannot operate without some external 
object  or  quality  that  excites  passion,  it  is  very  clear  that  to  be  proud  is  
something desirable, whereas humility or true modesty is not. 
 When introducing some limitations of his system of double relation of 
impressions and ideas concerning pride, Hume makes use of an example of 
a  ‘feast’  where  the  guests  may  only  feel  ‘joy’  and  not  ‘pride’  by  being  
present,  whence  the  ‘master  of  the  feast’  is  the  only  one  that  has  ‘the  
additional passion of self-applause and vanity’.203 The fact that Hume chose 
to  use  this  particular  example  is  revealing  of  his  idea  of  politeness  as  a  
method of  hiding  pride.  In  his  essays,  Hume explains  how we are  able  to  
detect  this  ‘master  of  the  feast’  among  ‘good  company’.  According  to  
Hume,  most  ‘certainly’,  he  is  the  ‘man,  who  sits  in  the  lowest  place,  and  
who is always industrious in helping every one’.204 The master is proud, but 
he appears to be humble. In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume also defines that 
one feature of the ‘general rule’ of not revealing our ‘self-applause’ is that in 
order to keep ‘the appearance of modesty’ men have to ‘be ready to prefer 
others  to  ourselves’  and  ‘to  seem  always  the  lowest  and  least  in  the  
company’.205 A polite gentleman is proud, and entertains a high opinion of 
himself,  thus  to  ‘seem’  the  ‘lowest  and  least’  most  definitely  is  not  
something natural for him. All  this has to do with is the ‘appearance’,  and 
nothing with actual modesty. In other words, because the master is the only 
one, who may truly feel proud of the fact that ‘delicacies of every kind’ are 
being served, he self-evidently is extremely careful not to expose this 
passion.206  
 As Annette Baier has pointed out, Hume describes pride as an indirect 
passion that in a sense does not immediately cause actions, yet it is a passion 
that  according  to  Hume  has  to  last.207 Mandeville’s term, self-liking, 
captures Hume’s meaning. Hume’s own definition confirms this 
Mandevillean backdrop. ‘By pride’, he points out, ‘I understand that 
agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view’ of our good 
qualities ‘makes us satisfy’d with ourselves’.208 The very essence of social 
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existence is that we are satisfied with ourselves, in other words, we have to 
be able to cultivate our self-liking. This condition is dependent upon several 
variable circumstances. Bernard Mandeville emphasised that when self-
liking ceases, life becomes a burden and thus, suicide might be a valid 
option. David Hume on his part emphasises that ‘no man ever threw away 
life, while it was worth keeping’.209 Since  our  passions  are  often  
unaccountable and extremely amendable to different situations, Hume 
elaborates that one turns to this option, indeed, as a last resort.  According 
to  Hume,  ‘a  man  may  be  proud’  of  virtually  anything  –  not  just  virtue,  
beauty, riches and power, which are the most obvious and natural causes of 
pride.210 ‘Any  thing,  that  gives  a  pleasant  sensation,  and  is  related  to  self,  
excites the passion of pride’.211 Most people are able to find something to 
be proud of, something that they think help them outshine everyone and 
that is closely related to the self.  All  of us need other people to somehow 
confirm (in our own mind) the opinion that we have of ourselves.  This is 
the  central  part  of  Hume’s  analysis  of  self-applause  or  self-liking.  The  
necessary  premise  for  us  to  build  our  self-image  is  that  it  has  to  be  
strengthened by the people whose opinion we value. This is the key point to 
understand how self-liking, in the end, creates social cohesion and how our 
‘vanity’ is, like Hume describes it, ‘a bond of union among men’.212 The 
causes  of  pride,  such  as  ‘virtue,  beauty  and  riches’  have  almost  no  
‘influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others’.213 
Because our self-applause and vanity is dependent upon other people, 
Hume  explains,  ‘we’  cannot  even  ‘form’  a  ‘wish’  that  would  ‘not  have  a  
reference to society’ and ‘perfect solitude’ might be ‘the greatest 
punishment we can suffer’.214  
 This  leads  me  to  a  point  where  I  think  Baier’s  analysis  needs  some  
rethinking. Since Hume is not trying to form a prescriptive theory of ethics, 
neither is he taking up the Sisyphean task of explaining what is due pride 
and what is not. What is striking in Hume’s philosophical analysis is that he 
is able to consistently support an outlook based on the idea that we never 
know if our own pride is well-founded and everything is depended upon the 
fact that we follow established rules. The point is that all of us are more or 
less proud and so we have to hide this sentiment of self-applause. As Baier 
acknowledges, Hume does not treat the concept of due pride in Book 2 of 
the Treatise.215 The most problematic part of Baier’s analysis is that, in order 
to show that due pride is a vital concept for Hume, she finds her evidence 
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from a section in the Treatise, which, in my opinion, proves that this idea is 
not central for Hume.216 When Baier talks about due pride, she means the 
pride that is well-founded. She bases her evidence on a supposed 
dichotomy between ‘overweaning conceit’ and ‘due pride’. But Hume is not 
however stressing the importance of well-founded and ‘due pride’. The 
precise quote from the Treatise is  ‘that  nothing  is  more  useful  to  us  in  the  
conduct  of  life,  than  a  due  degree  of  pride’,  which  is  only  another  way  of  
saying that pride, in general, is a useful passion.217 I cannot see how Hume 
would have been pinpointing a dichotomy between well-founded pride and 
‘overweaning conceit’. Baier’s further suggestion is that it was unnecessary 
for  Hume  to  suggest  that  we  have  to  conceal  our  due  pride.  The  only  
‘expression of ill-founded excessive and uncorrected pride’, she tells us, 
‘should be restricted’ and we have to be able to show our due pride if it is 
our ruling passion.218 This might be a good basis for a contemporary 
philosophical  stance,  but  it  misses  the  point  of  the  ongoing  section  in  the  
Treatise.  On  the  following  page,  Hume  clearly  states,  and  I  quote  his  
reasoning  at  length:  ‘nothing  is  more  disagreeable  than  a  man’s  over-
weaning conceit of himself: Every one almost has a strong propensity to 
this vice: No one can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and virtue, 
or  be  certain,  that  his  esteem  of  his  own  merit  is  well-founded’.219 Thus, 
instead  of  making  any  distinctions  between  the  right  and  wrong  kind  of  
pride, Hume contends with the notion that most of us are plain proud.  
 Of course, it might be argued that it is better, if everyone was proud of 
the fact that they respect the laws of justice instead of some vain notions 
that they are pretty or own beautiful houses. Nevertheless, these are meagre 
distinctions,  and  Hume  is  not  making  such  a  point.  To  expect  that  men  
should  only  have  due  pride  is  to  anticipate  an  immense  change  in  human 
nature, which Hume has ruled out as impossible. What he is saying is that – 
despite  the  causes  –  we  always  think  highly  of  ourselves,  which  to  us  is  
simply a positive phenomenon since it gives us confidence and causes a 
pleasant sensation.220 This goes to the point that we cannot possibly be sure 
whether  we  have  stepped  over  the  boundary  of  ‘due  degree  of  pride’  (if  
such a line could actually be drawn and the concept was not just used for 
descriptive purposes). On the one hand, our self-liking does not harm 
others as long as we do not reveal our true sentiments. On the other hand, 
once  we  start  showing  our  pride,  everything  goes  astray  no  matter  how  
“legitimate” reasons we would have for our self-applause. The case is 
analogous with the laws of justice.  If we turn to consult our natural ideas,  
instead  of  the  fixed  rules  of  justice,  or  if  we  start  pondering  whether  our  
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pride is well-founded or not, soon we find civil society in confusion and our 
conversations unpleasant. In the end, everyone would find the means to 
justify their unlawfulness and to vent their pride, which would be a setback 
for the possibility of cultivating self-love and self-liking. Simultaneously, the 
circle of refinement would be reversed. This is the reason why Hume 
carries on stating that ‘all direct expressions of this passion are condemn’d; 
nor do we make any exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and 
merit’. I think this neatly sums up the core idea of politeness. Not a single 
exception is to be made to the rule that no-one is ‘allow’d to do themselves 
justice openly’. It is the ‘impertinent, and almost universal propensity of 
men to over-value themselves’ and it is this same propensity that ‘has given 
us such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a 
general rule,  wherever  we  meet  with  it’.221 Maybe  the  idea  of  ‘due  pride’  is  
relevant in contemporary philosophy, but I am not convinced that it was 
something that David Hume himself wanted to stress. 
Centrality of a section entitled Greatness of mind in the Treatise 
When we realise  that  in  the  section  3.3.2  Hume is  vindicating  the  idea  of  
politeness instead of due pride, it  also makes sense why in other places he 
tries  to  build  such  a  strong  case  for  our  self-image  being  dependant  upon 
other people’s opinion.222 We may now give a technical explanation of how 
politeness and pride operate in Hume’s system of mind. Here the contrary 
effect of pride and humility in accordance with the operation of sympathy 
and comparison is of vital importance.  
 The idea of social distance plays a notable role in Hume’s system. 
According to the established tradition of court civility in the eighteenth 
century, external politeness is particularly needed within an equal social 
group. Hume also thinks that respect and deference towards superiors has 
more to do with a natural turn of the mind and does not necessarily need 
strong  artificial  rules  in  order  to  be  stirred  up.  This  means  that  when  a  
person is actually above us, in rank or in some other substantial sense, the 
mechanism of sympathy will operate on us rather smoothly, and if we 
contemplate the causes that most likely create the passion of pride in a 
superior person it will give rise to a pleasant impression in us as well. For 
example, a rich man will naturally acquire our esteem, if he is placed above 
us.223 If we do not think that we are on an equal level with a person placed 
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above  us  in  social  hierarchy,  we  cannot  be  envious  of  his  good  fortune,  
even when an overpowering feature of human nature is that ‘we are every 
moment apt to’ compare ‘ourselves with others’.224  
 Meanwhile, ‘a sense of superiority’ creates in us ‘an inclination to keep’ 
this ‘distance’ from a person above us and ‘to redouble the marks of respect 
and reverence’, if we have ‘to approach him’.225 It is only natural that ‘in the 
presence of a great man’, we ‘sink’ in ‘our own eyes’ and are very sincere in 
our ‘respect’.226 This respect is an actual sentiment that we as inferiors are 
supposed  to  have,  and  if  we  do  not  ‘observe’  a  proper  ‘conduct’  towards  
him,  it  is  ‘a  proof’  that  we  ‘are  not  sensible  of  his  superiority’.227 
Throughout the Treatise, Hume emphasises that ‘whoever is elevated’ above 
‘the rest of mankind, must’ through operation of sympathy ‘excite in us the 
sentiments of esteem and approbation’.228 Such person that ‘can excite 
these sentiments’ will also acquire ‘our esteem; unless other circumstances 
of his character render him odious and disagreeable’.229 In other words, in 
most cases, the politeness towards the people who are placed far above us 
comes through a natural operation of the mind. This sentiment of humility 
created by the presence of a great man does not mortify us.230 But if it is 
natural to respect people set above us in hierarchy, this does not hold true 
among equals, which explains why Hume in his letter on politeness was so 
astonished that the French ‘porters and coachmen’ are not only ‘civil’ 
towards gentlemen, but ‘likewise among themselves’.231 
 For the convenient existence of a peer group it is indispensable that we 
are required to hide our sentiments of self-applause. Technically speaking, 
external politeness (or hypocrisy, if you like) is needed because of the 
natural operation of comparison in Hume’s system. In the presence of 
other gentlemen, no one is elevated above others. Hume denotes 
comparison as an operation of the mind that can function in several ways. 
If we (as poor people) could not be envious by comparing ourselves to the 
rich man, comparison in turn functions as a mechanism that explains how 
this rich man might boost his pride. He may compare ‘himself to his 
inferior’ and receive ‘pleasure from the comparison’.232 A rich man is proud 
of his wealth, and confirms his opinion by comparing himself to a poor 
man. Nevertheless, regardless of how many comparisons he makes, a rich 
man’s self-liking is established on thin ice, if his character is not supported 
by  (what  he  can  take  as)  the  approving  opinion  of  his  equals.  The  self-
sustaining idea of comparing ourselves to our inferiors is not the primary 
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social conjunction between pride, comparison and politeness. It is 
significant to notice that Hume’s idea of politeness concerns men who are 
not separated by a social gap. As I said, this becomes clear, when we realise 
that  Hume’s  analysis,  even  when  it  has  merits  of  its  own,  belongs  to  a  
certain tradition of analysing the court society.  
 When the principle of comparison operates within a social group (with 
reference  to  pride  and  humility)  it  has  a  different  task  than  towards  
superiors (non-function) or inferiors (vindicating pride). Hume describes 
pride as a passion that is ‘always pleasant’, whereas humility, in most cases, 
causes a painful sensation. However, ‘humility’ is considered a virtue 
because it ‘exalts’ us, whereas ‘pride’ is a vice, because it ‘mortifies us’.233 
Here, Hume is evidently referring to the effect of the sentiment that other 
people seem to entertain of themselves. According to Hume, it is a natural 
operation of the mind that ‘when we compare the sentiments of others to 
our  own,  we  feel  a  sensation  directly  opposite  to  the  original  one’.234 In 
other words, if we are forced to operate through the principle of 
comparison, the appearance of pride in other equals will cause humility in 
us,  whereas  the  appearance  of  humility  will  cause  pride.  ‘Through  
sympathy’, Hume explains, we ‘enter into those elevated sentiments, which 
the proud man entertains of himself’. Sympathy denotes a mechanism by 
which we obtain an impression by the signs of the sentiment expressed by 
the  other  person.  The  point  is  that  when  we  detect  signs  of  pride,  the  
operation of sympathy is immediately blocked and this leads into 
‘comparison, which is so mortifying and disagreeable’. Hume elaborates and 
tells  his  audience  that  ‘if  we  observe’  in  a  ‘man,  whom  we  are  really  
persuaded  to  be  of  inferior  merit’  any  ‘extraordinary  degree  of  pride’,  the  
‘firm  persuasions  he  has  of  his  own  merit,  takes  hold  of  the  imagination,  
and diminishes us in our own eyes’.235 Technically speaking, the idea that we 
have of this man is not converted into an impression and we are forced to 
make a disagreeable comparison to ourselves. Vice versa, if we would 
actually  think  that  he  obtains  these  good  qualities  that  he  seems  to  be  so  
proud of, this would have ‘a contrary effect’. The idea would now be 
converted into an impression and the man’s sentiments ‘wou’d operate on 
us by sympathy’ creating approval.236 However, this does not happen often 
within a peer-group.  
 Hume describes it as an ‘impertinent, and almost universal propensity of 
men, to over-value themselves’. This premise might not turn out to be such 
an enormous obstacle for sympathy, if it only concerned the person 
expressing the good opinion about himself. Nevertheless, the inclination to 
over-value one’s worth holds equally true with the interlocutor that is 
affected by the expressed sentiment. If he happens to over-value himself, 
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which  is  a  very  likely  scenario,  this  also  bears  consequence  on how he,  in  
turn, interprets the merit of the other person. Thus, what commonly 
happens is that a due expression of pride (whatever that might mean) is still 
creating an unpleasant feeling. Hence, this is yet another reason why Hume 
is not concerned with due pride. We may conclude that the case is usually 
that both parties over-value themselves, and the gap between their 
understanding of due merit and pride is greater than expected. By and large, 
it  is  not a normal situation (in any given social  framework) that the actual 
opinions of merit between equals meet at a level where sympathy, instead of 
comparison,  operates.  Thus,  we  may  safely  say  that  instead  of  eulogising  
due pride, Hume goes on and concurs with the idea that if people opened 
their hearts and revealed what they take as a due degree of pride, we would 
be facing an unsustainable situation of a never-ending circle of humility 
through the natural operation of the principle of comparison.237  
 ‘Pride’ simply ‘must be vicious’, because ‘it causes uneasiness in all men, 
and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison’.238 
Another (or rather a Mandevillean) way of saying this, is that a high degree 
of  self-liking  is  a  recommendable  quality,  but  once  it  becomes  visible  to  
others it is called pride, and turns to be vicious because it causes a setback 
for other people’s self-liking. Notably, here we are talking about equals, 
because the operation of the principle of comparison is different when the 
social distance is greater. The virtue of humility can only be the hypocritical 
appearance  of  humility,  since  the  passion  within  is  vanity,  pride  or  self-
applause (depending on which one of these synonyms for self-liking we 
want to use).  As Hume argues, ‘while’  sentiments ‘remain conceal’d in the 
minds  of  others,  they  can  never  have  any  influence  upon  us’.239 In other 
words, we only approve of the sign (humility), not necessarily because we 
are mistaking it for a true quality, but because it causes a pleasant sentiment 
(pride) through comparison with ourselves.240 In  the  case  of  humility,  the  
actual virtue is the sign of humility, and no questions about motives or real 
quality have to be asked. As Hume perceptibly concludes, ‘no one, who 
duly  considers  of  this  matter,  will  make  any  scruple  of  allowing,  that  any  
piece of ill-breeding, or any expression of pride and haughtiness, is 
displeasing to us,  merely because it  shocks our own pride, and leads us by 
sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagreeable passion of 
humility’.241 Hume’s intention seems rather clear to me. Since pride always 
brings pleasure to an individual and the cultivation of our self-liking is the 
cornerstone of our existence, everyone should be able to be proud. Since 
                                                        
237 T 3.3.2.11; SBN 598. 
238 T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596. 
239 T 3.3.2.3; SBN 593. 
240 In other words, a theory of mistaken attribution of virtue is not a sufficient 
explanation for Hume’s idea of moral approval. This is an influential theory argued by 
Mackie, Hume’s moral theory, 1980, p. 72. 
241 T 3.3.2.17; SBN 601. 
DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND 
 
286 
other people’s visible pride usually mortifies us and brings in humility, the 
point  is  simple.  We have  to  be  proud without  showing  it  to  others.  ‘Self-
satisfaction  and  vanity’,  Hume  declares,  ‘may  not  only  be  allowable,  but  
requisite  in  a  character’,  but  it  is  ‘certain,  that  good-breeding  and decency  
require that we shou’d avoid all  signs and expressions, which tend directly 
to show that passion’.242 This is indeed what politeness is. Hume makes this 
point already in Book 2 of the Treatise,  but  he  vindicates  it  much  more  
forcefully in Book 3, ‘Of morals’, where he manages to integrate it into his 
social and political theory. 
Flattery 
The system of human mind presented in the Treatise also has a relevant 
connection to flattery, another Mandevillean social concept. As we 
remember, the particular feeling that is created in us by the appearance of 
our peer’s sentiment has a corresponding effect on our sentiments towards 
him. If through sympathy we detect signs of pride, we turn to compare this 
elevated idea to ourselves and cannot be but mortified, which means that 
our sympathetic feelings towards his character are unlikely to prevail. In 
contrast,  if  we  detect  (through  sympathy)  signs  of  humility,  this  exalts  us  
and  we  are  also  inclined  to  be  sympathetic  towards  the  character  of  the  
person in question. What this means, as Mandeville described it,  is  that in 
civil  society  men  are  ready  to  take  one  further  step,  flattery  runs  in  as  a  
torrent and within a peer-group people seek other people’s approving 
sentiments through deliberate attempts to please.  
 At  first  glance,  flattery  might  seem  to  be  an  undemanding  pastime  to  
David Hume. He describes ‘vanity’ as a ‘passion’ that ‘is so prompt, that it 
rouzes at the least call’.243 We are very much inclined to be proud. By the 
same token, it should be easy to encourage this passion in others, especially 
when ‘nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and 
vanity’.244 Since ‘self-applause’ is ‘always agreeable’245 and the ‘causes of 
pride’ have almost no ‘influence, when not seconded by the opinions and 
sentiments of others’246,  would  it  not  be  more  than  evident  that  men  are  
very pleased when flattered and also inclined to adopt this practise 
themselves? According to Hume, indeed it is. ‘Whoever can find the means 
either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself useful or 
agreeable to us, is sure of our affections’.247 The human mind, Hume 
explains, is a faculty that is ‘easily shock’d with whatever opposes’ the ‘good 
opinion we have of ourselves’ and likewise ‘peculiarly pleas’d with any 
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thing, that confirms’ our self-applause.248 Certainly, ‘nothing more readily 
produces kindness and affection to any person, than his approbation of our 
conduct and character’.249 Hume is taken by the idea that, because of certain 
principles of human mind, a society of gentlemen naturally produces a self-
sufficient system of exchanging ‘a good office’ after another – a practise, 
which is ‘agreeable, chiefly because it flatters our vanity’.250 To put it briefly, 
Hume thinks that to be in civilised company is always pleasing, because we 
are ‘seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves’.251  
 To successfully flatter a person is not as simple as one might think. Like 
any positive social practise, flattery has rules based on the operation of the 
human mind. Hume takes the topic of flattery highly seriously and points 
out  that  ‘the  praises  of  others  never  give  us  much  pleasure,  unless  they  
concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we 
chiefly excel’.252 In other words, we are only flattered when we are praised 
for a reason and not a single individual can much appreciate gross flattery 
that fails to create a plausible illusion and convince that the person might 
actually mean what he is saying. As both Nicole and Abbadié pointed out,  
deceiving flattery is one of the worst insults,  because it  ‘cloaks a most real 
contempt, under the mask of an apparent esteem’.253 Hume himself points out 
that  the  presence  of  a  gross  flatterer  is  not  desirable,  because  the  signs  of  
his sentiments do not please. Meanwhile, the gross flatterer’s own opinion 
about himself is unlikely to be ‘seconded by the opinions and sentiments of 
others’.254 According  to  a  vain  man,  ‘every  thing  belonging’  to  him ‘is  the  
best  that  is  any  where  to  be  found’,  Hume  writes.255 But  not  even  this  
miserable wretch can reap pleasure from praise that is not in accord with his 
own opinions. Consequently, the self-liking of the vain man is established 
on  just  as  fragile  a  base  as  the  self-applause  of  the  gross  flatterer.  As  a  
result,  if  he has any sense, he will  learn through experience to regulate his 
behaviour  so  that  it  turns  out  to  be  more  advantageous.  And  if  the  ‘vain  
man’ is a gentleman, how could it ever occur to us that he actually is ‘a vain 
man’, since he is able to hide his self-applause? At least theoretically 
speaking we cannot detect his vanity and thus we approve of his character. 
 Flattery is a prime example of how the natural principles of human 
mind can turn the social  sphere into a self-regulating system that does not 
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need moral philosophers to tell what is well-founded pride and what is not. 
All we need to do, in order to realise that a man may only advance a limited 
way  depending  on  flattery  and  politeness,  is  to  look  at  the  way  human  
nature functions in society. Flattery, already by its definition, has to be 
based on the intrinsic worth of the attribute in question. According to 
Hume, ‘no person is ever prais’d by another for any quality, which wou’d 
not,  if  real,  produce,  of  itself,  a  pride  in  the  person  possest  of  it’.256 The 
subject  matter  of  successful  flattery  has  to  be  something  that  is  actually  
considered praiseworthy, and if a person is praised for a quality that he in 
fact does not think that he possesses, does not think that the flatterer thinks 
that  he  possesses  it  or  does  not  consider  it  praiseworthy,  this  cannot  
promote his self-satisfaction in any considerable way. Of course, the 
flattered person might be inclined to over-value himself,  but even then he 
has to have some reason to take the praised quality as his own. Flattery has 
to at least resemble truth.  
 These premises of the definition of flattery help to explain its social 
nature. The fact about human nature that confirms flattery as a sociable 
practise  is  that  there  is  no  ‘original  instinct’  that  would  create  ‘a  desire  of  
fame’.  If  there  was  such  instinct,  flattery  would  be  anything  but  a  self-
regulating  social  practice,  since  it  would  not  make  any  difference  whose  
‘opinion’ is ‘favourable’ to us. In this case, all the ‘opinions’ of the world 
‘wou’d equally excite’ our passions and it would not matter if the approving 
‘judgement’ was passed on by ‘a fool’ or ‘a wise man’. However, this is not 
consistent with experience. We do not have an original desire for fame and 
even when ‘fame in general’ is ‘agreeable’, we ‘receive a much greater 
satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and 
approve’.257 Not  just  any  approval  or  disapproval  will  do.  Our  actions  are  
restricted by us being utterly ‘mortify’d with the contempt of persons, upon 
whose judgement we set some value’, whereas in some cases, we might even 
be ‘indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind’.258 Thus, we may 
notice the significance that the idea of social cohesion and self-regulating 
practices have in Hume’s social theory.  
 The relevant point for Hume was that because of education and social  
pressure,  most  people  will  not  choose  the  difficult  path  of  trying  to  
systematically take advantage of people and the established system. It would 
soon backfire and become a disadvantage because of the risk of ending with 
no-one  who  they  would  value  and  who,  in  turn,  would  sincerely  support  
their self-liking. We have to remember that if people are educated to respect 
the established rules, they will automatically acquire a disapproving 
sentiment when they see these rules being broken, regardless of the fact that 
they might be just as tempted to break the rules themselves. As simple as it 
is, in a group of people a person who systematically acts in a dishonest, or 
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otherwise improper manner will eventually be excluded, and the particular 
person might end up realising that his character is no longer approved by 
the people whose opinions he used to admire.  
 On the one hand, there are times when anyone might slip back to the 
strategy of a knave. But this is the precise reason why we need good 
education  and  a  strict  system  of  laws  regulated  by  the  government  and  
established on a previous convention to take possession of the ductile 
minds of children. On the other hand, because men are dependent upon 
society, the presence of acquaintances naturally restricts the behaviour of its 
members (even of the ones who are more prone to knavery than others due 
to these operations of pride and humility that I have explained). When these 
attributes are combined with actual punishments regulated by the 
government, we may understand how it is possible for civil society to grow 
and yet remain intact even when human nature remains as it is. 
Government and political society 
The evolutionary theory of artificial virtues, as noted by Knud Haakonssen, 
is bold and ingenious, because it explains how such an elementary 
constituent of social life as ‘justice is a result of human activity’, but is ‘not 
deliberately constructed by men’.259 I would add to this observation that the 
evolutionary theory was not only restricted to justice, but both Mandeville 
and Hume also applied the same idea to politeness and were able to argue 
that both of these moral institutions were the unintended consequences of 
individual human actions.260 Only  now that  we  have  conducted  a  detailed  
analysis of the nature of both of these primary artificial virtues of justice 
and politeness  and the  passions  behind  them,  we  may  advance  to  analyse  
the essential role of government in the conjectural history of civil society 
and how the political society is thought to function in the Treatise. 
 We ought  to  start  by  re-examining  sympathy  in  the  conjectural  history  
of civil society. In his influential analysis of ‘Hume’s theory of justice’, 
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Haakonssen does not explicitly refer to the government. Instead, he 
underlines that the ‘principle of sympathy’ counters the problem that ‘as 
society grows larger, the self-interested motive to observe the rules of 
justice grows fainter for the individual’.261 I think that to omit the 
government from Hume’s theory of justice is to overemphasise the role of 
the principle of sympathy.262 Sympathy might explain how men come to 
hate themselves when they consider how they are judged by their fellow 
men if they breach the rules of justice, but this only concerns a society that 
already has an established government and a specific system of laws. 
Sympathy  is  not  the  solution  to  counter  the  faint  motive  to  observe  the  
rules of justice that Hume prescribes for large societies. Without analysing 
the role of government in the conjectural history of civil society, we cannot 
understand  how  Hume  thought  that  large  societies  are  able  to  function.  
Once a convention of justice has been formed, men will – without further 
reflection  –  feel  approval  when  observing  actions  that  are  in  accordance  
with this convention, but this is not Hume’s principal point. His major 
concern  is  that  men  have  to  observe  the  rules  of  justice  in  their  own  
conduct  in  a  large  society  also.  Without  laws  that  are  enforced  by  a  
government, this is utterly impossible, despite the principle of sympathy. 
Thus, sympathy might be an important feature of the moral value of justice, 
but  it  is  not  the  factor  that  enables  the  civil  society  to  function.  It  is  the  
purpose of this section to explain, according to the Treatise, what is the way 
to preserve peace in a large society.263 In order to do this,  I will  argue, we 
need to take into account all the central social elements – conjectural 
history, self-love, self-liking and the role of an established government.  
 Besides the methodological point of unintended consequences, another 
purpose of the conjectural scheme of civil society is to explain how moral 
institutions cannot be arbitrary inventions of clever politicians, since they 
are based on previous human conventions. Hume takes particular care to 
prove that the convention of justice precedes laws and the established 
government. As a result,  he is able to make the point that even when ‘the 
rules of justice’ are ‘artificial, they are not arbitrary’.264 In a same manner he 
goes on to declare that the ‘government, upon its first establishment’ derives ‘its 
obligation’ from the ‘laws of nature’, which effectively rejects the idea of an 
arbitrary role of the sovereign.265 The inflexible laws prescribed by a 
government have to be derived from a preceding convention. It is both, 
‘natural, as well as civil justice’, that receive their ‘origin from human 
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conventions’.266 We  cannot  overemphasise  that  in  Hume’s  system  moral  
institutions are established upon human convention in order to control 
certain passions. Hume stresses this point by stating that it is possible that 
‘men’ may even ‘preserve society for some time, without’ a government 
relying on a simple convention.267 However,  it  concerns  only  ‘a  small  
uncultivated society’.268 This  is  why,  once  again,  we  have  to  be  careful  
where the differences between small and large societies are concerned.  
 In a small, clan-based society, once the rules of justice have been 
established, everyone becomes sensible of their own interest in justice. The 
foundation of justice, self-interest, is immediately present, and on each 
occasion that justice is breached, it is something concrete and substantial 
that directly concerns each member of the society. According to Hume, it is 
a  common  feature  of  human  nature  to  prefer  ‘whatever  is  near  and  
contiguous’ to ‘any object,  that lies in a more distant and obscure light’.269 
This is a powerful principle of the human mind. Even though ‘we may be 
fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to 
regulate our actions by this judgement; but yield to the solicitations of our 
passions’.270 This  premise  does  not  create  intractable  difficulties  in  a  small  
society because justice is directly couched to self-interest that is 
continuously  at  hand.  But  once  the  society  increases  in  size,  men  start  to  
lose  the  sight  of  their  own  interest  in  justice,  which  was  prescribed  as  its  
first foundation. At the same time, it  becomes inevitable that men ‘cannot 
be associated without government’.271  
 Hume affirms  that  because  of  the  inherent  weakness  in  human nature  
men  might  be  able  to  assert  that  ‘the  rules  of  justice’  are  ‘sufficient  to  
maintain any society’, but it still is ‘impossible for’ these very same men ‘to 
observe  those  rules,  in  large  and  polish’d  societies’.272 Every person 
educated in human society has a moral sentiment that approves of certain 
rules of justice. A man does not choose to have these approving sentiments. 
He simply feels them. Most likely, a normal person will also pity the people 
whose property has evidently been violated and demand that other people 
act according to the principle of justice. However, it does not entail that he 
would be able to respect these rules himself (even when it is another 
common feature of human understanding to extend a general rule beyond 
its  first  circumstances).  There  is  simply  no  other  natural  motive  than  self-
interest in order to observe the rules of justice, and it is impossible that self-
hatred and sympathy could counter the inclination to prefer what is near to 
what is remote until a government has been established and the principle of 
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justice  is  enforced  by  strict  laws.  In  a  large  society  that  is  not  run  by  a  
government  ‘every  one’  turns  out  to  be  his  ‘own  master,  and  violates  or  
observes the laws of society, according to his present interest or pleasure’.273 
This is a critical statement. In Hume’s system, the principle of sympathy 
alone is not sufficient to replace the fading motive of self-interest for justice 
in a large society. In a large society, without government everyone conducts 
along  the  lines  of  his  own interpretation  of  the  rules  of  justice  that  varies  
according to the circumstances – which is virtually the same as having no 
justice  at  all.  To put  it  differently,  men might  have  a  general  idea  of  right  
and wrong, however, they are carried along with their passions and are 
unable to control their actions according to this judgement. This is also 
‘why  men  so  often’,  as  Hume  points  out,  ‘act  in  contradiction  to  their  
known interest’. A common feature of human nature is to ‘prefer any trivial 
advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so 
much depends on the observance of justice’. Once the society has become 
large, ‘the consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, 
and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage, that may be 
reap’d from it’. Hume emphasises that ‘all men are, in some degree, subject 
to  the  same weakness’,  thus,  ‘it  necessarily  happens,  that  the  violations  of  
equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by 
that means, be render’d very dangerous and uncertain’. Hume claims that 
‘this  quality’  is  not  only  ‘very  dangerous  to  society’;  it  seems  that  it  is  
‘incapable of any remedy’.274  
 At this point in the conjectural history of civil society, despite our 
approval of actions that are beneficial to the public, we are facing a similar 
difficulty  as  small  societies  before  the  establishment  of  the  convention  of  
justice. The rules of justice have turned out to be ineffective, because there 
is no longer a general agreement on what they mean in practise. The 
convention of justice is no longer the immediate interest of every member 
of society. Men need another impression of their own interest in upholding 
civil society. This comes, anew, as an unintended consequence of their 
experience in society. The remaining ‘difficulty’ is to ‘find’ a method by 
‘which men cure’ this ‘natural weakness, and lay themselves under the 
necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity’.275 ‘Once’ men become 
aware of ‘the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society’, they 
‘naturally run into the invention of government, and put it out of their own 
power, as far as possible, to transgress the laws of society’.276 Men ‘establish 
government, as a new invention to attain their ends, and preserve the old, 
or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution of justice’.277  
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 Hume is convinced that we cannot possibly ‘change or correct any thing 
material in our nature’. We cannot remove the ‘violent propension to prefer 
contiguous  to  remote’,  all  we  can  do  is  ‘change  our  circumstances  and  
situation’. We have to revert the state of affairs and ‘render the observance 
of  the  laws  of  justice  our  nearest  interest,  and  their  violation  our  most  
remote’. In a sense, we have to return to the same situation that prevailed in 
a small society when our interest in justice was immediately present. But 
since this is ‘impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only take place 
with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest in the execution 
of justice’.278 Hume reminds his audience that ‘all government is plainly an 
invention of men’279, instituted in order for ‘bettering their own 
condition’.280 The idea is that ‘the persons, whom we call  civil  magistrates,  
kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers’ become ‘indifferent 
persons  to  the  greatest  part  of  the  state’.  The  politicians  can  ‘have  no  
interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice’. Once they are ‘satisfied 
with their present condition, and with their part in society’ they will also 
‘have an immediate interest in every execution of justice, which is so 
necessary to the upholding of society’.281 This is the ‘origin of government 
and political society’.282 The ‘execution of justice’ becomes the business of 
government283 and  now  ‘men  acquire  a  security  against  each  others  
weakness  and passion,  as  well  against  their  own,  and under  the  shelter  of  
governors,  begin  to  taste  at  ease  the  sweets  of  society  and  mutual  
assistance’.284  
 Hume sees the consequences of this explicit step to political society far-
reaching. ‘The rule’, he exclaims, that is ‘absolutely necessary to human 
society’, ‘stability of possession’ can finally ‘serve’ a specific ‘purpose’.285 
Prior to the established government ‘the general rule’ of justice was ‘apply’d 
by particular judgements’. Once society becomes a political society, justice is 
finally directed ‘by other general rules, which must extend to the whole 
society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour’.286 Thus,  only  in  a  
political society we are governing ‘ourselves by rules’ that are ‘general in 
their application’ and ‘free from doubt and uncertainty’.287  
 It is important to realise that Hume is redefining, instead of dismissing, 
the role of politicians and government in the conjectural history of civil 
society.  In  a  sense,  he  is  assigning  the  rulers  the  very  same  role  that  
Mandeville did in his Part II.  Hume is  unambiguous  when stating  that  we  
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should not go too far and try ‘to extirpate all  sense of virtue from among 
mankind’ and claim that politicians invent all moral distinctions.288 
Nevertheless, the role that is prescribed to politicians in the development of 
civil society is, nonetheless, great. In order to understand the nature of this 
role, we first have to realise what the politicians cannot do. It would ‘be in 
vain’, Hume writes, ‘either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or 
attempt  to  change  the  usual  course  of  our  actions,  with  a  view  to  public  
interest’. If their task was to correct ‘the selfishness and ingratitude of men’, 
it would be impossible that we could ever ‘make any progress’. But after we 
have entered a political society, it becomes the business of politicians ‘to 
give  a  new  direction’  to  our  ‘natural  passions,  and  teach  us  that  we  can  
better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their 
headlong and impetuous motion’.289  
 The scheme of countervailing passions in political society is placed in 
the hands of the authorities. It is the enlightened interest of the governors, 
not of the individual citizens, to make sure that everyone follows the rules 
of  justice.  In  a  sense,  within  the  transformation  from  a  small  into  a  large  
society we have replaced the convention of justice with strict laws. Even 
when the laws of society are based on previous convention, it is the 
business of the government from now on to form and execute other 
general rules that guarantee that the principle of justice is rendered effective, 
and to ‘constrain men to observe the laws of nature’.290 Particular laws are 
based on earlier convention, but they are also general rules in their own 
right. The idea that inflexible laws, to a certain extent, replace (and not only 
execute) the previous general rule of justice is vital in Hume’s system. These 
new general rules serve the same purpose as the preceding convention, 
namely to prevent the opposition of self-interest for each citizen. The laws 
of justice are particular and concrete. Their execution through rewards and 
punishments restores the interest in justice for every individual.  
 For Hume, as some modern scholars have emphasised, the ‘distinction 
betwixt justice and injustice’ has two different foundations, ‘self-interest’ 
and ‘morality’.291 What we have to understand is that in a large society this 
second foundation, morality, is rendered effective only when there is an 
established government. Hume uses quite freely the idea that a certain 
‘separate interest’ may produce ‘a separate sentiment of morality’.292 He uses 
this idea for justice (in general) and promise-keeping, allegiance and chastity 
(in particular). This of course leads us to the question of why it could not be 
used  for  other  purposes  as  well.  It  is  plausible  that  Hume’s  discussion  on 
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artificial virtues in the Treatise concerns only those moral institutions where 
there is a direct and evident connection to a corresponding passion. 
Nevertheless, the idea of ‘separate sentiment of morality’ created by a 
‘separate interest’ applies to a variety of different virtues. According to 
Hume’s  definition,  anything  that  is  useful  or  agreeable  and  that  creates  a  
certain  kind  of  pleasant  sentiment  in  us  is  a  virtue,  whereas  anything  that  
creates an unpleasant sentiment is a vice.  
 Traffic regulations would be an obvious example of artificially invented, 
interest-based  virtue,  where  the  rules  create  a  morality  of  their  own.  It  is  
easy to comprehend that the rules of traffic are based on a previous human 
convention established in order to organise traffic. The convention is 
coined and replaced by specific regulations that might vary in different 
countries,  although  the  function  of  the  rules  is  universal  and  fully  in  line  
with the preceding convention that used to organise traffic. Once we have 
become accustomed to specific regulations, a disapproving sentiment arises 
in us when we detect a sign of an action that is contrary to the regulations. 
The  disapproving  sentiment  is  caused  by  an  action  that  breaks  a  specific  
rule (for example ignoring a stop sign),  not by the violation of the idea of 
traffic regulations in general. We might even picture a situation where 
ignoring  a  stop  sign  could  never  hurt  anyone,  or  be  contrary  to  anyone’s  
actual interest, but this action might still create a disapproving sentiment in 
a bystander. It should also be noted that without considerable sanctions 
enforced  by  a  government  it  would  be  impossible  to  organise  traffic  in  a  
large society or to even get anyone to stop at a stop sign in the first place. 
The morality of the rule would be missing. Hence, we may ask: how could 
there be moral sentiments towards an action if such an action does not exist 
(which  would  be  the  case  of  justice  in  a  large  society  without  a  
government)? We may also contemplate the idea of a separate morality by 
sympathising with the sentiments that a traveller might have towards traffic 
regulations in a foreign country, where the rules and morality are different 
from what he is used to following.  
 Another example that helps us to understand the idea of moral 
foundation for justice concerns chess. The rules of chess create an 
independent morality of respecting the rules. This might be analogous with 
the rules of justice, but fair play in chess is not part of justice (the rules of 
justice in the Treatise only regard property). The moral sentiment created in 
a chess player (if he is a chess player in the first place) exists independent of 
the further reflection that without respecting the rules, it would eventually 
become utterly impossible to play the game, and thus, cheating is in contrast 
with  his  own  interest  in  playing  the  game.  A  cheating  chess  player  most  
likely disapproves of other people that attempt to cheat in chess.  I do not 
think that this disapproving sentiment has necessarily much to do with the 
understanding of the fact that the existence of the game is jeopardised if 
people tend to cheat. The person simply has a moral sentiment of the rules 
of  chess.  Thus,  we  may  claim  that  the  rules  of  chess  have  acquired  an  
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independent moral foundation among chess players. Does this moral 
sentiment stop people from cheating? Does it motivate? Obviously, not 
necessarily.  I  think  that  this  disapproving  sentiment  towards  cheating  in  a  
person that might cheat himself is an interesting example of how certain 
actions  might  acquire  an  independent  moral  status  that  affects  the  
sentiments despite our own inclinations. But why do not chess players 
usually cheat? Well, if the other player is experienced enough he easily 
detects an attempt to cheat. What can we infer from this? Chess is a game 
of good rules, because it is difficult to cheat in chess.  
 The separate morality of a certain action (once the action or quality has 
been generally approved) is something factual that does create some kind of 
a moral sentiment in every person that is part of the society in question 
(with  society  I  am  referring  to  any  number  of  people  joined  together).  If  
human nature does not change, and it  is virtually the same in all  countries 
and all ages in history, what this means is that in every large society that is 
able  to  function  there  are  certain  moral  institutions  that  are  based  on  a  
preceding convention and originally established to counter certain original 
features of human nature. According to Hume’s assumption, in a civil 
society that is able to function and last there will always be justice and 
politeness and the corresponding moral sentiments. Simultaneously, 
attempts to reform society based on unrealistic interpretation of human 
nature or measures contrary to the basic moral conventions are doomed to 
fail.  Nevertheless,  the  actual  purpose  of  these  speculations  is  to  point  out  
that  the  idea  that  a  separate  interest  produces  a  separate  morality,  is  a  
principle of the human mind and it can be applied (and it is applied in the 
Treatise)  in  several  cases  beyond  justice.  Thus,  we  need  to  put  into  
perspective the idea of the moral foundation of justice and consider Hume’s 
social  theory  from  a  general  point  of  view  instead  of  putting  too  much  
weight on this important, nevertheless thin straw of morality.  
 Hume’s foundational idea is that in the course of time, men will acquire 
an independent approving sentiment towards certain kinds of actions that 
originally cause a pleasant sentiment because they are useful or agreeable.293 
What eventually happens is that a particular action detaches itself from the 
direct connection with the preceding interest. In the human imagination it is 
no longer the underlying interest that concerns men, but an impression of 
an  action  itself  is  sufficient  to  produce  a  pleasant  sentiment.  As  we  have  
seen in the case of chastity, once a certain mode of behaviour has been 
generally approved, not even the ones who are inclined to conduct their 
own  behaviour  in  an  opposite  manner  are  able  to  feel  anything  but  
disapproval  towards  other  people  who  break  this  rule.  But  a  critical  
condition for a certain action to acquire this independent moral status is 
that it actually has to be generally approved.  
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 I have stressed the point that in the Treatise Hume is continuously using 
symmetric  arguments  and  parallels.  Many  of  these  have  to  do  with  the  
difference between small and large societies.294 As we recall, with regard to 
small  societies,  he emphasises that all  that is needed, is one example of an 
act  of  justice  in  order  for  the  whole  society  to  adopt  a  convention  that  
serves  their  self-interest.  In  a  large  society,  which  is  not  run  by  a  
government, this same method reverts the development and utterly 
incapacitates the principle of justice. Everyone is ‘naturally carried to 
commit acts of injustice’. Each ‘example’ of injustice ‘pushes’ others 
‘forward  in  this  way  by  imitation’  and  gives  them  ‘a  new  reason  for  any  
breach of equity, by shewing’ that why ‘should’ they ‘be the cully’ of their 
‘integrity’, if they ‘alone shou’d impose’ on themselves ‘a severe restraint 
admidst the licentiousness of others’.295 In a large society that is not guided 
by strict laws licentiousness becomes a common phenomenon. As we recall, 
in  small  societies  it  was  the  first  foundation,  self-interest,  that  kept  the  
convention of justice intact and once the society grew larger the general 
rules  of  justice  became  futile.  Thus,  without  emphasising  the  role  of  the  
government and the replacement of the convention of justice by precise 
laws, it is difficult to comprehend what difference would it ever make that 
‘morality’ is a second foundation for justice. Before government and 
inflexible laws, men have a moral sentiment of the rules of justice, but in a 
large society they are fully carried along with their particular judgements and 
inclination to break these rules. Meanwhile, the object of these moral 
sentiments becomes ambiguous, and the moral sentiments that men have 
turn  to  serve  their  own  short-term  interest.  Only  when  we  return  to  a  
situation that is as clear and obvious as the example of the two men pulling 
the oars of the boat there can be an actual foundation of morality in justice. 
This can only be accomplished with an axiomatic system of laws. The whole 
point  of  the  conjectural  history  of  civil  society  is  to  press  the  point  that  
‘rules, by which property, right, and obligation are determin’d’ are 
‘changeable by human laws’.296 ‘Self-love is their real origin’ and since ‘the 
self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another’, only when 
we have a specific ‘system of conduct and behaviour’ that forces ‘these 
several interested passions’ to ‘adjust themselves’ in a particular manner, we 
may talk about a moral duty.297 Thus, in the case of justice in large societies, 
the moral foundation in practise concerns particular, established laws and 
not  the  abstract  idea  of  justice.  Only  with  regard  to  human  laws,  it  is  
unquestionable  that  men  have  a  duty  to  act  justly.  This  is  also  in  perfect  
accordance with the fact that Hume was trying to establish a system based 
on a ‘very low degree of rationality’.298 A common man feels approval for 
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the actions that are in accordance with precise laws and not with the 
abstract foundation behind them. He follows (and expects that other people 
do so as well)  specific rules and might not have a slightest comprehension 
why these rules are such as they are. This is further enhanced by the fact 
that ‘men are mightily addicted to general rules’.299 A simple man is not 
addicted to the novel idea of justice.  He is addicted to a law that tells him 
precisely what he can and what he cannot do. 
 Only ‘after’ the moment when ‘interest is once establish’d and 
acknowledg’d, the sense of morality in the observance’ of the rules of 
justice ‘follows naturally’. It seems that Hume is making a point that, of large 
societies, this can only be accomplished in a political society. Only with 
respect  to  particular  laws  we  may  say  that  ‘interest’  in  justice  is  finally  
‘observ’d to be common to all mankind, and men receive pleasure from the 
view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from 
such as  are  contrary  to  it’.300 Since the relationships between men in large 
societies are complicated and sometimes obscure, only a rigid system of 
inflexible and universal laws restores meaning to the fact that ‘we approve 
of such actions as tend to the peace of society,  and disapprove of such as 
tend to its disturbance’.301 Hume underlines this same point in Book 2 of 
the Treatise by  stating  that  it  is  first  and  foremost  the  ‘government’  that  
‘makes  a  distinction  of  property  and  establishes  the  different  ranks  of  
men’.302  
Conclusion 
Hume’s theory of justice has been criticised because it only concerns 
property and rightful ownership.303 It has been claimed that Hume’s system 
is unable to explain that there is much more to a peaceful existence in a civil 
society than property rights. Justice should expand to other aspects of 
human life, pace ‘justice as fairness’ etc. I do not think that Hume’s idea was 
that the principle of justice should be able to cover all the different aspects 
of  human  life.  He  simply  does  not  have  a  positive  theory  of  social  (or  
distributive) justice.  
 Justice and property are, of course, Hume’s first concern in the 
conjectural history of the civil society presented in the Treatise.  After  a  
government has been established ‘self-interested commerce of men’ finally 
starts to take place.304 As we recall, also Mandeville emphasised that ‘once 
men come to be govern’d by written laws’ and ‘property, and safety of life 
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and limb, may be secured’, ‘all the rest comes on a-pace’.305 In  this  very  
same  tone,  Hume  stresses  that  progress  towards  a  polite  society  is  rapid  
once we have entered a political stage in the conjectural history of civil 
society. Besides restoring morality in justice by putting a general idea back 
into practice by rigid and specific laws, the government and politicians also 
have other means to ‘preserve order and concord in society’.306 When 
‘nature’ has ‘given us some notion of moral distinctions’, the ‘politicians’ 
may ‘extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds’.307 This 
means that rulers mould the behaviour of citizens by setting examples and 
supporting certain kinds of useful and agreeable actions, honourable 
conduct for soldiers and chastity for women being the most obvious 
examples.  It  is  the  effect  of  ‘custom’  that  may  give  us  ‘an  inclination  and 
tendency’ towards ‘any action’ that could never otherwise be an ‘object of 
inclination’ as long as it is not ‘entirely disagreeable’.308 For example, men 
may acquire an otherwise unnatural inclination to be polite towards their 
equals, but only when a custom of politeness has long been established.  
 In addition, Hume states that ‘nothing has a greater effect both to 
encrease and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain 
into pleasure, than custom and repetition’.309 This remark yields strong 
relativistic undertones, since by custom virtually anything may be turned 
from ‘pain into pleasure’.  Mandeville had not been entirely wrong with his 
initial  idea  that  at  least  some  of  the  moral  virtues  are  the  effect  of  skilful  
politicians moulding the passions of common men. He was just inaccurate. 
Hume emphasises that on ‘some occasions’ public encouragement may 
even ‘produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action’.310 
We may  notice  that  in  the  Treatise,  ‘publick  praise  and blame’  and ‘private  
education and instruction’, are the two sides of the same coin that guide the 
moral sentiments and actions of the citizens. When these are combined 
with the fact that our self-liking is dependent upon other people’s opinion 
and we have a strong ‘interest’ in ‘our reputation’, we may grasp how David 
Hume thought that political society is able to function.311 
 The progress that is launched by establishing a government is in many 
respects ambivalent, and a modern reader might not be too keen on taking 
notice of all the effects important for Hume. For example, the social theory 
of the Treatise is  anti-egalitarian  in  spirit.  It  is  the  ‘government’  that  
‘establishes  different  ranks  of  men’  and  it  is  this  inequality  within  society  
that eventually ‘produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, 
leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other 
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actions  and  objects,  which  cause  such  a  diversity,  and  at  the  same  time  
maintain such an uniformity in human life’. Competition further amplifies 
the  distinction  between  different  groups  of  men,  and  it  is  this  effort  to  
distinguishing  oneself  that  creates  wealth,  luxury  and  convenience.  As  a  
proof of the different ranks of men, Hume makes a comparison between ‘a 
day-labourer’ and ‘a man of quality’. They are said to be virtually different in 
all possible respects. Their ‘skin, pores, muscles, and nerves’ are different 
and  so  are  their  ‘sentiments,  actions  and  manners’.  According  to  Hume,  
most evidently ‘different stations of life influence the whole fabric’. To have 
these different ranks is not only beneficial in Hume’s opinion, but also the 
natural outcome of historical development. These ‘different’ ranks, Hume 
writes, arise ‘necessarily’ from the ‘necessary and uniform principles of 
human nature’.312  
 Why is  it  important  for  Hume to  emphasise  the  existence  of  different  
classes of men? One reason concerns the way Hume thinks that it is 
possible to preserve peace among human beings. If some of the utopian 
republican ideas became true and all men were in fact equal there would not 
be any natural respect towards the superiors. As we have seen in the case of 
politeness, Hume thinks that modesty and respect towards the people who 
are  clearly  set  above  us  in  hierarchy  is  produced  naturally  in  the  human  
mind and does not cause a painful sensation despite the fact that all  of us 
are by nature selfish and proud. This becomes a key issue in Hume’s 
political philosophy presented in Essays as we will soon learn.  
 The artificial virtue of justice in a large society has two main effects on 
men. First, once the laws of justice have been established men will develop 
an inclination through education and living in a society to respect these 
established rules. Second, once accustomed to the laws of justice men will 
spontaneously disapprove of actions that breach these rules. These moral 
sentiments do not altogether prevent the strong temptation of being unjust. 
Nevertheless, because of the social cohesion created through the fact that 
our self-liking is dependent upon other people’s opinion it is possible to 
cultivate our self-interest and maintain social order, even when the passion 
of self-love itself is ‘directly destructive of society’.313 What is momentous in 
Hume’s project, is that our self-love is subordinate to our self-satisfaction. 
‘Riches’ that we acquire might in many cases be the cause of vanity, but the 
final end is to be ‘satisfy’d with ourselves’, which is Hume’s understanding 
of self-liking.314 He  writes  that  ‘the  relation,  which  is  esteem’d  the  closest,  
and  which  of  all  others  produces  most  commonly  the  passion  of  pride,  is  
that of property’.315 However,  the  cultivation  of  self-love  and following  the  
rules of justice could not render us satisfied with ourselves. Even if ‘riches’ 
were the ‘original’ cause of pride, ‘when not seconded by the opinions and 
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sentiments of others’, they would ‘have little influence’.316 Additionally, 
living among equals requires flattery and dissimulation, since practically 
everyone has an over-weaning conceit of himself. Without the practice of 
dissimulation, our opinions and sentiments would not be seconded by 
mankind.  It  is  precisely  the  same  ‘secondary  satisfaction  or  vanity’  that  
‘becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief 
reason, why we’ desire them in the first place.317 In modern society, self-
love is secondary to pride, and unquestionably, politeness, dissimulation and 
hiding  our  actual  thoughts  and feelings  are  not  only  beneficial  for  us  and 
the  safeguard  of  human  interaction,  but  are  a  relevant  part  of  the  social  
theory of the Treatise. In short, the secrets to a well-functioning society are 
the due respect for other people’s property and pride, while boasting in our 
wealth and vanity. 
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6. Politics and the science of man  
in Hume’s Essays 
We have accounted for the basic social theory of the Treatise. We have not 
yet  discussed  how  this  is  an  integral  part  of  Hume’s  science  of  man  as  a  
general expedition and how it strongly overlaps with his understanding of 
politics. In order to do this, we need to turn to discuss his Essays. 
 Essays complete the Treatise. Hume’s political thought can only be 
understood with this link in mind. Yet, a common view is that his ‘attempt 
to  base  politics  upon the  science  of  man is  given  up one  year  after  being  
partially realised in the third Book of Treatise’ and ‘the political thinking 
recorded in the Essays Moral and Political of 1741’ is not informed ‘by 
empirical investigations of human psychology’.1 As  the  argument  goes,  
Hume’s thoughts turn into uninteresting constitutional history. This might 
seem to be the case, if  we do not comprehend that the greatness of mind 
project is continued in Essays.  In  this  case,  we  should  not  put  too  much  
emphasis  on  the  change  of  genre  from  a  treatise  to  essays.2 The  two  
Enquiries come very close to being essays themselves (although they are 
entitled treatises), but when read together, we realise that Book 3 of the 
Treatise and the earliest essays form together a coherent political program. It 
is therefore doubtful that by the time of writing his essays ‘Hume has come 
to realize that political theory’ can ‘be based directly upon the historical 
study of political events without involving any intricate psychological 
investigations’.3  
 Much of the current discussion upon Hume’s relation to the Treatise 
regards Hume’s possible ‘disavowal’ of the youthful piece in 1775.4 Modern 
editors of Hume’s philosophical works are inclined to argue that Hume’s 
                                                        
1 James Noxon, Hume’s philosophical development. A study of his methods, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 24. 
2 For example, contemporaries saw Enquiry concetning the principles of morals particularly 
as essays. An ironic broadside recapping the EPM was published in Edinburgh in 1755. It 
was entitled ‘The Quintessence of Modern Philosophy extracted from Ten Late Essays’ 
(Glasgow University  Library).  It  may be remarked that  the Dialogue was interpreted as 
the essay number X, in which ‘The Characters of the impure Diogenes and Pascal’ were 
‘curiously contrasted’. 
3 Noxon, Hume’s philosophical development, 1973, p. 25. 
4 On this question, see Norton, ‘Historical account’ in T, pp. 433–589 and the works 
cited there. See also Beauchamp, EPM, p. xii. 
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renouncement of the Treatise is  not  in  fact  a  disavowal  of  the  work  or  
constitutes  only  a  partial  disavowal.  My  argument  is  that  very  early  on,  
Hume sought to supplement the Treatise. John Immerwahr has also 
suggested ‘the Essays, Moral and Political are not the abandonment of Hume’s 
original program but its natural continuation’.5 We have two manifestations 
of Hume’s science of man. One, in the form of the Treatise in three books, 
and the other, in form of Essays and treatises that elaborates on some crucial 
issues.  In  order  to  understand Hume’s  moral  and  political  philosophy,  we  
naturally need to read both, his Treatise and Essays. 
 I have adopted the title of “Greatness of mind” for this second part of 
my dissertation, mainly to point out the relevance of this particular section 
in Book 3 of the Treatise,  but  also  to  highlight  that  the  question  of  civil  
society’s ability to defend itself becomes an aching problem for eighteenth-
century psychology. We may account for reasons for how a man becomes 
civilised, but how is it possible to do this without him becoming a coward?  
Eloquence and politeness considered politically 
Just  over  a  decade  ago,  the  history  of  intellectual  history  was  in  a  state  
where David Hume started to be customarily linked with the republican 
tradition of political thought. In one sense, this association marked the 
zenith of J. G. A. Pocock’s argument about the trans-Atlantic Machiavellian 
moment – an interpretation, which regarding the Scottish enlightenment 
was originally contested by the significant student of Hume’s philosophical 
politics, Duncan Forbes.6 There undoubtedly are certain elements in 
Hume’s Essays which suggest that he is a republican political thinker or that 
he should at least be studied in close connection to this tradition. But at the 
same time, there are even stronger reasons to detach the study of Hume’s 
political thought from republicanism and start developing new analyses of 
Hume’s political  thought.  The problem, as I perceive it,  is  that there have 
not been serious attempts to understand Hume’s political thought as part of 
his  science  of  man  project.  It  is  my  aim  to  move  towards  such  an  
interpretation. 
 First,  we  ought  to  make  clear  what  politics  are  not  for  Hume.  
Throughout  his  oeuvre  Hume raises  the  objection  that  self-rule  is  a  futile  
topic in politics. For example, in an ironic description of the Stoics in 
Essays, Hume remarks that when ‘we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we 
are philosophers’ and ‘when we have reduced these rules to practice, we are 
sages’.7 What is left unsaid, and what makes this ironic is that,  according to 
Hume, self-rule rarely applies in real life and the part of putting the rules of 
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Pocock’s Machiavellian moment, Historical Journal, 19, 1976, p. 555. 
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conduct into practice falls within the sphere of politics. Hume famously – in 
his  challenging  tone  –  declares  as  his  own  opinion  that  in  politics  ‘every  
man ought  to  be  supposed  a  knave’.8 What is required hence is a political 
structure based on a realistic, almost cynical, understanding of human 
nature – quite the opposite of the society of Zeno’s sages. A basic principle 
of  any  political  system,  according  to  Hume,  is  the  assumption  that  people  
remain just as foolish as they are without the right ‘forms and institutions’. 
It  does  not  mean  that  we  need  to  assume  that  every  man  is  necessarily  a  
knave. But it does mean that to talk about self-rule as a political principle is 
a waste of time and Hume was not a cosmopolitan Stoic thinker.9 
 Let us first consider Hume’s essay ‘Of eloquence’ that has received very 
little attention in modern scholarship.10 What  I  seek  to  establish  is  how  
clearly Hume’s analysis of politeness differs from other kind of discussion 
on politeness by Hume’s contemporaries who can and should be linked to 
the republican line of thought.11 One  point  that  has  not  been  sufficiently  
stressed is the link between eloquence and politeness that certain authors 
make.  If  any  human activity  ought  to  be  linked  to  the  republican  political  
tradition,  it  is  rhetoric  and  eloquence.  Once  we  realise  that  Hume  
deliberately detaches his analysis of politeness from this kind of 
interpretations, we understand what different kind of political significance 
his own analysis of politeness has.  
 Hume’s essay on eloquence highlights a problem. Eighteenth-century 
public speakers are inferior in their oratorical skills compared to their 
ancient counterparts. This was a commonplace in the eighteenth century 
and  Hume  presents  it  as  a  fact.  According  to  him,  there  has  been  ‘so  
sensible a decline of eloquence in later ages’.12 But the essay does not seek 
to  solve  this  problem  and  neither  can  it  sensibly  be  read  as  any  sort  of  
promotion of the rhetorical or the republican tradition. In the early 
eighteenth century defending eloquence customarily went hand in hand 
with promoting civic values and free government. One of the most 
“republican” moments of Cato’s letters, for example, is a discussion on 
eloquence as a political attribute – how good oratorical skills directly relate 
to martial virtues i.e. citizens defending the realm of a free state. The 
                                                        
8 Hume, ‘Of the independency of parliament’, in Essays, p. 42. 
9 For a fresh argument that ‘Zeno’s Republic and the Cosmopolitan tradition’ are in 
fact grounded on similar principles, see John Sellars, ‘Stoic cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s 
Republic’, History of Political Thought, 28, 2007, pp. 1–29. 
10 On Hume and eloquence, see above all, Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of 
Hume, 1994. The increasingly more negative attitude through the progress of different 
editions of Hume’s Essays is  also  pointed  out  by  T.  H.  Grose  in  his  ‘History  of  the  
editions’ in The philosophical works, Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, eds., 4 
vols., London, 1886, III, p. 74. 
11 I  use  Cato’s letters as an epitome here. Even though the essays by Gordon and 
Trenchard are eclectic, I read them as a manifestation of republican thinking in a 
Pocockian manner. Hence, I do not agree with the extremely strong position taken by 
Annie Mitchell linking them to Mandeville. 
12 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 102. 
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opening line of Trenchard’s piece entitled ‘Of eloquence, considered 
politically’ claims that ‘in free states, where publick affairs are transacted in 
popular assemblies, eloquence is always of great use and esteem’.13 In 
contrast, Hume discusses the rhetorical tradition only to undermine it. He 
treats the question of eloquence as a trite commonplace and as a surface to 
plunge into more complex questions of moral and political philosophy. The 
essay ‘Of eloquence’ is a significant part of Hume’s political argumentation, 
but not in the sense that readers trained to look for clues of republicanism 
might expect. In the end, as it turns out, the question of politics for Hume 
was of a completely different nature than what particularly the English 
authors such as the authors of Cato’s letters generally assumed it to be. 
 The commonplace that Hume had decided to question in the first 
editions of his essays was that free government is vital  for the progress of 
arts and sciences in eighteenth-century Europe. Hume’s attack is carried out 
in a sequence of essays. In the essay ‘Of eloquence’, Hume’s decision was to 
take up the claim by introducing rhetoric and eloquence – civic attributes 
customarily linked to the republican form of government. Before we may 
engage  with  the  analysis  of  the  essay,  we  need  to  make  a  few remarks  on  
Hume’s style of writing. It is striking how economical he is in most of his 
early essays. Hume’s concepts are often clearly defined and analytically used. 
His distinctions are systematic and precise. This is quite the contrary to his 
Treatise, where he is causing frustration for commentators because of his 
vague use of certain definitions. But in the best of his essays,  he does not 
blur the edges of the argument. For example, Hume designed the essay ‘Of 
superstition and enthusiasm’ to be an essay about religion. Together with 
the preceding essay ‘Of the parties of Great Britain’ it  is  Hume perhaps at 
his most topical. Therefore, these essays also need to be read as topical 
essays.  Superstition and enthusiasm in this framework denote ‘two species 
of false religion’, not these particular states of mind in general.  
 In  a  similar  vein,  the  scope  of  eloquence  in  the  essay  on  eloquence  is  
not eloquence in general. The essay is intentionally tied to deliberate 
rhetoric. Hume only discusses eloquence used in ‘popular assemblies’.14 
This narrows down the extent of the argument (instead of touching on 
every possible aspect of speech) and focuses it on English authors 
underlining the relevance of eloquence as an example of civic and 
republican  values.  It  is  important  that  Hume’s  choice  was  to  only  discuss  
public speaking. Consequently, he avoids turning the question into a 
lukewarm  talk  about  a  man’s  behaviour  in  general.  There  are  many  
examples of the contrary in Hume’s time. For example, Fénelon wrote, in a 
similar fashion, about eloquence with an explicit comparison between the 
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skill of the ancients and moderns.15 But eloquence in Fénelon’s prose mixes 
with  politeness  and  manners  becoming  part  of  his  general  critique  of  
luxury.16 At  the  same  time,  his  discussion  on  eloquence  loses  most  of  its  
argumentative value. What Fénelon leaves his audience with is only his 
general critique of luxury. In comparison, Hume is more precise. 
 Hume’s claim about eloquence is that upon comparison with the 
classical examples, modern orations are but ‘lame performances’.17 First he 
treads  a  long  mile  upon  the  popular  road  stating  that  ‘of  all  human  
productions, the orations of Demosthenes present to us the models, which 
approach the nearest to perfection’.18 Hume labours to emphasise the 
premiership of ancient eloquence. Suddenly he halts and forces his audience 
to think. What is the modern free government that everyone always refers 
to?  ‘England’,  Hume declares,  is  ‘of  all  the  polite  and learned  nations’  the  
only  one  that  has  ‘a  popular  government’  and  which  structurally  forms  a  
‘dominion of eloquence’.19 Therefore,  if  the  authors  stressing  the  role  of  
free government for arts and sciences are correct, we most certainly should 
expect England to be boasting with skilful orators. But, what is the state of 
eloquence in Britain? Poor, awful and wretched, Hume spells out in bright 
colours, which leads to the conclusion that the question of free government 
in the modern case of England does not count for much. Since England is 
the  only  learned  nation  with  a  popular  government,  it  should  have  high  
standards of eloquence, if authors such as that of Cato’s letters were correct 
and in a country such as England ‘eloquence is always of great use and 
esteem’.20 
 At  the  same  time,  Hume  avoids  denouncing  eloquence  (or  free  
government,  for  that  matter).  Indeed,  his  essay  on  eloquence  is  a  prime  
example how one can remain philosophically sensible and tolerant towards 
different  ages  and  customs,  yet,  at  the  same  time  use  arguments  in  a  
politically motivated (and severely poignant) way. In the end, he shows no 
real concern over the faith of eloquence in Britain, mainly because the essay 
is  a  prolegomena  for  Hume’s  almost  unreserved  panegyric  of  France  and  
politeness put forward in the following essay ‘Of the rise and progress of 
the  arts  and  sciences’.  It  is  highly  relevant  that  for  Hume  eloquence  and  
politeness are different customs that do not mix.21 Nevertheless, the essay 
                                                        
15 Cf. Fénelon, François, The adventures of Telemachus the son of Ulysses in five 
parts, 5th ed., London, 1703, pp. 80–1. 
16 Ibid., passim. 
17 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 105. 
18 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 106. 
19 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 99. 
20 Cato’s letters, p. 727. 
21 Adam  Potkay  has  pointed  out  that  as  Hume  ‘time  and  again  revised  the  essay  
between its initial publication in 1742 and its final version of 1770, he increasingly 
expressed his distrust of eloquence not in philosophical terms but rather in terms of the 
emerging discourse of manners or politeness’. Potkay, The fate of eloquence in the age of Hume, 
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on eloquence has much to do with politeness, even when the concept does 
not feature in the text. 
 Hume deliberately exaggerates the difference in style between ancient 
and modern forms of eloquence. ‘Ancient eloquence’ was ‘pathetic’, 
‘sublime and passionate’.22 When describing the Greek model, Hume uses 
such  terms  as  ‘blaze  of  eloquence’,  ‘swelling  expressions’  and  gives  as  his  
favourite example the pathetic style of the ancients ‘stamping with the 
foot’.23 In contrast, Hume describes ‘modern’ English taste for eloquence as 
‘argumentative and rational’.24 Any stamping is only carried out in the 
theatre instead of a public assembly. Now, if we compare the contrast that 
Hume  is  drawing  here  against  the  context  of  opinions  advanced  during  
Hume’s time about the relationship between ancient and modern 
eloquence, we realise that Hume’s position is highly polemical. But this is 
intentional  on  Hume’s  part.  It  did  not  really  matter  to  him  whether  the  
featured contrast is real or not, because he is using it to illustrate a different 
point. The contrast is derived directly from what Hume calls the ‘more 
zealous partizans of the ancients’ are claiming about politeness.25 The 
admirers  of  the  ancients  pointed  the  finger  towards  the  artificiality  of  
modern (French) manners. The ones stressing the superiority of ‘ancient 
simplicity’ blamed ‘modern politeness’ of ‘affection and foppery’.26 What 
Hume does is to turn this same form of argument towards the question of 
eloquence  that  the  ancients  are  so  much  praised  of  –  and  reverse  it.  The  
admirer  of  the  Greeks  that  Hume  singles  out  is  of  course  ‘Lord  
Shaftesbury’.  In  a  mock-‘Shaftesburian’  sense  Hume  now  shows  that  the  
ancient manners were perhaps plain, but their style of public speaking was 
extravagant and artificial while the modern British style is plain (and dull). 
Hume states that it is the sublime, passionate and exaggerated orations that 
‘always have more command and authority over mankind’.27 The modern 
Brits were levelheaded public speakers, the ancients were extremely 
passionate. Yet, it is the exaggerated style that rules in eloquence. This is a 
direct parallel to the question of politeness and l’Art de vivre addressed 
immediately  afterwards.  It  is  also  a  volte  face  of  the  moralising  voices  on  
modern manners. Hume’s idea was to take the obvious edge from the 
criticism of politeness before he starts to praise it. It is also important that 
we realise that in Hume’s framework it is fully possible – and indeed 
necessary – to separate, compare and contrast the customs of eloquence 
and politeness in this way.  
                                                                                                                 
1994, p. 4. In contrast, Trenchard writes: ‘where-ever politeness, liberty, and learning 
subsist, rhetoric will be cultivated as part of them’. Cato’s letters, p. 733. 
22 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 108. 
23 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 101. 
24 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 108. 
25 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 131. 
26 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 130–1. 
27 Hume, ‘Of eloquence’, in Essays, p. 108. 
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 In Hume’s Dialogue (that discusses the above mentioned ‘opposite 
directions’ of ‘Rhine’ and ‘Rhone’), the counterparts of this metaphorical 
dichotomy are not ancient Greece and modern Britain, but ‘an Athenian 
and a French man’.28 By  and  large,  when  Hume  uses  the  dichotomy  
between ancient and modern (in an actual, and not hypothetical sense as in 
the essay on eloquence) the modern model that he has in his mind is always 
the French. There is a clear difference between ancient and modern 
manners  and  politics  for  Hume.  And  that  the  concept  of  modern  is  the  
ideal of France is one of the most significant aspects for us to grasp in order 
to understand Hume’s moral and political philosophy.  
 Hume’s move in the essay on eloquence was not to discuss France at all, 
which is also quite striking because the following essay ‘Of the rise and 
progress’ has everything to do with France. Also, within the context of 
contemporary discussion on ancient and modern eloquence Hume would 
have  had  other  options  open  to  weaken  the  enthusiasm  for  free  
government and republican values. Alongside Fénelon, a vast theoretical 
French literature on eloquence existed and Hume was surely aware of it. 
Nicole, Saint-Evremond, Fontenelle, and Charles Rollin, all wrote during 
Louis XIVs reign and they all carried discussions on public speaking. These 
and even Blaise Gisbert’s Christian eloquence in theory and practice were 
translated into English and widely read. Hume was a Francophile and one 
easy option to dismiss the British argument about eloquence would have 
been to point out that the French eloquence fared just as well as the British 
despite  the  lack  of  popular  assemblies.  But  the  fact  that  Hume leaves  the  
French completely out of the discussion (even when they were very much 
in his mind) shows that he follows the argument put forward by the authors 
he opposes. Hume demonstrates that in the end eloquence is yet another 
form of art (such as poetry), nothing more and nothing less.29 Hume’s point 
was that the political significance of eloquence had been much overrated 
while the importance of politeness was neglected. The most important 
function of the essay on eloquence is therefore to make room for the 
greatness of mind exposition that follows. 
 This  puts  us  into  the  position  to  understand  the  role  of  eloquence  in  
Hume’s introduction to his Treatise. He writes that in science ‘the victory is 
not gain’d by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by 
the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army’.30 Again, instead of 
being an actual praise of eloquence, this is a rather resentful analysis of his 
time. What Hume proposes – instead of inconsequential advances of ‘taking 
now and then a castle or village on the frontier’ that eloquence enables – is 
‘to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human 
                                                        
28 EPM ‘A dialogue’.27; SBN 334. About eloquence in Enquiry concerning the principles of 
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particularly to painting (and the theatre), David Hume, ‘Of tragedy’, in Essays, pp. 224–5. 
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nature itself’.31 There is a clear difference between these warlike maneuvers. 
Hume is not suggesting here the advancement of eloquence or ‘musicians 
of  the  army’,  but  a  method that  will  function  as  a  more  powerful  weapon 
than all  the pikes and swords combined. The science of man is not about 
eloquent trifles. It is about a method of understanding the nature of all that 
is human. Simultaneously, it is an attempt to harness the soul of warfare. It 
is indeed a scientific program. 
 It is revealing that the only part of Hume’s essay on eloquence where we 
might  detect  a  whiff  of  normative  attitude  is  his  closing  remarks.  In  a  
somewhat sulky manner Hume points out that little formality would help 
modern  orators  to  get  their  point  across.  It  is  the  ‘great  affection  of  
extemporary discourses’ that has made ‘modern orators’ reject ‘all order and 
method’, which to Hume counts as ‘a material defect’.32 All this is in line, of 
course, with Hume’s ideas of the nature of politeness. If anything, Hume is 
an exponent of formality. Hume in his self-taught humanism naturally 
appreciates  eloquence  as  a  form  of  art,  but  when  it  is  taken  as  a  political  
attribute or compared to the l’Art de vivre, perfected in a country commonly 
concerned to have nothing to do with free government, it  surely does not 
count for much. 
 To put it in short, the essay on eloquence is best understood in the 
contrasting  light  of  the  essay  ‘Of  rise  and  progress’  and  vice  versa.  It  is  
important also to realise that the argument functions in different directions. 
On the one hand, it annihilates the Fénelonian mishmash where some of 
the edges of different arguments and concepts are blurred – where 
eloquence, manners, politeness, luxury, etc. become the same. Hume 
refuses to mix eloquence and politeness. This mixing would be quite natural 
to do, if one did not have such a clear and concentrated view of things. On 
the other hand, Hume’s discussion dismisses the republican argument about 
the role of free government for modern Europe and the role of rhetoric as 
a political parameter. Hume thought that there was something more 
important at stake. 
 The sharp edge of the essay ‘Of eloquence’ is not eloquence and 
modern orations. The whole political spectrum is at stake. The real 
significance of the essay is not that Hume opposes the republican 
arguments, but that he is committed to a political program of his own. It is 
the  greatness  of  mind agenda  that  Hume advances.  Hume’s  paradigm is  a  
full-fledged  program  because  it  is  derived  from  his  science  of  man  and  
extended to the political realm. It not only constitutes a framework. As we 
will shortly learn, Hume uses it coherently to extend it to central aspects of 
his political theory.  
 It  is  not  a  coincidence  that  when  Hume  rearranged  the  two  first  
volumes  of  his  essays  in  1748  into  the  third  edition,  the  essay  ‘Of  
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eloquence’ is placed between ‘Of liberty and despotism’33 and ‘Of the rise 
and progress of the arts and sciences’. These three essays form together the 
most forceful political argument that David Hume set forward. This is 
where Hume takes up his theory of the greatness of mind and applies it to 
politics. 
Association of ideas and politeness 
One distinguishably new element in Hume’s Essays compared to the Treatise 
is the relevance of the form of government. However, when we understand 
how  the  basic  axiom  of  his  science  of  man  –  the  association  of  ideas  –  
functions in politics, the discussion on the form of government turns out to 
be  a  logical  outcome  of  the  social  theory  of  the  Treatise. By and large, 
Hume’s thinking remains highly consistent throughout his prose. What 
turns out to look comprehensive is Hume’s emphasis on politeness. 
Simultaneously, it is of first importance that we understand Hume’s corpus 
as a constant development from pre-Treatise material  onwards.  Hence,  we  
need to start our analysis of Hume’s politics as part of the science of man 
by examining how the principle of association of ideas features in the pre-
Treatise material. We will first establish a link between Hume’s early analysis 
of politeness and the general principle of the association of ideas. This will 
lead  us  to  the  overall  function  of  the  extension  of  general  rules  in  human 
psychology.34 What  this  then  enables  us  to  do  is  to  analyse  the  different  
implications of general rules, which explains why Hume’s outright defence 
of monarchy is a natural outcome of his science of man. Simultaneously, we 
come  to  the  understanding  that  science  of  man  in  Hume’s  case  actually  
means that the same basic principles of mind that occupy his epistemology 
also have a relevant role in his political theory. 
 David Hume’s early intellectual development has become a fashionable 
topic in Hume studies today.35 Yet,  the  inevitable  link  between  the  
association of ideas in Hume’s early analysis of politeness and his basic 
epistemological principles has not been established. It has also been argued 
that Hume’s positive use of the association of ideas is not present in any of 
the surviving pre-Treatise material.36 Not  only  do  I  argue  that  it  indeed  is,  
but it forms the core of Hume’s intellectual development and his political 
thinking. Since the science of man is based on the analogy between 
                                                        
33 Entitled, since the 1758 edition Essays and treatises on several subjects, ‘Of civil liberty’. 
34 About general rules and the role of a philosopher, see Richard Serjeantson, 
'Hume's general rules and the "Chief Business of Philosophers"', in Impressions of Hume, 
2005, pp. 187–212. 
35 Barfoot, ‘Hume and the culture of science in the early eighteenth century’, 1990; 
Stewart, ‘Hume’s intellectual development, 1711–1752’, 2005; Wright, ‘Hume on the 
origin of modern honour: a study in Hume’s intellectual development’, 2005 and Norton, 
‘Introduction’, 2007. 
36 Nevertheless, about the importance of the association of ideas for the young 
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different  parts  of  natural  and  moral  science,  it  is  understandable  that  the  
‘rules of good-breeding’ and the ‘laws of honour’ are also present in Book 1 
of the Treatise in the discussions on human understanding.37 My attempt is 
to  take  the  argument  further  and  show  that  the  early  modern  theory  of  
politeness is one cause for Hume’s emphasis on the role of the association 
of ideas in his science of man. 
 What is of particular significance is the letter on politeness of 1734 that 
consists  of  three  examples  of  the  positive  use  of  the  association  of  ideas.  
The main point for Hume, as we have already learned, was to demonstrate 
why the French have more real politeness than the English. Hume argues 
that ‘real  politeness’  is not natural in the sense that Chevalier Ramsay had 
suggested. Instead, Hume explains, because of the ‘little niceties’ that the 
French practice, they develop ‘a sincere Inclination to oblige & be 
serviceable’. Without education and customs men would not be serviceable, 
but because of the niceties they develop an inclination to follow a general 
rule.  To  my  understanding,  this  constitutes  a  textbook  case  of  Hume’s  
positive use of the principle of association of ideas. This principle of mind 
is confirmed by two other examples of habits, courage and devotion.38 In 
other words, Hume offers three different cases in which the association of 
ideas explains how the ‘mind pleases itself by the Progress it makes in such 
Trifles,  & while  it  is  so  supported  makes  an  easy  Transition  to  something  
more material’. All of the three examples are fully in line with Gill’s overall 
thesis about Hume’s use of the association of ideas.39 The case of courage 
demonstrates clearly how the mind can be disciplined through any artificial 
means (holding a gun in a certain way does not have any actual quality that 
contributes to a person conquering his fear of death). It does not mean that 
in the end the inclination that person has for being polite, devoted or 
courageous  would  not  be  sincere.  In  short,  all  the  three  examples  are  
different  ways  of  saying  that  once  a  general  rule  is  established  and  
supported by certain outward objects, people develop an inclination to 
follow the rule. 
 There is a close resemblance between the analysis offered in the 
politeness  letter  and  some  of  the  main  passages  discussing  the  formation  
and nature of belief in Book 1 of the Treatise. The main focus of the letter 
on politeness is on ‘an easy Transition’ in the human mind ‘to something 
more material’ – namely an inclination to be polite towards strangers. This 
process  of  mind is  similar  to  the  one  described  in  T 1.3.8.2,  where  Hume 
writes that when ‘any object is presented, which elevates and enlivens the 
thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more strong 
                                                        
37 Especially T 1.3.13.15–17; SBN 152–3. 
38 Namely, by ‘Soldiers’ who ‘are found to become more courageous in learning to 
hold their Musquets within half an Inch of a place appointed’ and by ‘Devotees’ feeling 
‘their Devotion encrease by the Observance of trivial Superstitions’. 
39 See especially Gill, ‘Fantastick associations and addictive general rules: a 
fundamental difference between Hutcheson and Hume’, 1996, pp. 23–48. 
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and  vivid,  as  long  as  that  disposition  continues’.  Hume  concludes,  ‘when  
the mind is once enliven’d by a present impression, it proceeds to form a 
more  lively  idea  of  the  related  objects,  by  a  natural  transition  of  the  
disposition  from  the  one  to  the  other’.  The  evident  analogy  between  the  
formation  of  belief  and  Hume’s  analysis  of  French  politeness  is  striking.  
The continuity between the question of ‘something more material’ in the 
politeness-letter and the question of ‘manner’  in  which  a  belief  is  ‘being  
conceiv’d’ (i.e. how ‘something’ is ‘felt by the mind’) also seems evident.40 
 One  could  of  course  argue  that  Hume  is  first  and  foremost  thinking  
about epistemological questions and hence applying the discovered 
principles to questions such as politeness, but there is other textual evidence 
suggesting that it is actually his insight into the question of politeness 
described in the letter to Ramsay that enlivens his own epistemological 
thinking. Especially the discussion on ‘ceremonies of the Roman Catholic 
religion’ which explain the common ‘effect of resemblance in enlivening the 
idea’ (immediately after the passage discussed above) in paragraph T 1.3.8.4 
directly relates this to the letter on politeness and the example of devotees 
becoming more devoted because of superstitious rituals. The passages T 
1.3.8.3-5 also suggest that these parts were written in France sometime after 
the letter on politeness to Ramsay. In them, Hume discusses the effect of ‘a 
picture of an absent friend’ and being ‘two hundred leagues distant’ from 
home (roughly the distance from Edinburgh to Rheims / La Flèche). These 
were subjects that evidently occupied Hume’s mind when composing the 
letter comparing English and French manners. 
 By and large, to me it looks that the frequent examples of politeness in 
the Book 1 of the Treatise are no coincidence. Based upon the evidence that 
we have, we might well argue that Hume is inferring his conception of the 
science of man from the basic tenets of the theory of politeness. There are 
further  reasons  for  doing  this.  The  1734  letter  on  politeness  needs  to  be  
read in accordance with Hume’s first essay on Chivalry and modern honour 
written sometime after Mandeville’s Origin of honour had  been published  in  
1732. John P. Wright has analysed the role of Mandeville in this early essay. 
Wright’s balancing argument towards Hutcheson is that Hume benefited 
much from Mandeville’s analysis, but yet turned towards Hutcheson to 
argue for the natural customs and that modern honour and manners are 
monstrous and ridiculous. I believe that Wright’s otherwise excellent 
analysis is mistaken in this point. 
 Hume’s attitude towards the artificiality of modern manners and even 
the comical features of knight-errantry is much more ambiguous than what 
Wright suggests. As the politeness-letter clearly implies, Hume is quite far 
from criticising French politeness as unnatural or condemning the courage 
of  the  “disciplined”  soldiers  as  artificial.  We  need  to  see  this  analysis  of  
French politeness also in accordance with Hume’s essay on modern 
honour.  Yet,  it  is  equally  important  to  realise  that  this  goes  hand in  hand 
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with the role that these same principles that dominate his philosophical 
system play in his political theory. One should not forget that Hume’s 
claims that his science of man extends to politics.  
Essay on chivalry and the extension of general rules 
Despite the growing interest, very little is known about Hume’s early 
intellectual development. More recently it has also been discovered that 
‘modern scholarship has been dogged by poor information about the likely 
chronology of David Hume’s undated manuscripts’.41 This  has  been  
particularly true of his first known essay. John Hill Burton mistakenly 
attributed Hume’s essay on Chivalry and modern honour as an essay written 
by a young student.42 Hume’s more recent biographer, Ernest Mossner, 
followed Burton’s lead claiming that the ‘Historical essay on chivalry and 
modern honour’ was an ‘undergraduate term paper’ or a ‘prize essay’, 
written  ‘at  the  age  of  fourteen  or  fifteen’  in  ‘1725  or  1726’.43 Already  in  
1977, Reindhard Brandt argued that Mossner was wrong and the essay was 
written around 1734.44 Professor Alexander Stewart has recently published 
detailed  evidence  proving  that  Mossner’s  dating  ‘was  as  whimsical  as  his  
transcription’.45 This  essay  was  composed  with  a  more  mature  hand  and  
Stewart’s suggestion is that it was written in 1731.46 However, since so little 
is known or preserved of Hume’s work prior to Treatise, the precise date of 
the essay seems to me quite insignificant. More importantly, Stewart brings 
to the surface with calligraphic evidence that ‘the letters to Ramsay ca. 
1730-34’,  the  famous  ‘letter  to  the  physician  of  1734’  and  the  ‘essay  on  
Chivalry’ belong to the same group.47  
 In ‘Chivalry and modern honour’ Hume sought to investigate the birth 
and development of knight-errantry,  which had ‘run like Wild-fire over all  
the Nations of Europe’ with a vast impact on the manners of the whole 
continent.48 If we analyse the essay on chivalry from a philosophical 
perspective, we notice that Hume introduces a basic psychological principle 
twice  (and  he  does  this  for  a  specific  reason).  Wright  discusses  a  
‘psychological principle which Hume introduces in the essay in order to 
account  for  the  origin  of  modern  honour  at  the  time  the  barbarians  
conquered the Christianized Roman empire’. Wright calls this ‘the 
overreaching principle’ that explains that ‘when human beings aspire to an 
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ideal which is far beyond their capacities, they create a distorted conception 
of that ideal that cannot actually be realized, or else is realized in an entirely 
perverse form’.49 At the beginning of the essay, Hume points out that the 
‘Minds’ of the Goths ‘were bewilder’d’ and they would ‘invent at first’ a new 
set of manners ‘which was suitable to that Twilight of Reason’. I agree with 
Wright that the question is about how the untrained imagination ‘runs in a 
moment quite wide of Nature’ and operates in a ‘fairy-ground’ and ‘makes 
us  frame  to  ourselves,  tho’  we  cannot  execute  them,  Rules  of  Conduct  
different  from  these  which  are  set  to  us  by  Nature’.  Therefore,  most  
certainly,  according  to  Hume,  a  man  has  a  tendency  to  form  rules  
(resembling  fantasies),  which  are  too  idealistic  compared  to  his  own  
capacity. 
 When we analyse Hume’s second treatment of the same principle in this 
essay, which Wright does not take into consideration, we realise that there is 
also another feature in Hume’s thinking, which in fact (instead of the 
overreaching principle) is the effective cause of the difference between 
ancient  and  modern  manners.  Towards  the  end  of  the  essay  Hume  
concentrates on the difference between the first rise of ancient and modern 
manners  as  forms  of  heroism.  The  overreaching  principle  is  said  to  be  
identical  in  both  ancient  and modern  times.  Hume writes  also  that  in  the  
ancient times people would ‘from the Novelty of the Subject, exceed 
Nature, & overcharge their Courage with something excessive & 
monstrous’. As Hume states, in this perspective the two cases of heroism 
are identical because they are both based on constant principles of mind. 
Therefore,  it  is  not  the  overreaching  principle  alone  that  explains  the  
peculiar nature of the gothic rules of conduct. 
 The actual difference between the first rise of ancient and 
gothic/modern  manners  is  constituted  by  the  role  that  the  extension  of  a  
general  rule  plays  in  Hume’s  thinking.  Like  the  explanation  of  the  three  
different cases given in the letter on politeness, the explanation of the 
difference between ancient and modern manners and heroism is also 
derived from Hume’s conception of the association of ideas. For Hume, the 
first  case  of  ancient  heroism is  not  an  extension  of  a  general  rule  because  
there is no prior rule of conduct to follow. Therefore, Hume argues, in this 
case ‘the Idea of Heroism is form’d only from Men’s own imaginations’ and 
‘it cou’d not very much exceed their Abilities, but a little Practice, 
Experience, & Reflection must soon reduce it to Nature’. When there is no 
general rule which can be extended or previous examples to fuel the mind, 
reality  soon  eats  up  the  chimera.  The  ideals  are  not  removed  far  enough  
from reality and men stop following the fantastic rules of conduct suggested 
by their imagination. For this reason, in ancient times, men turned ‘into 
Pirates  &  Robbers’  instead  of  throwing  ‘into  all  their  Behavior,  the  most  
courteous & humane Air imaginable & that sublime Generosity, which 
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alwise attends the most elevate & refin’d Courage’.50 This  kind  of  
transitional phases are important in Hume’s historically oriented political 
thinking. 
 What explains why the modern manners were not reduced to nature (as 
its ancient counterpart) is that in fact the modern case is an extension of a 
general rule ‘beyond the Original from which they drew their first Notion’. 
‘The Moorish & Gothic Heroes had their Fancy prompted by the Foot-
steps of something great & gallant, beyond what of themselves they cou’d 
ever have conceiv’d, & far beyond what they had any light or Example to 
guide them in the Attainment of’. The ancient ideal in their wild 
imagination was transmuted into something unrecogniseable. An important 
part in this eventually “fortunate accident” was that the corruption of the 
ancient civility also left room for innovation. This is also confirmed by 
Hume in the key essay ‘Rise of Arts and Sciences’ where he writes: ‘I have 
sometimes been inclin’d to think, that Interruptions in the Periods of 
Learning, were they not attended with such a Destruction of antient Books, 
and the Records of History, wou’d be rather favourable to the Arts and 
Sciences’.51 But  what  is  crucial  is  that  there  was  some  sort  of  example  
(which can well be compared to the role that niceties play in turning people 
into serviceable, superstitious rituals in devotion or discipline in courage). 
The question of actually being able to live up to the set of rules is beside the 
point. What matters is that people were psychologically unwilling to give up 
the imaginary rules of conduct despite their evident shortcomings to follow 
these principles. Therefore, Hume writes, it is ‘no Wonder so great a grasp 
& so small a reach; so great an Endeavor & so small Abilities, produc’d very 
fantastical Effects on their manners, & such as were difficult to moderate & 
reduce to Nature & a just Simplicity’. 
 The message remains simple: if there is no general rule or concrete 
example guiding us (which can be in the form of a written law, custom of 
pulling the oars together or even a bird flying), men’s conduct animated by 
wild imagination eventually returns to conduct that is in accordance with 
human nature. Imagination alone, without a concrete example, is not 
enough to support the artificial principles. But what happened, quite 
accidentally  of  course,  at  the  point  of  the  fall  of  the  ancient  legacy  is  that  
artificial manners were invented, which did go wide off nature and did try in 
a  sense  to  replace  wings  with  an  engine,  and  did make a man 
uncharacteristically polite. As Hume himself put it, if the ‘chimerical 
Politeness’ is ‘not better’ than ‘plain roughness’ of the ancients, ‘’tis at least 
an Endeavour to be so’.  
 We should turn to Mandeville to grasp the essence of Hume’s argument. 
People laugh at the age of chivalry, yet they follow the very same customs. 
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On the one hand, Mandeville lectured, the gap between the gothic and 
present  times  was  not  as  large  as  people  thought.  On the  other  hand,  the  
breach between the ancient world and modern Europe was much greater 
than  people  commonly  wanted  to  believe.  This  was  not  only  true  of  the  
principles of honour and duelling, but also of more casual aspects of 
politeness. Horatio asked his mentor, ‘which pray do you believe more 
antient, pulling off the Hat, or saying, Your humble Servant?’ Cleomenes’s 
answer was that ‘they are both of them Gothick and modern’.52 Cleomenes 
carried on instructing his friend that 
to this Day, taking off the Hat is a dumb Shew of a known Civility in Words: Mind 
now the Power of Custom, and imbibed Notions. We both laught at this Gothick 
Absurdity, and are well assured, that it must have had its Origin from the basest 
Flattery:  yet  neither  of  us,  walking  with  out  Hats  on,  could  meet  an  Acquaintance  
with  whom we  are  not  very  familiar,  without  shewing  this  Piece  of  Civility;  nay,  it  
would be a Pain to us not to do it.53 
What was the difference between the gothic gallantry and modern 
politeness? Manners and customs had been refined. ‘Flattery’ had become 
‘less  bare-faced,  and the  Design  of  it  upon Man’s  Pride  is  better  disguis’d  
than it was formerly’.54 It  is  also  interesting  to  notice  that  the  question  of  
politeness as a sincere position (in the sense in which David Hume applies 
it in his politeness-letter) is clearly apparent in Mandeville’s later works. 
 In  a  similar  manner  Hume  would  openly  laugh  at  the  exaggerated  
expressions of the politeness of the Goths. This, however, does not mean 
that Hume would prefer the ancient form of civility, but quite the contrary. 
Since “real” politeness for Hume is artificial, the ancients never really 
accomplished to put up a set of rules that would, metaphorically speaking, 
lift  a man off the ground. It would therefore take a long march in history 
before the ancient manners reached any tolerable state (and Hume’s 
argument is of course that they never did in fact).  Here the point that the 
general rule that the Goths and moors followed was based on a “mistaken” 
association  of  ideas  and  the  extension  of  general  rules  is  the  key.  What  
matters in terms of Hume’s philosophical development is that in 1732-4 
Hume is not far from his positive aspect of association of ideas presented in 
the Treatise. 
Implications of the extension of general rules 
Hume uses the idea of extending general rules on several occasions and in 
different forms throughout his works.55 Perhaps  the  best  example  is  the  
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case of chastity and modesty in the Treatise.56 Hume summarises this 
principle when recasting the argument in the second Enquiry:  ‘General rules 
are often extended beyond the principle, whence they first arise’.57  
 In  the  case  of  chastity,  this  means  two  things.  First,  the  extension  of  
general rules explains how people ‘who have no interest’ in certain general 
rules ‘are carry’d along with the stream, and are also apt to be affected with 
sympathy for the general interests of society’. What we in effect are talking 
about here is a “mistaken” association of ideas, since the fidelity of women 
is  not  strictly  speaking  the  general  interest  of  society,  but  of  ‘those,  who  
have  an  interest  in  the  fidelity  of  women’  –  namely  their  lovers  and  
husbands. But when eventually (after the general rule has gained currency) 
even the debauched bachelors are ‘shock’d with any instance of lewdness or 
impudence  of  women’,  we  may  well  speak  of  a  society  having  formed  a  
general interest in the fidelity of women, even when this does not imply any 
kind  of  necessity  of  it  being  a  “real”  general  interest.  Hence,  in  modern  
theoretical terms, this is a point about social ontology. Collective acceptance 
makes  chastity  a  true  clause  for  virtue  for  women.  The  expectation  of  
chastity does not make it necessarily right nor does it make it a real general 
interest. It constitutes a social fact.58 
 The other manner in which the general rule is extended beyond the 
principle in the case of chastity concerns resemblance. Hume takes it as 
given  that  ‘all  these  ideas  of  modesty  and  decency  have  a  regard  to  
generation;  since  they  impose  not  the  same laws,  with  the  same  force, on the 
male sex’. Hume is not being sexist by justifying the double standard.59 He 
only describes the prevailing general rule. What Hume seeks to establish is 
the way in which the general rule that concerns the generation (and in fact 
only the women who are in their child bearing age) is extended to concern 
all ‘the different ages of women’. What is interesting is that there need not 
be any rational explanation for this extension. The initial problem is not 
that women beyond their child bearing age would set a bad example for the 
younger ones. It is the resemblance in the association of ideas that extends 
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the general rule to concern all women. This happens in our minds without 
reflection, following a natural train of thought. Only in Enquiry concerning the 
principles of morals Hume extends the discussion on chastity to also consider 
the question of whether ‘the example of the old would be pernicious to the 
young’.60 For  Hume,  the  example  of  how  ‘the  notions  of  modesty’  are  
extended ‘over the whole sex, from their earliest infancy to their extremest 
old-age and infirmity’ is a prime example of how ‘the general rule carries us 
beyond the original principle’.61 The extension of a general rule is true for 
several different cases of both natural and moral philosophy. It is also good 
to keep in mind that in Book 1, Hume states that ‘resemblance is the most 
fertile source of error; and indeed there are few mistakes in reasoning, 
which  do not  borrow largely  from that  origin’.  The  reason for  this  is  that  
the ‘resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of the 
mind, which we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we 
are not able to distinguish them’.62 The  argument  about  Hume’s  moral  
system being an error theory has hence some textual support, at least when 
public interest and public opinion are concerned. 
 The  reason  to  discuss  these  mechanisms  of  mind  is  that  they  play  an  
immediate role in Hume’s political theory. We may notice this problem of 
resemblance in the case of factions and why Hume sees political interest 
groups  as  such  a  taunting  problem  (which  are  of  course  built-in  in  the  
republican form of government). Factions have everything to do with 
Hume’s philosophy of the mind. Hume puts an emphasis on the 
mechanism through which men communicate their sentiments. He strongly 
stresses that the ‘human mind is of a very imitative nature’ and that it is not 
‘possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a 
similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well 
as virtues’.63 For  example,  as  we  have  noticed,  men  are  apt  to  acquire  a  
dislike for women’s infidelity. This is based on the interest that some men 
have in it, which in turn is extended into a general rule. In the same manner, 
through general rules men may develop different moral attitudes towards 
other questions that seem to concern the public. The mechanism of 
sympathy thus explains how men are public minded. However, the course is 
just  as  easily  reversed:  ‘when  men  act  in  a  faction,  they  are  apt,  without  
shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to 
serve their party’.64 Mechanism of sympathy is not a moral sense. And since 
there  is  no  moral  sense,  men  are  just  as  easily  misled  and  divided  into  
factions following the same principle of sympathy that makes them feel as if 
they were acting for the greater good, when in reality they are not. It is just 
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as  easy  to  develop  moral  sentiments  considering  partial  rules,  which  we  
mistake for general ones. The warm feeling inside does not mean that we 
are  correct.  And  in  the  case  of  factions,  it  is  all  too  easy  to  be  wrong  
because of the very same feeling. ‘Where a considerable body of men act 
together’  one  ‘is  sure  to  be  approved  of  by  his  own  party,  for  what  
promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours 
of adversaries’.65 
 Now, when we add to our discussion what I call  the “lingering effect” 
of general rules,  we understand the extent of this problem in politics.  The 
operation of this lingering effect in a particular mind is best captured in one 
of Hume’s essays, where he writes that ‘The mind naturally continues with 
the same impetus or force,  which  it  has  acquired  by  its  motion;  as  a  vessel,  
once  impelled  by  the  oars,  carries  on  its  course  for  some  time,  when  the  
original impulse is suspended’.66 In other words, our minds are not only 
quick to misidentify partial interests as general, they are also very thick and 
stubborn (which has its good and bad effects). Once we adopt some basic 
rules  of  conduct,  moral  principles  and habits,  they  usually  stick  with  us  –  
even when the supposed interest in them has been proved to have ended – 
because of the way that our mind operates.  
 If we consider this lingering effect in politics, we notice that there are 
several occasions when Hume uses this argument about the extension of a 
rule as the causal explanation of a given phenomenon. Among other things, 
it explains why ‘nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun 
upon a real difference, continue after that difference is lost’. The extension 
of  a  general  rule  and  the  lingering  effect  go  so  far  that  after  men  have  
contracted ‘an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an 
animosity against their antagonists’, these ‘passions they often transmit to 
their posterity’.67 Not only can the moral feeling be directed towards a false 
end,  it  is  perfectly  possible  that  because  of  the  operation  of  our  mind,  
prejudices are “inherited” from one generation to another. The explanatory 
weight that Hume charges this principle with is demonstrated through his 
claim  that  ‘those  who  pass  the  early  part  of  life  among  slaves,  are  only  
qualified to be, themselves, slaves and tyrants’.68 In philosophical terms, this 
may be described as the influence of the lingering effect of general rules. In 
practice it means that, for Hume, breaking bad habits and acquired rules is 
notoriously difficult, if not impossible. But what is truly interesting is that 
the  extension  of  general  rules  in  politics  provides  David  Hume  with  the  
most  forceful  argument  against  the  republican  line  of  thought.  What  was  
madness for some turned out to be greatness of mind for Hume.  
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Hume’s case for monarchy 
We have now gained a sufficient understanding of the different 
argumentative tools that Hume utilised in his Essays to analyse the political 
argument that he sets forward. Association of ideas in the early eighteenth 
century was of course strongly linked to education and different institutions 
independent of David Hume’s aspirations.69 Nevertheless,  it  is  difficult  to  
think of anyone who would have put as much weight on this principle and 
claim  that  ‘those  who  pass  the  early  part  of  life  among  slaves,  are  only  
qualified  to  be,  themselves,  slaves  and  tyrants’.  In  this  light,  it  is  
unsurprising how large a role education and institutions play in Hume’s 
political thought. 
 Hume was a Francophile, but his emphasis on French manners and 
even the French form of government are not mere personal whims nor are 
they simple examples that he used when considering the problem of public 
debt and voluntary bankruptcy.70 Instead, Hume’s emphasis on the 
monarchical government and institutions that promote what he considers a 
civilised society are integral parts of his political theory that correlates with 
his philosophical system. Although he expressed some concerns about the 
possibility of finding ‘general Truths in Politics’ elsewhere in his essays, in 
‘That politics may be reduced to a science’ he argued in 1741 that ‘so great 
is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Government, and so little 
Dependence  have  they  on  the  Humours  and  Temper  of  Men,  that  
Consequences as general and as certain may be deduced from them, on 
most Occasions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences can afford us’.71 
This, of course, emphasises the weight put on the form of government – 
and monarchy, in particular – in Hume’s argument. 
 The reason why Hume turns towards the monarchical government is 
threefold.  First,  it  functions  as  a  part  of  Hume’s  solution  to  the  topical  
question of public debt.72 Second, it is an inherent part of Hume’s case for 
politeness as a moral institution. And third, the ultimate problem that 
Hume is facing is the question of unrestrained love of dominion, which 
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requires some kind of Hobbesian solution.73 Here  also  the  question  of  
factions  and  their  link  to  the  republican  form  of  government  feature  
strongly  in  the  argument.  Hume’s  choice  was  to  turn  towards  a  stronger  
monarchical structure stressing the role of the crown and importance of the 
real executive power. But above all, it is the second question, the question 
of politeness that sets Hume forward to make a case for monarchy.  
 One of the aims of Hume’s political argumentation was the vindication 
of  monarchy.  This  is  a  position  that  is  extremely  interesting  because  it  is  
based on the same principles as other parts of Hume’s science of man. 
Without  this  link  Hume’s  stance  on  the  question  of  different  forms  of  
government  would  be  of  much  less  interest.  One  of  Hume’s  reasons  for  
dismissing Machiavelli is that the Italian confined ‘his study to the furious 
and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly 
principalities of Italy’ and therefore ‘his reasoning especially upon 
monarchical government, have been found extremely defective’.74 One  of  
the key moments of Hume’s rebuttal of the republican line of thought is the 
essay ‘Of civil liberty’ that was originally entitled ‘Of Liberty and 
Despotism’. Hume’s main target is the popular claim that ‘the arts and 
sciences could never flourish, but in a free government’.75 What he does is 
to assert that the first progress of civility is linked to a sufficient amount of 
liberty. However, he treats the actual argument that arts and sciences could 
only flourish in a free state as ridiculous. Hume points out that there are 
clear historical examples of the contrary. ‘The most eminent Instance of the 
flourishing of Learning in despotic Governments’, according to Hume, ‘is 
that of France, which never enjoy’d any Shadow of Liberty, and yet has carried 
the Arts and Sciences nearer Perfection than any other Nation of the Universe’.76 
Even when Hume reconsidered his choice of words later, the argument 
remains palpable.  
 Together with ‘Of liberty and despotism’, the project of greatness of 
mind culminates in the essay ‘Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences’. 
It is useful to compare this key essay with the initial essay on ‘Chivalry and 
modern  honour’.  What  Hume  is  doing  in  1742,  besides  extending  his  
discussion to consider the forms of government, is recasting his original 
design  in  a  slightly  different  form.  For  example,  in  the  early  essay  Hume  
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wrote that when the example of modern manners ‘was once broken upon it 
run  like  Wildfire  over  all  the  Nations  of  Europe  who  being  in  the  same  
Situation  with  these  Nations  kindled  with  the  least  Spark’.  The  main  
purpose of sympathy for Hume is to describe how general rules are spread. 
The same psychological principle is at play in the ‘Rise and progress’, when 
Hume discusses how easily the ‘multitude’ is ‘seized by the common 
affection’ and ‘governed by it in all their actions’.77 Again the spreading of 
the ‘common affection’ is described as ‘fire’ that ‘runs along the earth’ and 
‘is  caught  from  one  breast  to  another’.  This  of  course  regards  Hume’s  
analysis of sympathy. But here we also need to discuss general rules. Hume 
emphasises  that  ‘the  question’  of  ‘the  rise  and  progress  of  the  arts  and  
sciences’ may be ‘accounted for’ by ‘general causes and principles’ since it 
concerns ‘the taste,  genius,  and spirit’  of the ‘whole people’  and not some 
particular individuals.78 Hume’s emphasis might be on the mechanism that 
explains this phenomenon, but the object of the study is the common 
approval. 
 The first cause that Hume accounts for in the ‘Rise and progress’ is the 
explanation why ‘it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any 
people unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government’.79 As it turns out, the 
problem is not the authoritarian form of government as such. The problem 
is the effect that despotism has on the people living in a small community. 
When the ‘arbitrary power’ is ‘contracted into a small compass’, the effects 
are ‘altogether ruinous and intolerable’80 and ‘people, governed after such a 
manner,  are  slaves  in  the  full  and  proper  sense  of  the  word;  and  it  is  
impossible that they can ever aspire to any refinements of taste or reason’.81 
We ought to take notice of the difference that Hume makes between slavery 
and despotism. In a small society political despotism compares to domestic 
slavery – in a large society it necessarily does not. Hume discusses domestic 
slavery in the essay ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’. ‘The practice 
of domestic slavery’, he writes, is the clearest implication of the ‘barbarous 
manners  of  ancient  times’.  What  it  implies  is  that  ‘every  man of  rank  was  
rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and 
low debasement of his slaves’.82 In a strict sense, Hume’s polemical 
argument is that in the ancient times men were only fitted to be slaves and 
tyrants  –  an  argument  derived  from  the  principles  of  the  association  of  
ideas. The logical conclusion is that there could not be any significant 
advancement of arts and sciences when there is nothing to ‘engage’ men ‘to 
the reciprocal duties of gentleness and humanity’.83 The argument presented 
                                                        
77 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 112. 
78 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 114. 
79 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 115. 
80 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 116. 
81 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 117. 
82 Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 384. 
83 Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 384. 
POLITICS AND THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN HUME’S ESSAYS 
 
323 
in  the  ‘Populousness  of  ancient  nations’  is  about  slavery,  but  since  Hume 
thinks  that  slavery  is  a  problem  that  has  been  resolved  in  his  own  time  
(except for some of the most peripheral corners of earth where slavery still 
exists),  the  argument  here  is  directed  against  the  republican  tradition  in  
general and particularly against the admirers of the ancients.84  
 Even when Hume’s attitude remains sceptical towards the republics, he 
is not however about to deny the prevalence of free government in the first 
rise  of  arts  and  sciences.  The  main,  positive  effect  of  free  government  is  
that  ‘by  an  infallible  operation’  it  ‘gives  rise  to  Law,  even  before  mankind 
have made any considerable advances in the other sciences’.85 This together 
with the necessary consequence that ‘free state’ is ‘the only proper Nursery’ 
of  ‘arts  and  sciences’  are  salutary  points  for  Hume  to  make.  What  is  
interesting  is  the  manner  in  which  Hume  takes  these  points  for  granted  
relying heavily on his philosophical principles. 
 The extension of general rules and sympathy create a distorting problem 
in the form of factions, but in his argument about civilised monarchies, 
Hume uses the same principles as justification. On the surface it might look 
as  if  the  essay  ‘Rise  and  progress’  would  underline  the  importance  of  
republican features of government. Hume writes that the ‘monarchical 
form’ of government ‘owes all its perfection to the republican’ form and 
‘must borrow its laws, and methods, and institutions, and consequently its 
stability and order, from free governments’.86 The  key  to  Hume’s  
philosophical  system  here  is  the  word  ‘borrow’.  What  shows  that  the  
question of free government in eighteenth-century Europe is of little 
moment for Hume is the consequence of the extension of general rules. 
The way Hume applies his science of man in the sphere of politics is mainly 
mechanical and geometrical. Because of the force that he puts on the idea 
of  the  extension  of  general  rules,  he  now finds  himself  at  liberty  to  argue  
that whatever the advantages of free governments, civilised monarchies are 
able to emulate them.  
 It  might  look  like  an  unfounded  extension  of  the  benefits  of  the  
democracy to also concern civilised monarchies, but it turns out to have 
deep roots in Hume’s philosophical system. About law in general, Hume 
writes that ‘when it has once taken root, is a hardy plant, which will scarcely 
ever perish’.87 Indeed, Hume thinks that the free government plays the role 
of “nursery” with regard to arts and sciences, but once they have first taken 
root, these ‘noble plants’ may ‘be transplanted into any government’.88 Our 
interpretation is facilitated by Hume’s use of the plant-metaphor that 
                                                        
84 Hume, ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’, in Essays, p. 384. 
85 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 118. 
86 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 125. 
87 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 124. 
88 Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, p. 124; David 
Hume, ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, in Essays, Moral and political. 2nd 
edition, 1742, p. 74. 
DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND 
 
324 
signifies  that  law in  fact  is  more  or  less  the  only  part  of  arts  and sciences  
that Hume connects to republics. The psychological mechanism that 
ensures  that  the  law  is  ‘a  hardy  plant’  that  survives  without  a  free  
government  is  the  “lingering  effect”  of  general  rules.  It  is  the  obvious  
advantage of having a legislative system that first carries the approval of it 
from breast to breast giving it  additional support.  Later,  a man’s addiction 
to rules and the lingering effect also makes it almost impossible to root it 
out.  At  the  same  time,  this  gives  Hume  a  justification  to  take  his  own  
argument  further  and claim that  ‘the  arts  of  government,  first  invented  in  
free states, are preserved to the mutual advantage and security of sovereign 
and subject’ in a civilised monarchy.89  
 After Hume has explained why he has adopted a position of taking for 
granted that the benefits of free government are transported into a civilised 
monarchy,  he  turns  to  discuss  the  nature  of  civility  in  general.  This  is  the  
moment in the ‘Rise and progress’ essay when the argument takes a radical 
turn. While a monarchy can emulate the benefits of free governments, it is 
much more difficult for republics to imitate monarchies. What becomes 
overtly clear is that civility, in the form that Hume imagined it, cannot 
bloom in a fully republican government in a similar manner in which – after 
the monarchies have “borrowed” the principles of free governments – 
‘private property’ is ‘fully as secure in a civiliz’d European Monarchy, as in a 
Republic’.  Hume  takes  a  step  even  further  stating  that  in  a  civilised  
monarchy there is no ‘Danger ever apprehended’ from ‘the Violence of the 
Sovereign’.90 This is the reason for overlooking the argument about arts and 
sciences linked to free governments. 
 Hume stresses that arts and sciences rise in republics, but are preserved 
and improved in civilised monarchies. According to him, ‘in monarchical 
governments there is a source of improvement, and in popular 
governments a source of degeneracy’.91 This  is  often  interpreted  as  an  
argument for commerce and the topical question of public debt. 
Speculation about state bankruptcy is one reason for Hume’s claim that 
monarchies are a source of improvement. However, there is something 
even more important at stake. When the essay ‘Liberty and despotism’ was 
first published, Hume was leaning heavily towards the side of civilised 
monarchies. In one of his examples he claimed that even ‘with regard to the 
Stage’, the French ‘have far excell’d the Greeks’. Later he polished the edges 
of the argument by modifying the sentence so that the French have ‘even 
excelled the Greeks’.92 Yet, the message remains the same. What is at stake 
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is the whole spectrum of civility that is not necessarily tied to the question 
of commerce. Growth of exchange, production and diversified labour had 
nothing to do with the excellence of drama in ancient or modern times, the 
form of government, instead, does. Unsurprisingly, liberal arts were one of 
the decisive questions for Hume when he considered the debate of ancients 
v moderns. 
 The advantages of free government and its by-products are of particular 
nature since they consider everybody. These benefits in turn are usually well 
protected because of the natural bent of human nature. ‘What is profitable 
to  every  mortal,  and  in  common  life,  when  once  discovered’,  Hume  
reminded his audience, ‘can scarcely fall into oblivion, but by the total 
subversion of society’.93 Hume’s choice of words, ‘profitable to every 
mortal’,  is  very  telling.  The  contrast  is  that  ‘the  arts  of  luxury  and  much  
more the liberal arts’ are ‘easily lost; because they are always relished by a 
few only’. Hence, a hierarchical structure and outward protection of these 
weakly rooted plants is important for Hume.  
 Promoting trade does not have a necessary connection to the 
advancement of liberal arts. The positive effects of commerce were not on 
Hume’s mind when discussing liberal arts. This becomes apparent in his 
attitude  towards  the  Dutch.  Holland  functions  as  the  prime  example  for  
Hume how ‘multitudes of people, necessity and liberty, have begotten 
commerce’ in a small republic, but simultaneously ‘study and application 
have scarcely produced any eminent writers’.94 Hume’s attitude towards the 
Dutch  was  harsh.  He used  Holland as  the  epitome of  the  claim that  ‘The  
Republics in Europe are at present noted for Want of Politeness’. The reason 
for  this  is  that  the  ruling  passion  of  the  Dutch  is  avarice.  When writing  a  
letter  from  his  travels  in  1748,  Hume  claimed  that  ‘Holland  was  
undoubtedly ruin´d by its Liberty’. When William IV seized power, Hume 
thought that Holland had ‘a chance of being saved by its Prince’. Ironically, 
Hume  added  that  ‘Let  Republicans  make  the  best  of  this  Example  they  
can’.95  
 In the essay ‘Liberty and despotism’, Hume also makes a clear 
distinction between commerce and refined arts. His carefully chosen 
historical examples of advances in the arts concern governments that ‘never 
made any Efforts towards the Arts and Sciences, till they began to lose their 
Liberty’.96 In other words, there is no necessary connection between 
modern republics and liberal arts. Justifying his claim that trade can be just 
as profitable in a monarchy as in a republic is a balancing act. At the same 
time,  he  steps  far  towards  the  side  of  external  protection  of  liberal  arts.  
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Later he explicitly stated that ‘We must sometimes sacrifice somewhat of 
the useful,  if  we  be  very  anxious  to  obtain  all  the  agreeable qualities; and 
cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage’.97 What this plainly 
means  is  that  in  Hume’s  political  thought,  promoting  trade  is  not  an  all-
encompassing end, quite the contrary. It is the role of the government to 
interfere in order to uphold ‘agreeable qualities’, even if this means 
sacrificing some of the commercial advantages. Upholding a hierarchical 
structure is the prime example of this. 
 We cannot comprehend Hume’s moral and political philosophy without 
considering the questions of form and structure in accordance with the 
principles of association of ideas.98 The reason why republics cannot 
emulate monarchies concerns the role of hierarchy and social distance in 
Hume’s philosophy. The clearest and most important demonstration of this 
regards politeness.  
 Politeness is the best example of an artificial moral institution. In order 
to render it ‘general among any People’, Hume explains in the essay on 
‘Rise and progress’ that ‘it seems necessary to assist the natural Dispositions 
by some general Motive’. We ought to notice that ‘natural Disposition’ here 
means  an  acquired  disposition  that  has  become  a  habit  of  being  obliging  
and serviceable. However, in this essay Hume suggests that this acquired 
disposition alone does not suffice. Artificial politeness needs to be further 
assisted ‘by some general Motive’. Hume thinks that a hierarchical structure 
is needed in order for politeness to be general among a multitude. In all its 
simplicity, this is the most important function of a monarchical 
government. ‘In a civiliz’d Monarchy, there is a long Train of Dependence 
from  the  Prince  to  the  Peasant,  which  is  not  great  enough  to  render  
Property precarious, or depress the Minds of the People; but is sufficient to 
beget in every one an Inclination to please his Superiors, and form himself 
upon those Models, which are most acceptable to People of Condition and 
Education’. The covet of this ‘train of dependence’ is consequently the 
reason why modern republics necessarily lack politeness. ‘Where Power 
rises upwards from the People to the Great, as in all Republics, such 
Refinements  of  Civility  are  apt  to  be  little  practis’d;  since  the  whole  State  
are,  by  that  Means,  brought  near  to  a  Level,  and  every  Member  of  it  is  
render’d, in a great Measure, independent of another’. Hume is clear in his 
choice of words: politeness can only flourish in a country that has 
implemented a monarchical structure. The question of politeness also turns 
out  to  be  a  decisive  one.  Not  only  does  Hume  claim  that  ‘Politeness  of  
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POLITICS AND THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN HUME’S ESSAYS 
 
327 
Manners’ arises ‘most naturally in Monarchies and Courts’, he also takes the 
argument one step further by claiming that ‘where that flourishes, none of 
the liberal Arts will be altogether neglected or despis’d’.99  
 The  role  of  form  and  structure  also  explains  why  the  general  rule  of  
politeness cannot be extended to consider republics in the same manner the 
benefits  of  republics  can  be  transfered  into  any  type  of  government.  It  is  
the  question  of  facility  of  association  of  ideas  that  decides  this.  The  
question of form functions seamlessly with Hume’s principles of human 
understanding. In T.1.4.1.10 Hume clearly states that ‘where the mind 
reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have 
not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas;  nor does 
the imagination feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that 
which arises from its common judgements and opinions’. For example, we 
are more likely to be moved by sadness when a funeral is held in a church 
rather than in an amusement park. The same principle can easily be 
extended to the general question of any habit. It is easy to see how forms of 
government may relate to this. With regard to politeness in democracies 
‘the attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy; and the 
spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern’d in their 
movements by the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they 
flow in their usual channel’ (as they do in monarchies regarding the 
disposition  to  please  others).  It  is  the  ‘train  of  dependence’  that  in  a  
monarchy gives the ‘easiness and facility’ that helps the principles of 
politeness to have a considerable effect on our behaviour since we are 
moved once our imagination feels the sensation of a need to be polite.  In 
democracies our ‘attention’ is always ‘on the stretch’ when we have to 
please others – the inclination of being polite does not feel natural – since 
we  are  more  used  to  considering  everyone  our  equal.  In  this  manner,  we  
may say that ‘Politeness of Manners’ arises ‘most naturally in Monarchies 
and Courts’, just in the same way that we may claim that ‘eloquence’ in turn 
‘springs up more naturally in popular governments’.100 So, if  we are asking 
how Hume’s thinking from the pre-Treatise time forwards evolved, we may 
notice that while his general interest in politeness retained a central role, the 
emphasis on the monarchical form of government is a new element that 
first arises in Essays. 
 The question of distance is of great moment for Hume. The reason why 
‘a long Train of Dependence from the Prince to the Peasant’  is ‘not great 
enough to render Property precarious, or depress the Minds of the People’ 
concerns the size of civilised monarchies. Civilised monarchies are large 
enough, so the authority does not have a dispiriting effect. This argument 
about social distance is a concrete one: ‘the more the master is removed 
from  us  in  place  and  rank,  the  greater  liberty  we  enjoy’.  There  are  two  
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aspects of this liberty. First, it means that ‘the less are our actions inspected 
and controlled’. Second, and perhaps more importantly, ‘the fainter that 
cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, 
and even dominion of another’.101 In this sense, the comparison between 
‘domestic and political situation’ and the demonstration that ‘domestic slavery’ 
is ‘more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever’ is an 
important one. Only with these aspects in mind, it makes sense when we 
consider that Hume thinks that ‘human nature, in general, really enjoys 
more liberty at present, in the most arbitrary government of Europe, than it 
ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient times’.102 It  is  the  
question of social distance that makes the difference. Social distance also 
received considerable attention from Hume in Enquiry concerning the principles 
of morals. As Annette Baier has pointed out, one added condition of justice 
in Enquiry that  does  not  feature  in  the  Treatise is  that  ‘justice  is  owed’  in  a  
“true society” ‘only if there is a society of more-or-less equals’.103 When the 
social distance is so great that the resentment of the other party is not felt, 
we then necessarily need other measures to uphold justice. In a political 
society this condition naturally does not matter, because the execution of 
justice is assigned to a third party regardless of the question of resentment. 
But what this also enables us to understand is that one of Hume’s contrary 
political messages derived from this same psychological insight was that in a 
civilised monarchy the sovereign ‘is so far removed’ from the people ‘and is 
so much exempt from private jealousies or interests, that’ the ‘dependence 
is scarcely felt’.104 In  Hume’s  science  of  man,  political  despotism  was  a  
problem of less consequence in large societies than, say, factions and the 
want  of  politeness  that  are  the  consequences  of  the  free  functioning  of  
sympathy without external constraints and general motives that assist the 
natural disposition of human mind.  
Ancient v Modern 
The  greatness  of  mind  project  is  perhaps  best  demonstrated  in  Hume’s  
treatment of the popular eighteenth-century dispute upon the supremacy of 
ancient vs. modern culture.105 David Hume undoubtedly sides with the 
moderns in this question. His severe criticism of political circumstances 
during the ancient times underlines ‘the disposition of men’s minds’.106 As 
we have discussed it, this is an argument about greatness of mind. It is the 
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dispositions of mind that matters in the end. Circumstances that constitute 
and create a certain types of disposition can be accounted for, according to 
Hume, with good probability, through an analysis of ‘moral causes’. In the 
essay ‘Of national characters’, Hume explains that ‘by moral causes’ he refers 
to  ‘all  circumstances,  which  are  fitted  to  work  on the  mind as  motives  or  
reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us’.107 It is 
understandable that for Hume this turns into a distinction between the 
supposed greatness of ancient commonwealths and the modern disposition 
of greatness of mind particularly in European monarchies. 
 An  interesting  feature  of  the  ancient  v.  modern  debate  is  that  Hume  
claims that politeness is a fully modern disposition – therefore, it is a 
contradiction  in  terms  to  speak  of  politeness  in  a  classical  culture.  Hume  
makes a strong contrast between ‘modern politeness’ and ‘ancient 
simplicity’.108 The modern development of gallantry and honour together 
with the considerable effect of the forms of government are placed on the 
central stage in this conjectural history.109 Hume clearly  marks  the  role  of  
the  form  of  government  for  the  disposition  of  men’s  minds.  ‘Where  the  
government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a peculiar 
set  of  manners’,  but  ‘where  it  is  altogether  monarchical,  it  is  more  apt  to  
have the same effect’ because ‘the imitation of superiors’ spreads ‘the 
national manners faster among the people’. The pejorative point that Hume 
added  to  this  distinction  is  that  if  ‘the  governing  part  of  a  state  consist  
altogether of merchants, as in Holland, their uniform way of life will fix 
their character’.110 Hume, indeed, did not think very highly of the Dutch. 
 While the essay ‘Of national characters’ puts emphasis on question of 
structure, the essay entitled ‘Populousness of ancients’ considers the 
question of size. In the eighteenth century it was hotly debated which was 
more widely populated, the ancient world or modern Europe. Hume draws 
many of his conclusions (throughout his works) based on the assumption 
that ancient states were, generally speaking, small, so it is unsurprising that 
he should argue that the modern European population was larger than its 
ancient counterpart. ‘The more I consider this subject’, Hume snorted, ‘the 
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more am I inclined to scepticism, with regard to the great populousness 
ascribed to ancient times’.111 Hume spent most part of this particular essay 
calculating and demonstrating this point.  
 Hume is consistent when describing the ancient mode of civility. 
‘Almost all the nations, which are the scene of ancient history, were divided 
into  small  territories  or  petty  commonwealths’,  he  writes  and at  the  same 
time reminds us that because of this,  ‘a great equality of fortune prevailed, 
and  the  center  of  the  government  was  always  very  near  its  frontiers’.112 
There are many aspects of Hume’s political  thinking that are combined in 
this particular sentence. The relationship between the size of the state, 
social structure and concentration of political power are interrelated issues. 
In  a  small  state  the  political  circumstances  start  to  resemble  a  domestic  
situation. This is the reason why he argues that the hierarchical structure in 
a small political state is unbearable. It also makes sense that domestic 
slavery  and  the  enslaved  minds  of  the  ancients,  together  with  their  
incapacity for reciprocal refinement (encapsulated in cruelty), were perhaps 
the attributes that Hume despised the most.113 The price to pay for frugality 
and simplicity of manners was simply too high for Hume.114 
 Hume carries on pointing out that ‘equality of property’, ‘liberty, and the 
small divisions of their states, were indeed circumstances favourable to the 
propagation’ of the ancients. But because of the above mentioned political 
circumstances, ‘wars were more bloody and destructive’, ‘governments 
more factions and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and 
languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular’.115 The 
situation in modern Europe was de facto different. Europe, Hume wrote, ‘is 
shared out mostly into great monarchies’116 and ‘Swisserland alone and 
Holland resemble the ancient republics’ (a proof of Hume’s dislike for 
them).117 The attribute that Hume often uses to describe ancient 
governments, both Greek and Roman, is tyrannical.118 ‘The maxims of 
ancient politics contain’, in all simplicity, ‘so little humanity and moderation, 
that it seems superfluous to give any particular reason for the acts of 
violence committed at any particular period’.119 What is also clear,  because 
of this factual difference in size and form, is that the ancient model could 
not possibly serve as an example for modern Europe. Why would anyone 
want to turn their eyes on the ‘furious and tyrannical governments of 
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ancient times’120,  when Hume’s whole point was that while large states are 
easily kept at ease, small states turn naturally into tumultuous 
commonwealths?121 An easy way to grasp Hume’s conception of the form 
of  government  with  regard  to  the  size  of  state,  is  a  model  where  a  small  
territory  and  a  small  population  are  linked  with  a  republic  and  a  minimal  
concentration of executive power; while a large territory and a large 
population are linked with a monarchy with a highly concentrated power. 
This  is  uninteresting  as  such,  but  now  when  we  understand  the  link  to  
Hume’s science of man, also his political determinism starts to look 
theoretically more appealing. At the same time we realise that there is a clear 
contrast with Hume’s earlier essays and the essay entitled ‘Idea of a perfect 
commonwealth’ where Hume writes that it is ‘the falsehood of the common 
opinion’ to think ‘that no large state, such as France or Great Britain, could 
ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of 
government can only take place in a city or small territory.’122  
 As  I  have  already  pointed  out,  there  is  a  momentous  argumentative  
change in the essay entitled ‘Rise and progress’ between the first and second 
half of the essay. There are also several dozen variants between the first 
printing and the later editions of the essay missed by the editors Green and 
Grose, and consequently unrecorded in the Liberty Fund edition of Hume’s 
Essays.  Many of the missed variants are stylistic,  adding little or nothing to 
our  understanding  of  Hume.  But  there  are  also  variations  revealing  that  
Hume took the sharp edge off some passages in this essay. What is perhaps 
the most bizarre feature of the reception of Hume’s essays is that the actual 
argument that Hume puts forward in the ‘Rise and progress’ has evaporated 
because of the editing of his works. 
 We have come to realise what kind of significance different institutions 
play in Hume’s thinking mainly because of the way in which the principle of 
association of ideas functions in his political thought. This is already clearly 
implied in Hume’s essay called ‘Modern honour’ where gallantry and 
honour constituted an interlinked institutional pair that partly explains the 
modern development of politeness. The chosen title is already illuminating 
and it  shows that Hume was aware of the theoretical  disputes of his time. 
The  choice  not  to  treat  honour  in  general  and  to  specifically  discuss  
‘modern honour’ is important. By clearly distinguishing the modern from 
the ancient culture Hume was setting himself apart from the theorists 
(Shaftesbury  in  particular)  who  claimed  that  the  contemporary  idea  of  
civility originates from the ancient times and that the ideals of honour and 
politeness should be modelled after the Greek or Roman examples. Thus, 
the  pivotal  aspect  of  Hume’s  essay  is  this  break  between  the  ancient  and  
modern culture, namely that gallantry and duelling were modern 
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concepts.123 It  was  manners,  not  learning,  that  discriminated  the  ancient  
from the modern world. In his History, Hume also presents a clear analysis 
of the ‘ideas of chivalry’ causing the birth of ‘modern gallantry and the point 
of honour, which still maintain their influence’.124 But  what  has  not  been  
noted  is  that  originally,  the  idea  of  this  complimentary  pair  was  also  the  
main argument set forward in the essay ‘Rise and progress’. When we 
understand this, we also grasp the consistency of Hume’s political 
argumentation. 
 In  1742,  when  Hume  significantly  turned  to  consider  in  ‘Rise  and  
progress’ why moderns are more polite than the ancients, he wrote that the 
‘modern Notions of Gallantry and Honour, the natural Product of Courts and 
Monarchies, will probably be assign’d as the Causes of this Refinement’. He 
carried on stressing that ‘No one denies these Inventions [in plural] to be 
modern’, but ‘some of the most zealous partizans of the Antients, have 
asserted them to be foppish and ridiculous, and a Reproach, rather than an 
Honour  to  the  present  Age.  It  may  here  be  proper  to  examine  this  
Question, with regard both to Gallantry and Honour. We shall  begin with 
Gallantry’.125 In  the  1770  edition,  Hume  omitted  the  reference  to  the  
institution of honour. This,  most crucial  change was missed by Green and 
Grose. The Liberty Fund edition of the essay also plainly reads that the 
‘modern notions of gallantry, the natural produce of courts and monarchies, 
will probably be assigned as the causes of this refinement’. ‘No one denies 
this invention [in singular] to be modern’, but ‘some of the more zealous 
partizans of the ancients, have asserted it to be foppish and ridiculous, and 
a reproach, rather than a credit, to the present age. It may here be proper to 
examine this question’.126 So,  we  are  left  without  a  hint  of  the  fact  that  
Hume originally discussed the same institutional pair that he also 
emphasised in his essay on ‘Modern honour’ and in his History. After 1770, 
when the essay changed to only consider gallantry without modern honour 
and duelling, the argument no longer makes sense and it is unsurprising that 
so little has been made of it.  
 Of course, what does become apparent from the variant readings is that 
the essay before 1770 touched upon honour and duelling. But when 
Hume’s  remarks  on  honour  are  presented  as  separate  from gallantry,  they  
strike as an utterly negative approach to modern honour, which might have 
been the  message  that  Hume wanted  to  send out  later  on,  but  which  was  
contrary to his original intention. It is understandable, of course, that Hume 
did  not  want  to  present  himself  as  an  apologist  of  duelling.  At  the  same  
time, what is lost is that gallantry and honour for Hume were an inseparable 
complementing  pair  –  a  moral  cause  that  can  be  analysed  historically  –  at  
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least  until  1770.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  by  dropping  modern  honour  Hume 
was also concealing his actual views. The mudding of his arguments, instead 
of being an exception for Hume, seems to have been a rather common 
modus operandi for him, starting with the castration of the more noble parts 
of his Treatise.  Yet,  it  appears to be that he rarely changed his actual views 
over time. Only the form in which he set his arguments forward was 
altered. 
Courage and honour 
The reason why this matter of editing is of consequence is that the question 
of courage lies at the heart of the juxtaposition between the republican 
tradition and the greatness of mind argument that Hume had adopted. 
 In Origin of honour, Mandeville distinguished two uses for the ‘word 
honour’. ‘In its first literal sense’, it is ‘a Technic Word in the Art of Civility, 
and signifies a Means which Men by Conversing together have found out to 
please and gratify one another on Account of a palpable Passion in our 
Nature, that has no Name, and which therefore I call self-liking’. Mandeville 
believed that in this sense ‘the Word Honour, both as a Verb and a Noun, 
to be as Ancient as the oldest Language’. In the second sense, ‘Honour 
signifies likewise a Principle of Courage, Virtue, and Fidelity, which some 
Men are said to act from, and to be aw’d by, as others are by Religion. In 
this  latter  Sense,  it  is  much  more  modern,  and  I  don’t  believe  to  be  met  
with a Thousand Years ago in any Language’.127 
 Mandeville’s  idea  of  honour  as  ‘a  Principle  of  Courage’  is  vital  for  his  
distinction between the ancient and modern culture. Mandeville clarified 
that  ‘all  ages  and  most  Countries  have  produced  Men  of  Virtue  and  
Bravery’,  but  this  modern  ‘Term  of  Art’  is  something  that  ‘the  Ancients  
knew Nothing of; nor can you with Ten Words, in either Greek or Latin, 
express  the  entire  Idea  which  is  annex’d  to  the  Word  Honour  when  it  
signifies a Principle’.128 Honour (in this sense), the binding of modern 
society, did not exist in the ancient world. Moral virtues and the principle of 
self-denial however did. In Mandeville’s system ‘what we call Prowess or 
natural  Courage  in  Creatures,  is  nothing  but  the  Effect  of  Anger’.129 
According to him, there is ‘a great Difference between’ natural ‘and artificial 
Courage’.130 The  ancient  world  knew  a  variety  of  methods  to  coax  their  
soldiers to fight,  for example ‘the Greek and Roman Histories abound with 
Instances of the immense Use that may be made in War of Superstition well 
turn’d’. The ancient politicians had understood that ‘the grossest, if skilfully 
managed, may make the fearful, undaunted, and the loosest Livers exert 
themselves to the utmost of their Power, from a firm Belief, that Heaven is 
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on their Side’.131 But religion and patriotism could only enhance courage to 
a certain extent. The modern principle of honour was specifically ‘an 
Invention to influence Men, whom Religion had no Power over’.132 This 
code was not founded on natural courage. The principle of honour and the 
courage it produced were artificial, based on the cultivation of self-liking 
instead of self-denial. 
 It  is  commonplace  that  a  soldier  ‘should  Fight  undauntedly  and  
obstinately’.  It  is  somewhat  more  difficult  to  reason  how  men  could  be  
polite without losing their undaunted courage, when it is based on anger. 
According to Mandeville, the ambiguity between natural courage and good 
manners never vanished from the Greek world. The ancient politicians used 
all the known arts ‘to raise and keep up’ the spirits of the soldiers ‘and their 
Hatred to their Enemies’. However, ‘it is the easiest Thing in the World to 
make’ a man ‘hate his Neighbour with all his Heart’, but a far more difficult 
task ‘to make’ him ‘sincerely love his Neighbour’.133 The Greek nations, 
without the principle of honour and modern politeness, were only able to 
support territories very limited in size. The principle of self-denial and 
frugality only suited small city-states. ‘Frugality is like Honesty, a mean 
starving Virtue, that is only fit for small Societies’, but ‘in a large stirring 
Nation you may have soon enough of it’.134 Athens  did  not  merit  on  
Mandeville’s list of flourishing nations, when compared to modern Europe. 
The  example  of  Sparta,  on  the  other  hand,  showed  that  once  an  ancient  
state was faced with continuous offences, it soon lost all the signs of good 
manners.  In  general,  the  character  of  a  citizen  living  in  one  of  the  small,  
ancient states was not polite. It was simple and warlike. The moderns might 
not sincerely love their neighbour, but the principles of politeness and 
honour  required  them  to  act  in  such  a  manner  as  if  they  did  indeed  love  
their neighbours. In the modern world, artificial courage was directly linked 
to politeness through the principle of honour. This was an important factor 
supporting the maintenance of a large society. 
 In  all  ages,  courage  (whether  natural  or  artificial)  had  always  been  the  
chief virtue for soldiers.  It  was obvious that not a single soldier ‘will  serve 
with a noted Coward’.135 It  was  also  presented  as  a  universal  rule  that  
‘Courage and Cowardice, in all Bodies of Men, depend entirely upon 
Exercise and Discipline’.136 The significant differences between the 
different ages were constituted by the principles that men follow. To be a 
man of modern honour, it  is  not enough to be ‘brave in War’.  One ‘must 
bear no Affront without resenting it, not refuse a Challenge, if it be sent to 
him in  a  proper  Manner  by  a  Man of  Honour’.  Mandeville  explained  that  
                                                        
131 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 146. 
132 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 15. 
133 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 135. 
134 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, pp. 104–5. 
135 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 150. 
136 Mandeville, Part II, p. 318. 
POLITICS AND THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN HUME’S ESSAYS 
 
335 
‘the Signification of the Word Honour is entirely Gothick, and sprung up in 
some of the most ignorant Ages of Christianity’.137 To make his point 
explicit, Mandeville explained the ‘reason’ why he thought that ‘the origin of 
honour’ is ‘of Gothick Extraction’. ‘Honour’ was first invented in the age of 
chivalry, because ‘all other Ties’ had ‘prov’d ineffectual’ to make men keep 
their promises ‘and the Christian Religion itself was often found insufficient 
for that Purpose’.138 
 What was central in the genealogy of honour was that this invention had 
been refined through an extensive period of time. The difference between 
the gothic knights and the eighteenth-century gentlemen was that the latter 
simply  did  not  have  to  be  enthusiastic  enough  to  believe  that  there  were  
monsters that they had to fight in order to prove their worth. A modern 
‘Gentleman is  not  required  to  shew his  Bravery,  but  where  his  Honour  is  
concern’d’.139 In  other  words,  natural  courage,  which  still  had  a  strong  
impact on the chivalric knights, was eventually substituted with artificial 
courage based on the principle of honour and politeness. However, even 
though the principles of honour, duelling and gallantry had been refined, 
they originated in the times of gothic ignorance, when they had first been 
invented. 
 According to Mandeville, the ingenuity of the principle of honour is that 
‘it was an Improvement in the Art of Flattery, by which the Excellency of 
our  Species  is  raised  to  such  a  Height,  that  it  becomes  the  Object  of  our  
own  Adoration,  and  Man  is  taught  in  good  Earnest  to  worship  himself’.  
This  is  the  reason  why  Mandeville  marked  that  ‘the  invention  of  honour’  
was  ‘by  far’  a  ‘greater  Atchievement’  than  the  principle  of  virtue  or  self-
denial.140 Modern honour is specifically a political principle. When men are 
taught to worship themselves, they are more easily governed. Politicians did 
not have to depend on the patriotism of their citizens. Mandeville was not 
trying  to  deny  the  importance  of  loyalty  to  the  king  and  country,  but  he  
wanted to highlight its capricious nature, when not supported with the 
principle  of  honour.  He  spelled  out  that  ‘the  Love  of  one’s  Country  is  
natural;  and  very  bad  Men may  feel  it  as  warm about  them,  as  very  good 
Men;  and  it  is  a  Principle,  which  a  Man  may  as  sincerely  act  from,  who  
Fights  against  his  King,  as  he  who  Fights  for  him’.141 In  contrast,  when  
depending on honour, ‘a good Politician may add to, or take from the 
Principle of Honour, what Virtue or Qualification he pleases’.142 This 
explained why modern gentlemen were much easier to control than the 
knights-errant and particularly the ancient citizen-soldiers. True gentlemen 
were principally concerned with the reflection in the looking glass. Natural 
                                                        
137 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 15. Italics my own. 
138 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, pp. 29–30. 
139 Mandeville, Part II, pp. 86–87. 
140 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 42. 
141 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 177. 
142 Mandeville, Origin of honour, 1732, p. 141. 
DAVID HUME AND GREATNESS OF MIND 
 
336 
courage was substituted with artificial conduct. Meanwhile, men remained 
brave and modern society could grow polite, large and flourishing. Already 
in the first part of The Fable Mandeville explained at length that 
There is nothing refines Mankind more than Love and Honour. Those two Passions 
are equivalent to many Virtues, and therefore the greatest Schools of Breeding and 
good Manners are Courts and Armies; the first to accomplish the Women, the other 
to polish the Men. What the generality of Officers among civiliz’d Nations affect is a 
perfect Knowledge of the World and the Rules of Honour; an Air of Frankness, and 
Humanity peculiar to Military Men of Experience, and such a mixture of Modesty 
and undauntedness, as may bespeak them both Courteous and Valiant.143 
Mandeville  stressed  that  ‘the  Invention  of  Honour  has  been  far  more  
beneficial to the Civil Society than that of Virtue, and much better answer’d 
the  End for  which  they  were  invented.  Ever  since  the  Notion  of  Honour  
has  been  receiv’d  among  Christians,  there  have  always  been,  in  the  same  
Number of People, Twenty Men of real Honour, to One of real Virtue’.144 
The  point  that  the  idea  of  honour  rose  only  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  
Empire is important for our understanding of Mandeville’s thought. Only 
when men strictly followed the principles of honour would they start paying 
close attention to their outward expressions. Manners started to soften, but 
this  did  not  mean  that  courage  was  lost.  Modern  ‘soldiers  are  made  by  
Discipline. To make them proud of their Profession, and inspire them with 
the  Love  of  Glory,  are  the  surest  Arts  to  make  them  valiant’.145 Thus, 
Mandeville stated that ‘the most civiliz’d Fellows make the best Soldiers’.146 
In the Greek world, bravery in soldiers was enhanced by the inflexible strain 
of self-denial. In the eighteenth century, natural courage was substituted 
altogether with artificial  policy and bravery was ‘aim’d at by the Height of 
Politeness and a perpetual Attachment to the Principle of Modern 
Honour’.147 With  good  reason  it  had  to  be  acknowledged  that  these  
customs were of ‘gothic extraction’. 
Hume on courage 
Hume’s scheme of conjectural history coincides with his principle of 
association  of  ideas.  We  ought  to  analyse  this  from  the  perspective  of  
courage.  The  historical  change  of  courage  and honour  is  stated  already  in  
Hume’s  essay  ‘Chivalry  and  modern  honour’.  In  a  state  of  barbarity,  the  
only possibility to attain the position of a governor was by force. According 
to  Hume,  this  is  the  reason  why  ‘in  all  rude  Ages’  and  ‘in  the  infancy  of  
every State’ courage ‘or Warlike Bravery’ is ‘alwise the most admir’d 
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Virtue’.148 Another important aspect that Hume shared with Mandeville was 
that natural courage is not indispensable for society. Mandeville had pointed 
out that ‘Human Wisdom is the Child of Time’ and political ‘Inventions’ 
such as virtue, honour and ‘politeness’  are ‘the joint Labour of Many’ and 
‘not the Contrivance of one Man, nor could it have been the Business of a 
few Years’.149 One characteristic of a polite age is that ‘courage’ is no longer 
the principal source of merit and the governors have introduced different 
precepts that will produce praise and advantage to the subjects, who attain 
these qualities. As Mandeville put it, in a state of civility ‘natural courage’ is 
substituted with ‘artificial’ bravery, which in modern Europe is ‘aim’d at by 
the  Height  of  Politeness  and  a  perpetual  Attachment  to  the  Principle  of  
Modern Honour’.150 David  Hume  agreed.  ‘Warlike  bravery’  can  be  
contested with ‘conduct or policy’, although this is ‘never apprehended, 
until the Age has from long Experience become considerably refin’d’. This 
was  not  the  case  at  the  time  of  the  birth  of  chivalry.  ‘Untaught  Nature’,  
Hume  argued,  admires  ‘more  bodily  Force,  &  that  mental  Force  of  
Courage, which resembles it, than an Ability of a different kind, which may 
teach  the  right  Use  of  both’.  Thus,  in  the  state  of  barbarity,  bare  force  is  
‘more suitable Virtue for Subjects than Conduct’ and natural courage is not 
only ‘celebrated’ by ‘the Example of Rulers’, but by ‘their Precept likewise’. 
In  ‘uncivilized  Nations’  it  will  always  have  the  ‘approbation  of  all  
Politicians’, because they are ‘the persons, who principally reap Advantage 
by it’.151  
 Like Mandeville, Hume proved his point about the prevalence of natural 
courage in the early stages of human societies by means of historical 
examples taken from Greek and Roman ‘poetry’ and Chivalric ‘romances’. 
Hume wrote that ‘in Rome about its earliest Time we find’ courage ‘in so 
great Repute that the general Name of Virtue was derived from it’.  It  was, 
he continued, ‘alone sufficient to bring a man into Credit’ and ‘without it all 
his other Virtues were of no avail’.152 Warlike bravery was also ‘the reigning 
Quality of the first Grecian Heroes’ and with ‘cavaliers or Romantic 
Heroes’ courage keeps ‘itself ready for any Call, rises at every thing which 
can exercise it, & courts all Dangers & every Opportunity of exerting 
itself’.153 Courage, in David Hume’s opinion, is always the chief virtue in a 
newly found state, but this is as far as the ‘Resemblance’ between ‘the 
Heroes of Poetry & of Romance’ goes.154 
 Hume  speculated  that  the  manner  in  which  ‘courteous  Knights’  
achieved their ‘extreme Civility’ was by ‘mixing love with their Courage’. 
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This ‘new scheme of manners’ resulted in two abiding principles. Firstly, it 
yielded ‘an extravagant Gallantry & Adoration of the whole Female Sex’. 
Secondly, it introduced ‘the Practice of Single Combat’. A knight-errant 
would not ‘be contented with a submiss Reverence & Adoration to one’ 
female ‘but wou’d extend in some degree the same Civility’ to all women. It 
was by this ‘curious Reversement of the Order of Nature’ that female sex 
was made ‘superior’. If gallantry was one of the main principles for men in 
the  gothic  age,  duelling,  which  also  ‘sprung  up  from  Chivalry’,  was  the  
other. Hume emphasised the calm civility of the duellist. ‘A knight-Errant 
fights not like another Man full of Passion & Resentment, but with the 
outmost Civility mixt with his undaunted Courage’, always ‘showing his 
generous Calmness & amicable Courage’. The practise of duelling implied 
the first significant step towards substituting warlike bravery with artificial 
courage. By and large, in the age of chivalry ‘every thing is performed with 
the greatest Ceremony & Order’.155 
 Also, in his published essays Hume analysed the role of courage and its 
connection to civility in the ancient world attentively. His point was that the 
relative power of the ancient city-states had been more of an exception than 
a rule in history. Whatever limited success they had had, they had owed it to 
the small size of their states and an archaic lifestyle, both of which had led 
to encourage warlike bravery. Hume’s provoking point was that the ancient 
politicians had never accomplished to substitute natural courage with the 
artificial principles, which had substantially demarcated the nature of their 
civility.  This  in  turn  explains  why  the  ancient  model  never  ranked high  in  
Hume’s standards.  
 The primary principle to amplify courage in ancient Greece had been 
patriotism and self-denial. The citizens of these states were ‘unacquainted 
with  gain  and industry  as  well  as  pleasure’.156 Sparta’s  military  glory  owed 
‘entirely to the want of commerce and luxury’157 and  ‘to  live  like  an  
Athenian, was a Proverb for living frugally’.158 In fact, ‘no probable reason 
can  be  assigned for  the  great  power  of  the  more  ancient  states  above  the  
modern, but their want of commerce and luxury’,  which had helped them 
to cultivate their warlike character.159 Hume stressed that ‘the ancient 
republics were almost in perpetual war’, which had been ‘a natural effect of 
their martial spirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that 
hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in close 
neighbourhood’.160 The ancient states ‘were small’ and ‘all their neighbours 
were continually in arms’.161 Hume maintained, that ‘before the encrease of 
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the Roman power’ almost the entire ‘scene of ancient history’ was ‘divided 
into small territories or petty commonwealths, where of course a great 
equality of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always 
very near its frontiers’.162 Naturally, the ‘public spirit’ must increase, ‘when 
the public is almost in continual alarm, and men are obliged, every moment, 
to expose themselves to the greatest dangers for its defence’. In short, ‘a 
continual succession of wars makes every citizen a soldier’.163  
 The  ancients  might  have  been  masters  of  patriotism  and  warlike  
bravery, but Hume did not regard self-denial as a civilised method to 
enhance courage and enable men to fight. The wars fought in the ancient 
world, compared to modern times, ‘were more bloody and destructive, their 
governments more factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures 
more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and 
irregular’.164 Hume’s point was to highlight that the consequences had been 
inhumane. ‘In ancient history’, he asserted, we meet with ‘frequent’ 
examples of barbarous behaviour. The ‘Greeks’ were led by a ‘determined 
spirit’ of natural courage closely resembling ‘cruelty’, when ‘wrought up to’ 
a high ‘degree of fury’. This had often ‘been destructive to human society, 
in those petty commonwealths, which lived in close neighbourhood, and 
were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions’.165 In the ancient world, 
only the Romans had been exceptional in their military organisation. 
According to Hume, they ‘were almost the only uncivilized people that ever 
possessed military discipline’. Nonetheless, their discipline was attained ‘by 
applying themselves solely to war’, instead of artificial courage, honour and 
politeness.166  
 What is remarkable about Hume’s treatment of ancient courage is that 
the  target  of  his  criticism  is  ancient  civility  in  general.  By  and  large,  ‘it  
appears that ancient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, 
not only in times of war,  but also in those of peace’.167 There could be no 
politeness based on patriotism or self-denial. The foundational problem 
with  politeness  and courage  is  that  once  passions  start  to  multiply  and to  
enlarge, without some artificial principle men become feeble and cowardly. 
They  lose  the  natural  quality  of  warlike  bravery.  The  ancient  states  had  to  
rely on self-denial and discourage commerce. The fear of losing their ability 
to fight also explains the nature of their civility.  Whatever ‘refinement and 
civility’ the ‘ancients’ had, they ‘owed’ it ‘all’ to ‘books and study’. In 
contrast, modern politeness was ‘learned from company’, not books. By the 
same token, in ancient Greece citizen-soldiers were not polite, whereas 
present day soldiers are inclined towards ‘pleasure and gallantry’ and 
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‘acquire good breeding and an openness of behaviour’.168 An artificial turn 
took place in manners during the age of chivalry and it was particularly the 
invention of the principle of honour that explained why this modern 
development was possible in Europe.  
 On  several  occasions  Hume  treated  the  ancient  states  in  the  same  
manner as Mandeville. Ancient Greece and Rome were not polite. 
‘Simplicity of manners’169 was the reigning characteristic for the Greek 
world also at the highpoint of its civility, whereas artificiality was the chief 
feature  of  modern  manners.  In  1742,  he  pointed  out  in  a  letter  to  lord  
Kames  that  reading  the  great  Cicero  ‘you  may  judge  of  the  Manners  of  
those times’. Hume thought that the conclusion was rather harsh and ‘the 
whole turn of’ ancient manners ‘wou’d not now be generally admir’d’.170 
Modern Europe was more polite than ancient Greece or Rome. In an essay 
published the same year, Hume also asserted that ‘I shall also be so bold as 
to affirm’ (the “boldness” of this sentence was later toned down) ‘that 
among the ancients, there was not much delicacy of breeding, or that polite 
deference and respect, which civility obliges us either to express or 
counterfeit towards the persons with whom we converse’.171 It  was  also  
evident in this cluster of civility that Hume was mapping that ‘among the 
ancients, the character of the fair-sex was considered as altogether 
domestic;  nor  were  they  regarded  as  part  of  the  polite  world  or  of  good  
company’.172 
 Besides civility and manners, ‘there are many other circumstances, in 
which ancient nations seem inferior to the modern, both for the happiness 
and encrease of mankind. Trade, manufactures, industry, were no where, in 
former  ages,  so  flourishing  as  they  are  at  present  in  Europe’.173 Hume’s 
point about commerce is not that it gave birth to politeness. Politeness and 
the  principle  of  honour  are  partly  political  inventions,  a  set  of  rules  and  
principles coined at a certain point in history. Maintaining courage is the 
touchstone of politeness and civility. Hume stated that ‘in general, we may 
observe,  that  courage,  of  all  national  qualities,  is  the  most  precarious  
because it is exerted only at intervals, and by a few in every nation; whereas 
industry, knowledge, civility, may be of constant and universal use, and for 
several ages, may become habitual to the whole people’.174 Mandeville had 
given  a  plausible  solution  to  this  problem.  When  warlike  bravery  was  
substituted by artificial courage based on the principle of honour, courage 
and politeness were refined hand in hand by the simple act of becoming a 
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habitual part of civility. Meanwhile, trade and commerce could also flourish. 
Hume  wrote  also  that  even  though  ‘the  want  of  trade  and  manufactures,  
among  a  free  and  very  martial  people,  may  sometimes have no other effect 
than to render the public more powerful, it is certain, that, in the common 
course of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency’.175 Plainly, 
Hume was promoting commerce and trade, but before a nation could turn 
civil and commercial, courage as a general quality had to be secured. In 
general, it should be remarked that throughout his works Hume concurred 
with Mandeville’s view that in order for a nation to grow large and opulent, 
the government needs theatrical politeness and the principles of gallantry 
and honour in order to render its subjects tractable. Gallantry and duelling, 
the main outcome of the ‘new scheme of manners’ that Hume introduced 
in  his  pre-Treatise essay,  were  a  crucial  part  of  Europe’s  historical  
development. It was this development that explained why greatness of mind 
trumped the greatness of ancient cities. 
 In the essay ‘Of refinement in the arts’ (originally entitled ‘Of luxury’), 
Hume  tells  his  audience  what  ‘distinguishes  a  civilized  age  from  times  of  
barbarity  and  ignorance’.  The  true  token  of  a  civilized  age  is  the  
‘conspicuous’ character of ‘humanity’, which can only come about after ‘the 
tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved’.176 The 
effects  of  humanity  point  unmistakably  to  modern  Europe,  which  is  in  
contrast  with  the  ancient  world.  In  a  civilized  age  ‘factions’  are  ‘less  
inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less 
frequent.  Even  foreign  wars  abate  of  their  cruelty;  and  after  the  field  of  
battle, where honour and interest [instead of warlike bravery and virtue] 
steel  men  against  compassion  as  well  as  fear,  the  combatants  divest  
themselves of the brute, and resume the man’. As we have seen in Hume’s 
other essays, in his opinion this was not the case in the ancient times, where 
wars were ‘bloody and destructive’, ‘governments more factious and 
unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, and 
the general police more loose and irregular’.177 But how could this kind of 
humanity be possible in modern Europe? How could men have ‘softened’ 
their ‘tempers’ without losing the capability for war, which never really 
happened in Athens or Rome? The answer is plain: Because of the principle 
of honour. According to Hume, ‘we’ do not ‘need’ to ‘fear’,  ‘that men, by 
losing their ferocity, will lose their martial spirit, or become less undaunted 
and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty’. Once ‘anger, 
which is said’ by some ‘to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of 
its  asperity,  by  politeness  and  refinement;  a  sense  of  honour,  which  is  a  
stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh 
vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good 
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education’. 178 Thus, in a civilized age, knowledge, politeness and humanity 
were  refined  hand  in  hand  in  a  positive  circle,  but  it  is  the  principle  of  
honour that renders this possible. By and large, it is the artificial principles 
that facilitate the ‘intercourse of minds’.179 
Political discourses and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals 
In the 1750s, Hume made additions to his published works, and in a sense, 
recasted his science of man. What is of interest to us is how this recasting 
affected his moral and political philosophy. At the beginning of the 1750s, 
Hume  rejuvenated  the  argument  of  greatness  of  mind  that  he  had  first  
attempted in Book 3 of the Treatise and  essays  of  the  turn  of  the  1740s.  
Both, Political discourses and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals intensified 
Hume’s attack on the republican tradition while at the same time clarifying 
and elaborating the original argument. These works were largely compiled 
in 1749 and 1750.180 In his autobiography Hume noted that ‘I went down in 
1749  and lived  two Years  with  my Brother  at  his  Country  house’.  During  
that  time,  I  ‘composed  the  second  Part  of  my  Essays,  which  I  called  
Political Discourses; and also my Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals, which is another part of my Treatise, that I cast anew’.181 The works 
were published in 1751 and 1752. 
 Political discourses, and particularly the essay ‘Of Commerce’ are the prime 
indication  of  how  the  formula  of  greatness  of  mind  operates  against  the  
classical republican ideas. In Political discourses, Hume utilises the apparent 
Baconian conflict between ‘the greatness of the state and the happiness of 
the subject’ to make his own case. The commonly perceived problem was 
that  ‘the  one  can  never  be  satisfied,  but  at  the  expence  of  the  other’.182 
Hume’s solution to the problem is that in modern Europe there need not 
be  any  such  conflict.  ‘Of  Money’,  ‘Of  Interest’,  ‘Of  Taxes’,  ‘Of  Public  
Credit’,  ‘Of the Balance of Trade’ etc.,  as the titles of the essays in Political 
discourses indicate, offer a partial solution to dissolve the following paradox: 
‘as  the  ambition  of  the  sovereign  must  entrench  on  the  luxury  of  
individuals; so the luxury of individuals must diminish the force, and check 
the ambition of the sovereign’. But the actual aching political problem – the 
question of greatness of state to which all these essays on commerce relate 
to – still regards the state’s ability to defend itself. It is therefore central that 
the question of courage is at the heart of the essay ‘Of commerce’. The 
barbarians at the ‘Infancy of every State’, discussed in the first modern 
honour essay, were naturally right to think of ‘Courage or Warlike Bravery’ 
as ‘the most admir’d Virtue’.  The primary political  question in the modern 
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world that needs to be addressed is how this ability of the state to defend 
itself is retained despite the seemingly harmful quality of humanity. A part 
of Hume’s solution is that ‘public advantage’ in modern Europe consists of 
‘taxing’, which enables the raising of an army.183 Yet, without the link 
between ‘politeness’, ‘sense of honour’, ‘courage’ and ‘martial skill’, there is 
no solution to the Baconian conflict.184 Courage,  instead  of  being  an  
amplification of natural ferocity, is therefore linked to artificial politeness in 
modern Europe. This is the discovery that Hume presented in his political 
writings  regarding  the  question  of  the  greatness  of  state.  But  the  striking  
move  is  that  politeness  is  also  linked  with  love  and  humanity.  Here  the  
direct reference to the contrast between Hume’s own position and Francis 
Bacon’s  essay  ‘Of  the  true  greatness  of  Kingdoms  and  Estates’  is  of  
particular interest.185  
 The core of Political discourses is hence the same modern disposition that 
Hume had emphasised earlier, namely greatness of mind. Simultaneously, 
we  understand  how  it  operates  as  an  argument  in  accordance  with  the  
‘jealousy of trade’ doctrine. What happens in Political discourses is  that since 
the basic questions of greatness of mind have been accounted for in earlier 
essays, Hume’s focus naturally switches towards the side of political 
economy. It does not mean that the overall argument would change. 
 It  needs  to  be  stressed  that  Hume  dealt  with  the  greatness  of  mind  
argument from the very first pre-Treatise essay onwards. It is the jealousy of 
trade elaboration on commerce that is built on this foundation (starting 
with some notebook references at the time when Hume was already writing 
the essay on modern honour, where the core of the greatness of mind 
argument had already been developed).  It  is also useful to understand that 
the essay following ‘Of Commerce’ in Political discourses,  ‘Of Refinement in 
the  arts’,  is  mainly  an  elaboration  of  the  argument  presented  in  the  essays  
‘Modern  honour’  and  ‘Rise  and  progress’.  The  issue  of  Seven  years  war  
certainly  attached Hume’s  mind closer  to  the  question  of  public  debt  and 
political economy, but this reasoning is something that adds to the original 
argument of greatness of mind. The subject of luxury and the importance 
of political economy have been well established by Istvan Hont.186 I fully 
agree that the modern change in manners, the fact that ‘commodities come 
more to market, after men depart from their ancient simplicity’, is crucial 
for Hume. However, this is just one side of the story. For example, jealousy 
of trade alone reveals nothing of how Hume’s moral and political 
philosophy might relate to his science of man or the principle of association 
of ideas. As such, it is difficult to see jealousy of trade as an actual extension 
of the science of man unlike, for example, Hume’s case for monarchy. 
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Therefore, we may consider the argument of jealousy of trade as an 
elaboration of the project of greatness of mind. 
 Greatness of mind has an even more visible role in Enquiry concerning 
Principles of Morals.  Hume devotes  one  of  the  nine  sections  of  the  book to  
discuss it in a more narrow sense. In that work Hume analyses politeness as 
a  quality  ‘Immediately  Agreeable  to  Others’  and  greatness  as  a  disposition  
of mind that is ‘Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves’.  The overall  point is 
that these two qualities are founded on the same basis, self-liking, as Hume 
had already argued in the Treatise. One significant change in Enquiry 
concerning  the  principles  of  morals is  to  divide  the  original  ‘Greatness  of  mind’  
section in this way in two. The full elaboration of greatness of mind project 
as a modern disposition then follows in ‘Dialogue’ closing Enquiry concerning 
the principles of morals.  The  main  function  of  the  Dialogue  is  to  discuss  
greatness of mind and politeness in relation to modern honour in the 
context of a comparison between ancient Greece and modern France. We 
may read the Dialogue as free-standing essay, but at the same time we need 
to know that it recaps the argument of greatness of mind that has a central 
stage in Hume’s moral and political thinking. 
 Enquiry concerning the principles of morals is a work where Hume re-
organises some of the arguments set forward in Book 3 of the Treatise and 
manages to encapsulate some of his central concepts in a more convenient 
form, although the original contribution, compared to the Treatise, is slim. 
For  example,  as  an  attribute  of  ‘greatness  of  mind’  Hume  now  helpfully  
points  out  that  ‘a  certain  degree  of  generous  pride  or  self-value  is  so  
requisite, that the absence of it in the mind displeases, after the same 
manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most material features of 
the face or members of the body’.187 Hume also immediately links ‘courage’ 
as ‘an obvious foundation’ of self-value after introducing it.188 What Hume 
champions in section 7 is the demonstration of the problems of ancient 
courage  in  relation  to  greatness  of  mind.  Hume  reiterates  in  a  
characteristically Mandevillean manner that ‘the martial temper of the 
Romans’, for example, ‘enflamed by continual wars, had raised their esteem 
of  courage  so  high,  that,  in  their  language,  it  was  called  virtue,  by  way  of  
excellence and of distinction from all other moral qualities’.189 In the 
following passage, Hume demonstrates how ‘martial bravery’ usually 
‘destroyed the sentiments of humanity’ during the ancient times.190 In 
Enquiry concerning the principles of morals one of Hume’s main arguments is that 
peaceful existence in civil society and humanity in general are a modern 
phenomenon. 
 In  contrast  to  ancient  times,  when Hume turns  to  discuss  the  modern  
cases of greatness of mind in section 7, the attention switches to outward 
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show  and  greatness  in  appearance.  The  role  of  vanity  grows  at  the  same  
ratio  that  natural  ferocity  diminishes  during  Hume’s  advancement  from  
ancient to modern examples. A splendid illustration of this switch is ‘Harry 
the IVth of France’.191 Gallantry and honour were of course attributes that 
Hume  particularly  linked  to  Henry  IV  and  the  king  himself  served  as  an  
epitome of vanity for Hume. Yet, Henry never had problems retaining his 
courage despite his ‘amours and attachments’. The reason was that modern 
courage  as  an  expression  of  greatness  of  mind  was  founded  on  artificial  
principles that functioned in accordance with pride. 
 
Amour-propre in politics 
Hume’s moral and political philosophy is based on the Mandevillean 
paradigm of human nature also in Essays and Enquiry concerning the principles of 
morals. The basic axiom of Hume’s psychology is the division between self-
love and self-liking throughout his works. His moral and political 
philosophy is constructed largely as an analysis of this division in different 
settings. In the view of how little attention this aspect of Hume’s thought 
has previously received, it is difficult to overemphasise the significance of 
this simple division in Hume’s thought.  
 Its clearest implication in a single passage appears in Enquiry concerning the 
principles of morals. Hume states that ‘the sentiment of conscious worth, the 
self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of man’s own conduct and 
character’ is ‘the most common of all others’, yet it ‘has no proper name in 
our language’. Not only are these precisely the same words that Mandeville 
used when introducing his concept of self-liking, but Hume also carries on 
in a footnote explaining that  
the term, pride,  is  commonly  taken  in  a  bad  sense;  but  this  sentiment  seems  
indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and 
according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The French express this 
sentiment by the term, amour propre,  but  as  they  also  express  self-love  as  well  as  
vanity, by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in Rochefoucault, and 
many of their moral writers.192  
Mandeville’s definition was that self-liking is the cause of pride, but only 
when  ‘excessive,  and  so  openly  shewn  as  to  give  offence  to  others’  it  is  
called pride. When it is kept out of sight it has ‘no name’, even when men 
act ‘from that and from no other principle’.193 The reason that Mandeville 
gave  for  calling  this  passion  ‘self-liking’  was  simply  that  it  has  ‘no  Name’,  
although it is ‘a palpable Passion in our Nature’.194 
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 In this Mandevillean manner, what is imperative, according to Hume, is 
to make a theoretical distinction between self-love and ‘self-satisfaction’ 
(and self-love and vanity). And in order to confirm that self-liking has 
everything to do with his project of greatness of mind, Hume declares that 
this sentiment particularly arises from ‘the endowments of courage and 
capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental 
excellencies’.195 In the Treatise,  Hume wrote:  ‘Provided  we  agree  about  the  
thing,  it  is  needless  to  dispute  about  the  terms’.196 In Enquiry concerning the 
principles of morals he clearly took sides in ‘some verbal disputes’.197  
 Previously we noticed that ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ is an essay 
about different species of false religion. If we’d like to derive Hume’s 
general notion of certain states of mind based on this essay, this needs to be 
kept  in  sight.  Hume’s  general  tenet  towards  religion  is  resentful.  It  should  
not surprise anyone to learn that according to Hume a basic ingredient of 
‘false religion’ is ignorance. Hume remains sceptical about religion because 
almost everything relating to it is imaginary. The role of ignorance in false 
religion for Hume might be commonplace, but the basic axiom upon which 
the essay on false religion is constructed has not been accounted for. With 
this  in  mind,  it  might  come  as  a  surprise  how  simple  the  framework  that  
Hume  uses  to  analyse  enthusiasm  and  superstition  as  two  basic  types  of  
false religion actually is. Hume insists that of enthusiasm and superstition, 
the  founding  question  that  we  need  to  answer  is:  how  in  these  particular  
cases does ‘the soul’ foster ‘its predominant inclination’?198  
 Hume’s analysis of superstition and enthusiasm is based on the concept 
that Mandeville coined as self-liking. It is important to notice that the 
picture  that  Hume  draws  of  superstition  and  enthusiasm  is  diametrical.  A  
precondition of ‘false religion’ is ignorance. It concerns both enthusiasm 
and superstition. Besides ignorance, the attributes of superstition that 
Hume  singles  out  in  this  particular  essay  are  ‘weakness,  fear  and  
melancholy’. In a geometrical contrast, he gives ‘hope, pride’ and 
‘presumption’ as the basic attributes of enthusiasm.199 To cut  a  long  story  
short, in the case of superstition the self-liking of the superstitious person is 
diminished and in the case of an enthusiast it is enlarged. Much attention 
regarding this essay has been put on Hume’s concept of melancholy, which 
is a legitimate point of interest, of course.200 The point I would like to make 
is that the question of soul’s ‘predominant inclination’ is a question that 
concerns first of all  humility and pride. In this context,  Hume’s use of the 
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term melancholy turns out to be the counterpart of presumption. 
Everything has to do with one’s opinion of oneself. Moreover, not only the 
question of false religion can (and should), according to Hume, be analysed 
in terms of self-liking. More or less any human phenomenon ought to be 
judged by how it relates to this foundation. The distinction between 
enthusiasm  and  superstition  as  two  species  of  false  religion  is  only  one  
example of this.  
 The fact that the analysed objects (enthusiasm and superstition) 
function as a countering pair is important. Based on Hume’s understanding, 
‘superstition is founded on fear, sorrow, and a depression of spirits’. He 
elaborates that it is of decisive importance that superstition gives the person 
a sensation that he is ‘unworthy, in his own eyes’.201 And as we have already 
learned, this is the very basic question of self-liking and humility studied in 
the Treatise. In the case of superstition, self-liking receives a blow regarding 
humility and sinking spirits, which magnifies the role of fear creating more 
imaginary obstacles for the mind to dwell on. In direct contrast, ‘enthusiasm 
arises from a presumptuous pride and confidence’.202 Religious enthusiasm 
in psychological terms is yet another case of strengthening one’s 
overweaning conceit of oneself. In the Humean psychology, the gate 
leading towards the ‘frenzy’ that (the species of false religion called) 
enthusiasm requires is vanity and pride. To put briefly, religious enthusiasm 
is  one  form  of  swelling  pride,  and  superstition  is  reduced  into  its  direct  
opposite, which can be called melancholy or humility. But the precise 
terminology  in  this  particular  case  is  of  secondary  importance  for  Hume.  
What  is  of  importance  is  the  significance  of  pride  as  the  foundation  for  
human actions. 
 The picture that Hume leaves us with in this particular essay seems 
highly schematic, but this is because it has a separate function as well. The 
essay  was  topical  and  it  only  served  a  limited  purpose.  Together  with  the  
following (and later removed) ‘Of avarice’ it originally operated as a double 
essay in precisely the same manner as the “sibling essays” ‘Of Eloquence’ 
and ‘Of rise and progress’. It should be noted that certain ways of grouping 
essays is relevant in order to grasp Hume’s meaning. As the argument of the 
“sibling  essays”  is  meant  to  point  out,  the  certain  way  of  grouping  essays  
goes beyond the obvious case of four essays on philosophical sects (The 
Epicurean, The Stoic, The Platonist, The Sceptic). While ‘Of superstition’ 
turns  out  to  be  yet  another  analysis  of  self-liking,  ‘Of  Avarice’  solely  
concentrates on self-love. We will  turn back to this a little later.  Firstly we 
need to account how Hume operates with the division between self-love 
and self-liking in general in the political framework of Essays. 
 As we may see from Hume’s analysis of false religion, self-liking has a 
role in Hume’s treatment of almost any human phenomenon. This naturally 
applies to politics. According to him, ‘the humours and education of 
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particular  men’  play  no  actual  role  in  the  question  of  whether  a  state  is  
‘wisely’ or ‘weakly’ conducted. What makes the difference is ‘merely’ the 
‘forms and institutions’ by which the state is ‘regulated’.203 To ‘merely’ talk 
about forms and institutions is not a way of belittling the political system in 
any way, quite the contrary. Two foundational questions of political thought 
for Hume are: What are the institutions that enable us to turn human 
society into a peaceful and prosperous civil establishment and, how do 
these instruments relate to human nature? 204 The  questions  are  
interconnected. Both of them are derived from the conjectural history of 
civil  society,  which  Hume considers  in  Book 3  of  the  Treatise,  as  we  have  
already learned. What is crucial is the link to modern political framework. 
Politics  is  about  a  theory  in  practice.  This  is  one  reason  why  Hume  
continued his project of greatness of mind in Essays. 
 What  is  well  recognised  in  modern  scholarship  is  that  Hume  makes  
good use of the general principle of redirecting and countering passions.205 
A ‘Republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity’, Hume 
writes, ‘if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, 
had really no influence, and made it  not the interest,  even of bad men, to 
act for the public good’.206 The  stage  was  set  for  the  idea  of  turning  the  
passions  to  work  towards  the  common  good.  It  is  quite  obvious  that  the  
principle of redirecting and countering passions has significance for Hume. 
Yet, it is somewhat unclear what Hume thought that this actually means in 
practice. 
 We have already learned that the scheme of redirected passions needs 
the  long  evolution  of  justice  and  politeness,  but  in  addition,  how  is  the  
pragmatic  political  system  to  be  framed?  As  always,  Hume  keeps  the  
structure  as  simple  as  possible.  In  the  ambitiously  entitled  essay  ‘That  
politics  may  be  reduced  to  a  science’207,  Hume  writes  that  it  is  most  
important ‘to maintain’ those ‘forms and institutions, by which liberty is 
secured,  the  public  good  consulted,  and  the  avarice  or  ambition  of  
particular men restrained and punished’.208 The  emphasis  is  again  on  the  
‘forms and institutions’. In this particular passage, the liberty and public 
good are  trite  points  of  reference.  Instead,  Hume puts  a  strong  accent  on  
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the  last  part  of  the  sentence.  In  a  political  society,  it  is  the  passions  of  
avarice and ambition that cause all the trouble that needs to be strained. It is 
therefore such ‘forms and institutions’ that keep them under control that 
matter the most. 
 In the eighteenth century it was of course common to discuss ambition 
and avarice  together.  On the  surface  this  might  seem like  any  Hobbist  or  
even Machiavellian way of discussing a familiar topic.209 For Hume there is 
a clear philosophical distinction between these two. Philosophically, the 
question of how to cope with avarice and ambition is intriguing. By turning 
his focus on these two attributes, Hume sought to put the division between 
self-love and self-liking in the middle of his practical discussion on politics. 
When Hume writes  that  ‘every  man ought  to  be  supposed  a  knave’,  he  in  
fact emphasises the role of ‘several checks and controuls’ without 
elaborating what these checks and controls specifically are. It is particularly 
the ‘insatiable avarice and ambition’ of men that needs to be dealt with.210 
Avarice and ambition are directly derived from the distinction between self-
love and self-liking in the same manner as justice and politeness. However, 
to analyse them on their own terms has some added value. 
 In one sense, the Mandevillean idea of turning vices to public benefits 
applies  to  Hume’s  system.  And  what  is  of  importance  is  that  we  do  not  
make  the  mistake  of  operating  with  a  single  idea  of  self-love.  Again  we  
might want to turn to Enquiry concerning the principles of morals for  a  more  
careful wording. Of avarice and ambition, Hume points out that ‘vulgarly,  
though improperly’, ‘avarice, ambition, vanity’ – and in fact ‘all passions’ – 
are ‘comprized under the denomination of self-love’. This is improper since it 
misses the self-liking side of amour-propre. Avarice belongs within the 
dominion  of  self-love,  but  ambition  and  vanity  are  based  on  the  basic  
sphere of self-liking.211 With regard to the distinction between avarice and 
ambition this means that ‘interest and ambition’ may be considered 
counterparts in a similar manner as ‘friendship and enmity’ or ‘gratitude and 
revenge’.212 It is along these lines that the distinction between self-love and 
self-liking evolves into a distinction between useful and agreeable in Enquiry 
concerning the principles of morals.  
 What is ambition for Hume? One feature of ambition is our ‘desire to 
excel’. A pathological need to think that one is better than others is the seat 
of  politics,  and  ambition  is  always  linked  to  self-liking  in  Hume’s  prose.  
Beyond that, we may break the question down crudely into two different 
sides of ambition for Hume. These two sides are the question of reputation 
and  the  question  of  power.  It  needs  to  be  stressed  that  the  question  of  
power (as well as reputation) always arises from self-liking. In Book 2 of the 
Treatise,  even the question of physical strength is turned into a question of 
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self-liking.  ‘Strength  is  a  kind  of  power’,  Hume  writes,  ‘and  therefore  the  
desire to excel in strength is to be consider’d as an inferior species of 
ambition’.  On the  other  hand,  there  is  also  a  distinct  quality  in  power  (and 
ambition) itself. Self-liking in the form of a desire to excel is ever present, 
but the question of power can develop into a question of love of authority 
without regard to one’s reputation. If we follow Hume’s wordings of power 
in Book 2, we notice a strong emphasis put on the fact that ‘power or an 
authority over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires’.213 
Several  things  are  implied.  On  the  most  basic  level  this  indicates  that  the  
question of power is also linked to self-preservation. Authority helps us to 
satisfy  our  basic  needs.  More  interestingly,  with  regard  to  the  principle  of  
comparison, it means that the opinions of others still matter in the question 
of authority. ‘Considering the nature of ambition’ one issue is ‘that the great 
feel a double pleasure in authority from the comparison of their own 
condition with that of their slaves; and that this comparison has a double 
influence, because ’tis natural, and presented by the subject’.214 At the same 
time, it should be remarked that the question of power as authority is also a 
path towards solipsism – a direction where Hume did not want go.  
 In Essays, Hume uses the expression ‘love of dominion’.215 The ‘love of 
dominion’  can  be  discussed  in  its  own  terms.216 There  is  a  quality  in  
ambition that separates it from the question of reputation. In the essay ‘Of 
the independency of parliament’ (that opens with the famous discussion on 
avarice,  ambition  and  the  political  maxim  according  to  which  every  man  
must be supposed a knave), Hume claims that ‘so great is the natural 
ambition of men, that they are never satisfied with power; and if one order 
of  men,  by  pursuing  its  own  interest,  can  usurp  every  other  order,  it  will  
certainly  do  so,  and  render  itself,  as  far  as  possible,  absolute  and  
uncontroulable’.217 In  one  of  his  later  essays,  Hume  chose  to  use  such  
strong wording that claimed ‘power’ to be ‘the most coveted’ of ‘all human 
acquisitions’ and ‘in comparison of which even reputation and pleasure and 
riches are slighted’.218 It  seems that lust for power alone can be a cause of 
action according to David Hume. 
 When  we  consider  these  passages  in  the  context  of  other  attempts  to  
base moral and political philosophy around the concept of self-liking, they 
turn out to be nothing unusual. Pierre Nicole and Mandeville wrestled with 
these same issues. Hume comes closest to Mandeville’s concept of instinct 
of sovereignty when arguing against contract theories. ‘Our primary 
instincts’, Hume writes, ‘lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited 
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freedom, or to seek dominion over others’.219 This  Hobbist  twist  in  the  
questions of ambition, power and authority seems unavoidable. There is 
something irreducible in this instinctive quality that concerns human actions 
and  cannot  be  easily  explained  away.  As  was  pointed  out,  it  ought  to  be  
linked to Mandeville’s discussion on ‘instinct of sovereignty’, but also to 
Pierre Nicole, as it was earlier demonstrated. One possible classical 
reference point for instinct of sovereignty is Cicero’s ‘dominatus 
cupiditatem’ that translates into ‘desire of governing’ in the Tusculan 
disputations.220 
 Even when ‘love of dominion’ may develop into a pathological 
obsession, it is important to know that it usually does not. This instinctive, 
authority seeking side of ambition is balanced by our ‘desire of esteem and 
applause’.221 A more casual way for Hume to discuss ‘ambition’ is to talk of 
a ‘motive’ for man to ‘push him in his Attainments;  being certain, that he 
can  never  rise  to  any  Distinction  or  Eminence  in  the  World,  without  his  
own Industry’.222 We need  to  keep  in  mind that  one  of  the  crucial  points  
that Hume was trying to make in the Treatise is that pride, ambition and 
avarice – and in fact all the passions – are linked to the thoughts of others. 
It is with regard to this point that Hume stresses that ‘a perfect solitude is, 
perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer’.223 A ‘love of dominion’ 
might push someone to disregard the opinions of others in her search of 
authority,  but if  not balanced by care for one’s reputation, sooner or later 
this ambition starts bordering a mental disorder. 
 Perhaps the best example of Hume’s understanding of ambition 
ordinarily controlled by the care for one’s reputation comes from Essays, 
where he discusses the exceptional professional group of the clergy. Again, 
as  a  basic  principle  Hume  gives  the  fact  that  ‘most  men  have  an  
overweaning  conceit  of  themselves’.  In  other  words,  we  have  a  need  to  
excel. Therefore, logically, ‘most men are ambitious; but the ambition of 
other men may commonly be satisfied, by excelling in their particular 
profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society’. The ‘ambition 
of the clergy’ is different. It concerns ‘promoting ignorance and 
superstition’, which are a public nuisance. The logical link, or pattern, that 
Hume draws is helpful.224 Ambition  concerns  the  satisfaction  of  our  self-
liking. Since the view that we have of our own worth is always warped, we 
have almost a pathological need to excel. When we excel for example in a 
particular profession, this promotes the ‘interests of society’. Therefore, as 
Mandeville  might  have  agreed,  our  private  vice  (ambition)  turns  quite  
effortlessly into a public benefit. But there are many cases where more 
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direct political meddling is required. We need the right kind of political 
structure  concerning  both  ambition  and  avarice,  if  we  want  to  live  in  an  
enlightened  Europe.  This  is  the  political  message  that  Hume’s  project  of  
greatness of mind was designed to put forward. 
 In the Treatise,  Hume drew a  geometrical  line  from self-love  to  justice  
and property.  As we have already learned, we understand the point of this 
picture only when considered together with the parallel line from self-liking 
to politeness. Nothing changes in this respect in Essays and treatises.225 What 
we should not forget is that self-liking is effectively linked to the question of 
politeness. Ambition, as a desire to excel, makes no exception. Perhaps the 
easiest  way  to  grasp  this  is  to  consider  it  in  contrast  to  its  counterpart,  
avarice. While Hume applauds ambition, his attitude towards avarice 
borders hostility. We have learned that ambition through the desire to excel 
(in all its different cases) is inseparable from self-liking. Avarice is chained 
to  self-love  in  the  same  manner.  In  Essays,  Hume  gives  as  a  synonym  of  
avarice,  ‘the  desire  of  gain’.  ‘Avarice,  or  the  desire  of  gain’  is  to  be  
considered as ‘an universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, 
and upon all persons’.226 Avarice  is  also  the  very  epitome  of  self-love.  It  
concerns concrete, material things, which originally evolve from the 
concept of self-preservation. What particularly interests us here is the 
contrast between the ‘desire to excel’ and ‘desire of gain’ that is apparent for 
example in an essay entitled ‘Of avarice’.  
 What  needs  to  be  understood  is  that  Hume’s  treatment  of  avarice  
concerns ‘men of immense fortunes, without heirs, and on the very brink of 
the grave, who refuse themselves the most common necessities of life’ 
because they are possessed with the ‘desire of gain’.  This fits well  into the 
luxury debate of the early eighteenth century.227 A man hoarding riches, but 
unwilling to spend does not contribute to the commercial system and risks 
his part in the international state system (one could even imagine a parallel 
between  this  ‘avaritious  man’  and  a  mercantilist  state).  In  fact,  the  reason  
why Hume has such a negative attitude towards avarice is a general criticism 
towards the modern, commercial system that produces these men that have 
avarice as their ‘prevailing inclination’ (one can still imagine the parallel 
between man and state).  The  argument  that  unfolds  also  explains  Hume’s  
zeal  for  France.  There  is  a  solution  that  might  reap  the  benefits  of  both  
commerce and monarchical form of government, namely ‘civilized 
monarchies’.  
 For  us  to  understand  that  the  main  issue  for  Hume  is  not  the  luxury  
debate,  we  ought  to  turn  to  some  of  the  other  early  essays.  On  the  one  
hand, Hume naturally perceives that there is a positive side to avarice. As a 
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universal, ‘obstinate’ passion, it is a ‘spur to industry’.228 Avarice  is  one  
wheel that keeps civil society in motion. What we also need to understand is 
that  self-love  is  the  basis  of  this  passion.  One  description  of  avarice  that  
Hume gives in his second Enquiry is  that  it  is  ‘one  extreme  of  frugality’.  
Frugality, quite naturally, concerns how a person is willing to dispose of her 
possessions, a question concerning self-love. The extreme of avarice, ‘both 
deprives  a  man  of  all  use  of  his  riches,  and  checks  hospitality  and  every  
social enjoyment’. Here the link to self-preservation is inevitable, and we see 
the basic friction between self-love and ‘social enjoyment’.229 In the Treatise, 
Hume famously explains that ‘vanity’ should be considered ‘a bond of 
union among men’ and pride is a social passion.230 It is the core of 
hospitality and social enjoyment. Meanwhile, at a very basic level, self-love 
is  the  opposite,  as  the  concept  of  avarice  reveals.  What  this  means  is  that  
desire of gain drives men to solitude. Even in the worst case of misguided 
ambition social relations are apparent. But in the case of avarice, when the 
hoarding becomes an object in itself, reputation and opinion of others do 
not necessarily matter. As Hume pointed out, ‘none of the most furious 
excesses  of  love  and  ambition  are  in  any  respect  to  be  compared  to  the  
extremes of avarice’.231  
 Hume’s ambiguous attitude towards self-love and avarice as dominating 
passions is also revealed in the essay ‘Rise and progress’. ‘Desire of gain’ as 
a ‘universal passion’ is a driving force especially in ‘Holland’. The Dutch are 
for Hume the prime example of what is wrong with modern Europe. 
‘Multitudes of people, necessity and liberty, have’, quite right, ‘begotten 
commerce  in  Holland’,  but  at  the  same  time  ‘study  and  application  have  
scarcely produced any eminent writers’ among the Dutch.232 In his letters, 
Hume expounded his personal loath of the Dutch culture.233 It  was  the  
‘want  of  politeness’  that  made  Hume  quote  the  abusive  line  of  a  rustic  
person ‘civilized in Holland’.234 As we have already seen, this has everything to 
do with the role that the form of government plays in Hume’s political 
thought.  But  it  is  the  link  between  certain  passions  and  the  form  of  
government that makes this interesting. The Dutch are a prime example of 
a  republican  society  that  operates  based  on  the  ‘desire  of  gain’  instead  of  
refining the different forms of self-liking. The problem for Hume is not the 
form of government as such. It is the fact that the prevailing inclination in 
Holland is the ‘desire of gain’ instead of different forms of self-liking that 
refine the culture. This is the simple, foundational point that Hume makes. 
In the end, it is Hume’s loath of culture based on self-love that makes him 
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dismiss  the  Dutch.  And  avarice,  of  course,  is  the  cornerstone  of  this  
criticism. 
 We have learned that Hume turned even the question of false religion 
into a question of self-liking. Originally ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’ 
functioned as a double essay together with ‘Of avarice’ in the same way as 
the  pair  ‘Of  eloquence’  and  ‘Of  rise  and progress’.  While  one  function  of  
‘Of eloquence’ was to dismiss the republican arguments stressing the 
political significance of eloquence for modern European states, ‘Of rise and 
progress’ turned into a praise of French politeness, which was particularly 
denounced by the same authors that embraced eloquence and the ancient 
republican  parameters.  In  a  similar  manner,  ‘Of  superstition  and  
enthusiasm’ (that was placed right before ‘Of avarice’)  implicates that self-
liking is the natural foundation of many aspects of modern culture. And 
after this analysis, Hume turns to renounce self-love as a “false”, motivating 
passion  in  ‘Of  Avarice’.  The  pointed  argument  in  the  essay  on  avarice  
becomes clear after the overall significance of self-liking has been 
previously underlined in a separate essay. And it is the context of these two 
contrasted essays that enables us to understand what Hume means in the 
closing of the essay ‘Of the dignity or meanness of human nature’ (which 
came after ‘Of Avarice’). Hume writes, ‘vanity is so closely allied to virtue’ 
that  ‘to  love  the  glory  of  virtuous  deeds  is  a  sure  proof  of  the  love  of  
virtue’.235 Bernard Mandeville would have agreed with Hume, but Francis 
Hutcheson did not. 
 Hume’s  pragmatic  message  regarding  a  political  system is  simple.  As  a  
politician one ought to use the passions of men by employing the objects 
that satisfy them: avarice with riches, ambition with honours. In democratic 
and monarchical ‘forms of government, those who possess the supreme 
authority have the disposal of many honours’, which ‘excite the ambition’ 
and ‘advantages’ that in a parallel manner satisfy the ‘avarice of mankind’.236 
Hume also  expresses  this  is  by  proposing  two questions:  ‘Are the riches the 
chief object of your desires?’  or ‘Would you acquire  the public  esteem?’237 In practice, 
these questions naturally overlap. Riches acquire admiration and can raise 
someone’s self-esteem (they also naturally function in accordance with self-
preservation). Just in a similar vein, ambition usually seeks public esteem, 
which also entails power. Now, power can also be used to function in the 
direction of self-preservation and it always raises the self-esteem. The point 
is  that  these  two  basic  principles,  the  axiom  of  human  nature,  cannot  be  
accurately described. At the same time Hume reminds us that the objects of 
ambition and avarice vary from person to person. One man’s ambition is 
not the same as the other’s. Yet, the principles behind the particular objects 
are the same.  
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 We are starting to grasp the significance of discussing ‘passions of 
interest and ambition’ together.238 We should also still keep emphasising the 
direction in which this basic division of fundamental passions evolves. And 
this is the direction of culture in general and Hume’s later emphasis on the 
distinction between useful and agreeable. 
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Epilogue: Hume’s mature position  
on greatness of mind 
Artificial principles can make a compelling outward appearance of 
greatness. Artificial principles do not, however, guarantee strength of mind, 
Hume reminds his readers in Enquiry  concerning  the  principles  of  morals.1 
‘Strength of mind’ is ‘a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, 
in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage’.2 
Greatness of mind is mainly ‘a disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a 
man to rise in the world’.3 Hume’s point is that we ought not to think that 
even people with greatness of mind would have real strength of mind. This 
is one reason why we should not confuse Hume’s discussion on greatness 
of mind with the common usage of magnanimity from Aristotle onwards. 
The point becomes evident when we consider Hume’s treatment of the 
ancient ‘heroes in philosophy’, those who are often thought to have 
accomplished ‘undisturbed philosophical tranquillity’. In Enquiry concerning 
the principles of morals,  the ancient heroes of philosophy are put at the same 
level with the Scythians ‘scalping their enemies’.4 Stoicism is proved to be 
just another ‘branch’ of self-denial, which in essence is ‘extravagant and 
supernatural’ and not different from the feverish courage of the ancients.5  
 Throughout  his  oeuvre  Hume  raises  the  objection  that  self-rule  is  a  
futile topic in politics. For example, in an ironic description of the Stoics in 
Essays, Hume remarks that when ‘we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we 
are philosophers’ and ‘when we have reduced these rules to practice, we are 
sages’.6 What is left unsaid, and what makes this ironic,  is that according to 
Hume, self-rule rarely applies to real life and the part of putting the rules of 
conduct into practice falls within the sphere of politics. As Hume famously 
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declares,  in  politics  ‘every  man  ought  to  be  supposed  a  knave’.7 What  is  
required hence is a political structure based on a realistic, almost cynical, 
understanding of human nature, quite the opposite of the society of Zeno’s 
sages. The basic principle of any political system, according to Hume, is the 
assumption  that  people  remain  just  as  foolish  as  they  would  without  the  
right ‘forms and institutions’. It does not mean that we need to assume that 
everyone necessarily is a knave. But it does mean that to talk about self-rule 
as a political principle is a waste of time.8 Hume’s overall point is that 
people do not cultivate such attributes as ‘philosophical tranquillity’ in 
‘modern  times’  as  part  of  their  character.9 Instead,  the  ‘administration  of  
government’ has had its influence and ‘a degree of humanity, clemency, 
order’  and  real  ‘tranquillity’  has  been  distributed  even  among  the  vulgar  
together  with  justice  and  politeness.  To  Hume,  this  was  a  true  
‘compensation’.10  
 But  what  this  also  means  is  that  even  the  modern  ‘greatness  of  mind’  
should  not  be  too  much  applauded  as  a  quality  of  a  particular  individual.  
The most mature presentation of the subject is included in Enquiry concerning 
the principles of morals. In the Treatise, the partly ironic treatment of Alexander, 
the Macedonian madman, as an epic illustration of greatness, is only 
implied. In Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, Hume consciously reveals 
the  shallowness  of  greatness  of  mind.  The  ‘supernatural  courage  of  
Alexander’,  that  Hume  also  referred  to  in  Enquiry concerning human 
understanding, was based upon extraordinary degree of pride.11  
 The ambiguous character of greatness of mind becomes apparent, when 
we consider how Hume’s own attitude towards the relationship between 
natural and artificial virtues changes from the Treatise to Enquiry.  In  the  
Treatise,  Hume  treated  natural  affection  and  other  natural  virtues  more  or  
less indifferently. As we have seen, their principal function was to reveal our 
confined generosity, which in a way conflicts with artificial virtues that 
enable a civil society to function. This is unsurprising, because Hume’s 
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objective  was  to  make  a  point  about  the  neglected  importance  of  artificial  
virtues. A clear change in Enquiry concerning the principles of morals is that Hume 
now treats natural virtues in a more positive light, even when he still points 
out that ‘we are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends’ even when 
we ‘are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable 
conduct’.12 In Enquiry, Hume does not discuss the difference between 
natural  and  artificial  as  a  direct  contrast  (which  is  still  implied  however).  
Also, he is no longer discussing de facto natural  virtues,  but  uses  the  term  
social  (and softer) virtues.  Justice is still  presented as coarse (in section 3),  
but instead of stressing the partial role of natural virtues, Hume now turns 
to imply that the real significance of the social virtues (which they are now 
also  called)  is  that  they  function  as  a  balancing  force  to  the  greatness  of  
mind. Nevertheless, as Hume himself points out, his ‘present business’ was 
not ‘to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true 
colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues’. His concern had much 
to do with ‘being eminent’, a central feature of greatness of mind.13  
 An original development in Hume’s moral and political philosophy 
when turning from Treatise to Enquiry is his emphasis on the conceptual pair 
of useful and agreeable.14 Hume engages in this subject early on in Enquiry 
concerning the principles of morals and in fact some of the earlier essays already 
reveal Hume’s interest in the topic. Hume started off his project of 
greatness of mind with the Mandevillean conceptual pair of self-love and 
self-liking. Through a subtle analysis of interest and pride Hume drew the 
moral institutions of justice and politeness from this foundation by focusing 
his attention on the direct connection between human nature and moral 
institutions. In his political essays, Hume elaborated on the same 
foundation with his analysis on avarice and ambition and how they relate to 
the practical side of politics. The final step expanding this discussion was to 
introduce a broadly cultural distinction implied in the division of useful and 
agreeable. 
 Hume  divided  the  section  of  ‘greatness  of  mind’  of  the  Treatise into 
sections  7  and  8  of  Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.  These  two  
sections are the only ones discussing agreeable qualities of human nature. 
As Hume in the Dialogue sums up, his concern has been the ‘four sources 
of moral sentiment’, which are ‘the useful or the agreeable qualities; to those 
which regard self, or those which extend to society’. Since two of the four 
qualities fall within the sphere of self-liking, we may point out that the 
project  of  greatness  of  mind  bears  significant  relevance  to  all  of  Hume’s  
philosophical works. But still, we ought to stress the enthusiasm that Hume 
puts  to  his  analysis  of  politeness,  which  only  refined  over  time.  The  first  
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paragraph of the section 8, ‘Of qualities agreeable to others’, is Hume at his 
very  best  and  we  ought  to  close  this  thesis  with  a  full  quote  of  it,  which  
summarises the importance of the distinction between self-love and self-
liking for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy: 
As  the  mutual  shocks,  in  society, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have 
constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice; in order to preserve the 
advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like manner, the eternal 
contrarieties, in company, of men’s pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of 
GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of 
minds, and an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a 
mutual deference is affected: Contempt of others disguised: Authority concealed: 
Attention given to each in his turn: And an easy stream of conversation maintained, 
without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without 
any airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately agreeable to 
others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: They 
conciliate affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person, 
who regulates his behaviour by them.15  
The argument of politeness in the Treatise is  fully  retained  and  even  
enhanced in Enquiry  concerning  the  principles  of  morals.  But  now,  when  this  is  
presented as the epitome of agreeableness, it implies that the role of 
politeness is even further amplified. In the end, even when Hume’s position 
became more mature, nothing really changed. It was the question of self-
liking and politeness that dominated his moral and political thinking from 
the beginning to the end. 
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